170 Ga. App. 74 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1984
Lead Opinion
A petition was filed alleging that appellant was a delinquent child by reason of her commission of the offense of theft by shoplifting. A hearing was conducted on the petition, at the conclusion of which the juvenile court found that appellant was a delinquent child for the reason alleged in the petition. Pursuant to that finding, a dispositional hearing was held and appellant was committed to the Department of Human Resources for care and supervision. Appellant appeals.
1. The general grounds are enumerated. The evidence adduced at the adjudicatory hearing authorized the following findings: Appellant was observed entering a store in the company of several smaller chil
This evidence authorized a finding that appellant was at least a party to the crime of theft by shoplifting. See generally Callaway v. State, 156 Ga. App. 598 (275 SE2d 158) (1980). “All questions as to reasonableness of the evidence are to be decided by the fact finder, and even though the evidence was circumstantial here, it was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Accordingly, we cannot disturb such finding unless we are supported by evidence [that appellant was] not guilty as a matter of law. [Cits.]” D. O. D. v. State of Ga., 156 Ga. App. 301, 303 (274 SE2d 696) (1980). The finding that appellant committed a delinquent act is supported by sufficient evidence of record.
2. Appellant enumerates as error the juvenile court’s dispositional decision to order commitment to the Department of Human Resources. No “explicit finding is required as to the need for treatment or rehabilitation, as long as the record shows that there is clear and convincing evidence which authorizes the judge’s implicit finding (implied from his action committing the child . . .)” that such a dis
3. Although the issue was never raised below, on appeal, appellant asserts that the accusatory proceedings against her were conducted by a juvenile probation officer and that this was error. The state does not contest the assertion that it was a juvenile probation officer who conducted the delinquency proceedings against appellant. The state merely contends that no reversible error results from this fact.
The relevant statute provides as follows: “In any proceeding before the juvenile court, the judge, upon his own motion, may request the assistance of the district attorney or a member of his staff to conduct the proceedings on behalf of the petitioner. If for any reason the district attorney is unable to assist, the judge may appoint legal counsel for such purpose.” OCGA § 15-11-28 (d). It is clear that a juvenile probation officer is not “the district attorney or a member of his staff ...” Moreover, assuming that a juvenile probation officer were a licensed attorney and therefore could be considered as “legal counsel” within contemplation of OCGA § 15-11-28 (d), it is clear that he would still be otherwise unauthorized to conduct accusatory proceedings against a child before the juvenile court. “A probation officer may not conduct accusatory proceedings against a child who is or may be under his care or supervision . . .” OCGA § 15-11-8 (5). (Emphasis supplied.)
These prohibitions serve not only to protect the interests of the child; the entire juvenile court system benefits. First, it is fundamental that accusatory proceedings of any nature, juvenile or otherwise, should be conducted only by one who is licensed to practice law. Although a juvenile accusatory hearing is not a criminal proceeding, it is nonetheless a legal proceeding. We construe OCGA § 15-11-28 (d) as requiring, at the minimum, that “legal counsel” conduct juvenile accusatory proceedings. Second, the wisdom of the prohibition of OCGA § 15-11-8 (5) is obvious. It is clear that the official whose statutory responsibilities include the supervision and assisting of juveniles can best serve that remedial function if, insofar as possible, he remains an objective and unbiased figure in the eyes of those juveniles whom he supervises and assists. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in holding that it is error for a juvenile probation officer to conduct accusatory proceedings against a child “who is or may be under his care or supervision . . .”
The question yet remains, however, of the effect that appellant’s failure to raise any objection in the juvenile court has upon her right
Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially.
While agreeing with Divisions 1 and 2 and the judgment affirming the juvenile court proceedings below, it should be observed that the issue discussed in Division 3 of the majority opinion was never raised below. Since the purpose of our court is to correct errors made below and since there were no objections made on this point, there is nothing for us to decide. “He may, therefore, not raise these issues on appeal.” Willis v. State, 249 Ga. 261, 266 (290 SE2d 87) (1982).