148 N.Y.S. 18 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1914
When Jane Dickie, as executor, offered the will of Horton for probate in the county of Westchester, showing that Horton left realty and personalty in said county and alleging that he was a resident therein, Alice Horton, who was cited as wife, appeared, objected to the probate and answered that she and Horton had intermarried in 1912; that the will offered was not the last will • of Horton, forasmuch as it was made in 1902 and he had made another will in 1913. She set forth a copy of the latter and of its attestation clause. And she answered further that Horton when he died was a resident of Ohio; that the said will was duly probated in a probate court of that State and that she had been appointed and was the executoi thereof. The latter will is not only contrary to but contradictory of the earlier will, and expressly revokes and annuls all former wills. On the hearing, Jane Dickie produced testimony and prayed for probate. Alice Horton produced an exemplified copy of the will of 1913 and record of the probate thereof in the probate court of Ohio. Jane Dickie and others of similar interest objected that the said probate court of Ohio had no jurisdiction of the heirs of Horton who resided in New Y ork, and insisted that they were not bound by the proceedings in the Ohio court. The objection was sustained under exception. An exemplified copy of the will and of the probate thereof were marked for identification. The learned surrogate ruled: “ So far as this exemplified copy. I am satisfied these people
This controversy is not altogether like unto one between living litigants with an issue of original rights of meum and tuum. For here the rights in dispute are in the property of another, derivative from his disposition to be effective after his death. And the State has covenanted with the dead that it will see to it that his disposition shall prevail. The paramount consideration of the courts is to maintain this covenant. The learned Surrogate’s Court was apprised, and we are apprised in this case by pleading and by contention serious and substantial, that this testator left a will executed in 1913, and that thereby he specifically revoked and annulled all previous wills. It is the last utterance of the testator that is heeded, for this power of testamentation is ambulatory, I think that there should be every opportunity to establish such will in. this proceeding. The learned surrogate commendably continued the proceedings. It was not to be expected that he should prolong continuance indefinitely. But the important consideration is, not whether the contestant did, but whether the contestant could have presented a will which as pleaded revoked the earlier will. (Decedent Estate Law [Consol. Laws, chap. 13; Laws of 1909, chap. 18], § 34.) I have suggested considerations which take this kind of case out of the category of litigations wherein courts must decree to the swift and to the vigilant according to the procedure prescribed. If it be the fact that the final will, at least final as to the will of 1902, of this testator exist, but was filed, and now remains in another State, and yet such will, if before this surrogate or this court, may overthrow the will of 1902,1 think that a commission should be issued to take proof of the later will. In such case the commissioner is considered as an officer of the court, and the production of the will before him would be held to be before the court in the person of the commissioner. If, as the result of such procedure, the alleged will is proved in this Surrogate’s Court, then the Surrogate’s Court can proceed
This practice is supported by Spratt v. Syms (104 App. Div. 232), Russell v. Hartt (87 N. Y. 19), Matter of Delaplaine (45 Hun, 225) and Matter of Cameron (47 App. Div. 120; affd., 166 N. Y. 610). I think that our disposition of this case is within our powers in appeals from the Surrogates’ Courts. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2586, 2587. See, too, Redfield’s Law & Practice of Surrogates’ Courts [7th ed.], §§ 1144, 1145; Jessup’s Surrogate Practice [4th ed.], 196-219; Heaton’s Surrogates’ Courts, §§ 1242, 1243.)
The decree should be reversed, without costs, and proceedings remitted to the Surrogate’s Court of Westchester county, to be continued in accord with this opinion.
Burr, Carr, Stapleton and Putnam, JJ., concurred.
Decree of the Surrogate’s Court of Westchester county reversed, without costs, and proceedings remitted to said court to be continued in accord with opinion.