IN RE the PATERNITY OF L.S.G.:
T.E.D., Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
P.S.G., Respondent-Appellant.[]
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
*234 On behalf of the respondent-appellant, the cause was submitted on the brief of Edmund C. Carns of Hughes, Mathewson, Carns & Slattery of Oshkosh.
On behalf of the petitioner-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Diane L. Matsche, assistant corporation counsel, and Ronald A. Venci of Evans, Venci, Camilli & Bowman of Green Bay.
Before Cane, P.J., LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
*235 MYSE, J.
Patrick G. appeals an order denying his motions for HLA blood tests to determine the paternity of Loren G.[1] Patrick contends that the court abused its discretion when it refused to order blood tests based upon Patrick's allegation that he recently learned that the mother, Tina D., told a third party that he was not Loren's father. Patrick further contends that our holding in Nehls v. Nehls,
Loren was born on December 26, 1988. Six months later, Patrick was adjudicated Loren's father in a closed paternity proceeding. Patrick had been served with a petition that clearly stated the presumed conceptive period for Loren. At the paternity proceeding, the court apprised Patrick of the defenses available to him and his rights to assistance of counsel, blood tests and to contest paternity. Patrick expressly waived these rights and admitted paternity. In October 1991, Patrick filed a motion to reopen the paternity proceedings and requested the court to order HLA blood tests and other discovery. The court denied the motion based on Patrick's knowing and voluntary waivers, and its determination that reopening the judgment was not in Loren's best interests.
[1, 2]
A motion for blood tests preparatory to a motion to reopen a paternity judgment under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats., is addressed to the trial court's discretion. Nehls,
[3]
As grounds to order the HLA test under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats., Patrick alleges that (1) he first met Tina after the conceptive period had run, and (2) Tina told a third party that Patrick was not Loren's father. Relief under sec. 806.07 is allowed when there are "extraordinary circumstances." Nehls,
[4, 5]
In determining whether extraordinary circumstances exist, the trial court should consider
whether the judgment was the result of the conscientious, deliberate and well-informed choice of the claimant; whether the claimant received the effective assistance of counsel; whether relief is sought from a judgment in which there has been no judicial consideration of the merits and the interest of deciding the particular case on the merits outweighs the finality of judgments; whether there is a meritorious defense to the claim; and whether there are intervening circumstances making it inequitable to grant relief.
State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H.,
A review of the record indicates that the trial court considered all of these factors when it refused to order the HLA blood tests. After being advised of his right to assistance of counsel, the defenses to paternity and the availability of blood tests, Patrick admitted paternity. The trial court also determined that reopening the proceedings would not be in Loren's best interests. The trial court based this determination on the facts that Loren, Tina and Patrick lived together as a family for over a year after Loren's birth, and that reopening the proceedings would be disruptive to the parent-child bond existing between Loren and Patrick.
[7]
Patrick argues that under Nehls, he is entitled to HLA blood tests. In Nehls, we held:
[W]here, as here, an affidavit shows that an adjudicated father did not contest paternity at trial, but he has since received information which raises a question as to his paternity, he is entitled not to an order reopening the judgment, but to discovery, including access to HLA blood tests.
Id. at 521,
[8-10]
Patrick argues that because he did not contest paternity, the issue of paternity was not decided on the merits. However, a judgment on the merits was entered based on Patrick's admission of paternity. A trial is not *238 required to determine that the merits of the claim have been litigated. Great Lakes Trucking Co. v. Black,
[11]
The HLA test was available to Patrick, and he was informed of his right to that test at the paternity proceeding. Patrick waived that right, as well as his right to contest paternity. These actions manifest Patrick's choice not to present the court with the contention that he met Tina after the conceptive period had run. The contention that Patrick met Tina after the conceptive period had run was, or should have been, known to him at the time of the original paternity proceeding. Therefore, Patrick cannot now claim that this contention is an extraordinary circumstance requiring relief under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats.
Patrick also alleges that Tina told a third party that he was not Loren's father, and that this presents an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats. We note that this allegation is second-hand hearsay, supported only by an affidavit from the person to whom Tina allegedly made the statement. The affiant was not present at the hearing on Patrick's motion to reopen the proceedings, and Tina denies making such statements.
[12-14]
However, we need not address whether such information is an extraordinary circumstance. Even if the trial court determined that Patrick had presented extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify relief under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats., whether to grant relief is *239 still discretionary with the trial court. "A finding that there are grounds to reopen the judgment does not necessitate reopening it. As part of its exercise of discretion, the trial court may consider factors that would militate against granting relief." Johnson,
By the Court.Order affirmed.
NOTES
Notes
[] Petition to review denied.
[1] This is an expedited appeal under Rule 809.17, Stats.
