In Re Poulin
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Kenison
Juvenile court proceedings in this state are protective and not penal and are designed to rehabilitate minors rather than punish them for the commission of crimes.
State
v.
Lefebvre,
91 N. H. 382;
Petition of Morin,
95 N. H. 518, 520. The
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statute requires that juvenile delinquency proceedings be heard “in an informal manner.”
There is no express provision in the juvenile court law which explicitly allows or prohibits the presence of counsel in juvenile proceedings. The pertinent part of
The right to notice and an opportunity to be heard in special proceedings of a civil nature is generally considered to be a basic essential of most judicial proceedings.
DiPietro
v.
Lavigne,
98 N. H. 294, 295. It is not to be assumed that a statute denies notice and hearing in the ordinary case. A concomitant of an opportunity to be heard in support of or in defense of a claim is the right to the assistance of counsel.
Shioutakon
v.
District of Columbia,
236 F. (2d) 666. Inasmuch as a finding of juvenile delinquency may result in the child’s commitment for the period of his minority, it is quite evident that this may be of serious concern to the child as well as his parents. The custodial rights of parents may be affected. The matters considered may lead to imposition of penalties upon the parents.
The worthwhile objectives of the juvenile courts can be accomplished without prohibiting the child or the parent from obtaining *460 the assistance of counsel. Rubin, Protecting the Child in the Juvenile Court, 43 J. Crim. L. 425 (1952). It is significant that the right to counsel in juvenile courts has been emphasized by those most interested in the advancement and improvement of juvenile courts. See “Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing with Children,” pp. 56, 58 (1954), a publication prepared by Children’s Bureau, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, in cooperation with National Probation and Parole Association and National Council of Juvenile Court Judges.
Some cases have indicated that the right to counsel in a juvenile court proceeding is a constitutional requirement under the federal Constitution. In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224; 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1000. We find it unnecessary to decide the present case on constitutional grounds since we believe the answer can be found in the statute itself.
We find nothing inconsistent with the right to counsel on the one hand and the laudable objectives of the juvenile court law on the other. Both the child and the parents are entitled to a fair hearing in the juvenile court even though it may not have all the procedural safeguards such as trial by jury and a public trial that would be accorded in the usual- prosecution of an adult for a crime.
People
v.
Lewis,
260 N. Y. 171. It is noted that the interstate compact on juveniles passed by the Legislature in 1955 specifically provides that there shall be notice to the juvenile delinquent and that he shall have the right to counsel. RSA ch. 169-A; Laws 1955,
c.
121. We find nothing in the juvenile court law to indicate that the Legislature intended to deprive minors or their parents of the right to counsel and think that the phrase in
The objection to the jurisdiction of the court is conceded by
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counsel to be a secondary point. It is true that the minor and his mother were residents of Massachusetts but the court properly denied the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The act of delinquency was committed in this state. Both the minor and his parent appeared in this state. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is not limited to those who reside or have their domicile in this state but applies to any neglected or delinquent child found within the state.
Remanded.
Lampron, J., concurred in the result; the others concurred.