In Re Platt
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This contested matter came before me for hearing on the chapter 7 trustee’s (“Trustee”) objection to the exemption claimed by the debtors, Jason Ronald Platt and Pamela Kay Platt (the “Platts”), in funds on deposit in their bank account on the petition date, that they alleged were deposited wages. At the hearing (the “Hearing”) on November 13, 2001, after listening to arguments from the parties, I ruled orally in favor of the Platts but took the matter under advisement to write on the legal issue submitted.
Facts
The facts in this matter are not in dispute. When the Platts filed their chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on July 2, 2001, they had $6,870.31 on deposit in their bank account, which consisted entirely of deposits of “disposable earnings,” as that term is defined under Oregon Revised Statutes (“ORS”) section 23.175. All of said funds on deposit were directly traceable to wages of Mr. Platt. The Platts have claimed an exemption in 75% of said funds, or $5,152.73 (the “Fund”), under
Legal Discussion
The issue before me is whether the Platts may use the exemption provided for in
Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may exempt from property of the bankrupt estate any property that is exempt under applicable state law.
See In re Osworth,
The Platts claim that the Fund is exempt under
“(1) All funds exempt from execution and other process under ORS...23.185(1)...(d) and (e)...shall remain exempt when deposited in an account of a judgment debtor as long as the exempt funds are identifiable.
“(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any accumulation of funds greater than $7,500.”
Under Oregon law, statutory analysis begins with an examination of the text and context of the subject statute. On this first level of analysis, the best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute itself. “Also at the first level of analysis, the court considers the context of the statutory provision at issue, which includes other provisions of the same statute and other, related statutes.”
Portland General Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor and Indus.,
“The significance ofORS 23.166 to us is that it is an unambiguous exemption that appears to say that earnings protected from garnishment are also exempt. Moreover, it provides for continuation of such exempt status once the funds are in a deposit account. The connection betweenORS 23.166 andORS 23.185 that is inherent in the phrase ‘remain exempt’ represents a context in which the garnishment limitation also functions as an exemption that would apply in bankruptcy per Section 522(b)(2). And it bespeaks legislative intent to treat earnings limitations on garnishment as exemptions.” Id. at 449.
As stated in
In re Chlebowski,
While the
Robinson
decision did not directly determine the issue as to whether funds traceable to wages are exempt upon deposit in the debtor’s bank account, it reflects a clear understanding of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that a debtor could claim an exemption in wages under
The language of
In addition, in order to insure that the exemption provisions of
In
The Trustee argues that the operation of the
As a legal matter, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel effectively rejected the Trustee’s position in the
Robinson
case, when it determined, consistent with prior Oregon bankruptcy court decisions, that
I am mindful of the Trustee’s concern that more debtors now will claim exemptions in funds in their bank accounts, as such funds typically are traceable to wages. Potentially, such claims could reduce the estate assets available for distribution to creditors. However, I cannot ignore the provisions of Oregon exemption law to alleviate that concern. I find that by its terms and in its context in the Oregon statutory exemption scheme,
This Memorandum Opinion constitutes my findings of fact and conclusions of law, which will not be stated separately. The Court will enter an order consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The preamble to subsection 1 of