In Re Phillips
DECISION GRANTING UNITED STATES TRUSTEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS BUT ALLOWING TIME FOR DEBTOR TO CONVERT TO CHAPTER 13
The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
In its motion to dismiss, the United States Trustee (“UST”) questions calculations on Official Form 22A, also known as the “means test form,”
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that was filed by Debtor Janice E. Phillips (“Debtor”) with her petition and schedules. More specifically, the UST asserts that it was improper for the Debtor to take deductions for payment of mortgages and taxes on a house that was surrendered by the Debtor prior to her bankruptcy filing. If the deductions are eliminated from the calculation of disposable income on the means test form, the UST asserts that a presumption of abuse would arise under
Alternatively, the UST asserts that the Debtor’s Chapter 7 filing constitutes an abuse under the “totality of the circumstances” test pursuant to
Following a hearing held by the court on April 15, 2009, the court reviewed the parties’ arguments and testimony as well as the filed documents. As explained in the decision below, the court concludes that the language of
FINDINGS OF FACT
On October 17, 2008, the Debtor, a single woman in her mid-fifties with no dependents, filed her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and schedules. The Debtor scheduled secured debts totaling $115,928 and unsecured debts of $71,378. The debts are primarily consumer in nature and amount. The Debtor also filed her means test form indicating that she had income that was above the median income for a household of one in the State of Ohio. The form included a calculation of monthly disposable income 2 that, when multiplied by 60 was more than $6,575, but less than $10,950 and also was less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the nonpriority unsecured claims. Accordingly, the Debtor checked a box on the form noting that the “presumption of abuse” did not arise in her case.
At the time of her bankruptcy filing, the Debtor scheduled an ownership interest in real property located at 2013 Pittsfield Street in Kettering, Ohio where she had lived since 1994. She vacated the house and surrendered it to the mortgage company in May of 2008, prior to the bankruptcy filing. The last mortgage payment she made was in April or May of 2008. However, the Debtor remained contractually obligated to make the payments on the mortgage note. 3
Although the Debtor vacated and surrendered the property prior to her bankruptcy filing, she took deductions related to the property on the means test form. On Line 42(a), the Debtor listed $780 as her average monthly payment on her first mortgage on the Pittsfield property. On Line 42(b), the Debtor listed an additional $320 per month for a second mortgage owed to the same mortgage holder. 4 On Line 43, the Debtor listed $14 for past due payments owed to the Montgomery County Treasurer for real estate taxes on the Pittsfield property.
The UST takes the position that it is inappropriate for the Debtor to take deductions for expenses related to a parcel of property surrendered prior to the bank
In addition to the deductions related to the surrendered property, Mr. Van Bramer pointed out an error on the Debtor’s means test form respecting health care expenses. Mr. Van Bramer noted a potential doubling of the Debtor’s health care expenses through the deductions on Line 19B (a standard deduction for health care), Line 34(c) (a deduction for amounts placed in a health care savings account), and Line 31 (a deduction for out-of-pocket expenses beyond those deducted on Line 34(c) and Line 19B). The Debtor’s testimony supported Mr. Van Bramer’s observation. She testified that her out-of-pocket expenses beyond those paid through the health care savings account were approximately $50 per month and, therefore, were not in excess of the standard deduction for health care on Line 19B. Consequently, the Debtor’s deduction on Line 31 should be reduced from $43 to $0 leading to a corresponding increase in monthly disposable income on the means test form.
Alternatively, the UST submits that the Debtor’s Chapter 7 case is an abuse pursuant to the
With respect to her retirement contributions, the Debtor testified that the $313.08 she pays into the CSRS is mandatory. As long as she retires with thirty years of service and at age 55, two requirements she has already met, she will receive a yearly amount from the CSRS matching 56% of her salary. Each year that she continues to work, there will be a corresponding 2% increase in the percentage of salary that she will receive upon retirement.
Unlike the contributions the Debtor pays into the CSRS, the $357.78 that she pays in monthly contributions to her TSP retirement account is voluntary. Presently, she has saved approximately $39,000 in her TSP account and hopes to retire within five years.
At the hearing, Mr. Van Bramer testified that if the Debtor stopped the monthly TSP contributions and repayment of her TSP loans, the Debtor would have approximately $794.00 in monthly disposable income with which to pay creditors. However, the Debtor noted that if she stopped payment on her TSP loans, there would be a ten percent (10%) penalty and the balance of the loans would become taxable income.
With respect to the Debtor’s expenses listed on Schedule J, the UST did not question the accuracy of most of them nor did the UST feel that her budget was unreasonable. Nonetheless, the Debtor did admit that her health care expense, stated as $100 per month in excess of the funds paid out of her health care savings account, was probably $50 too high. The Debtor further testified that some of her expenses were expected to increase in the near future. The Debtor believes that she will need to replace her only vehicle, a 1998 Chevrolet Blazer with approximately 105,000 miles. In addition, the Debtor’s apartment lease expires soon and she expects the rent to increase upon renewal.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Bankruptcy Code
A. The Means Test and Presumption of Abuse Pursuant to
Significant to the UST’s first argument is how a debtor’s allowed deductions or monthly expenses are to be calculated on the means test form to determine whether the presumption of abuse arises.
As is often the case with provisions added by BAPCPA, this provision is ambiguous and courts have understandably come to differing conclusions as to whether it allows debtors to deduct monthly payments towards secured debt when the collateral has been or is to be surrendered in the bankruptcy case.
See In re Norwood-Hill,
There is case law that conversely supports disallowing means test deductions for secured debt payments on surrendered property. These courts take a “future oriented” approach to expenses, focus on the debtor’s statement of intention rather than schedules, and adhere to the oft-cited goal of BAPCPA that debtors who can afford to pay their debts should do so.
See, e.g., In
re
Burden,
The court concludes that the Debtor’s deductions on Lines 42(a), 42(b), and 43
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of the means test form for payments towards mortgages and real estate taxes on the Pittsfield property are appropriate. Consequently, the presumption of abuse does not arise in this case under
B. Determining Abuse Using the Totality of the Circumstances Test in
Alternatively, the UST asserts that the case should be dismissed pursuant to
(3) In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter in a case in which the presumption in subparagraph (A)(i) of such paragraph does not arise or is rebutted, the court shall consider—
(B) [whether] the totality of the circumstances ... of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.
The language of this provision clarifies that, although an above median income debtor passes the means test under
Under
The seminal pre-BAPCPA cases in the Sixth Circuit addressing the “totality of the circumstances” test under former
In
Behlke,
the Sixth Circuit noted that one way courts determine a debtor’s ability to pay is “to evaluate whether there would be sufficient disposable income to fund a Chapter 13 plan.”
Unlike the means test and its “snapshot” of secured debt expenses as of
More important to the UST’s argument are the significant funds deducted from the Debtor’s paycheck each month for retirement related purposes: $436.11 towards a TSP loan repayment, $357.78 in TSP contributions, and $313.06 in contributions to a mandatory CSRS retirement plan. The UST argues that the Debtor’s monthly TSP contribution is voluntary and that the Debtor already enjoys the mandatory retirement contribution to CSRS. By deleting the TSP contribution and loan repayments, the Debtor would have an additional $794.00 each month to pay towards creditors in a Chapter 13 plan which, over five years, translates to a 67% repayment of unsecured creditors.
The UST cites pre-BAPCPA Sixth Circuit case law, including
Behlke
and
Harshbarger v. Pees (In re Harshbarger),
The court agrees with the UST that these cases support the inclusion of voluntary retirement contributions and loan repayments in disposable income when conducting the hypothetical Chapter 13 analysis under
Following the enactment of BAPCPA,
Because BAPCPA changed the treatment of retirement funds in Chapter 13 cases, it would appear that the parameters of any hypothetical Chapter 13 analysis under
This court respectfully disagrees with the
Felske
court and others adopting the same line of reasoning. When the basis for an attack on an individual’s status as a Chapter 7 debtor is the ability to pay unsecured creditors in a hypothetical Chapter 13 case, it only makes sense that the analysis involve a realistic estimation of what the debtor would be required to pay in such a case under current law. The court does recognize the legitimate concern highlighted in
Felske
that a
The same point was highlighted in
In re Latone,
This court concurs with
Latone
that it would be pointless to either dismiss a Chapter 7 case when a debtor could refile under Chapter 13, or convert the case directly to Chapter 13 if such action would not result in any additional funds being repaid to unsecured creditors.
Id. See also In re Salerno,
For these reasons, the court rejects the UST’s argument that the $357.78 in monthly contributions to the Debtor’s TSP account and $436.11 towards repayment of two TSP loans should be included in the calculation of funds available to creditors in a hypothetical Chapter 13 case. Because these funds would be excluded from “disposable income”
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in an actual Chapter 13 case, the court will afford the funds the same treatment in a hypothetical Chapter 13 analysis conducted under
However, the hypothetical Chapter 13 analysis does not end here. In those jurisdictions that interpret “projected disposable income” as a more discretionary and future-oriented concept, the court must examine the record and account for funds that may become available to creditors sometime during the term of a Chapter 13 plan. Given the inherent unreliability of any prediction of future events, this analysis must be solidly grounded in reality and objective evidence. In this case, the court must take into consideration that the TSP loans are finite and that both TSP loans would be paid off within the lifetime of a five-year Chapter 13 plan. Clearly, the funds presently directed to repayment of the loans could be dedicated to pay creditors in future months once the loans are paid off.
The court is able to determine the availability and amount of these funds with
The facts of this case demonstrate that the Debtor enjoys a relatively high and stable income which would allow her to pay her creditors a significant dividend in a Chapter 13 case while paying her necessary expenses and continuing to contribute to two separate retirement accounts and to repay two retirement loans. Pursuant to
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Official Form 22A is designed to implement the so-called means test of
. The Debtor's monthly disposable income figure on line 50 of the means test form was $133.46.
. Although not a stipulated fact, the court must assume this to be true because the UST, who has the burden of proof on the issues of "abuse,” did not establish or even suggest that the Debtor was not so obligated or that the Debtor’s scheduling of the mortgage debt was inaccurate. As a consequence, this decision does not address situations in which a mortgage note has been cancelled prior to the bankruptcy filing.
.The Debtor did not include a deduction for the amount of the arrearage owed on the date of the filing.
. Mr. Van Bramer has been a paralegal for eleven years and has worked for the UST's office for two and a half years. Mr. Van Bramer's job duties include reviewing bankruptcy means tests and schedules in Chapter 7 cases.
. See UST’s Ex. 2. The disposable income amount reflects a decrease in Chapter 13 administrative expenses, which is calculated as a multiplier of the projected average monthly Chapter 13 plan payment, on Line 45 of the means test.
. Mr. Van Bramer testified to other items that might be artificially reducing the Debtor’s calculation of her disposable income on the means test form. He asserted that the Debt- or's employer might be withholding too much of her gross income because the Debtor received a federal tax refund of $1,009 for 2008.
See In re Hale,
. Above median income debtors are those debtors whose current monthly income is above the median income for their household size in the state where they filed.
See
. The presumption of abuse arising under this provision can be rebutted by a debtor for certain “special circumstances” not asserted in this case.
. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel addressed the propriety of this deduction on the means test in the context of a Chapter 13 case to determine “disposable income” as opposed to a Chapter 7 case to determine whether the presumption of abuse arises.
Hilderbrand v. Thomas (In re Thomas),
. The court rejects a third approach adopted in
In re Singletary,
. The court agrees with dicta in the
Goble
decision that the result may be different if a judgment of foreclosure had been entered prepetition extinguishing the contractual terms between the debtor and creditor so that no amounts were "contractually due” as of the petition filing date.
See Goble,
.The real estate taxes owed on the Pittsfield property are also a proper deduction on Line 43 as a secured expense that would be necessary to pay in order to retain possession of the Pittsfield property.
See
. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded that "disposable income” in
.
"A plan may not materially alter the terms of a loan described in section 362(b)(19) and any amounts required to repay such loan shall not constitute 'disposable income' undersection 1325 .”11 U.S.C. § 1322(f) . Section 362(b)(19) covers loans from a 401(k) plan account, a thrift savings account and other types of retirement accounts.11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(19) .
.
(b) Property of the estate does not include—
(7) any amount—
(A) withheld by an employer from the wages of employees for payment as contributions—
(i) to—
(I) an employee benefit plan that is subject to title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or under an employee benefit plan which is a governmental plan under section 414(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(II) a deferred compensation plan under section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(III) a tax-deferred annuity under section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; except that such amount under this subparagraph shall not constitute disposable income as defined insection 1325(b)(2) [.]
. By determining that "projected disposable income” and "disposable income” have different meanings in the Bankruptcy Code, the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's
Petro
decision leaves some questions unanswered including whether
. The court recognizes that neither the language of
. Because the first TSP loan will be paid off in seven months, the Debtor would have an extra $100 to pay into a plan for the remaining 53 months which provides $5,300 in disposable income over the life of the plan. The second loan will be paid off in 36 months leaving the Debtor with an additional $336.11 for the remaining 24 months or $8,066 in disposable income over the life of the plan.
. The court calculates the total payments over the life of the five year plan to be [ ($132 x 60) + $5,300 + $8,066] which totals $21,286.00.
. The dividend is calculated based on the $71,378.00 in general unsecured debts scheduled by the Debtor.
. The Debtor also testified that she has an older vehicle which may be replaced in the near future and that she may experience an increase in her apartment rental expense. However, no evidence was provided on when the replacement of the vehicle may occur nor did the Debtor quantify how either event would impact her monthly expenses. Consequently, these potential future expenses are too speculative to be included in the hypothetical Chapter 13 calculation.
See Lenton,