229 Conn. 691 | Conn. | 1994
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the sixty day time limitation for conducting a hearing in probable cause that is mandated by General Statutes § 54-46a
The procedural history relevant to this appeal is as follows. On August 4, 1993, a police referral summary was filed in Juvenile Matters stating that the juvenile,
Execution of the transfer order was automatically stayed for twenty days pursuant to Practice Book § 4046,
The juvenile’s motion to vacate the transfer order did not seek to relitigate the evidentiary grounds for the transfer order. He alleged, instead, that he could no longer be tried for murder because of the state’s failure to hold a § 54-46a hearing in probable cause within sixty days of the filing of the police referral or the initiation of delinquency proceedings against him. Relying on the reasoning in State v. Torres, 206 Conn. 346, 359-61, 538 A.2d 185 (1988), he maintained that, in the absence of a timely finding of probable cause, the trial court was required to retransfer his case from the regular criminal docket to the juvenile docket of the Superior Court. The trial court rejected this argument.
On appeal, the juvenile reiterates the procedural argument that he advanced in the trial court. The state responds that the procedural requirements of § 54-46a do not apply to an action for the adjudication of delinquency of a child, even when that action is based on the intentional killing of another person. According to the state, the sixty day provision of § 54-46a is triggered only by the filing of an information on the regular criminal docket.
It is undisputed that the juvenile “has a constitutional right not to be tried [for murder] without probable cause being found according to the procedures set forth in General Statutes § 54-46a . . . .” State v. Ramos, 201 Conn. 598, 602-603, 519 A.2d 9 (1986); State v. Haye, 214 Conn. 476, 481, 572 A.2d 974 (1990); State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 329-30, 512 A.2d 140 (1986).
Despite the enactment of General Statutes § 51-164s in 1978, merging the Juvenile Court and the Superior Court, “the legislature has preserved a separate system for the disposition of cases involving juveniles accused of wrongdoing.” State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323,
“The General Assembly . . . has expressed a preference for shielding children from criminal liability except in clearly circumscribed situations.” State v. Torres, supra, 206 Conn. 360. Thus, it is only upon the effectuation of a transfer to the regular criminal docket pursuant to §§ 46b-126 or 46b-127 that a child may stand trial and be sentenced, if convicted, as if he were an adult. Our juvenile justice statutes mandate a preliminary hearing in probable cause, delineate the narrow circumstances under which a child shall be transferred, and set forth the procedures to govern such hearings.
This unambiguous statutory framework counsels against interpolating into our juvenile justice system a single statute from the laws governing adult criminal procedures. The legislature has expressed no such intention. In reviewing the statutes governing the transfer of juveniles to the regular criminal docket, we have recognized that the probable cause hearing mandated by § 54-46a is afforded a child after his case has been transferred to the regular criminal docket. See In re Ralph M., 211 Conn. 289, 307, 559 A.2d 179 (1989); State v. Kelley, supra, 206 Conn. 326-27. We expressly reaffirm this view.
Section 54-46a was enacted as part of title 54 of the general statutes, which governs criminal procedure. In re Jose M., 30 Conn. App. 381, 392, 620 A.2d 804, cert. denied, 225 Conn. 921, 625 A.2d 821 (1993). The statute provides that “[n]o person charged by the state . . . shall be put to plea or held to trial for any crime punishable by death or life imprisonment unless the court at a preliminary hearing determines there is probable cause to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that the accused person has committed it,” which hearing “shall be conducted within sixty days of the filing of the complaint or information in superior court” unless “extended by the court for good cause shown.” General Statutes § 54-46a. The language
To rebut this plain reading of the applicable statutes, the juvenile urges us to read the term “complaint” in § 54-46a broadly to include a police referral or a delinquency petition initiating an action in Juvenile Matters. We are unpersuaded that so broad a reading of “complaint” is warranted.
The phrase “complaint or information” in § 54-46a (b) mirrors the express language of General Statutes § 54-46
The meaning of the term “complaint” in § 54-46a (b) is not illuminated by the reference to “complaint” in General Statutes § 46b-128. That statute provides that “[wjhenever the superior court is in receipt of any written complaint filed by any person . . . maintaining that a child’s conduct constitutes delinquency within the meaning of section 46b-120, it shall make a preliminary investigation to determine whether the facts, if true, would be sufficient to be a juvenile matter and whether the interests of the public or the child require that further action be taken. . . .” (Emphasis added.) It is not likely that a complaint “filed by any person” is the statutory equivalent of a crime “charged by the state,” as § 54-46a requires. Furthermore, taken to its logical conclusion, construing § 54-46a to incorporate the language of § 46b-128 would require a probable cause hearing for any grievance alleging commission of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment on the part of a child referred to Juvenile Matters. Such a construction is inconsistent with the legislature’s express intent to circumscribe narrowly the circumstances under which a child may face criminal prosecution. State v. Torres, supra, 206 Conn. 360.
Finally, we turn to the juvenile’s contention that § 54-46a was triggered immediately by the initiation of juvenile proceedings because § 46b-127 makes a transfer to the regular criminal docket “mandatory”
A delinquency petition does not charge a child with having committed a “crime” and does not expose a child to punishment “by death or life imprisonment.” Even though a “serious juvenile offense” charges the commission of an act in violation of § 53a-54a, thus relating the offense to a violation of a criminal statute; General Statutes § 46b-120;
The fact that § 46b-127 is “mandatory” after its specific prerequisites have been met; see footnote 2;
The juvenile’s interpretation of § 54-46a would undermine the legislature’s intent, in providing a separate forum for juveniles, to protect the special interests that are presumed to be involved when the actor is a child. See State v. Torres, supra, 206 Conn. 360-61. It would contravene the purposes of both statutes to impose the procedural requirements of § 54-46a contemporaneously with the requirements established by § 46b-127 for the adjudication of a juvenile matter.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court correctly denied the juvenile’s motion to vacate the transfer. The requirements of § 54-46a had not yet come into play because the juvenile’s transfer to the regular criminal docket had not yet been effectuated, and no information had as yet been filed against the juvenile formally charging him with the crime of murder.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 54-46a provides in relevant part: “probable cause HEARING FOR PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIMES PUNISHABLE BY DEATH OR life imprisonment, (a) No person charged by the state . . . shall be put to plea or held to trial for any crime punishable by death or life imprisonment unless the court at a preliminary hearing determines there is probable cause to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that the accused person has committed it. . . .
“(b) Unless waived by the accused person or extended by the court for good cause shown, such preliminary hearing shall be conducted within sixty days of the filing of the complaint or information in superior court. . . .”
General Statutes § 46b-127 (formerly § 51-308) provides: “mandatory TRANSFER OF CHILD CHARGED WITH CERTAIN FELONIES TO REGULAR CRIMI
The juvenile does not dispute the trial court’s factual findings made pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-127 after the hearing on the motion to transfer. Rather, he focuses solely on the ground for the denial of the motion to vacate the transfer. We deem this denial a final order relating to the transfer of the juvenile to the regular criminal docket as contemplated by § 46b-127 and thus a final order for purposes of appeal.
General Statutes § 46b-120 (formerly § 51-301) provides in relevant part: “definitions. The terms used in this chapter shall, in its interpretation and in the interpretation of other statutes, be defined as follows: ‘Child’ means any person under sixteen years of age ... a child may be found ‘delinquent’ (1) who has violated any federal or state law or municipal or local ordinance .... ‘Serious juvenile offense’ means the violation by a child, including attempt or conspiracy to violate sections . . . 53a-54a to 53a-57, inclusive . . . 53a-101 . . . .”
General Statutes 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “murder, (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person . . . .”
The delinquency petition also charged the juvenile with the serious juvenile offenses of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, and burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101, and the delinquent act of carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of General Statutes § 53-206 (a).
Practice Book § 4046 provides in relevant part: “In all actions, except where otherwise provided by statute or other law, proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment shall be automatically stayed until the time to take an appeal has expired; if an appeal is filed, such proceedings shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause; and, if the case goes to judgment on appeal, until ten days after the decision is announced; but if the judge who tried the case is of the opinion that an extension to appeal is sought or the appeal is taken only for delay or that the due administration of justice so requires that a judge may at any time, upon motion and
It is undisputed that the finding of probable cause made by the trial court was done in the context of a transfer hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-127. Because we agree with the state that General Statutes § 54-46a is inapplicable to proceedings in Juvenile Matters, we need not address its alternative claim that the requirements of § 54-46a were met by the § 46b-127 transfer hearing.
See footnote 5 regarding automatic stay of judgment pending appeal.
Enacted in the 1983 legislative session, “[t]he purpose of [General Statutes] § 54-46a was to institute the procedures necessary to implement article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article seventeen of the amendments to the Connecticut constitution, which had been certified by the secretary of the state as adopted by the voters during the prior year. See State v. Sanabria, 192 Conn. 671, 677-78, 474 A.2d 760 (1984). That amendment eliminated the grand jury indictment as the required means for holding a person for a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment and replaced it with a probable cause hearing.” State v. Kane, 218 Conn. 151, 157, 588 A.2d 179 (1991). The amendment was “an attempt to correct [the] perceived inequities of the grand jury system and to provide expanded protections to an accused charged with a serious crime [by providing for] an open and adversarial probable cause hearing.” State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 328-29; see footnote 1.
General Statutes § 46b-145 provides that “[ri]o child shall be prosecuted for an offense before the superior court, nor shall the adjudication of such court that a child is delinquent in any case be deemed a conviction of crime except as provided in sections 46b-126 and 46b-127.”
See footnote 2.
See, e.g., General Statutes § 46b-124 (anonymity); General Statutes § 46b-122 (confidential proceedings); and General Statutes § 46b-146 (erasure of police and court records).
General Statutes § 54-46 provides in relevant part: “PROSECUTION ON complaint or information. For all crimes charged by the state on or after May 26,1983, the prosecution may be by complaint or information. ...”
Practice Book § 616 provides: “All felonies shall be prosecuted by information. All misdemeanors, violations, and infractions shall be prosecuted by information or complaint. In all jury cases, and in all other cases on written request of the defendant, the prosecuting authority as of course shall issue an information in place of the uniform summons and complaint.”
The juvenile also contends that the state improperly failed to seek an extension of time to conduct the probable cause hearing as prescribed by General Statutes § 54-46a. This claim is similarly premised on a conflation of the distinct procedural steps involved in the transfer of a child to the regular criminal docket. Because we conclude that § 54-46a is not triggered until effectuation of the transfer, we need not address this claim further.
See footnote 4.
We need not decide the issue, raised during argument before this court, of whether General Statutes § 46b-127 is mandatory only on the motion by the state to transfer a juvenile to the regular criminal docket, thus leaving some discretion with the state as to whether, in the case of murder, a transfer to the regular criminal docket is appropriate.