In Re Protest of Init. Petitions Proposing
{¶ 2} First, thе Secretary contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to intervene.
{¶ 3} Second, the Secretary argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to change venue. Once the Secretary is party to an action under R.C. Title 35, the trial court must grant his motion to change venue if, as in this case, there are cases pending in more than one jurisdiction that involve the same or similar issues. Thus, the trial court erred by not granting his motion.
{¶ 4} For thеse reasons, the trial court's decision is reversed. The Secretary's motion to intervene is granted and this case is transferred to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in accordance with
{¶ 6} The Harrison County Prosecutor filed a petition to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of certain initiative part-petitions in the Harrison County Court of Common Pleas. The Secretary filed a motion to intervene in his official capacity and requested that the trial court transfer the case to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Rothenberg also moved to intervene, and opposed the Secretary's motion. The trial court granted Rothenberg's motion and denied the Secretary's motions. It concluded that the Secretary did not have an unconditional statutory right to intervene under
{¶ 7} The Secretary timely appealed this decision and the trial court stayed a scheduled hearing on the merits pending this appeal. We have expedited this appeal on the Secretary's motion.
{¶ 9} "The trial court erred in overruling Appellant's motion to intervene."
{¶ 10} The trial court denied the Secretary's motion to intervene because he failed to prove that he had thе mandatory right to intervene under either
{¶ 12} The proper way to raise an issue regarding whether a public official is acting ethically is by filing a complaint with the Ohiо Ethics Commission. It is the body which "shall receive and may initiate complaints against" public officials who violate their ethical duties.
{¶ 13} The statutes governing the ethical duties of Ohio's elected officials appear to give the Ethics Commission, not the courts, the authority to investigate violations of those ethical duties. Those statutes do not give the courts the ability to prevent those public officials from discharging their statutory duties because an opposing party argues that the discharge of those duties may result in an ethical violation. We render no opinion about whether there is an ethical conflict in this case. Instead, we hold that the trial court should not prevent the Secretary from discharging his official duties by intervening in a civil action merely because doing so may create a conflict of interest. Rothenberg's argument to the contrary is meritless.
{¶ 15} According to
{¶ 16} "An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, involving process, pleadings, and ending in a judgment or decreе, by which a party prosecutes another for the redress of a legal wrong, enforcement of a legal right, or the punishment of a public offense."
{¶ 17} Rothenberg's argument on appeal that the Civil Rules are inapplicable in their entirety is meritless.
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{¶ 22} The Secretary argues that
{¶ 23} Since
{¶ 24} The trial court denied the Secretary's motion to intervene in this case for two reasons. First, it denied the Secretary's motion to intervene because he does not routinely participate in actions arising from rulings by local boards of election. It saw no reason to distinguish this case from the other situations in which the Secretary had not asked to intervene. This is an unreasonable basis for denying the motion to intervene.
{¶ 25} The Secretary is the public official who is charged with supervising all elections in the State of Ohio. He appoints the members of the various local boards of election, issues instructions by directives and advisories to the members of those boards, prepares rules and instructions for the conduct of elections, and compels observance with the elections laws.
{¶ 26} Contrary to Rothenberg's arguments, these statutes do not contemplate that the Secretary is a passive participant in cases involving elections issues. Rather, they indicate that the Secretary should be actively involved in ensuring compliance with election laws and allow him to facilitate judicial economy by transferring all related cases from the various county courts to Franklin County so various cases can be litigated as one.
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{¶ 28} The trial court also denied the Secretary's motion because not allowing him to participate "does not materially affect the exercise of [his] duties." But this conclusion ignores the fact that the legislature has given the Secretary the ability to intervene in elections cases precisely because some cases will involve statewide issues. The trial court's rationale means that the Secretary should not be allowed to intervene in any action. This plainly contradicts the purpose behind
{¶ 29} Rothenberg arguеs the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to intervene since the Secretary's intervention in the action and the subsequent transfer of the action to Franklin County would significantly delay the proceedings. After the Secretary becomes a party to a proceeding under
{¶ 30} This argument may have merit if the protest solely challenged the actual signatures on the ballots. But Rothenberg's protest does not do this. Rather, his challenges are more general. Rothenberg argues that some words are not capitalized when they should be. He contends that the petitions do not say that the solicitor witnessed every signature. These objections are about form rather than substance. Franklin County courts can deal with objections about form as easily as Harrison County courts.
{¶ 31} At oral argument, Rothenberg contended that the logistical difficulties in consolidating dozens of cases into Franklin County are so great that the wheels of justice would be frozen. But we have no evidence of this and we find it hard to believe that it would be any easier for the parties to litigate this matter in dozens of counties. The logistical difficulties in a statewide protest to a statewide initiative are inherent in the nature of the project. The legislature provided a means to limit many of these difficulties by consolidating the various cases in Franklin County. There is no basis to question the legislature's policy decision in this regard.
{¶ 32} For these reasons, we conclude that the triаl court erred when it denied the Secretary's motion to intervene. Appellant's first assignment of error is meritorious.
{¶ 34} "The trial court erred in refusing to transfer the case to the Franklin County Common Pleas Court."
{¶ 35} The Secretary asks us to review the trial court's decision denying his motion to intervene even though the trial court could not have granted that motion since it did not make him a party to the suit. If the trial court had any discrеtion in this matter, we would remand this case to the trial court so it could rule on the motion to change venue. But since transfer is mandated by statute in this case and the parties have asked that we deal with this matter expeditiously, we will rule on the merits of this argument.
{¶ 36} As the Secretary points out,
{¶ 37} Rothenberg argues this statute does not apply since a more specific statute,
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{¶ 39} The trial court did not grant the motion to change venue because it did not allow the Secretary to intervene. Given our conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing that intervention, we must grant the motion to change venue. Appellant's second assignment of error is also meritorious.
{¶ 40} Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. The Secretary's motion to intervene is granted and this case is transferred to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in accordance with
Waite, P.J., concurs.
Vukovich, J., concurs.