18 Kan. 72 | Kan. | 1877
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Motions to dissolve certain injunctions were argued before Hon. W. P. Campbell, district judge of the
Winfield, Cowley County,Kansas, June 26,1876.
Hon. W. P. Campbell — Dear Sir: Mr. Hackney this evening informed me that he had received a letter from you stating that you had overruled the motions to dissolve those injunctions. I can hardly believe that such is the fact, for it is directly contrary to every principle of law governing injunctions, and everybody knows it, I believe. Consequently we send herewith orders dissolving said injunctions. But if you have concluded to overrule said motions, as Hackney says, you will please allow our exceptions to each and every of your rulings, and allow us time to make and file our case in supreme court, which we will do as quickly as it can be done; for it is our desire that no such decisions or orders shall stand unreversed in any court we practice in. Also, fix terms for staying orders. Yours respectfully,
Pryob, Kager & Pryob.
The judge on the receipt of this letter construed it as a contempt — issued his warrant for the arrest of the writer, and after a hearing adjudged him guilty of contempt, fined him fifty dollars therefor, and suspended him from practice in the courts of that district until the fine should be paid. And the question presented for our consideration is, whether this ruling and order of the judge shall be set aside, or permitted to stand. It appears from other testimony in the case, as well as from the intimations in the letter, that no orders had actually been signed. Notice of his conclusions had simply been given by the judge, and the attorneys requested to prepare the formal order. The matter was therefore still pending before him.
Upon this we remark in the first place, that the language of this letter is very insulting. To say to a judge that a certain ruling which he has made is contrary to every principle of law, and that everybody knows it, is certainly a most
“There is nothing in Mr. Pryor’s letter to Judge Campbell that is insulting, contemptuous, or even the least disrespectful. Mr. Pryor simply tells the judge, in a plain, matter-of-fact way, that he has committed an error of law in his decision, if such decision is as has been represented to him, and in that event requests that his exceptions thereto may be allowed, to the end that he may have an opportunity of presenting the matter to the supreme court for .review. There is no reflection upon the motives of the judge in rendering such decision; or imputation upon his integrity; nothing in fact to which, in the light of reason and fairness, any possible intention of contempt can be attached. In the warrant issued for the arrest of Mr. Pryor, the judge states that the letter was written for the purpose of ‘insulting, abusing, and intimidating’ him. There is nothing insulting in the letter — unless it is an insult to this judge for an attorney to disagree with him upon a question of law; nothing abusive about it, unless it is the unpardonable temerity of the expressions that evidence the dissent on the part of the attorney from the exposition of the law by the judge; nothing about it calculated to ‘intimidate,’ unless it is the statement that the disputed question will be referred to the supreme court for review.”
We cannot concur in this construction of the letter. It is not merely an assertion of a difference of opinion, but a charge that he has decided in a way that he as well as everybody else knew to be wrong. To say to a judge that his ruling is contrary to every principle of law, may be simply a reflection upon his intelligence; but to couple with it an assertion that everybody knows it, is clearly an imputation upon his integrity. How can a judge be honest, and yet decide contrary to that which he as well as all others knows to be the law ?
We remark secondly, that an attorney is .under special obligations to be considerate and respectful in his conduct and communications to a judge. He is an officer® of the court, and it is therefore his duty to uphold its honor and dignity. Certain privileges attach to him by reason of such official position. He may in the trial of cases use language concerning witnesses, and parties, and all matters and things in issue,
We remark again, that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that, in every case where a judge decides for one party, he decides against another; and ofttimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment therefore is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than bitter feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge therefore ought to be patient, and tolerant of everything which appears but the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed of such outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence. On the other hand, a little thing which is properly unnoticed once, may by its repetition require notice and punishment. It is but a little matter to whisper a
We remark finally, that while from the very nature of things the power of a court to punish for contempt is a vast power, and one which in the hands of a corrupt or unworthy judge may be used tyrannically and unjustly, yet protection to individuals lies in the publicity of all judicial proceedings, and the appeal which may be made to the legislature
The conclusion then to which we have come is, that the order of the district judge must be affirmed. It perhaps should be added that in the long answer made by the appellant to the order to show cause why he should not be punished, he tenders no apology, and expresses no regret for the language used, but insists upon his right to use it. Order affirmed.