In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 204 F. 248

In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc.

204 F. 248 | 2d Cir. | 1913

Lead Opinion

NOYES, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). In considering this case it may be unnecessary to determine whether the pile driver, under all the circumstances, came within the limitation of liability statutes. If the statute applied and yet the accident occurred through fault within its privity or knowledge, the petitioner is not entitled to benefit by it. The determination of the question of privity' or knowledge may be decisive.

[1] The petitioner might have applied to limit its liability as soon as the claim in question arose and thus have brought all the issues into the District Court. It did hot choose to do so and left some issues to be decided in the.common law court. It is hound here by the decision upon such issues. In re Old Dominion S. S. Co. (D. C.) 115 Fed. 845; The Capt. Jack (D. C.) 169 Fed. 455.

The complaint in the common law court alleged, among other things, that there were defects in the ways, works and machinery through the fault of the defendant — the petitioner. Elsewhere it stated that the defect was the absence of braces to control piles while being driven. From the testimony in the common law case which was read into the present record, it appears that the absent brace was a “chock-block” which is a wedge-shaped piece of wood used, when necessary, to. prevent a pile while being driven from spinging out of proper alignment. There was also testimony that no chock-block was supplied or used upon this pile driver and, although there was much evidence to the contrary, that its absence caused the accident.

[2] Upon such allegations and evidence the judgment in the common law action necessarily went much further than to find mere negligence in the petitioner’s subordinate employés. It adjudicated that the petitioner was itself negligent in failing to equip the pile driver with a chock-block. These questions were raised by the pleadings, and evidence was offered upon them. They were settled by the judgment and it is not material that it may have settled other questions or that other grounds of negligence may have been charged. . A judgment on the merits is conclusive as to every matter' offered and received to sustain or defeat a demand. 23 Cyc. 1169, 1170.

[3] When therefore, the case came into the District Court, the only question was whether the absence of the chock-block was with the privity or knowledge of the petitioner. The finding in the common law case that the petitioner failed in its duty to properly equip did not establish that. But the petitioner is a corporation, and is charged with the knowledge of its officers or agents who have charge of the particular subject matter. Undoubtedly its high officers were not per*251sonally informed as to the details of the equipment of all the vessels belonging to their corporation. But it had a superintendent whose duty it was to see that all vessels were in repair and properly equipped. The petitioner failed to show that the absence of a chock-block was without the knowledge of such superintendent. It failed to show that the pile driver when built was supplied with a chock-block or that it ever had one. Consequently the petitioner failed to show want of privity or knowledge and, in view of the common law judgment, fails to bring itself within the limitation of liability statute. In re Jeremiah Smith & Sons, 193 Fed. 395, 113 C. C. A. 391.

Martin T. Mantón and Anthony J. Ernest, both of New York City, for appellant. Everett, Clark & Benedict, of New York City (Edward G. Benedict, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

The decree of the District Court is reversed with costs and the cause remanded with instructions, in case the claimant apply therefor, _ to decree in her behalf to the extent of the fund in the hands of the trustee without prejudice to her right to collect the remainder of her judgment.

Rehearing

On Petition for Rehearing.

PER CURIAM.

Tn view of the petition and the brief accompanying it, we have again considered the question whether the petitioner sustained the burden of showing that the failure of a master’s duty upon which the common law judgment was based, was without its privity or knowledge.

The petitioner is apparently a large corporation having different departments of business, over one of which Campbell was superintendent. It is not satisfactorily shown that any duly elected officers of the corporation had any duty of inspecting the pile driving plant under him. There is no proof that the pile driver, either as part of the structure or of the equipment, ever had a chock-block and Campbell certainly was aware of its condition. Under such circumstances we still think he was such a representative of the corporation that his knowledge was imputable to it. While the cases generally speak of the knowledge of managing officers as being the knowledge of the corporation, the real test is not as to their being officers in a strict sense but as to the largeness of their authority. Upon the record as it stands we are satisfied that our former conclusion was correct.

[4] The petitioner further urges that we should now take further testimony as to the authority actually possessed by Campbell. It is possible that we should give weight to this request were it not for another consideration which we did not lay stress upon in the opinion. It is entirely clear from the testimony, as already pointed out, that this vessel which was rebuilt by the petitioner as a pile driver had been lacking in a cliock-hlock for five years before the accident. Whatever may have been the authority of the superintendent, the corporation must be presumed to have had knowledge of such condition, and this presumption is not overcome by general statements of the elected officers that they kept the vessel in good repair and knew of no defects in it. *252Their testimony was not directed to chock-blocks and the proof is that none was ever supplied. A corporation cannot be excused for a long continued and apparent structural defect or for lack of necessary equipment without any proof that a supply of such equipment was available or that it was the duty of any agent to obtain it.

The case was apparently tried in the common law court upon the theory that chock-blocks were not necessary and, consequently, that the petitioner omitted no duty in failing to supply them. The common law judgment negatived this theory and produced a situation where the establishment of want of knowledge or privity was particularly difficult. In such situation we think the proof offered entirely insufficient for the purpose.

The petition for a rehearing is denied.