D.H., the foster mother, appeals from an order of the trial court returning custody of fraternal twins, Phi. W. аnd Phy. W. to T.W., their natural mother. She contends that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the natural mother’s motion for reunification; and (2) the trial court failed to apply the “bеst interest of the child” standard in granting the reunification order returning the children to their natural mother. T.W., thе natural mother, urges that D.H., the foster mother, has no standing to bring this appeal. After first resolving the standing issue in favor of D.H., we affirm the order which is the subject of this appeal.
The twins were bom prematurely on December 16, 1992, at Howard University Hospital. At birth, they tested HIV positive and were addicted to bоth cocaine and heroin. In June 1993, they were transferred from Howard University Hospital to the Hospital for Sick Children (“HSC”). At present, it appears the twins are no longer HIV positive or drug addicted.
In May 1993, the District of Columbia filed a neglect petition. Based on a stipulation by the natural mother (whо was then incarcerated) the twins were adjudicated neglected and placed in the custody of the Department of Human Services (“D.H.S.”).
STANDING
The natural mother argues that the foster mother lacks standing to bring this appeal. She аsserts that there is no statutory or constitutionally protected interest which would be the basis of such standing. We conclude that where the foster parent has been granted “party status” by the trial court in the proceeding in that court, the foster parent has standing to challenge an ordеr in those proceedings (which is otherwise appealable) by an appeal to this court.
D.C.Code § 16-2304(b)(3) (1997 Repl.) specifically authorizes the trial court to designate a foster pаrent as a party. Here, since the twins had been living with the foster mother more than twelve months, the trial court was authorized to grant party status to her. It did so. The trial court’s subsequent order granting the natural mother’s motion for reunification deprived D.H. of the twins. She was thus a “party aggrieved.”
This court has jurisdiction to hear appeals by a “party aggrieved” by certain orders of the trial court. D.C.Code § ll-721(b) (1995 Repl.). The reunification order in this case falls within our jurisdiction. See In re S.C.M.,
CLAIMS OF ERROR
D.H.’s claims of error need not tarry us long. Here, Judge Satterfield had presided over these proceedings for two years or so. As such, he was entitled to rely on the prior record of this casе during further review. This includes the approximately twenty review hearings Judge Satterfield conducted during this рeriod. We find no error in the denial of an evidentiary hearing. See
Likewise, we find no merit in D.H.’s contention thаt the trial court applied some legal standard other than “the best interest of the child.” See In re D.I.S.,
The order appealed from is
Affirmed.
Notes
. P.M., the natural father (who has been incarcerated during most of these рroceedings), has at all relevant times been represented by counsel. He supports thе reunification order.
. D.C.Code § 16 — 2304(b)(3), in relevant part, reads:
(3) If the child has been living with a person other than the parent, the persоn shall receive notice of the neglect or the termination proceedings and, if the сhild has been with them for twelve (12) months or more, the person may, upon his or her request, be designatеd a party to the proceedings. If the child has been living with the person less than twelve (12) months, upon the person’s request the judge may, at his or her discretion, designate the person a party to the procedings [proceedings] which pertain to the determination of neglect as defined in D.C.Code, section 16-2301.
.Having decided that D.H. has a statutory right to appeal as a "party aggrieved," we need not determine whether a constitutional interest also gives her standing. However, see Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,