IN RE: P.M.H.
C.A. No. 18AP0057
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO
December 2, 2019
[Cite as In re P.M.H., 2019-Ohio-4908.]
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO CASE Nо. 2018 JUV-G 000266
Dated: December 2, 2019
CALLAHAN, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, T.H., appeals an order of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that granted legal custody of her daughter P.M.H. to her father. This Court affirms in part and reverses in part.
I.
{¶2} T.H. (“Mother“) and C.P. (“Father“) are the parents of P.M.H., who was four years old at the time of the trial court proceedings in this case. Mother and Father have never been married. In 2017, the parties obtained an administrative order for child support and medical support from the Wayne County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA“) pursuant to
In addition to the findings and provisions stated in this Order, both parties have reviewed the Wayne County Juvenile Court‘s Standard Order of Parenting Time Local Rule 11. Both parties knowingly and voluntarily agree to be bound by the terms of this parenting time order until further order of the Court. The Standard Order of Parenting Time to which both parties agree and are bound is attached to this Administrative Order, incorporated by reference, and hereby made a part of
this Order. Both parties were informed that Wayne County Child Support Enforcement Agency cannot assist either party with modifying or enforcing any term in their parenting time order, but both parties have been made aware that they may privately file a motion in Wayne County Juvenile Court if еither party wishes to modify or enforce the attached parenting time agreement.
CSEA moved the juvenile court to adopt and register the order, as required by
{¶3} On March 30, 2018, Father filed a document entitled “MOTION BY FATHER TO CHANGE CUSTODY - MAKING FATHER THE CUSTODIAL PARENT.” In the motion, which Father made by filling in blanks on a preprinted form prepared by the juvenile court, Father indicated that he was the noncustodial parent pursuant to the case number assigned to the registration of the administrative support order. Mother, in turn, filed a document entitled “MOTION FOR CHANGE OF PARENTING TIME (COMPANIONSHIP AND VISITATION) AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT.” Like Father‘s pleading, Mother‘s wаs produced using a form—a preprinted copy of Uniform Juvenile Form 5, approved by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Following a pretrial appearance, the magistrate recognized that “[t]he parties informed the court that they [had] a parеnting time order from the Wayne County Child Support Enforcement Agency.”
{¶4} During the subsequent hearing before the magistrate, Father confirmed that he was seeking custody of P.M.H. Both parents presented testimony related to the best interests of the child. The magistrate noted thаt the parties had agreed to a standard schedule of visitation as part of CSEA‘s administrative determination, but evaluated their respective motions as requests for an initial allocation of parental rights and responsibilities. The magistrate concluded that it was in the best interest of P.M.H. to name Father as the residential parent and to provide Mother with parenting time as provided by local rule. The magistrate also determined that
{¶5} The trial court denied Mother‘s motion to hear additional evidence, overruled her objections, and entered judgment consistent with its previous decision. Mother filed this appeal. Her five assignments of error are rearranged for purposes of discussion.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING AND FAILING TO HOLD A HEARING ON APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO HEAR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE BEFORE RULING UPON OBJECTIONS.
{¶6} In her fifth assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on her motion for additional evidence and, ultimately, by denying that motion before ruling on her оbjections.
{¶7}
{¶8} This Court has concluded that
{¶9} In the context of the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, courts have also observed that requiring a party to file a motion for modification of parental rights does not substitute for hearing additional evidence before judgment is entered in the first instance. See Maddox at ¶ 20 (“[R]equiring [the father] to file a subsequent motion for modification” basеd on changed circumstances “would not be judicially economical, would place form over substance, and would not serve the best interest of the parties’ children.“). See also Morrison at ¶ 27-28. In this respect, this Court has concluded that both judicial economy аnd the best interests of a child are better served when a trial court considers new evidence that arises after a magistrate‘s
{¶10} In this cаse, Mother requested a hearing based on new evidence related to the best interest of P.M.H. in the trial court‘s determination of parental rights and responsibilities. She noted in her motion concerns about the safety of Father‘s home and P.M.H.‘s physical condition once parenting time with Father commenced after the magistrate rendered a decision. In a separate pleading, Mother also requested, and was granted, the appointment of a guardian ad litem. This additional evidence was relevant to the trial court‘s determination of the custody issues in this case and, as this Court noted in In re: A.S., the best interests of P.M.H. and the interests of judicial economy would be better served by considering this evidence in the context of the custody determination than in the context of subsequent motions to modify custody, which were pending when the trial court entered judgment. This Court takes no position on whether Mother‘s allegations are well-founded or regarding whether they would have an impact on the trial court‘s ultimate determination of this case. We simply conclude that circumstances warranted a further hearing. See id. at ¶ 27. In light of our previous decisions in Morrison and In re A.S., this Court concludes that the trial court erred by denying Mother‘s motion for the trial court to hear additional evidence under
{¶11} Mother‘s fifth assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING AND FAILING TO HOLD A HEARING ON APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY.
{¶12} Mother‘s fourth assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to disqualify the magistrate without conducting a hearing on the motion. This Court disagrees.
{¶13} “Disqualification of a magistrate for bias or other cause is within the discretion of the court and may be sought by motion filed with the court.”
{¶14} Mother‘s first argument is that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on her motion to disqualify the magistrate. Although this Court has, on a prior occasion, concluded that a trial cоurt abused its discretion by denying a similar motion without conducting a hearing, we did so “[i]n light of the record before us,” which “raise[d] numerous questions that are not answered” about potential bias arising from the magistrate‘s relationship with persons connected to the litigation. Lingenfelter at ¶ 12, 16-17. In that case, the wife‘s motion to disqualify the magistrate alleged bias arising from the magistrate‘s relationship with husband‘s parents. Id. at ¶ 12. In a recorded discussion between the magistrate and counsel, the magistrate described that relationship, but the recording abruptly ended when the magistrate became aware that he was still on the record. Id. at ¶ 13. Further on-the-record comments reflected the magistrate‘s opinion of the wife. Id. This Court observed that in light of the fact that resolution
{¶15} In this case, Mother‘s motion to disqualify the magistrate was based solely on the magistrate‘s statements on the record during a hearing in which, Mother alleged, the magistrate demonstrated bias by providing Father with legal advice. Mother‘s motion did not point to any other conduct as evidence of bias or impartiality. Consequently, there are no concerns regarding an undeveloped and ambiguous record in this case, and this Court‘s decision in Lingenfelter is distinguishable on that basis.
{¶16} Mother‘s second argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to disqualify the magistrate. The Code of Judicial Conduct applies to magistrates as well as to judges.
{¶17} As evidence that the trial court abused its discretion, Mother points to the transcript of a contempt heаring conducted on September 25, 2018. The hearing was held to determine Father‘s motion for contempt, which alleged that Mother failed to comply with the trial court‘s order that determined he should be the residential parent of P.M.H. The magistrate
{¶18} The transcript of that proceeding does not demonstrate evidence that would lead a reasonable, objective observer to harbor serious doubts about the magistrate‘s impartiality. To the contrary, it demonstrates the magistrate‘s efforts to ensure that both parties to the proceeding understood the status of the case and to prevent future misunderstandings. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother‘s motion to disqualify the magistrate.
{¶19} Mother‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY APPLYING
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT‘S DECISION TO NAME APPELLEE RESIDENTIAL PARENT PURSUANT TO
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
THE TRIAL COURT‘S DECISION DENYING APPELLANT‘S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF PARENTING TIME PURSUANT TO
{¶20} In light of this Court‘s resolution of Mother‘s fifth assignment of error, her first, second, and third assignments of error are premature.
III.
{¶21} Mother‘s fifth assignment of error is sustained. Her fourth assignment оf error is overruled. Her first, second, and third assignments of error are premature. The judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part, rеversed in part, and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandаte, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
Costs taxed equally to both parties.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
TODD E. CHEEK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
C.P., pro se, for Appellee.