In re Philwin
Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York City (Raymond Vallejo of counsel), for petitioner.
Jed M.D. Philwin, respondent pro se.
Per Curiam.
Respondent Jed Matthew David Philwin was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Third Judicial Department on February 11, 1993. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.
By superseding information, respondent, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit immigration fraud, a felony, in violation of
Based on the foregoing, the superseding information alleged that respondent and others violated
The Departmental Disciplinary Committee (Committee) petitions this Court for an order pursuant to
An attorney convicted of a felony, as defined by
When the out-of-jurisdiction statute pursuant to which an attorney stands convicted is facially analogous to a statute in this state, whose violation also constitutes a felony, the statutes are essentially similar and disbarment pursuant to
When the out-of-jurisdiction felony has no facially similar analog in this state, essential similarity may nevertheless be established by looking beyond the elements and wording of the out-of-jurisdiction felony and to respondent‘s conduct in the commission of the out-of-jurisdiction crime (Matter of Weiss at 206; Matter of Sorin at 3-4; Matter of Amsterdam at 96; Matter of Hug at 128-129; Matter of Harnisch at 59; Matter of Mercado at 55-56; Matter of Kim at 130). Then, the relevant issue is whether, irrespective of the language of the out-of-jurisdiction statute, respondent‘s conduct underlying the out-of-jurisdiction conviction constitutes a felony in this state under our
Here, as we previously held, the federal felony of conspiracy to commit immigration fraud is facially analogous to this state‘s crime of offering false instrument for filing in the first degree and therefore these statutes are essentially similar (Matter of David, 102 AD3d 23, 25 [1st Dept 2012]; Matter of Ramirez, 7 AD3d 52, 53 [1st Dept 2004]; Matter of Porges, 297 AD2d 1, 3 [1st Dept 2002]). Specifically, pursuant to
“knowingly makes under oath, or as permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, or knowingly presents any such application, affidavit, or other document which contains any such false statement or which fails to contain any reasonable basis in law or fact.”
Furthermore, a person commits fraud under
“knowing that a written instrument contains a false statement or false information, and with intent to defraud the state or any political subdivision, public authority or public benefit corporation of the state, he [or she] offers or presents it to a public office, public servant, public authority or public benefit corporation with the knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or otherwise become a part of the records of such public office, public servant, public authority or public benefit corporation.”
Based on the foregoing, a person commits conspiracy to commit immigration fraud (
Moreover, even if the foregoing statutes were facially dissimilar, insofar as respondent, at his plea allocution, stated that he submitted immigration forms to the government knowing that they contained false information, he submitted a written instrument with knowledge that it contained “a false statement or false information, and with intent to defraud the state or any political subdivision” (
Because as the federal felony charge of conspiracy to commit immigration fraud is essentially similar to the New York felony of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, respondent was automatically disbarred upon conviction (
Accordingly, the Committee‘s petition is granted, and respondent‘s name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York, nunc pro tunc, to January 3, 2013, the date of his conviction.
Gonzalez, P.J., Saxe, Moskowitz, Manzanet-Daniels and Román, JJ., concur.
Respondent disbarred, and has name stricken from the rolls of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York, nunc pro tunc to January 3, 2013.