ORDER
On Mаrch 22, 1988, and May 10, 1988, the court held hearings on a motion to dismiss filed by Colwell Financial Corporation, Colwell Mortgage Corporation, Ben Milam Savings Association, and Mercury Savings Association (“Colwell”). Colwell subsequently filed a motion to convert this case to a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Colwell contends that the debtor Virgil Pulliam (“Pulliam”) is not eligible to be a debtor under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code because at the time he filed his Chapter 13 petition, he owed more than $100,000 in noncontingent, liquidated unsecured debts. Colwеll and Pul-liam were represented by counsel at the hearings. The court now concludes that Colwell’s motion to dismiss/convert must be granted. Pulliam will be given an opportunity to decide whether he wants this case dismissed or converted to another chapter of the Code. This memorandum opinion and order contains the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Bankruptcy Rules 7052 and 9014.
Facts
Colwell provided the financing for 484 condominium units. In 1984 Pulliam executed 484 guaranty contracts in which he agreed to guarantee repayment of the aрproximately $19,000,000 in promissory notes. The borrowers defaulted on April 17, 1986, and Pulliam filed his Chapter 13 petition on June 11, 1986. Pulliam contends that he did not know that the borrowers had defaulted until he received a letter dated July 14, 1986, from Colwell’s attorneys. In November 1986 Colwell foreclosed on its security interests. In December 1986 Colwell filed a proof of claim in which it states that Pulliam is liable to them “in an amount as yet undetermined.” In its December 16, 1986, motion to dismiss, Col-well contends that Pulliam owes it approximately $9,000,000. On April 6, 1987, Col-well filed an amended proof of claim for $10,689,392.50.
Colwell contends that Pulliam’s unsecured debts exceeded the $100,000 limit contained in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) at the time Pulliam filed his petition because Pulliam’s obligations under the guaranty agreements were fully matured, noncontingent, and liquidated on that date. Pulliam contends that he is entitled to be a Chapter 13 debtor because Colwell’s claims were contingent and unliquidated at the time he filed his petition. He contends that the claims were contingent because Colwell had not demanded payment from him before he filed his petition. He contends that the claims were contingent because Colwell had not demanded payment from him before he *243 filed his petition. He also alleges that Col-well’s claims should not be counted because he listed these claims as “disputed.” According to Pulliam, he listed these claims as disputed becаuse his guarantees were obtained “through fraud, misrepresentations, coercion, and duress” and because the collateral securing Colwell’s notes were worth more than the indebtedness. Finally, Pul-liam contends that the claims were unliqui-dated because they are disputed and because Colwell characterized its claims as undetermined in its proof of claim.
DISCUSSION:
An individual may not be a debtor under Chapter 13 if his noncontingent, liquidated unsecured debts exceed $100,000 on the date he filed his petition. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e);
Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Pearson (In re Pearson),
A. Contingent Debts.
A debt is contingent if the debtor’s liability depends upon an extrinsic event.
Fostvedt v. Dow (In re Fostvedt),
A guaranty of collection, which is also known as a conditional guaranty, enables the creditor to seek payment from the guarantor only after the occurrence of some condition “such as the condition that the creditor has unsuccessfully and with reasonable diligence sought to collect the debt from the principal debtor.”
The parties did not present the guaranty agreements at the March 22 hearing. Pursuant to this court’s request, the parties submitted one of the guaranty agreements which they stipulate is identical to the re *244 maining guaranty agreements. This document shows that the guaranties were absolute and unconditional. Although the agreement provided that Pulliam did not have to cure a default until 5 days after he received notice from Cоlwell, this notice serves merely as a request for payment and is not a prerequisite to Pulliam’s liability. Pulliam’s liability arose immediately upon the primary obligors’ defaults. Thus, the guaranties were not contingent.
B. Liquidated Debts.
A debt is liquidated if the amount due and the date on which it was due are fixed or сertain, or when they are ascertainable by reference to (1) an agreement or (2) to a simple mathematical formula.
Flaherty,
C. Disputed Debts.
The general rule is that disputed debts should be included in the § 109(e) debt calculations.
In re Hutchens,
The Code defines a debt as a “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11);
In re Michaelsen,
The court in
In re Burgat,
The
Lambert
and
Burgat
analyses are based on erroneous definitions of the terms “claim” and “debt.” Congress intended for the terms claim and debt tо be coextensive.
Energy Cooperative, Inc. v. SOCAP International, Ltd. (In re Energy Cooperative, Inc.),
The Supreme Court has noted that Congress intended for the term claim to be used in its broadest sense.
Ohio v. Kovacs,
The Code states that a creditor has a claim if he has a right to pаyment even if this right to payment is “liquidated, unliq-uidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, [and] undisputed.” 11 U.S. C. § 101(4). When Congress wanted to limit this broad definition of a claim, it did so by modifying the term with these adjectives.
See
11 U.S.C. §§ 303(b), 502(c)(1), 702(a)(1). As the Supreme Court in
Kovacs
stated “Congress desired a broad definition of a ‘claim’ and knew how to limit the
*246
application ... when it desired to do so.”
The
Lambert
court also incorrectly concluded that a good faith dispute makes a debt unliquidated. “Liquidation ... refers to certainty as to the money value of the [debt].”
Albano,
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that debts based on tort and quantum me-ruit claims are generally unliquidated until resolved by judicial dеcree or otherwise because the plaintiffs damages are not fixed.
Denham v. Shellman Grain Elevator, Inc.,
Because Pulliam’s noncontingent, liquidated unsecured debts exceeded $100,000 on the date he filed his Chapter 13 petition, he may not be a debtor under Chapter 13. Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to convert is GRANTED. Because debtor has a right to dismiss or convert under § 1307, Virgil Pulliam has 10 days from the date this order is entered to inform the court whether he wants this case dismissed or converted to another chapter of the Code. If Pulliam does not file a timely response, the court will convert this case to Chapter 7.