In re WALTER PERKINS; on Habeas Corpus.
Crim. No. 6441
Second Dist., Div. Three
Nov. 12, 1958
165 Cal.App.2d 73
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Ariel C. Hilton, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
SHINN, P. J.—On October 3, 1958, Walter Perkins filed with this court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from Atascadero State Hospital, where he is held under commitment as an insane person. Return was duly made, a hearing was had at which Perkins was present and duly represented. Under order heretofore made the superior court file and all evidence and exhibits received upon the hearing of an application by Perkins in the form of a petition for habeas corpus for an order that he has been restored to sanity, held in the Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County September 17, 1958, have been transmitted to this court and made a part of the record in the pending proceeding.
The following facts are established: Perkins was accused in the city and county of San Francisco of murder; he was found to have been insane at the time of the offense and presently insane and was committed to the State Hospital on March 14, 1958 (
The present application urges as the sole ground for petitioner‘s release that it was conclusively shown by the evidence adduced in the former proceeding that Perkins is presently sane and that the court was powerless to rule otherwise.
The return made to the superior court stated that in the opinion of the Superintendent and Medical Director of Atascadero State Hospital Perkins was no longer insane and need no longer be confined in a state institution for care and treatment. This return was filed on behalf of the Superintendent by H. D. Neufeld, M.D., a member of the medical staff of the hospital.
The petitioner was present at the hearing but was not questioned nor did he speak. The only witness was Dr. Neufeld. There was documentary evidence considered by the court, consisting of a letter from the district attorney of the city and county of San Francisco, stating that he had no evidence to offer and that his office would be willing to abide by the findings of the medical staff of the hospital. Dr. Neufeld testified that Perkins had been directly under his care and supervision and that he was well acquainted with him; Perkins had been unusually cooperative; his conduct had been normal in every respect without any sign of delusion; at the time of the commission of the murder Perkins was under restraint in a hospital as an alcoholic; he was suffering from alcoholic hallucinosis; all the symptoms of this affliction disappear in a month or less and the patient is restored to normalcy; at the time of the murder Perkins had been deprived of liquor and had been given drugs; alcoholic hallucinosis is primarily due to the use of the liquor itself but “not so much to the liquor as to the sudden cessation“; Perkins was suffering from “an acute febrile condition plus the drugs that had been administered. Now, it is rather, shall I say, unusual to have a combination of circumstances such as that which would be necessary to even create the possibility that this sort of thing might recur.”
The burden of proof was upon Perkins to establish that he had been restored to sanity. There was also a presumption that having been committed as insane he would be deemed to be insane until his sanity had been legally restored
It is a general rule that a disputable presumption may be overcome by evidence introduced on behalf of the party in whose favor the presumption runs if it conclusively establishes the nonexistence of the presumed fact. (Chakmakjian v. Lowe, 33 Cal.2d 308 at 313 [201 P.2d 801], and cases cited.) However, in the hearing the presumption had no part in the decision that was rendered nor did the court weigh the evidence that was introduced. Moreover, as we shall presently see, that evidence not only sustained the burden of proof but it was conclusive of Perkins’ restoration to sanity.
The trial judge, for whom we have the greatest respect, did not question the findings of the medical staff nor the testimony of Dr. Neufeld. At no time during the entire proceedings did he intimate that he believed Perkins to be insane. It is true that he entered an order which declared that Perkins had not been restored to sanity and which directed him to be recommitted to the hospital for further care and treatment but the reason for this, and the sole reason, was made perfectly clear. The judge was convinced that the matter of Perkins’ sanity should be determined by the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco from which he had been committed. After referring to the provision of
In view of our conclusion that Perkins’ sanity was established in the hearing as a matter of law, it may not be inappropriate to refer briefly to the part played by the opinions of alienists in proceedings for the detention, commitment and release of persons suffering from mental illness or deficiency.
In the following proceedings initiated for the purpose of bringing about the detention or commitment of persons believed to be suffering from mental deficiency, it is mandatory that the court resort to the assistance of alienists in the trial of the issue of deficiency of the type charged: (1) where there is a trial of the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (
In cases of mental deficiency the court may in its discretion enlist the assistance of alienists (
Although it is not required that in an application under
In view of the policy of the state, evidenced by all the foregoing provisions respecting the detention, commitment and the release of persons in insanity proceedings, it is apparent that the opinions of alienists are entitled to great weight.
In the release of patients whose commitment is unrelated to criminal prosecution the findings of medical authorities are deemed conclusive with respect to the mental condition of patients who have been under observation, care and treatment in state hospitals. (
We mention the foregoing matters of procedure in order to point out the division of authority that exists between the courts and the medical staffs of state hospitals with respect to the release of mental patients. Great responsibility is placed upon hospital management. In a proceeding under
Our further discussion will not be upon the erroneous
The fact that Perkins had killed a human being and had been found to be insane at the time of the commission of the act, and at the time of the trial, did not tend in the slightest to controvert or weaken the opinions expressed by Dr. Neufeld or the findings of the medical staff that he had recovered his sanity and yet there was no other fact or circumstance which tended in any degree to lend support to the order of the court which declared that Perkins’ sanity had not been restored.
As we have said, there was a presumption that Perkins was still insane, but the court did not consider or rely upon that presumption. If there was a presumption that ran in favor of the state it was dispelled by the medical testimony. The rule that the presumption is overcome by wholly contrary evidence introduced by the person in whose favor the presumption runs has no application. We do not base our conclusion that the evidence dispelled the presumption upon the theory that it was introduced by the state. Alienists appointed by the court in insanity proceedings should be deemed to be the court‘s own witnesses, and their opinions should not be deemed evidence produced either by the state or the person whose sanity is the subject of inquiry. Dr. Neufeld‘s testimony should have been given full credit without questioning whether his testimony was received on behalf of the state or of the petitioner. It has been held that if the evidence conclusively establishes a fact contrary to the presumed fact the presumption can be deemed overcome even though the evidence consists of the testimony of a party in whose favor the presumption runs. (Estate of McConnell, 6 Cal.2d 493, 499 [58 P.2d 639].) In proceedings under
We repeat that we cannot accept as a theory for our decision that in the former hearing the court disagreed with the conclusions of the hospital medical staff. The record demonstrates that there was no such disagreement. And we know that the able trial judge, who has had long and trying experience in such matters would not substitute his own judg-
In the former hearing the right of Perkins to an order that he had been restored to sanity and for his release was established beyond question. It was the duty of the court to make such an order.
It has been held that an appeal will not lie from an order in a proceeding under
Perkins’ sanity was established as firmly as it can ever be established and if conclusive proof of that fact does not establish his right to be released, as a matter of law, he could be kept in confinement for the remainder of his days.
The present proceeding is solely an attack upon the jurisdiction of the court in the former proceeding to deny Perkins the relief to which he was entitled. The court had a manifest duty to act in only one way, namely, by adjudicating that Perkins had been restored to sanity; the order as made was therefore in excess of the jurisdiction of the court. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].)
The petitioner is not without adequate remedy. An appropriate, and indeed his only remedy, is provided by
Let a writ issue directed to R. S. Rood, Superintendent and
Vallee, J., concurred.
WOOD (Parker), J.—I dissent. I do not agree that the trial judge was required to adopt the opinion of the medical witness as the decision of the court. The statute (
Perkins, who killed a human being in San Francisco on November 28, 1957, was tried in San Francisco, before Judge Caulfield without a jury, upon a charge of murder. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to the state hospital for criminal insane at Atascadero, in San Luis Obispo County, on March 14, 1958. On August 27, 1958 (about five and one-half months after he was committed), he made application to the superior court of San Luis Obispo County for release, and alleged therein that his sanity had been restored.
Such an application could be made to the superior court in San Francisco from which he was committed, or in the superior court in San Luis Obispo County in which county he was confined. (
The return to the writ of habeas corpus (the writ issued by the San Luis Obispo court) was signed by Dr. Neufeld, who was the witness at the hearing. (The return was made by him on behalf of the superintendent of the hospital—the superintendent‘s name was in typewriting.)
Dr. Neufeld, in his testimony, undertook to relate “The situation that led up to the incident that caused” Perkins to be committed to the hospital. He testified that Perkins had been using alcohol excessively, “according to the records, approximately a fifth of a gallon of wine had been consumed daily over a considerable period of time“; that (as a result thereof) Perkins was confined in a hospital, the consumption of alcohol was discontinued abruptly, and drugs were administered; that those things “contributed to causing his condition” which is known as alcoholic hallucinosis. He testified further that such a “condition [alcoholic hallucinosis] subsides within a month or less“; and that “Some people fail to differentiate between alcoholic hallucinosis and delirium tremens.”
While Dr. Neufeld was a witness, the judge said that if Perkins were released it is possible that he might get alcoholic hallucinosis again and kill somebody. The witness replied, “It is possible, yes.” The judge said: “Here is a man that kills a person and in less than a year he wants to get out, and if he got alcoholic hallucinosis he might very well maybe kill a person again.” The witness replied, “We can‘t exclude that possibility, no.” After the judge said that he was “going to deny the writ and find and determine that the sanity of Walter Perkins has not been restored,” the witness said that not only alcoholic hallucinosis was involved, but that an acute
The testimony of the witness included statements which might well have caused the trial judge to decline to rely on his opinion.
In the beginning of his testimony the witness made a statement as to what he understood to be the situation that led up to the incident that caused Perkins to be committed. His testimony indicates that his understanding as to that situation was based upon his understanding as to what was shown by “the records.” Apparently he was giving his version or interpretation of the testimony and proceedings in the San Francisco court where Judge Caulfield presided.
It is to be noted further that the opinion of the witness was that the condition of Perkins (at the time of the killing) was a kind of insanity known as alcoholic hallucinosis and that such a condition “subsides within a month or less.” The trial judge might well have concluded, by reasons of other evidence, that the opinion of the witness was erroneous. The fact is that the killing occurred on November 28, 1957, and that on March 14, 1958 (about three and one-half months after the killing), Judge Caulfield of the San Francisco court found that Perkins was then “presently insane.” In other words, the kind of insanity which Perkins had at the time of killing did not “subside within a month or less” but had continued for three and one-half months after the killing and was still existing at the time of the commitment. The fact that the insanity which Perkins had did not subside within a month is a refutation of the opinion of the witness that the kind of insanity was alcoholic hallucinosis.
It is also to be noted that the witness said that some persons fail to differentiate between alcoholic hallucinosis and delirium tremens. The reason for the reference to delirium tremens does not appear. That reference, however, might indicate to the judge that the subject of delirium tremens had been involved in the trial in San Francisco.
If the trial judge had no judicial function to perform, and was not entitled to weigh the testimony of the witness and consider his manner and conduct while testifying, there would be no point in the legislative requirement that a hearing be had before the court. As above stated, the judge was the trier of the facts and was the one to be convinced that Perkins
At the time of making the order herein, the trial judge referred to the testimony of the medical witness wherein the witness said that it was a possibility that Perkins might have alcoholic hallucinosis again.
In my opinion, the trial judge properly exercised his judicial function of determining the facts; and the order was amply supported by the evidence.