*28 Opinion Concerning Contempt Hearing
Wе have before us a very rare case of deciding whether the Respondent should be held in contempt of the Supreme Court. The cаse arises from disciplinary proceedings brought against Respondent. Charges were made against Respondent and a hearing on a Mоtion for Suspension Pending Prosecution was held on November 14, 1972. The Disciplinary Commission presented several witnesses, all of whom indicated thаt the Respondent had attempted to solicit business from them in the hallways outside the Marion County Municipal Courts in apparent violation of DR-2-108 and 2-104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On November 16, 1972, the hearing officer recommended to this Court that Respondent be suspendеd from the practice of law pending final determination of the disciplinary action. Pursuant to § 15 (b) of A.D. 23, the Supreme Court entered an Order of Suspension on November 20, 1972, in which the Respondent, Biagio J. Perrello, was suspended from the practice of law pending final determinatiоn, and he was ordered to cease and desist from any and all further acts and activity as an attorney of law of this State until further notice. On Nоvember 21, 1972, the above order of this Court was personally served upon the Respondent.
Subsequent to the suspension, the Disciplinary Commission оbtained information that Respondent had been practicing law in defiance of the order of this Court. On December 12, 1972, the Commission sought from this Court an order to show cause why Respondent should not be held in contempt of the order of this Court, that a hearing be held in this matter and Respondent be held in contempt of the Order with such relief as would be necessary and proper.
*29 *28 A hearing was held in this matter on January 3, 1973 and evidenсe was taken. The evidence indicates that on December *29 5, 1972, the Respondent, in his office, entered into a contract of emрloyment with Bobby Minor, in which the Respondent was to represent Mr. Minor as his attorney as to criminal charges pending against him in Marion County Municipal Court. Mr. Minor signed a contract which called for a total fee of five hundred dollars and paid the Respondent fifty dollars of the fee аt that time. This is clearly holding oneself out as an attorney and engaging in the practice of law in violation of the Order of Suspension issued by this Court.
Respondent was found to be in indirect criminal contempt of the Supreme Court of Indiana. He was sentenced to thirty days on the Indiana State Farm.
IC 1971, 33-2-1-4 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-110 [1968 Repl.]) gives the Supreme Court of Indiana “full power ... to punish by fine and imprisonment for contempt of its authority and process . . .” In addition, the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction in Indiana.
LaGrange
v.
State
(1958),
One of the major assertions of the Respondent is that he had no intent to defy the court order. The old rule in a case of indirect contempt, was that if the alleged contemnor claimed under oath that he had no intent to defy the Court’s authority he was entitled to a discharge.
State ex rel. Indpls. Bar Assn.
v.
Fletcher Trust Co., supra.
However, this doctrine had no application where the charge of
*30
contempt was based upon alleged acts of respondent which were clearly contеmptuous in character.
Kilgallen
v.
State
(1922),
The Respondent claims the action is defective because it has not been brought in the name of the State of Indiana. See, State ex rel. Indpls. Bar Assn. v. Fletcher Trust Co., supra; Denny v. State, supra. However, the purрose of that rule is to distinguish between civil contempt proceedings and criminal contempt proceedings. It was clear to all, including the Respondent, that this was a criminal contempt proceeding. See, Allison v. State ex rel. Allison, supra. The action was brought by officials of the State appоinted by this Court. It was clearly not brought for any *31 private party. Under the circumstances we feel it unnecessary that the State actually be nаmed. The cause was certainly initiated for the public's interest and prosecuted by an arm of state government. See Allison, supra.
Respondent аlso contends the action is defective because the information was not verified by the oath of the informant. See, State ex rel. Indpls. Bar Assn., supra; Denny, supra. However, attached to the information is a transcript of the sworn testimony which the informant made to Judge Boring of the Marion County Municipal Court concerning his matter, along with the Certificate of the Reporter and the Certificate of the Judge. This obtains substantially the same result, and we hold it to be sufficient to prevent nullifying the action.
Respondent further asserts that the information lacks specificity. First it is contended that the time and plaсe are not stated with sufficient certainty. However, the date the actions occurred is given along with the exact address and plaсe where they occurred. He also contends the actions which constitute the indirect contempt are not stated clearly еnough. This argument is totally fallacious. A clear and succinct statement of the facts constituting the contempt are contained in the infоrmation.
None of the contentions made by Respondent convince this Court that it should act in a manner contrary to that chosen. Respondent was guilty of indirect criminal contempt of the Supreme Court and received what this Court considers to be an appropriatе punishment of thirty days on the Indiana State Farm. We hope this emphasizes the honesty and integrity which this Court expects of all attorneys. Open defiance of the orders of this Court will not be countenanced.
This opinion is in furtherance and support of the Order of this Court filed January 4, 1973, committing the Respondent to the Indiana State Farm for thirty days.
*32 Arterburn, C.J., DeBruler, Givan and Prentice. JJ., concur.
Note. — Reported in