616 F.2d 523 | C.C.P.A. | 1980
This is an appeal from a decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“board”),
Background
According to the application to register,
The only issue before the board was the correctness of the examiner’s refusal to register under section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act on the ground that the mark as applied to the stated services is merely descriptive thereof.
*525 In the instant case, applicant is claiming use of the mark “QUIK-PRINT” for printing and duplication, which falls within the general category of “printing” [See: “The Random House College Dictionary”]. Thus, the question is what meaning, if any, does the term “QUIKPRINT” invoke as to these services. There is no doubt but that “QUIKPRINT” is the equivalent of “QUICK-PRINT” and would be readily recognized as such, the word “QUICK” obviously would be equated with fast and promptly and when used with the word “PRINT” would immediately convey to customers that applicant’s printing or duplication services will be rendered or completed in a short time or quickly. And since the “SAME-DAY SERVICE” offered by applicant through its advertising material emphasizes this quick service and attempts thereby to capitalize on it, it is obvious this is a desirable service and a desirable aspect of applicant’s services that is conveyed to applicant’s customers and potential customers by the term “QUIK-PRINT”. Thus, “QUIKPRINT” is equated with “FAST-PRINT” and therefore constitutes a term that others in the trade should be free to utilize in describing the speed in which they render their services. The aptness or desirability of the use of this term is demonstrated by the some twenty users of the same or a similar mark in connection with similar services noted by applicant in its application. Applicant has attempted to denigrate such use by urging that such use, as in its case, merely reflects a suggestive use of the term. However, it is believed that the widespread use of the term “QUIK-PRINT” throughout the United States by others including a number in the same state tends to establish that the term has lost whatever suggestiveness it may have possessed and has taken on and projects a descriptive significance of quick or fast printing services to the general public. .
The board further said that a registration on the supplemental register of QUIK PRINT,
OPINION
A mark is merely descriptive
Appellant argues that although the words “quick” and “print” used individually are well-known, mundane words useful to the trade, the term QUIK-PRINT is a fanciful and distinctive term not ordinarily usable in the trade to describe any quality, characteristic, or ingredient of the service; that, at most, the mark suggests to the
We do not agree. One of the services provided by appellant is printing. Clearly the term “QUIK”
The decision of the board is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
. Reported at 203 USPQ 624 (1979).
. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) provides:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register account of its nature unless it—
(e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when applied to the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them . . ..
Section 3 (15 U.S.C. § 1053) provides for registration of service marks, subject to applicable provisions relating to the registration of trademarks.
. Serial No. 41,964, filed January 17, 1975.
. The registration states that is is under section 2(f) (of the Lanham Act).
. The examiner correctly pointed out that affirmance on this ground of refusal would moot a concurrent use proceeding.
. Supplemental Registration No. 908,296, for QUIK PRINT and arrow design for the service of reproducing documents and forms, also owned by Quik Print, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas.
. In this context, “merely” is considered to mean “only:” In re Colonial Stores, 55 CCPA 1049, 1053, 394 F.2d 549, 552, 157 USPQ 382, 385 (1968).
. Appellant relies heavily on In re Kopy Kat, Inc., 498 F.2d 1379, 182 USPQ 372 (CCPA 1974) (WE PR1NT-IT IN A MIN-IT, held to be highly suggestive of printing services). However it is well established that each case involving a trademark (or service mark) stands on its own facts, and prior decisions are of little value. Star Watch Case Co. v. Gebruder Junghans, A. G. 46 CCPA 929, 267 F.2d 950, 122 USPQ 370 (1959). Thus, contrary to appellant’s argument, whether or not others in the trade use QUIK-PRINT or its equivalent in a service-mark sense is not dispositive.
. There is no legally significant difference here between “quik” and “quick.”