In Re People v. B.B.A.M.
No. 19SA151
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
December 9, 2019
2019 CO 103
ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE; Juveniles—Competency to Stand Trial—Assessing Restoration to Competency. Rule Made Absolute en banc. Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge.
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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
December 9, 2019
2019 CO 103
No. 19SA151, In Re People v. B.B.A.M.—Juveniles—Competency to Stand Trial—Assessing Restoration to Competency.
The supreme court considers whether the juvenile court may order a second competency evaluation in lieu of holding a restoration review pursuant to
Because the relevant statutes do not permit a juvenile court to order a second competency evaluation to determine whether a juvenile has been restored to competency, the court rules that the district court erred in affirming the juvenile court‘s order. Accordingly, the court reverses the district court‘s order and remands with instructions to return the case to the juvenile court for a restoration review or a restoration hearing.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
2019 CO 103
Supreme Court Case No. 19SA151
Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21
Jefferson County District Court Case No. 17JD452
Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge
In Re
Petitioner:
The People of the State of Colorado,
In the Interest of
Juvenile:
B.B.A.M.,
and Concerning
Respondent:
P.M.
Rule Made Absolute
en banc
December 9, 2019
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Peter A. Weir, District Attorney, First Judicial District
Colleen R. Wort, Appellate Deputy District Attorney
Golden, Colorado
Attorney for Juvenile:
Diana M. Richett
Lakewood, Colorado
No appearance on behalf
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT dissents, and JUSTICE HART joins in the dissent.
¶1 The juvenile court found B.B.A.M. incompetent to proceed and ordered him to receive competency restoration services. Following the provision of those services, it ordered, over his objection, a second competency evaluation to determine whether he had been restored to competency. B.B.A.M. appealed, but the district court upheld the juvenile court‘s order. We subsequently granted B.B.A.M.‘s petition for a rule to show cause pursuant to C.A.R. 21. And we now make the rule absolute.
¶2 After a juvenile court finds a juvenile incompetent to proceed and orders him to receive competency restoration services,
¶3 Because the relevant statutes do not permit a juvenile court to order a second competency evaluation to determine whether a juvenile has been restored to competency, the district court erred in affirming the juvenile court‘s order. There was no basis to compel B.B.A.M. to undergo a second competency evaluation in lieu of holding a restoration review pursuant to
¶4 The People filed a petition in delinquency against B.B.A.M., charging him with one count of third degree burglary and three counts of criminal mischief. B.B.A.M.‘s counsel filed a motion to determine competency pursuant to
¶5 The court referred B.B.A.M. to DHS‘s Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH“) for restoration services. And, consistent with the requirement for periodic reviews, see
¶6 B.B.A.M. did not begin receiving restoration services until approximately four months later.2 Further, OBH informed B.B.A.M. that it intended to refer him for a second competency evaluation. B.B.A.M.‘s counsel immediately filed a motion seeking the court‘s intervention. Over the People‘s objection, the court granted the requested relief and ruled that B.B.A.M. would not be required to undergo a second competency evaluation “as part of [the] competency progress reports” unless “ordered by the Court.”
¶7 However, the order reflects that the court believed it had the discretion to order a second competency evaluation under
¶8 Finally, the order addressed some concerns expressed by OBH through the People‘s response. OBH had informed the People that, while its providers could submit progress reports outlining “which days the juvenile went to therapy and whether he is engaged” in restoration services, they could not opine “about whether the juvenile has been restored to competency” or render “an opinion as to competency.” More specifically, OBH apparently took the position that its providers had a conflict of interest that prevented them from opining about B.B.A.M.‘s progress toward being restored to competency because doing so was tantamount to opining about the effectiveness of the restoration services they were providing. OBH was seemingly troubled because it recognized that there was tension between its conflict-of-interest assertion and
¶9 The court did not resolve OBH‘s conflict-of-interest claim because it disagreed with OBH‘s understanding of
¶10 Because OBH did not submit a progress report within ninety days, B.B.A.M. asked the court to order OBH to provide a status update. The court granted the request and ordered a progress report. OBH did not submit the progress report required by the court, apparently because it was under the mistaken impression that the court had ordered a new competency evaluation. Therefore, in mid-March 2019, the court ordered an “evidentiary hearing,” which it scheduled to take place on May 1, 2019. The purpose of the hearing was to determine “if restoration remains viable” and whether restoration services “should continue.” In connection with that setting, the court ordered the People to “subpoena [the] needed representatives” from OBH to appear at the hearing.
¶11 On April 4, 2019, approximately a month before the hearing, OBH filed a progress report that indicated B.B.A.M. was doing well in the competency restoration program. However, the report contained no opinions. At the May 1 hearing, OBH submitted two additional progress reports, both of which predated the April 4 report; one was dated February 27 and the other March 29. The February 27 report informed the court that B.B.A.M. was “progressing nicely.” It specified that he was able to recall and describe “almost all the material” and that he could “describe with prompting” whatever he did not remember. It also mentioned that B.B.A.M. attended all his sessions on time, was always ready to learn, and was consistently “motivated to become competent and proceed with his case.” The March 29 report contained similar information. But neither report set forth any opinions.
¶12 The People advised the court at the May 1 hearing that they had not subpoenaed anyone from OBH because OBH‘s program director had advised them that any providers called to testify could not offer opinions regarding B.B.A.M.‘s competency or the likelihood of B.B.A.M. being restored to competency. According to OBH, its providers could only comment on what B.B.A.M. had done in the competency restoration program, including what modules he had completed, his engagement in the program, and his behavior while in attendance. In other words, OBH was standing by its conflict-of-interest position.
¶13 In light of OBH‘s stance, and given that more than a year had elapsed since the competency evaluation, the People orally requested a second court-ordered competency evaluation. The court granted the request over B.B.A.M.‘s strenuous objection, finding “that when a juvenile‘s been deemed to be incompetent to proceed, it‘s in the juvenile‘s best interest to be restored.” In so doing, the court generally agreed with all of the People‘s assertions: (1) the competency evaluation report was more than a year old; (2) a current competency evaluation was necessary; (3) OBH‘s providers had raised a conflict-of-interest concern; (4) the court needed to hear from the providers of the restoration services rendered to B.B.A.M.; and (5) the juvenile would suffer no prejudice by undergoing another competency evaluation.
¶14 B.B.A.M. sought judicial review of the juvenile court‘s order. But the district court sided with the juvenile court and held that
¶15 Approximately three weeks later, B.B.A.M. filed a C.A.R. 21 petition invoking our original jurisdiction. And we issued a rule to show cause.
II. Jurisdiction
¶16 The exercise of original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 rests solely within this court‘s discretion. People v. Tafoya, 2019 CO 13, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d 1193, 1195. We have made clear, though, that relief under C.A.R. 21 is “an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability.” People in Interest of T.T., 2019 CO 54, ¶ 16, 442 P.3d 851, 855-56 (quoting Villas at Highland Park Homeowners Ass‘n v. Villas at Highland Park, LLC, 2017 CO 53, ¶ 22, 394 P.3d 1144, 1151). In the past, we have exercised our jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1271 (Colo. 2005), when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, Hoffman v. Brookfield Republic, Inc., 87 P.3d 858, 861 (Colo. 2004), or when a petition raises “issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered,” Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 194 (Colo. 2001).
¶17 In invoking our original jurisdiction, B.B.A.M. argues that there is no other adequate remedy available, that he will suffer irreparable harm if we do not intervene, and that his petition presents an issue of significant public importance that we have never addressed. We agree with him and conclude that all three grounds justify the exercise of our jurisdiction in this case.
¶18 First, without our intervention, B.B.A.M. will be forced to undergo a second court-ordered competency evaluation. As such, ordinary appellate remedies in the event of an adjudication cannot properly address his claim of error and are inadequate.
¶19 Second, we have recognized that requiring a party “to undergo a medical examination against her will” is a decision that “implicates her privacy interests in her body and her health.” Schultz v. GEICO Cas. Co., 2018 CO 87, ¶ 13, 429 P.3d 844, 847. While this case does not involve a medical examination, Schultz is nevertheless instructive because the district court upheld the juvenile court‘s order to have B.B.A.M. undergo a second competency evaluation against his will. If the district court erred in doing so, there is at least potential for irreparable harm.
¶20 Finally, B.B.A.M.‘s petition raises an issue of first impression that is of significant public importance. Before 2017, “Colorado‘s statutory scheme [did] not designate an entity responsible for competency restoration services, nor [did] it provide a sufficient framework for the provision of outpatient restoration services to adults or juveniles.”
¶21 As the juvenile court acknowledged, the implementation of the 2017 legislation has not been without glitches and has caused some confusion. To begin, OBH and the juvenile court understood
¶22 We believe that this appeal presents a good opportunity to shed light on the 2017 statutory amendments. Moreover, we are convinced that today‘s decision will have ramifications for many juveniles throughout the state because the issue before us is likely to recur.
III. Standard of Review
¶23 Whether the juvenile court correctly determined it had authority to order a second competency evaluation is a question
IV. Analysis
¶24 The district court relied primarily on
¶25 When we interpret a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 17, 449 P.3d 725, 729. We must give the statute‘s words their plain and ordinary meaning, and we must read those words “in context” and “according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Id. (quoting McCoy, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d at 389).
¶26 Like the juvenile court, the district court misconstrued the language of
¶27 Here, the juvenile court correctly applied the provision when B.B.A.M.‘s counsel first raised B.B.A.M.‘s competency to proceed. The court ordered a competency evaluation because it felt it had inadequate information to make “a preliminary finding” of competency or incompetency. However, the court erred when it ordered a second competency evaluation. Regardless of the stage in the proceedings when the question of competency is raised, nothing in
¶28
¶29 There is one other method that allows the court to find that a juvenile has been restored to competency—“during a review, as provided in
¶30 Here, OBH asserted that its providers had a conflict of interest in opining about B.B.A.M.‘s progress toward competency or likelihood of being restored to competency. But the statutory scheme does not
¶31 Given OBH‘s conflict claim, we understand why the People requested a second competency evaluation at the May 1 hearing. But we ultimately side with B.B.A.M. because the juvenile court lacked authority to compel him to undergo a second competency evaluation in lieu of holding a restoration hearing or a restoration review.
¶32 We are not persuaded otherwise by our decision in W.P. It is true that we said there that the juvenile court has “discretion to decide when to order a competency evaluation.” W.P., ¶ 35, 295 P.3d at 526. However, when this statement is read in context, it becomes clear that we did not mean to suggest that a juvenile court may order a second competency evaluation in lieu of holding a restoration hearing or a restoration review. We reiterate that after a court has made a final determination of incompetency and a juvenile has started receiving restoration services, the court must determine whether the juvenile has been restored to competency either at a restoration hearing pursuant to
¶33 The People also refer us to
¶34 In sum, the juvenile court lacked authority to order B.B.A.M. to submit to a second competency evaluation to determine whether he had been restored to competency. It should have held a restoration hearing or a restoration review instead.
V. Conclusion
¶35 We conclude that the district court erred in upholding the juvenile court‘s order compelling B.B.A.M. to undergo a second competency evaluation. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to return the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT dissents, and JUSTICE HART joins in the dissent.
In Re People v. B.B.A.M.
No. 19SA151
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
December 9, 2019
2019 CO 103
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, dissenting.
¶36 A court may order a competency examination whenever it lacks adequate information to determine whether a juvenile is competent to proceed in an adjudication.
¶37 What the magistrate did in this case makes perfect sense. To briefly summarize the facts, the juvenile here, who had previously been found to be incompetent, had been receiving restorative services for approximately eleven months and was reportedly doing well in those services. Thus, any information the court had regarding the juvenile‘s competency from the initial competency examination was stale. The court, however, did not have anyone available to opine as to the juvenile‘s current competency. At that point, the magistrate determined that she did not have adequate information to make a finding of competency. She therefore looked to
¶38 The plain language of
Whenever the question of a juvenile‘s competency to proceed is raised, the court shall make a preliminary finding that the juvenile is or is not competent to proceed. If the court feels that the information available to it is inadequate for making such a finding, it shall order a competency examination.
The statute, in effect, allows the parties or the court to raise the issue of the juvenile‘s competency at any stage of the proceeding. At the point in time that the juvenile‘s competency is called into question, the court must make a preliminary finding regarding the juvenile‘s competency. Typically, as in the case before us, the court does not have enough information to make such a determination. In that case, the court ”shall order a competency evaluation.”
¶39 The statute does not place limits on when the question of the juvenile‘s competency may be raised. Nor does it say anything about prior examinations or what the procedural posture of the case must be in order to compel an examination. As evidence of the breadth of the statute, the legislature specifically authorizes the court to also order a competency examination even after a jury has been impaneled.
¶40 Not only is this the plain language of the statute, but it also makes sense. Competency is a fluid concept. It can change. For instance, a juvenile who stops taking psychotropic medication may quickly deteriorate, calling his competency into question. The court needs adequate information about the juvenile‘s competency at that time, regardless of previous examinations.
¶41 As another example, a juvenile who was previously found to be incompetent due to his young age or intellectual challenges, but has since been taught about the criminal justice system and the various roles people have in it, may now be ready to assist his lawyer and understand his rights. Again, the court needs adequate information about the juvenile‘s competency. Here too, the court may order a competency examination.
¶42 These two examples demonstrate why the word “whenever” is critical to the proper reading of the statute. It gives the appropriate breadth to its plain language. This broad
¶43 Indeed, the majority instead focuses on the restoration hearing statute,
¶44 We cannot consider sections 19-2-1302(1) and 19-2-1304(1) in isolation. Courts must construe a statute within the broader context of the entire statutory scheme, “giv[ing] consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts.” Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 2011).
The court may order a restoration to competency hearing, as defined in
section 19-2-103(14.3) , at any time on its own motion, on motion of the prosecuting attorney, or on motion of the juvenile. The court shall order a restoration of competency hearing if a competency evaluator with the qualifications described insection 19-2-1302(4)(b) files a report certifying that the juvenile is competent to proceed.
In effect, the restoration statute provides the court with discretion to order a restoration hearing if it so chooses or at the parties’ request. As the statute indicates, the hearing must conform with
¶45 I also take issue with the majority‘s conclusion that
¶46 Under a common-sense reading, the phrase “preliminary finding” refers to the court‘s temporary determination of competency and not to the point at which the issue of competency is raised. Thus, a more natural reading of
¶47 This is so because competency is a fluid concept; it is not immutable, nor is it
¶48 I do agree with the majority that the legislature contemplated that the Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH“) would testify about a juvenile‘s progress toward competency at the restoration hearing. Unfortunately, OBH refuses to opine about the juvenile‘s competency due to a claim of conflict of interest. Under the majority‘s interpretation, I am concerned that the trial court is forced to shrug its shoulders because it lacks sufficient information to determine whether a juvenile has been restored to competency. The majority‘s holding essentially divests the trial court of its authority to make a determination at the restoration hearing by disallowing it to order an additional competency examination. To be sure, the statute provides that OBH is solely responsible for overseeing restoration or coordinating the necessary restoration services.
¶49 In sum, I agree with the majority that a restoration hearing must be held for the court to make a determination of the juvenile‘s competency. But where I part ways with the majority is in what evidence will be available for the court to make such a determination. Under circumstances such as these where OBH refuses to opine and a current competency examination cannot be ordered, how can the court determine if the juvenile has been restored to competency? I fear the court will be left to speculate. And that is not in the juvenile‘s best interest.
¶50 I would therefore affirm the court‘s decision below.7 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE HART joins in this dissent.