In Re Olivia A.
On August 22, 1983, Solano County Superior Court issued an order declaring Olivia A. free from the custody and control of her father, appellant herein. On January 3, 1984, the district attorney, on behalf of Solano County, filed a mоtion to vacate or modify that order, or in the alternative for equitable relief. Olivia‘s father filed an opposition to the county‘s motion. Following a hearing on May 1, 1984, the court vacated its order, finding that a fraud had been perpetrated on the court. This appeal followed.
Statement of Facts
Olivia A., born July 21, 1980, is the daughter of Lucyle J. and appellant, Chris S. Her parents have never been married. On January 11, 1983, Olivia‘s parents entered into a stipulated judgment establishing appellant‘s paternity, and аrrearages in child support of $1,200 through September 1982, and ongoing support of $75 per month commencing October 25, 1982. Appellant paid $180 of his child support obligation in May 1983. Lucyle has received public aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) since Olivia was born.
On June 23, 1983, Lucyle filed a petition to declare Olivia free from appellant‘s custody and control, pursuant to
Both appellant and Lucyle appeared in propria persona at a hearing on the matter on August 17, 1983. The case was taken off calendar because the parties had failed to bring necessary documents. Appellant testified subsequently that he and Lucyle signed a stipulation to terminate his parental rights and responsibilities which hе presented to the court soon after the hearing was taken off calendar. Lucyle testified that she did not sign the stipulation and took no further action on the petition after the hearing was
The county had not been notified regarding the petition to declare Olivia freе from her father‘s custody. Soon after being notified that appellant had terminated his custody rights and support obligations, the county moved to vacate the trial court‘s order. On May 1, 1984, the trial court granted the motion, stating on the record: “All right. Maybe I‘m going to be making some law, but I feel rather strongly about this and perhaps it‘s because I was the judge in question. In any event, I find that there was a fraud perpetrated on the Court for the reason that the record does not reveal that at anytimе there was mention that there was a third party specifically and primarily concerned here, which is the District Attorney‘s office as representative of the minor or for person‘s support through AFDC. [¶] Further, that this order was obtained appаrently on some comment about a stipulation that does not appear in the record. It‘s apparent from all of the pleadings set forth that the purpose of the entire proceedings was not in the spirit of the 230 sections of the code in that it was not to facilitate an adoption but was done to, in fact, avoid the requirement of payment of support by [appellant]. And, finally, because there was not compliance with the investigation procedures as well.”
Discussion
Appellant contends that (1) the county lacks standing to appear in this action, and (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the previous order. We disagree, and therefore affirm the action taken by the trial court.
1. The county has standing.
“[T]he еnforcement of child support rights involves not only a matter of private or local concern, but poses an important question for the federal and state governments as well. Consequently, in determining child support rights, including those relating to the assignment of such rights, we are governed not only by the rules of common law, but also by specific statutes enacted by the federal and state legislative bodies. Notably, in 1975 Congress adopted
(1) In the instant case, since Lucyle appliеd for an received public assistance, her support rights against appellant were assigned to the county by operation of law. (See also
(3)
(4)
In County of Alameda v. Clifford (1960) 187 Cal. App.2d 714 [10 Cal. Rptr. 144], the defendant‘s mother was receiving an old age security grant from county, state and federal funds. The defendant brought an action under
We conclude, therefore, that not only did the county have standing to object to the court‘s action, but the county was an indispensable party to that proceeding. We turn now to the second issue, whether the trial court had jurisdiction to vacate the order.
2. The trial court properly vacated its prior order.
In support of his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the previous order, appellant cites
(5) Despite the language of
Second,
Third, the trial judge stated on the record that he believed that a fraud had been perpetrated on the court. A court always retains the inherent power to vacate a judgment obtained through fraud. (Villarruel v. Arreola (1977) 66 Cal. App.3d 309, 317-318 [136 Cal. Rptr. 19]; County of Alameda v. Clifford, supra, 187 Cal. App.2d 714, 720.) “It is settled law that in such a context an adversely affected party, although a stranger to the action, will have standing according to principles of equity to proceed to have the judgment so obtained set aside.” (Villarruel v. Arreola, supra, 66 Cal. App.3d 309, 317.)
In vacating the order, the court stated: “I find that there was a fraud perpetrated on the Court for the reason that the record does not reveal that at anytime there was mention that there was a third party spеcifically and primarily concerned here, which is the District Attorney‘s office as representative or the minor or for the person‘s support through AFDC.... It‘s apparent ... that the purpose of the entire proceedings was not in the spirit of the 230 Sections ... in that it was not to facilitate an adoption but was done to, in fact, avoid the requirement of payment of support....”
The California Supreme Court explained in In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826 [191 Cal. Rptr. 464, 662 P.2d 922], that case law, legislative history, and black letter statutory language all confirm the obvious conclusiоn that a
In addition, the court was not advised that Lucyle received AFDC or that the order would affect the county‘s right to reimbursement. The facts of the instant case support the trial court‘s conclusion that a fraud was committed on the court. Therefore, the court retained the power to set aside the initial order.
Finally, “[a] court of equity is not сonfined to cases of fraud. Want of notice and consequent inability to be heard may be sufficient ground for equity to interpose to set aside a judgment [or order].” (County of Alameda v. Clifford, supra, 187 Cal. App.2d 714, 721.) The trial court‘s decision to vacate the previous order, thereforе, may also be affirmed on the ground that the county, as an indispensable party, was denied its opportunity to present its case and to obtain a fair adversarial hearing on the matter.
The order setting aside the order terminating appellant‘s parental rights and responsibilities is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs.
Barry-Deal, J., and Merrill, J., concurred.