IN RE: R.D.A., A Minor Child [APPEAL BY DAVID A. ALDRIDGE]
No. 98306
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
March 14, 2013
2013-Ohio-935
BEFORE: Keough, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Jones, J.
JUDGMENT: REVERSED. Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. SU 11704912.
David A. Aldridge
4753 Autumn Lane
Brooklyn, Ohio 44144
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Christopher McMonagle
Assistant County Prosecutor
C.J.F.S.
P.O. Box 93923
Cleveland, Ohio 44101
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
I. Background
{¶2} On March 14, 2011, Aldridge‘s ex-wife, Hilda L. Aldridge, filed a notice of registration pursuant to
{¶3} Aldridge filed a response contesting the validity and enforcement of the support order pursuant to
{¶5} Aldridge presented three exhibits at the hearing. Exhibit A, consisting of several pages from an Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation document, demonstrated that Aldridge was working in Ohio on October 10, 1990 when he was injured on the job. Exhibit B, a “Certification of Incarceration” from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, demonstrated that Aldridge, Inmate No. A240-249, was incarcerated in the state of Ohio from August 1, 1991 through November 15, 2002. Exhibit C consisted of affidavits from Matthew A. Aldridge, Michael V. Aldridge, and Annmarie Paolino, Aldridge‘s siblings, all of whom averred that (1) Aldridge moved from California to Ohio on November 9, 1989, (2) Aldridge never lived at their parents’ residence at 4080 Pedley Road, #24, Riverside, California, and (3) Aldridge‘s ex-wife knew that Aldridge never lived at the Pedley Road address, was living in Ohio shortly before he was incarcerated, and was incarcerated in Ohio from August 1991 until November 2002.
{¶6} Aldridge testified that he never received notice of the divorce proceedings and was not aware that his wife had filed for divorce; he said he learned about the divorce
{¶7} At the close of the hearing, the magistrate told the parties that “service probably was not good on the father when the divorce happened,” but instructed the parties to brief the issue of what Aldridge‘s obligations relating to the child support order were once he learned of the order.
{¶8} In his brief, Aldridge argued that the California judgment could not be enforced because he was never properly served. In its brief, the State conceded that Aldridge had not been properly served:
The evidence from the previously held hearing establishes that at the time of the divorce, service was attempted on the respondent at an address that later turned out to be his parents’ address. The respondent was incarcerated in Ohio at the time, and service was not attempted at the prison. It seems clear that service on the respondent was not actually obtained at the time of the divorce decree and child support order. (Emphasis added.)
Nevertheless, the State argued that Aldridge had waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction because after he was released from prison and learned of the support order, he did nothing to challenge it.
{¶10} Aldridge filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision. The trial court overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate‘s decision that confirmed registration of the support order for enforcement.
II. Analysis
{¶11} In his first and second assignments of error, Aldridge contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the magistrate‘s decision and in confirming the support order for enforcement in Ohio because the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over him when it entered the order. We agree.
{¶12} The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA“), codified in Ohio at
{¶13} To be entitled to registration and enforcement, the foreign judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties. In re Donovan Kilburn, 2d Dist. No. 20993, 2006-Ohio-991, ¶ 14, citing Emig v. Massau, 140 Ohio App.3d 119, 123, 746 N.E.2d 707 (10th Dist.2000).
{¶14} “It is axiomatic that for a court to acquire jurisdiction there must be proper service of summons or an entry of appearance, and a judgment rendered without proper service or entry of appearance is a nullity and void.” Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader, 165 Ohio St. 61, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956); see also Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 366-367, 2000-Ohio-452, 721 N.E.2d 40 (2000) (a judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction over a defendant is void ab initio); Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Williams, 8th Dist. No. 93658, 2010-Ohio-1672, ¶ 13.
{¶15} Here, it is abundantly clear that Aldridge met his burden of demonstrating that the Los Angeles County Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him when it entered the support order. The evidence at the hearing clearly demonstrated that Aldridge was incarcerated in Ohio when the complaint for dissolution was served in California at an address where he never resided. As both the magistrate and the State conceded, Aldridge was never properly served in the California matter.
{¶16} Moreover, the evidence is clear that Aldridge never voluntarily submitted to the California court‘s jurisdiction. He never filed a responsive pleading in the matter, nor engaged in any other action that indicated his actual or constructive knowledge of the
{¶17} We are astounded by the State‘s assertion that Aldridge somehow waived the lack of personal jurisdiction because he contacted authorities in California to discuss the support order after he learned of its issuance but otherwise made no effort to challenge it prior to disputing the registration and enforcement action. It is axiomatic that a party‘s actions subsequent to the entry of a void judgment against that party cannot waive the trial court‘s lack of personal jurisdiction over that party. Furthermore, the State‘s contention that a trial court may enter a void judgment against a party who was never properly served, and that the party is then bound by the void judgment unless he actively contests the judgment, is contrary to the most basic principles of due process in our judicial system.
{¶18} Because Aldridge was never properly served in the California matter and did not waive insufficiency of process, the Los Angeles County Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment against him. The support order is therefore void and cannot be registered nor enforced in Ohio. The first and second assignments of error are sustained.
{¶19} In his third assignment of error, Aldridge asserts that the support order cannot be registered nor enforced in Ohio because it was obtained by fraud.
{¶20} The trial court‘s judgment overruling Aldridge‘s objections to the magistrate‘s decision and ordering the support order registered for enforcement in Ohio is reversed.
It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee his costs herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR