In re R.B.
Judgments Appealed From Are: Vacated
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 16, 2019
Jоseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Ohio,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Julie Kahrs Nessler, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Apрellant R.B.
{¶1} R.B. has appealed the judgments of the juvenile court continuing his classification as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant under Ohio’s version of the Adam Walsh Act. We vacate the judgments of the juvenile court continuing R.B.’s Tier I classification, because we hold that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to enter an order continuing R.B.’s Tier I classification after he had turned 21 and his disposition, by its own terms, had ended.
I. Procedural Background
{¶2} On October 14, 2011, R.B. admitted in juvenile court to acts which if committed by an adult would have constituted two counts of gross sexual imposition, felonies of the fourth degree. R.B., who was 14 when he committed the acts, admitted to placing his penis into the mouths of his two four-year-old cousins. The magistrate entered an order in both cases stating that the parties agreed that “this is a Tier I offense.” On December 2, 2011, R.B. was committed to the Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) until age 21. The commitment was suspended, and he was placed on probation and ordered to complete the residential treatment program at Altercrest.
{¶3} At a hearing on January 13, 2012, the magistrate stated on the record that the parties had agreed that R.B. would be classified as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant, and the parties agreed with the magistrate’s statement on the record. The same day, the magistrate issued a decision in each case, which erroneоusly stated in the body that R.B. was a Tier III sex offender, but at the end of each entry is typed “THIS IS A TIER I CLASSIFICATION—NOT TIER III.” The entries contain the
{¶4} On February 6, 2013, R.B.’s Altercrest placement was terminated. The juvenile court entered an order on July 29, 2013, releasing R.B. from official probation and placing him on nonreporting probation with monitored time. On September 3, 2014, the magistrate denied R.B.’s application to seal the record and noted that he was required to register until 2022 unless reclassified.
{¶5} The state filed a motion to set a completion-of-disposition hearing on October 24, 2016. R.B. objected on the basis that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to hold a completion-of-disposition hearing. R.B. argued that his end-of-disposition hearing under
{¶6} On July 20, 2017, R.B. turned 21 years of age. The juvenile court held a hearing on R.B.’s objections on September 19, 2017. On October 30, 2017, the juvenile court denied R.B.’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decisions continuing R.B.’s Tier I classification. R.B. has appealed.
II. Analysis
Did the juvenile court have jurisdiction to enter an order continuing R.B.’s Tier I classification аfter he turned 21 and his disposition, by its own terms, had ended? Be prepared to discuss the impact, if any, of State v. Amos, 2017-Ohio-8448, 87 N.E.3d 1305 (1st Dist.), on this issue.
{¶8} We answer the question raised by this court in the negative and hold that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to enter an order cоntinuing R.B.’s Tier I classification after he turned 21 and his disposition, by its own terms, had ended.
{¶9}
Juvenile [offender registrants] are afforded two classification hearings. First, under
R.C. 2152.83 , a juvenile is afforded a tier-classification hearing either as part of the child’s disposition or, if the child is committed to a secure facility, when the child is released. Second, underR.C. 2152.84 , when a child completes all aspects of the disposition, including probation and any ordered treatment, the trial court “shall conduct a hearing” to consider the risk of reoffending so that thе trial court can determine whether the order to register as a sex offender should be continued or terminated. Further, at the reclassification hearing, the trial court must determine whether the specific tier classifiсation in which the child has been placed is proper and if it should be continued or modified.
{¶11} In State v. Schulze, 2016-Ohio-470, 59 N.E.3d 673 (1st Dist.), the juvenile court had correctly entered an initial classification order under Megan’s Law, former R.C. Chapter 2950, but had erroneously held Schulze’s completion-of-disposition hearing and entered the reclassification order under the Adam Walsh Act, rendering the order void. We held that the juvenile court had not properly completed the stаtutorily-required process for classifying Schulze as a juvenile-offender registrant, and that the initial classification order was not “revived or still in effect.” Therefore, there was no valid order in place requiring Schulze to register. We stated, “In order to complete the process of classifying a juvenile as a sex-offender registrant, the juvenile court was required to hold an end-of-disposition hearing.” Id. at ¶ 8.
The juvenile court loses its jurisdiction over a juvenile who has completed his parole or community control and has been discharged by the court. Because the juvenile court did not hold a hearing before Amos was discharged from parole, completing his disposition for his sexually-oriented offense, the juvenile court did not properly complete the statutorily-required process for classifying him as a juvenile-offender registrant, and thus, it had no authority to classify Amos as a Tier I offender. Therefore, Amos has no duty to register as a sex offender.
Id. at ¶ 14. Wе noted that when Amos had been discharged from parole by the juvenile court he had “completed all aspects of the disposition” for his sexually-oriented offense. We held that at that time, the juvenile court should hаve held a completion-of-disposition hearing under
Because the juvenile court lacks statutory authority to classify Jean-Baptiste after he was released and the court’s delinquency adjudication has been fully satisfied, we agree with Jean-Baptiste’s first propоsition of law as applied to this case and hold that the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to classify Jean-Baptiste who is now no longer a “child” under the applicable statute.
Id. at ¶ 32. The Supreme Court noted that Jean-Baptiste was “in accord” with its decision in In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183, 774 N.E.2d 258, in which the court held that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to reimpose a suspended commitment to a DYS facility after the juvenile had been released from probation, because “the completion of probation signals the end of the court’s jurisdiction over a delinquent juvenile.” In re Cross at ¶ 28. “When the court ended Cross’s probation, it ended its ability to make further dispositions as to Cross on that delinquency cоunt.” Id.
{¶14} In the instant case, R.B.’s disposition was commitment to DYS until age 21, although that commitment was suspended. R.B. turned 21 on July 20, 2017. At that time, his disposition, by its own terms, was completed. The juvenile court held a hearing on R.B.’s objections to the magistrate’s decision on September 19,
{¶15} We note that our holding in this case in no way impacts our opinion in State v. Buttery, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160609, 2017-Ohio-9113, in which we upheld R.B.’s adult conviсtion for failing to register, because that conviction was based on the initial Tier I classification imposed at his disposition, which was still in effect at that time. We pointed out in that case that the record did not reflect that R.B. had had his completion-of-disposition hearing.
{¶16} R.B.’s assignments of error are made moot by our disposition in this case. The juvenile court’s judgments continuing R.B.’s classification as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant are hereby vacated.
Judgments vacated.
MOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.