RENTAL PROPERTIES OWNERS ASSOCIATION OF KENT COUNTY, 3830 G, L.L.C., RUSTY RICHTER, AFFORDABLE HOUSING COALITION, CHARLIE CURTIS, JEFF FORTUNA, JAMES KANE, DANIEL HIBMA, KEYSTONE REALTY GROUP, L.L.C., GREG McKEE, JOSH BECKETT, and MICHAEL BECKETT, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v KENT COUNTY TREASURER, COUNTY OF KENT, and KENT COUNTY LAND BANK AUTHORITY, Defendants-Appellees, and KENT COUNTY TAXPAYERS ALLIANCE, Amicus Curiae. KENT COUNTY LAND BANK AUTHORITY, Petitioner-Appellee, v 3830 G, L.L.C., RUSTY RICHTER, AFFORDABLE HOUSING COALITION, CHARLIE CURTIS, JEFF FORTUNA, JAMES KANE, DANIEL HIBMA, KEYSTONE REALTY GROUP, L.L.C., GREG McKEE, JOSH BECKETT, and MICHAEL BECKETT, Appellants.
Nos. 314256, 314318
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
December 18, 2014
FOR PUBLICATION; LC Nos. 12-009669-CH, 12-008120-CH
RENTAL PROPERTIES OWNERS ASSOCIATION OF KENT COUNTY, 3830 G, L.L.C., RUSTY RICHTER, AFFORDABLE HOUSING COALITION, CHARLIE CURTIS, JEFF FORTUNA, JAMES KANE, DANIEL HIBMA, KEYSTONE REALTY GROUP, L.L.C., CIERIA CHAVEZ, ROSIE BAKER, and SHARON HALL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and GREG McKEE, Plaintiff, v KENT COUNTY TREASURER, CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS, and KENT COUNTY LAND BANK AUTHORITY, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 319733
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
LC No. 13-006798-CH
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, various individuals, companies, and associations involved in property ownership, rehabilitation, and development in Kent County (the 3830 G parties)1 seek to invalidate tax deeds executed by the Kent County Treasurer (the Treasurer) to Kent County (the County) and the city of Grand Rapids (the City) and from the County and the City to Kent County Land Bank Authority (KCLBA), claiming that their actions deprived the 3830 G parties of the opportunity to purchase the properties. The appealed orders were all decided by the same circuit court judge on different dates.
In Docket No. 314318, the 3830 G parties appeal as of right the trial court‘s December 26, 2012 order denying their motion to set aside the quiet-title and foreclosure judgment entered in favor of petitioner, KCLBA. We affirm.
In Docket No. 319733, the 3830 G parties appeal as of right the trial court‘s December 6, 2013 order granting summary disposition in favor of all appellees. We affirm.
This Court ordered the appeals consolidated.2
I. BACKGROUND
Docket Nos. 314256, 314318
In 2012, the Treasurer foreclosed on numerous properties in Kent County (the County properties). On June 28, 2012, and July 12, 2012, the County adopted resolutions authorizing the County to purchase county tax-foreclosed properties and sell those properties to KCLBA, allegedly as the result of an agreement between the County, the Treasurer, and KCLBA. The Treasurer conveyed the county properties to KCLBA on July 18, 2012. KCLBA filed a petition for expedited quiet title and foreclosure of the County properties on August 29, 2012. The trial court granted KCLBA‘s petition on October 19, 2012, noting that KCLBA had complied with all notice, service, and publication requirements.
The 3830 G parties filed a complaint against Kent County Treasurer, Kent County, and KCLBA in Kent Circuit Court on October 17, 2012, and filed a first amended complaint on December 6, 2012, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the Treasurer, the County, and KCLBA‘s actions violated
The 3830 G parties filed a motion to set aside the October 19, 2012 quiet-title and foreclosure judgment pursuant to
[the motion is] not timely because [it was] not filed prior to the October 19 Order quieting title; procedurally defective in that plaintiffs failed to submit a pleading as required by
MCR 2.209(C)(2) , no legitimate basis here. The Legislaturecreated a specific statutory scheme which excludes more general remedies. And there‘s no violation here of due process. The 3830 G plaintiffs were aware of the expedited quiet title and foreclosure action, at least as early as October 9. And even if the argument could be made that they lacked actual notice, the public notice provided by posting and publication satisfies due process requirements.
The County and the Treasurer filed a joint motion for summary disposition in 12-009669 on November 30, 2012, and KCLBA filed a motion for summary disposition on December 10, 2012.
The trial court granted the motions for summary disposition, reasoning:
First, the Court‘s of the opinion that this motion should be granted. [3830 G parties] lack standing, due to both their failure to identify an actual controversy as required by [
MCR ] 2.605, and the Court‘s determination that [the 3830 G parties] do not have a special injury right or substantial interest that would be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large.Next, the Court finds no actions by the County Treasurer or Kent County itself that exceeded the powers conferred by the Constitution and laws of this State.
Finally, the Court‘s October 19 Order quieting title in the properties bars [the 3830 G parties‘] attempts to challenge that title. Summary disposition is granted . . . pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(5) , (7) and (8).
Docket No. 319733
In 2013, the Treasurer foreclosed on numerous properties (the Grand Rapids properties) in the city of Grand Rapids as a result of the owners’ failure to pay real property taxes and assessments. The properties were not redeemed from the foreclosures. On June 18, 2013, Grand Rapids entered into a development agreement with KCLBA to acquire the Grand Rapids properties. KCLBA placed money in escrow for the City to purchase the Grand Rapids properties from Kent County Treasurer. The City adopted a resolution determining that acquisition of the Grand Rapids properties constituted a public purpose under the city‘s policy in connection with its obligation to provide for the health, safety and welfare of the community and authorized their purchase from the County Treasurer. The properties were thereafter conveyed by the City to KCLBA to “fulfill the public purpose of restoring blighted properties and neighborhoods and providing housing on tax-reverted abandoned properties.” The Grand Rapids properties were thereafter sold to KCLBA by the City for the amount paid by the City to the County Treasurer for the properties, plus the cost of recording fees.
The 3830 G parties filed a complaint in Kent Circuit Court on July 19, 2013, against Kent County Treasurer, Grand Rapids, and KCLBA, and a first amended complaint on September 27,
On motion by Kent County Treasurer, Grand Rapids, and KCLBA, this case was reassigned to the judge to whom docket nos. 314256 and 314318 were assigned. On August 23, 2013, the Treasurer, the City, and KCLBA filed a joint motion for summary disposition on counts I and II of the 3830 G parties’ complaint and the City filed a separate motion for summary disposition on count III of the 3830 G parties’ complaint. A second joint motion for summary disposition was filed on November 15, 2013. Following a hearing on all of the motions, the trial court granted the motions for summary disposition, reasoning:
All right. The Court has viewed the briefs and heard the arguments here today, and the Court sees essentially no difference between this year‘s case and last year‘s case. The Court sees no violation of the statutes here with what the County Treasurer and the City of Grand Rapids and [KCLBA] have done, so motion for summary disposition is granted.
This Court consolidated this case with docket nos. 314256 and 314318 in an unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 25, 2014 (Docket Nos. 314256, 314318, 319733).
II. STATUTORY COMPLIANCE
The trial court granted summary disposition to the Kent County Treasurer, County of Kent, the City of Grand Rapids, and the Kent County Land Bank Authority,3 and dismissed the 3830 G parties’ amended complaint based on
With respect to statutory interpretation our Supreme Court has stated:
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the statutory language. The first step in that determination is to review the language of the statute itself. Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used. We may consult dictionary definitions to give words their common and ordinary meaning. When given their common and ordinary meaning, the words of a statute provide the most reliable evidence of its intent[.] [Krohn v Home Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 156-157; 802 NW2d 281 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).]
Thus, if the statute‘s language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is not required or permitted. In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes, Special Projects Procurement v Continental Biomass Indus, Inc), 468 Mich 109, 113; 659 NW2d 597 (2003). In addition, “nothing may be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the act itself.” Mich Ed Ass‘n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194, 217; 801 NW2d 35 (2011).
A foreclosing governmental unit may not transfer property subject to foreclosure under
Under the GPTA, when property taxes are delinquent for two years, the property is forfeited to the county treasurer.
a city, village, or township may purchase for a public purpose any property located within that city, village, or township set forth in the judgment and subject to sale under this section by payment to the foreclosing governmental unit of the minimum bid. If a city, village, or township does not purchase that property, the county in which that property is located may purchase that property under this section by payment to the foreclosing governmental unit of the minimum bid. If property is purchased by a city, village, township, or county under this subsection, the foreclosing governmental unit shall convey the property to the purchasing city, village, township, or county within 30 days. If property purchased by a city, village, township, or county under this subsection is subsequently sold for an amount in excess of the minimum bid and all costs incurred relating to demolition, renovation, improvements, or infrastructure development, the excess amount shall be returned to the delinquent tax property sales proceeds account for the year in which the property was purchased by the city, village, township, or county or, if this state is the foreclosing governmental unit within a county, to the land reutilization fund created under section 78n. Upon the request of the foreclosing governmental unit, a city, village, township, or county that purchased property under this subsection shall provide to the foreclosing governmental unit without cost information regarding any subsequent sale or transfer of the property. This subsection applies to the purchase of property by this state, a city, village, or township, or a county prior to a sale held under subsection (2). [
MCL 211.78m(1) (emphasis added).]
In this case, in accordance with
Subject to subsection (1), . . . the foreclosing governmental unit . . . shall hold at least 2 property sales at 1 or more convenient locations at which property foreclosed by the judgment entered under section 78k shall be sold by auction sale, which may include an auction sale conducted via an internet website. Notice of the time and location of the sales shall be published not less than 30 days before each sale in a newspaper published and circulated in the county in which the property is located, if there is one. If no newspaper is published in that county, publication shall be made in a newspaper published and circulated in an adjoining county. Each sale shall be completed before the first Tuesday in November immediately succeeding the entry of judgment under section 78k vesting absolute title to the tax delinquent property in the foreclosing governmental unit. Except as provided in subsection (5), property shall be sold to the person bidding the highest
amount above the minimum bid. The foreclosing governmental unit may sell parcels individually or may offer 2 or more parcels for sale as a group. The minimum bid for a group of parcels shall equal the sum of the minimum bid for each parcel included in the group. The foreclosing governmental unit may adopt procedures governing the conduct of the sale and may cancel the sale prior to the issuance of a deed under this subsection if authorized under the procedures. The foreclosing governmental unit may require full payment by cash, certified check, or money order at the close of each day‘s bidding. Not more than 30 days after the date of a sale under this subsection, the foreclosing governmental unit shall convey the property by deed to the person bidding the highest amount above the minimum bid. The deed shall vest fee simple title to the property in the person bidding the highest amount above the minimum bid, unless the foreclosing governmental unit discovers a defect in the foreclosure of the property under sections 78 to 78l. If this state is the foreclosing governmental unit within a county, the department of natural resources shall conduct the sale of property under this subsection and subsections (4) and (5) on behalf of this state. [Emphasis added.]
In brief, if the city, village, township, or county does not purchase the tax-foreclosed property, a public auction is held, with the tax-foreclosed property sold to the person bidding the highest amount above the minimum bid.
Contrary to the 3830 G parties’ argument,
A foreclosing governmental unit may not transfer property subject to forfeiture, foreclosure, and sale under . . .
MCL 211.78 toMCL 211.78p , until after the property has been offered for sale or other transfer under . . .MCL 211.78m , and the foreclosing governmental unit has retained possession of the property under . . .MCL 211.78m . [MCL 124.755(6) (emphasis added).]
The language is clear and unambiguous and must be interpreted as written. In re Certified Question, 468 Mich at 113.
The 3830 G parties essentially assert that Kent County was not a true owner of the properties before they were then sold to KCLBA and that Kent County Treasurer is the party who actually sold the properties to KCLBA, contrary to
Thus, the trial court did not err by concluding that Kent County did not violate
The 3830 G parties again argue here that Grand Rapid‘s purchase of the properties was a “ruse” to disguise the violation, that KCLBA inappropriately funded Grand Rapid‘s purchase of the properties from the Kent County Treasurer, and that the Legislature did not intend for local governmental units to act as a “straw man” to avoid a public sale of the properties. The 3830 G parties rely on Rutland Twp v City of Hastings, 413 Mich 560; 321 NW2d 647 (1982), to argue that this Court should reject the “straw-man” transaction and look at the real transaction.
The 3830 G parties’ reliance on Rutland Twp is misplaced because Rutland Twp is factually dissimilar this case. Unlike Rutland, which involved an analysis of
Reading
The 3830 G parties also erroneously rely on
III. MANDAMUS
The 3830 G parties’ challenge to the validity of the tax-foreclosed property deeds by way of mandamus also fails. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court‘s decision on a writ of mandamus. Coalition for a Safer Detroit v Detroit City Clerk, 295 Mich App 362, 367; 820 NW2d 208 (2012). However, the first two elements required for issuance of a writ of mandamus—that defendants have a clear legal duty to perform and plaintiffs have a clear legal right to performance of the requested act—are reviewed de novo as a question of law. Id.
To obtain the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the plaintiff has a clear, legal right to performance of the specific duty sought, (2) the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform, (3) the act is ministerial, and (4) no other adequate legal or equitable remedy exists that might achieve the same result.” Hanlin v Saugatuck Twp, 299 Mich App 233, 248; 829 NW2d 335 (2013). In relation to a request for mandamus, “a clear legal right” is “one clearly founded in, or granted by, law; a right which is inferable as a matter of law from uncontroverted facts regardless of the difficulty of the legal question to be decided.” Univ Med Affiliates, PC v Wayne Co Executive, 142 Mich App 135, 143; 369 NW2d 277 (1985) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Even where such a right can be shown, it has long been the policy of the courts to deny the writ of mandamus to compel the performance of public duties by public officials unless the specific right involved is not possessed by citizens generally.” Id.
Again as in docket no. 314256, the Kent County Treasurer was not required by
The trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants under
Next, the 3830 G parties argue that the process by which KCLBA obtained the properties violated due process and otherwise ran afoul of Constitutional guarantees. Again, we disagree.
The trial court granted summary disposition under
The 3830 G parties argue under
Moreover, even if they were entitled to notice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the judgment should not be set aside on the basis that KCLBA allegedly violated their due process rights when it did not immediately request a hearing date as required
The 3830 G parties’ due process rights were not violated by the notice provided in the petition and the quiet-title and foreclosure proceedings. KCLBA‘s petition was filed on August 29, 2012, requesting that a hearing be held within 90 days, contrary to
These notices provided the 3830 G parties notice of an opportunity to be heard in relation to the petition sufficient to satisfy due process. Dusenbery, 534 US at 167; Republic Bank, 471 Mich at 742. In addition, the 3830 G parties had actual notice of the October 19, 2012 motion to quiet title hearing before the judgment was entered, which also satisfies the fundamental requirements of due process. See Alycekay Co v Hasko Constr Co, Inc, 180 Mich App 502, 506; 448 NW2d 43 (1989) (concluding that where the trustee received actual notice of the claim, the service of process that was effected “satisfied fundamental requirements of due process and was not a substantial defect” in the process).
V. KENT COUNTY FIDUCIARY DUTY
The 3830 G parties also argue that Kent County exceeded its authority and violated its fiduciary duties to its taxpayers when it sold the tax-foreclosed properties to KCLBA at a price allegedly below their market values. The 3830 G parties did not raise these arguments in their statement of questions presented and thus they are not properly presented for appellate review. Bouverette v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 245 Mich App 391, 404; 628 NW2d 86 (2001). Regardless, these arguments are without merit.
First, the resolutions passed by Kent County‘s board of commissioners did not violate county resolutions regarding the sale of county-owned property. It is the policy of Kent County to seek to maximize the benefits to the taxpayers in the sale, disposal, or transfer of any property
Second, Kent County stated a county purpose behind its purchase of the Kent County tax-foreclosed properties. It is a valid public purpose for a land bank fast track authority, like KCLBA, to acquire tax-reverted property as a way to strengthen and revitalize the economy of where it is located.
WHEREAS, 64 properties . . . are part of 325 parcels that have all been foreclosed by the Kent County Treasurer for nonpayment of real property taxes in 2012; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to
MCL 211.78m , Kent County has the right to acquire tax-foreclosed properties prior to them being offered for sale at auction by paying the minimum bid price. Kent County has the right to sell these properties to the Kent County Land Bank Authority (KCLBA); andWHEREAS, KCLBA has reviewed the entire list of 325 parcels and has now identified 43 properties that either meet the criteria for following its strategic plan or have been requested to be acquired on behalf of the local unit where it is located; and
WHEREAS, four local non-profit developers are interested in acquiring and redeveloping 21 additional properties. Treasurer Parish requests that the County acquire and transfer ownership of these parcels to KCLBA; and
WHEREAS, no recording fees are required for a transfer to the KCLBA. Corporate Counsel will review and approve the transfer documents before execution.
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Board of Commissioners hereby exercise its right to purchase 64 parcels for the minimum bid price and sell them to the KCLBA at the same minimum bid price for future redevelopment and sale and that the Treasurer be authorized to sign the necessary documents. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, because Kent County resolved that the tax-foreclosed properties meet KCLBA‘s strategic plan, were requested by the local government, or for redevelopment, and KCLBA‘s acquisition of property is a valid public purpose involving the revitalization of the economy,
Kent County did not violate its policies or resolutions when it purchased the tax-foreclosed properties from Kent County Treasurer and then sold them to KCLBA without a competitive-bid process.
VI. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The 3830 G parties argue that the trial court erred when it determined that their claims in docket no. 314256 were barred by the quiet-title and foreclosure judgment obtained by KCLBA in docket no, 314318. We agree, but find the error harmless in light of our affirmance of the trial court‘s order summarily dismissing the 3830 G parties’ amended complaint under
KCLBA argued that the 3830 G parties’ complaint in docket no. 314256 was barred by the prior quiet-title and foreclosure judgment and the trial court addressed this issue when it granted summary disposition in favor of all defendants in part based on
“This Court reviews de novo a trial court‘s decision on a motion for summary disposition pursuant to
A land bank authority like KCLBA may initiate an expedited quiet title and foreclosure action to quiet title to real property by recording notice of the pending action with the register of deeds in the relevant county.
If a petition for expedited quiet title and foreclosure is filed under
The 3830 G parties claim that their complaint in 12-009669-CH is not barred by the foreclosure judgment obtained by KCLBA in 12-008120-CH because the foreclosures procedures outlined in
Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding. Leahy v Orion Twp, 269 Mich App 527, 530; 711 NW2d 438 (2006). Collateral estoppel is a flexible rule intended to relieve parties of multiple litigation, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication. Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340, 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990).
Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality. Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682-684; 677 NW2d 843 (2004).
In the subsequent action, the ultimate issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the first action. Qualls, 434 Mich at 357. The issues must be identical, and not merely similar. Keywell & Rosenfeld v Bithell, 254 Mich App 300, 340; 657 NW2d 759 (2002).
To be actually litigated, a question must be put into issue by the pleadings, submitted to the trier of fact, and determined by the trier. VanDeventer v Mich Nat‘l Bank, 172 Mich App 456, 463; 432 NW2d 338 (1988). The parties must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the first action. Keywell & Rosenfeld, 254 Mich App at 340.
For collateral estoppel to apply, the parties in the second action must be the same as or privy to the parties in the first action. VanVorous v Burmeister, 262 Mich App 467, 480; 687 NW2d 132 (2004). A party is one who was directly interested in the subject matter, and had a right to defend or to control the proceedings and to appeal from the judgment, while a privy is one who, after the judgment, has an interest in the matter affected by the judgment through one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase. Husted v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 213 Mich App 547, 556; 540 NW2d 743 (1995), aff‘d 459 Mich 500 (1999).
In this case, the October 19, 2012 judgment quieting title of the Kent County tax-foreclosed properties in KCLBA 12-008120-CH does not bar the 3830 G parties’ amended complaint in 12-009669-CH. Collateral estoppel does not apply because the parties in this action are not the same as those involved in the first action. While KCLBA was involved in both the quiet-title and foreclosure action and this action, the 3830 G parties were not involved in the quiet-title and foreclosure action. While the 3830 G parties were interested in the subject matter in the quiet-title and foreclosure action, they did not have a right to defend or control the proceedings. Id. In fact, the trial court denied their motion to intervene in the quiet-title and foreclosure action and as a result the 3830 G parties also did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in their complaint relative to the facts surrounding the sale of the Kent County tax-foreclosed properties in the first action; thus, the issue of KCLBA‘s ownership of those properties was not actually litigated. Keywell & Rosenfeld, 254 Mich App at 340. Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that the 3830 G parties’ complaint was barred by the prior quiet-title and foreclosure judgment under
While the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to defendants on the basis of collateral estoppel, the error was harmless because summary disposition was appropriate under
VII. THE QUIET-TITLE ACTION
In docket no. 314318, the trial court denied the 3830 G parties’ motion to set aside the quiet-title and foreclosure judgment on the basis that (1) it was not timely filed, (2) the 3830 G parties failed to submit a pleading as required by
In addition, this Court also reviews de novo issues of law involving statutory construction, Klooster, 488 Mich at 295-296, as well as the proper interpretation and application of a court rule, Henry v Dow Chem Co, 484 Mich 483, 495; 772 NW2d 301 (2009). Finally, unpreserved error may be considered if (1) failure to do so would result in manifest injustice, (2) consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the case, or (3) the issue involves a question of law, and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented. Johnson Family Ltd Partnership v White Pine Wireless, LLC, 281 Mich App 364, 377; 761 NW2d 353, 362 (2008). An unpreserved nonconstitutional claim of error is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 552-553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994); Veltman v Detroit Edison Co, 261 Mich App 685, 690; 683 NW2d 707 (2004) (applying the unpreserved plain error standard to civil cases).
A. MCR 2.611
In docket no. 314318, the 3830 G parties argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their “motion to set aside” brought under
Our Supreme Court has stated:
This Court uses the principles of statutory construction when interpreting a Michigan court rule. We begin by considering the plain language of the court rule in order to ascertain its meaning. The intent of the rule must be determined from an examination of the court rule itself and its place within the structure of the Michigan Court Rules as a whole. [Henry, 484 Mich at 495 (quotation marks and citations omitted.]
In relevant part,
A new trial may be granted to all or some of the parties, on all or some of the issues, whenever their substantial rights are materially affected, for any of the following reasons:
(a) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or prevailing party, or an order of the court or abuse of discretion which denied the moving party a fair trial.
* * *
(e) A verdict or decision against the great weight of the evidence or contrary to law. [Emphasis added.]
By its plain language,
B. MCR 2.612
(1) On motion and on just terms, the court may relieve a party or the legal representative of a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding on the following grounds:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
* * *
(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
As noted earlier in the Due Process section, the 3830 parties premised their argument that the trial court erred in denying them relief from judgment on the mistaken assertion that they were not given the proper notice regarding the petitions to expedite pursuant to
The 3830 G parties also argue, for the first time on appeal, that the quiet title and foreclosure judgment entered in 12-008120-CH should also be set aside under
The 3830 G parties also offered numerous arguments regarding the trial court‘s determination that they lacked standing. The question of standing is only significant in relation to the ability to bring the rejected assertions of statutory, policy and constitutional error. Therefore, we need not address standing to resolve this case.
IX. CONCLUSION
In docket nos. 314256 and 319733, we affirm the trial court‘s order granting summary disposition. In docket no. 314318, we affirm the trial court‘s order denying the motion to set aside the quiet-title and foreclosure judgment.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
Whitbeck, J., not participating, having resigned from the Court of Appeals effective November 21, 2014.