675 A.2d 1290 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1996
David Lebrón appeals from two orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which denied his motion to return to him a 1988 Toyota Corolla XR-5 automobile and granted the Commonwealth’s petition to forfeit the car as derivative contraband.
The Commonwealth contends that Lebrón, although the title owner of the automobile, is
The relevant facts are as follows. During the course of a police investigation of Angel Marrero and the drug activity at a bar known as Anita’s Place at 2812 North Lawrence Street in Philadelphia, Marrero was seen by a police detective operating the subject 1988 Toyota Corolla XR-5 on several occasions. Furthermore, the car was reported to be seen in front of Anita’s Place on at least a dozen other occasions when Marrero was there. Much of this activity was recorded on videotape and admitted into evidence at the hearings before the trial court.
On one occasion, police intercepted a telephone call Marrero made to the service department of a Toyota dealership which was doing some service work on the car. Marre-ro stated: “This is Angel, ah ... you have my Toyota there”; he then identified the car by make, model and year. (Commonwealth Exhibit No. 1, Transcript of telephone call, 11/10/89.) He asked the serviceman, named Anthony, if he had the owner’s card for the vehicle, stating that he, Marrero, needed to pick the owner’s card up. When asked whose name the car was under, Marrero told the serviceman that he could not recall the name and both laughed about that fact. At another time, police also observed Marrero installing stereo speakers in the car in front of the bar at Anita’s Place.
On November 22,1989, as the result of the investigation of Marrero’s activities,
On January 5, 1990, the Commonwealth filed a forfeiture petition pursuant to Sections 6801-6802 of the Judicial Code (hereinafter the Forfeiture Act),
Lebrón introduced the certificate of title in his name, testified that he had purchased the car by trading in another vehicle plus paying $1,500 cash, and that he financed the balance of the cost through a finance company. The trial court, however, found that Lebrón presented no proof of his purchase, but was only able to produce evidence of the financing. Significantly, he could not produce an agreement of sale and produced no evidence at all that he had ever been seen operating the car. Lebrón lives in the 3700 block of North 7th Street, but testified that he kept the Toyota XR-5 in a garage at 4631 Rosehill Street, which was, as indicated, approximately eighteen blocks away. Marrero was arrested by
After hearing all of the evidence, the trial judge concluded that Lebrón was the owner in name only, that his registered ownership was merely a sham ownership, and that Mar-rero actually exercised dominion and control over the automobile. Accordingly, Claimant’s motion was denied, and the vehicle was ordered forfeited to the Commonwealth. This appeal followed.
Lebrón presents three arguments for our review: (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in holding that he, Lebrón, had failed to sustain his burden of proving that he was the lawful owner of the car; and (3) the vehicle should not have been forfeited because the Commonwealth did not sustain its burden of proof under the forfeiture statutes.
Lebrón first argues that this case should not have been transferred from the Superior Court to the Commonwealth Court because Claimant filed a motion to return the property pursuant to Pa. R.Crim. P. 324, which provides:
(a) A person aggrieved by a search and seizure, whether or not executed pursuant to a warrant, may move for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession thereof. Such motion shall be filed in the Court of Common Pleas for the judicial district in which the property was seized.
(b) The judge hearing such motion shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision thereon. If the motion is granted, the property shall be restored unless the court determines that such property is contraband, in which case the court may order the property to be forfeited.
Claimant contends that because Pa. R.Crim. P. 324 is a rule of criminal procedure, these proceedings are no longer civil, and therefore, such an appeal is not within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction as provided in Section 762 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 762 (vesting jurisdiction in this Court in appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas in civil actions commenced by the Commonwealth government).
However, the mere fact that the procedure which governs Lebron’s possesso-ry claim is described by a rule of criminal procedure does not determine jurisdiction and does not transform the essential character of the in rem action of a forfeiture into a criminal proceeding. Section 6802(a) of the Forfeiture Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6802(a), declares that the “proceedings for the forfeiture or condemnation of property, the sale of which is provided for in this chapter, shall be in rem, in which the Commonwealth shall be the plaintiff and the property the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) Just as under Section 5513(b) of the Crimes Code,
In actual practice, there are seldom any significantly distinguishing features in terms of the standards applied between a forfeiture action commenced by the Commonwealth and motions to return property commenced by an individual. Under Pa. R.Crim. P. 324, an aggrieved person must establish first that he is entitled to the lawful possession of the property. Pomerantz. The burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to resist the return of property by proving that it is contraband. Pa. R.Crim. P. 324.
Of course, there may be certain situations where, because of the very nature of the order of the court, the issue of forfeiture would be criminal in nature, e.g., where the appeal is from a judgment of sentence following a criminal defendant’s guilty plea of driving under the influence of alcohol and the trial judge, as a condition of the defendant’s probation, orders that the defendant’s truck be forfeited. Commonwealth v. Crosby, 390 Pa.Superior Ct. 140, 568 A.2d 233 (1990). In such circumstances, any appeal from the trial court’s judgment of sentence would properly fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the
There are, of course, strong policy reasons to vest jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court for most forfeiture and “forfeiture-like” proceedings. The most obvious is the importance of a unitary appellate review of the same type of case. It would not make much sense to bifurcate these appeals between the Superior Court, for review of an order denying an appellant’s motion under Pa. R.Crim. P. 324, and the Commonwealth Court, for appellate review of an order of forfeiture under the Forfeiture Act. This would be a needless waste of time and resources for both the courts and the litigants. Moreover, unitary review will result in a consistent body of ease law and decrease the possibility of conflicting authority, which will provide guidance for both the Commonwealth and private citizens alike. Further, it will discourage “forum shopping” between the Commonwealth and Superior Courts created by a race to be first to file either a petition under the Forfeiture Act or a motion to return property under Pa. R.Crim. P. 324.
Accordingly, we hold that this Court has the authority to hear appeals from orders disposing of motions for the return of property pursuant to Pa. R.Crim. P. 324 in addition to our jurisdiction under the Forfeiture Act itself. See also Section 705 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 705 (both intermediate appellate courts have the authority on then-own motion to transfer “any appeal to the other court for consideration and decision with any matter pending in such other court involving the same or related questions of fact, law or discretion”).
We now turn to the merits of Le-bron’s appeal.
Lebrón argues that because his name was on the vehicle registration, he presented sufficient evidence to prove that he was the lawful owner of the Toyota XR-5. However, title ownership, as well as actual possession, is only one element of ownership, Commonwealth v. One 1988 Suzuki Samurai, 139 Pa.Cmwlth. 68, 589 A.2d 770 (1991), and here, Lebrón never established that he ever “possessed” the car. The trial court properly looked beyond the “paperwork” to analyze whether Lebrón also exercised dominion and control of the vehicle. Id. In Suzuki, the woman claiming ownership asserted that she was the lawful owner of the vehicle because she was the title owner and had the financial responsibility for the vehicle. However, this Court found that the vehicle had been purchased for her daughter’s use at work, was never driven by the woman, and was in fact garaged at her daughter’s residence some distance away from her home. Similarly in this case, the trial court found that the keys to the Toyota XR-5 were in possession of Marrero’s ex-wife, the car was garaged eighteen blocks
Lebrón also argues that the Commonwealth faded to sustain its burden of proving that the Toyota XR-5 was forfeitable under the Act.
Under the Forfeiture Act, “[a]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used or are intended for use to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of, property [in violation of the Controded Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
This matter was argued before a panel consisting of President Judge James Gardner Colins, Judge Joseph T. Doyle, and Senior Judge Charles Wright. Because of the death of Senior Judge Wright, the case was submitted on briefs to Senior Judge Charles A Lord for consideration as a member of the panel.
ORDER
NOW, April 30, 1996, the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter are hereby affirmed.
.Throughout the notes of testimony taken on three different occasions from June 5, 1990 to July 31, 1991, the name "Marrero” is often spelled with only two ‘Vs," i.e., “Marero,” rather than with three 'Vs,” i.e., "Marrero.” For the sake of uniformity, we will adopt the latter spelling.
.Two Philadelphia detectives from the Dangerous Drug Offenders Unit testified that between October 3, 1991 and November 7, 1991, they made numerous purchases of large quantities of cocaine, saw Marrero directing the drug operation, and on November 7, 1991, purchased an ounce of cocaine for $750 directly from Marrero.
.42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6801-6802.
. The evidence establishing that Evelyn Marrero was Angel Marrero’s ex-wife and that she lives at 4631 North Rosehill Street was hearsay evidence, but this was not made an issue on appeal by Lebrón.
. The appeal was originally filed in the Superior Court, but on motion of the Commonwealth was transferred to this Court.
. Claimant, citing Commonwealth v. Pomerantz, 393 Pa. Superior Ct. 186, 573 A.2d 1149 (1989) (if the Commonwealth does not file a petition for forfeiture, a court has no authority to order forfeiture in response to a motion under Pa. R.Crim. P. 324 for the return of property), also states that although the Commonwealth "technically" filed a forfeiture petition with the "Philadelphia Clerk of Quarter Sessions,” the trial court’s order granting the forfeiture was a nullity, since it was never physically “presented” to the trial judge. This argument is specious. The petition was properly filed and considered by the trial judge, who entered an appropriate order. It has never been required that such motions be physically submitted to the court at the hearing.
.18 Pa.C.S.§ 5513(b).
. Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, as reenacted and amended by, Act of June 29, 1987, P.L. 32, 47 P.S. § 6-602(a).
. But see Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 161 Pa.Cmwlth. 548, 637 A.2d 736, (1994), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 540 Pa. 605, 655 A.2d 993 (1995), where we held that under certain circumstances where the Commonwealth seeks forfeiture trader the Forfeiture Act, an indigent defendant is entitled to court appointed counsel.
.Although the language of Pa. R.Crim. P. 324 is less than clear on this point, even if the court denies the motion to return the property to a person claiming ownership, it is not automatically forfeited to the Commonwealth until the Commonwealth files a petition to forfeit, either orally or in writing. Pomerantz.
. President Judge Rowley writing for the Superior Court in Crosby, pointed out that in that case, an "appeal [was] from a judgment of sentence rather than from an order in a civil action relating to forfeiture.” Id. at 154, 568 A.2d at 240 (emphasis in original).
. It is also worth noting that transferring both forfeiture appeals and appeals from Pa. R.Crim. P. 324 orders to this Court will not interfere with the criminal proceedings which are clearly within the Superior Court’s jurisdiction and expertise. These proceedings are almost completely independent of the underlying criminal proceedings, and the Superior Court has held that appeals from orders denying the motion to return properly by criminal defendants are interlocutory and unappealable during the pendency of the criminal áction. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 288 Pa. Superior Ct. 198, 431 A.2d 357 (1981).
. Our scope of review is limited to examining whether the findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Commonwealth v. $8006.00 U.S. Currency, 166 Pa.Cmwlth. 251, 646 A.2d 621 (1994); see also SAS, Inc. v. State Police Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement, 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 263, 638 A.2d 455, petition for allowance of appeal denied, 539 Pa. 660, 651 A.2d 545 (1994).
. Significantly, on the forfeiture petition he does not allege that he is an innocent owner under Section 6802(j).
. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-101 to § 780-144.
