In Re Oakwood Homes Corporation, Debtor. Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Company Jefferson-Pilot Financial Insurance Tyndall Partners, Lp and Tyndall Institutional Partners, Lp, in No. 05-2032. (Amended in Accordance With Clerk's Order Dated 7/22/05). In Re Oakwood Homes Corporation, Debtor. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, in No. 05-2033
Robert J. Dehney, Gilbert R. Saydah, Jr., Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, DE, Robert J. Stark, Brown Rudnick Berlack Israels, New York, NY, for OHC Liquidation.
Michael B. Fisco (Argued), Faegre & Benson LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Karen C. Bifferato, Connolly Bove Lodge & Hutz LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Appellee U.S. Bank National Association.
OPINION OF THE COURT
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Consolidated before us are two appeals by JP Morgan Chase Bank (“JP Morgan“). JP Morgan challenges the District Court‘s order affirming the Bankruptcy Court‘s decision to reduce claims filed by JP Morgan, the trustee for the holders of certain certificates, after objections were filed by the U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank“), the indenture trustee for the holders of certain more senior notes. The Bankruptcy Court‘s dual, but related, rulings first disallowed any part of JP Morgan‘s claims for unmatured interest arising under a Guarantee on the certificates, then further discounted the principal of the claims to present value. JP Morgan alleges that discounting the principal of the claims to present value is unauthorized by the Bankruptcy Code, and results in inequitable treatment of like creditors. JP Morgan does not appeal the District Court‘s affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court‘s disallowance of claims for unmatured interest. We will reverse the order of the District Court with respect to present value discounting of principal.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Oakwood and the Trusts
These appeals arise from the bankruptcy proceedings of Oakwood Homes Corporation (“Oakwood“), a builder and seller of prefabricated homes. Oakwood‘s subsidiaries frequently extended credit to home-buyers under long-term mortgage arrangements, then securitized these mortgages by selling them to trusts set up for this purpose (“the Trusts“).1 The Trusts issued various certificates in order to raise the money to pay Oakwood for the mortgages. The certificates were serviced by the Trusts with the funds paid by customers under their mortgages. The buyers of the certificates were entitled to periodic payments of principal and interest.
At issue here are certain low-priority certificates issued by several of the Trusts over the course of three years. The certificate holders represented by JP Morgan bought approximately $100 million of these certificates, known as “B-2 Certificates,” from underwriters. With such low payment priority relative to other issued certificates, the B-2 Certificates were understandably difficult to market. Oakwood therefore provided a Guarantee of payment for the B-2 Certificates, whereby Oakwood promised to cover any shortfalls in payments by the Trusts of principal or interest. For example, in the Guarantee for one of the Trusts at issue here, Oakwood agreed to “unconditionally and absolutely guarantee[] the full and prompt payment to the Trustee on or prior to the Remittance Date relating to each Distribution Date of the Limited Guarantee Payment Amount.”
The B-2 Certificates, and distributions thereon, were governed by the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for each Trust. One Trust at issue here, the 1997-D Trust,2 issued certificates with a total principal value of over $250 million, of which about $10 million were B-2 Certificates. The Pooling and Servicing Agreement explicitly provided for “the distribution of the principal of and interest on the Certificates in accordance with their terms.” The agreement specified the applicable interest rates, distribution dates, and priorities for each of the classes of issued certificates, including the B-2 Certificates. On each distribution date, the trustee of the Trust was instructed to distribute principal and interest payments to each class, in order of priority. Distribution dates stretched almost to the year 2030.
The distributions from the Trusts fundamentally depended on the mortgage customers making their scheduled mortgage payments to the Trusts. This did not happen in many cases. The future ability of the Trusts to make principal and interest payments to the B-2 Certificate holders, who had the lowest payment priority, therefore came into doubt. Such nonpayment would trigger Oakwood‘s obligation under the Guarantees to ensure full payment of principal and interest to the B-2 Certificate holders.
B. Bankruptcy Proceedings
Oakwood filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on November 15, 2002, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Various creditors filed proofs of claim with the Bankruptcy Court. U.S. Bank, for example, filed proofs of claim as indenture trustee for holders of $300 million of more senior notes issued directly by Oakwood. JP Morgan filed proofs of claim on behalf of B-2 Certificate holders, seeking over $1 billion. The holders of $605 million of these claims, covered under different Guarantees than those at issue here, settled their claims, leaving about $400 million in claims remaining.
JP Morgan alleged that because the Trusts were unable to fully service the B-2 Certificates, Oakwood was, and would continue to be, liable for the principal and interest shortfalls on the Certificates by virtue of the Guarantee. Of the $400 million in claims, about $116 million was attributable to future shortfalls in the Trusts’ payment of principal to the B-2 Certificate holders. Another $1 million was attributable to shortfalls in the Trusts’ payment of interest, due before Oakwood filed its bankruptcy petition (“pre-petition interest“). The remainder was attributable to future shortfalls in interest payments, that would come due after the petition date (“post-petition interest” or “unmatured interest“).
U.S. Bank filed objections to JP Morgan‘s claims on October 10, 2003, and November 21, 2003, pursuant to the objection provisions of
Following several hearings, the Bankruptcy Court issued two rulings relevant here. First, the Bankruptcy Court at a hearing on November 26, 2003, disallowed any portion of JP Morgan‘s claims attributable to post-petition interest, totaling hundreds of millions of dollars, pursuant to
While immaterial to this appeal, we note that the Bankruptcy Court approved a reorganization plan for Oakwood on April 16, 2004. JP Morgan will ultimately receive a distribution equal to between 37.4% and 50% of its allowed claims.
C. Appeals and Collateral Litigation
Acting now on behalf of the holders of B-2 Certificates allegedly entitled to $95.5 million (of the $116 million at issue in the Bankruptcy Court) in future principal shortfall payments, JP Morgan appealed the Bankruptcy Court‘s Orders to the District Court for the District of Delaware on May 17, 2004. The District Court affirmed both of the Bankruptcy Court‘s rulings — disallowing interest and discounting principal — on February 22, 2005.
The District Court rejected JP Morgan‘s argument that
JP Morgan appealed the District Court‘s Order in three separate appeals (representing various B-2 Certificate holders), which this Court consolidated on April 12, 2005. JP Morgan appealed only the decision to discount the principal shortfalls to present value, and did not challenge the disallowance of post-petition interest. This Court dismissed one of the appeals, docketed at No. 05-2034, on December 20, 2005, pursuant to a joint stipulation of the parties. Remaining before us are claims for roughly $30 million (undiscounted) in principal shortfalls for which Oakwood will be liable.
Following the filing of JP Morgan‘s notices of appeal, the parties continued to litigate collateral effects of the claims issues in the courts below. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the Oakwood estate to reserve $61 million to cover JP Morgan‘s claims appeals if JP Morgan posted a bond; JP Morgan declined to post the bond, and both the District Court and this Court refused to stay distributions from the estate. The District Court later granted such a stay without bond, then rescinded the stay and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court‘s ultimate setting of a $0 cash reserve absent posting of a bond. On December 19, 2005, we stayed the appeals of the latter order pending our resolution of the instant appeals.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over Oakwood‘s Chapter 11 filing pursuant to
The parties do not dispute the Bankruptcy Court‘s factual findings. We exercise plenary review over the Bankruptcy Court‘s legal decisions, and application of law to fact. In re Telegroup, Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002). “Because the District Court sat below as an appellate court, this Court conducts the same review of the Bankruptcy Court‘s order as did the District Court.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Because JP Morgan did not appeal the District Court‘s affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court‘s ruling disallowing any claim for post-petition interest under
Given the complexity of the issue at hand, we will set out up front the parties’ main contentions and our conclusions. JP Morgan alleges that the Bankruptcy Court should not have “double discounted” its claims by disallowing that part of the claims attributable to post-petition interest, and then further reducing the claims by discounting the remainder to present value. U.S. Bank argues that discounting to present value is required by the clear and unambiguous language of
We conclude that JP Morgan‘s claims involve separable interest and principal, and not merely a single future liability on Oakwood‘s part that would be discounted to reflect the time-value of money. We find that
A. The Claims
On appeal, appellee U.S. Bank attempted to fill in and defend the Bankruptcy Court‘s silent reasoning by alleging that the documents providing the foundation for JP Morgan‘s claims — the Guarantee and the Pooling and Servicing Agreement — show a simple agreement to receive money in the future, and that basic economics and the Bankruptcy Code require money received in the future to be discounted to present value. U.S. Bank also contends that because the claims are being made only on the Guarantee, and not on the B-2 Certificates themselves, the claims should be treated similarly as a mere future liability. JP Morgan responds that the documents, as well as the Bankruptcy Court‘s approach to the claims and U.S. Bank‘s own litigation strategy and admissions, prove that the claims are for future payments of separable principal and interest. We agree.
We begin with the documents themselves. The Pooling and Service Agreement, which governs the B-2 Certificates at issue here, clearly defined the Certificates in terms of principal and interest distributions at set dates. See, e.g., 1997-D Pooling and Service Agreement, at § 3 (defining the certificate classes, their pass-through rates, and initial principal balances); id. at § 5 (setting out the order of priority for principal and interest payments on each distribution date); id. at § 10 (stating that “[i]nterest on the . . . Class B-2 Certificates will be computed on the basis of a 360-day year consisting of twelve 30-day months“). Based on their governing documents, the B-2 Certificate holders were intended to be entitled to both principal and interest payments throughout the certificate lifetime.
The fact that the claims here arise only because of Oakwood‘s obligations under the Guarantee does not change the fundamental economic nature of the B-2 Certificate holders’ bargained-for transaction. The Guarantee applicable to the 1997-D Trust B-2 Certificates states that Oakwood “unconditionally and absolutely guarantees the full and prompt payment . . . of the Limited Guarantee Payment Amount (as such term is defined in the Pooling and Service Agreement), if any” for each scheduled distribution date. Turning back to the Pooling and Service Agreement, we see that “Limited Guarantee Payment Amount” is defined as follows:
“With respect to any Distribution Date, the amount after giving effect to the allocation of the Available Distribution Amount for such date, equal to the amount of shortfalls in collections on the Assets otherwise distributable on such Distribution Date not in excess of the sum of (a) any unpaid Interest Distribution Amount, Carryover Interest Distribution Amount, Writedown Interest Distribution Amount and Carryover Writedown Distribution Amount distributable on such Distribution Date . . . and (b) any unpaid principal amounts payable on such Distribution Date . . . .”
1997-D Pooling and Service Agreement, at § 2 (emphases added). After parsing this rather dense language, the Guarantee reduces to the following: Oakwood promised to cover any shortfall resulting from the Trust‘s inability to make distributions of interest and principal to the B-2 Certificate holders.4
We note that the approach of the Bankruptcy Court throughout this litigation illustrates JP Morgan‘s claims for future, separable, payments of principal and interest, and not simply for a lump sum of money payable in the future, as U.S. Bank would have us believe. The Bankruptcy Court allowed the portion of JP Morgan‘s claims attributable to pre-petition interest; disallowed the portion attributable to post-petition interest; and then treated the principal portion separately. The Bankruptcy Court similarly stated that it was irrelevant whether the claim arose against a guarantor instead of a primary obligor. Hearing, Bankruptcy Court, November 26, 2003. U.S. Bank itself urged this approach — separating interest and principal — throughout proceedings in this Court, the District Court, and the Bankruptcy Court.
We do not accept U.S. Bank‘s argument that simply because the claims technically arise from the Guarantee, we should not treat them like normal claims based on an instrument obligating the payor to make periodic distributions of principal and interest. The Guarantee itself refutes this stance, and U.S. Bank has consistently taken the contrary position. As we have noted above, the Guarantee obligates Oakwood to take over payment of principal and interest to B-2 Certificate holders in the event of any shortfalls. This places Oakwood, the guarantor, in exactly the same position as the Trusts, the primary obligors, with respect to the obligation to make these principal and interest payments.
We conclude that as a matter of economics based on the governing B-2 Certificate documents, JP Morgan‘s claims consist of separable interest and principal components, and do not merely represent a singular future liability. We must still decide, though, whether
B. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)
The Bankruptcy Court held, and the District Court affirmed, that even after JP Morgan‘s claims for post-petition interest were disallowed, the principal owed under the Guarantee should be discounted to present value as of the petition date. In this limited appeal,5 we express no view on whether the Bankruptcy Court correctly disallowed post-petition interest pursuant to
Stated simply,
We begin as we must with the plain language of the statute. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). First, though, we find it necessary to briefly explain how the Bankruptcy Code processes and allows claims.
This brings us to the minutiae of
(b) Except as provided in subsections (e)(2), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of this section, if such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the extent that —
(1) such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured;
(2) such claim is for unmatured interest;
In response to JP Morgan‘s arguments, U.S. Bank contends the Bankruptcy Court, and the District Court in affirming, correctly held that the plain language of
1. Clear and Unambiguous?
Contrary to U.S. Bank‘s assertions, and the District Court‘s conclusion below, we do not believe
Viewed against the remainder of the Bankruptcy Code, “amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition” simply does not clearly and unambiguously require discounting a claim to present value. Rather, “the full face amount of a debt instrument is the proper amount of claim in a bankruptcy case” where, as here, original issue discount is not at issue.7 4-502 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 502.03 (5th rev. ed. 2005) (emphases added).
We are not convinced that a plain reading of
Most significant is how the Bankruptcy Code itself uses “amount” and “value.” U.S. Bank argues that “as of the date of the filing of the petition” axiomatically requires that a present value calculation be performed on the “amount” of a claim. However, as JP Morgan correctly notes, where the Bankruptcy Code intends a court to discount something to present value, the Code clearly uses the term “value, as of” a certain date. See, e.g.,
“In three places in section 1129(b)(2), and in at least two other places in section 1129, confirmation requires that a creditor or interest holder receive property ‘of a value, as of the effective date of the plan’ equal to some amount, usually the allowed amount of the participant‘s claim. Congress was clear that the use of this term meant that courts were to calculate the ‘present value’ of the property.”
7-1129 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.06 (emphasis added); id. at n. 3 (“This contemplates a present value analysis that will discount value to be received in the future.“) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 414 (1977)). Thus,
U.S. Bank is correct that in each of the Bankruptcy Code sections cited above, the Code refers only to the process by which the holders of already-allowed claims are paid from the bankruptcy estate. These sections permit a court, for example, to confirm a reorganization plan only if a holder of an impaired claim has accepted the plan or “will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date.”
Viewing the Bankruptcy Code holistically, we cannot say that the language of
We do not hold here that
C. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2)
The Bankruptcy Court treated the two facets of its ruling as separate and distinct — (1) post-petition interest was disallowed under
By its terms,
“A proof of claim or interest is prima facie evidence of the claim or interest. Thus it is allowed under subsection (a) unless a party in interest objects. The Rules and case law will determine who is a party in interest for purposes of objection to allowance. . . .
Subsection (b) prescribes the grounds on which a claim may be disallowed. The court will apply these standards if there is an objection to a proof of claim. The burden of proof on the issue of allowance is left to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. . . .
Paragraph (2) requires disallowance to the extent that the claim is for unmatured interest as of the date of the petition. Whether interest is matured or unmatured on the date of bankruptcy is to be determined without reference to any ipso facto or bankruptcy clause in the agreement creating the claim. Interest disallowed under this paragraph includes postpetition interest that is not yet due and payable, and any portion of prepaid interest that represents an original discounting of the claim, yet that would not have been earned on the date of bankruptcy. . . .14
Section 502(b) thus contains two principles of present law. First, interest stops accruing at the date of the filing of the petition, because any claim for unmatured interest is disallowed under this paragraph. Second, bankruptcy operates as the acceleration of the principal amount of all claims against the debtor. One unarticulated reason for this is that the discounting factor for claims after the commencement of the case is equivalent to [the] contractual interest rate on the claim. Thus, this paragraph does not cause disallowance of claims that have not been discounted to a present value because of the irrebutable presumption that the discounting rate and the contractual interest rate (even a zero interest rate) are equivalent.”
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 352-54 (1977) (emphases added); see also S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 62-65 (1978) (same).
We make several observations regarding this legislative history. To the extent that the Code in any way contemplates discounting to present value, such discounting is not permitted where the claim is for principal plus interest, and the interest has already been disallowed pursuant to
As a matter of economics, the legislative history recognizes that it is irrelevant whether a court applies
A (relatively) simple mathematical example shows the equivalence of the two methods. A $1,000 face value note bears an interest rate of 5%, and pays out annually over 10 years. At the end of the 10 years, the buyer/creditor would have received $1,628.89 in principal and interest (i.e., the note‘s “future value“). Assuming that the seller/debtor filed for bankruptcy on the day of issuance, however, disallowing all post-petition interest pursuant to
The point is to recognize what the creditor bargained for, while avoiding a windfall. The key difference between interest-and non-interest-bearing debt is in that bargain — the holder of a non-interest-bearing note bargained to receive only his $1,000, spread out over the 10 years. The holder of interest-bearing debt, however, bargained for much more than the $1,000 — $1,628.89, in fact. Giving him $1,000 today, then, means that by the end of what would have been the note‘s 10-year lifetime, he could have reinvested at the same theoretical rate of interest, and earned his $1,628.89. A creditor who bargained to receive only the $1,000 in principal, without interest, would be fully compensated by $613.91, which he would be able to grow into his $1,000 by the end of the 10 years; not so for the creditor who bargained to receive interest, who is shortchanged by only receiving $613.91.
We emphasize that our holding in this case in no way yields a windfall for creditors such as JP Morgan. Instead, the interplay between
We acknowledge, but reject, U.S. Bank and the District Court‘s near-total, but misplaced, reliance on In re: Loewen Group International, Inc., 274 B.R. 427 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (“Loewen”). Loewen, a Bankruptcy Court case, dealt only with non-interest-bearing instruments, and concluded that they should be discounted to present value. We reject, as detailed above, the Loewen court‘s baseline conclusion that
As appealing as it is, we must also reject our dissenting colleague‘s theory that the reason interest-bearing debt would not be discounted to present value is because future principal is accelerated (once post-petition interest is disallowed under
We conclude that the language used in
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Bankruptcy Court erred in holding, and the District Court erred in affirming, that JP Morgan‘s claims should be discounted to present value even after the portion of the claims for post-petition interest was disallowed. Accordingly, we will reverse.
SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The majority‘s reasoning today unnecessarily casts doubt on a long-standing, broadly-recognized, and well-justified principle arising under the Bankruptcy Code: that in order to avoid a windfall for certain creditors, claims based on future obligations should be discounted to present value before those obligations become eligible for immediate distribution.
Further, the majority‘s holding rests on a mischaracterization of the disputed claims: the majority treats the claims as equivalent to principal and interest payments on a loan, when in fact the securitization and guarantee process in this case gave rise to claims that were based on non-interest-bearing future obligations. I respectfully dissent.
The general purpose of bankruptcy is to “administer an estate as to bring about a ratable distribution of assets among the bankrupt‘s creditors.” Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161, 67 S. Ct. 237, 91 L. Ed. 162 (1946).
A.
When other courts have applied the general rule in
The courts have properly found the necessary textual support for this discounting practice in the general requirement of
In short, because payments that were originally due in the future will become eligible for immediate distribution through the bankruptcy process, in order to avoid overcompensating such creditors, the allowed amount of such claims should be determined by discounting the future payments to present value. And the general instruction in
B.
When the contested claim is based on an interest-bearing loan obligation, however, the courts have disallowed the remaining post-petition unmatured interest payments in accordance with
Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) , authorizes a creditor to accelerate a claim, to prove the full amount of an indebtedness, including the unmatured portion thereof. Even though only one payment may be due on a note when bankruptcy intervenes and the remaining payments may not become due until well into the future, the creditor is allowed to prove a claim for the entire balance due on the note, plus interest to the date of bankruptcy.
In re Lynch, 187 B.R. 536, 548 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1995); see also In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 287 B.R. 482, 488 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002) (“[T]he legislative history to section 502(b) states that bankruptcy acts as an acceleration of the principal amount of all claims against the debtor.“); In re Auto Int‘l Refrigeration, 275 B.R. 789, 813 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (“[B]ankruptcy may accelerate the Loan, however, this acceleration is only for the limited purpose of calculating Defendants’ claim in the bankruptcy.“); In re PCH Assocs., 122 B.R. 181, 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The Note may be deemed to have been accelerated ... for the purposes of calculation of the [creditor‘s] claim in these bankruptcy proceedings.“); In re Manville Forest Products Corp., 43 B.R. 293, 297 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“It is a basic tenet of the Bankruptcy Code that `[b]ankruptcy operates as an acceleration of the principal amount of all claims against the debtor.‘“) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the practice of allowing an interest-bearing claim subject to
This treatment of loan cases subject to
Subsection (b) prescribes the grounds on which a claim may be disallowed. The court will apply these standards if there is an objection to a proof of claim.
. . .
Paragraph (2) requires disallowance to the extent that the claim is for unmatured interest as of the date of the petition. Whether interest is matured or unmatured on the date of bankruptcy is to be determined without reference to any ipso facto or bankruptcy clause in the agreement creating the claim. Interest disallowed under this paragraph includes postpetition interest that is not yet due and payable, and any portion of prepaid interest that represents an original discounting of the claim, yet that would not have been earned on the date of bankruptcy....
Section 502(b) thus contains two principles of present law. First, interest stops accruing at the date of the filing of the petition, because any claim for unmatured interest is disallowed under this paragraph. Second, bankruptcy operates as the acceleration of the principal amount of all claims against the debtor. One unarticulated reason for this is that the discounting factor for claims after the commencement of the case is equivalent to the contractual interest rate on the claim. Thus, this paragraph does not cause the disallowance of claims that have not been discounted to a present value because of the irrebuttable presumption that the discounting rate and the contractual interest rate (even a zero interest rate) are equivalent.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 352-54 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6307-10; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 62-65 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5848-51.21
Another notable problem with this statement in the legislative history is that the interest rate on debt instruments typically will reflect not only a general discounting rate, but also other factors, most prominently the risk that the debtor will not fulfill his payment obligations as per the loan agreement. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474, 124 S. Ct. 1951, 158 L. Ed. 2d 787 (2004) (observing that an interest rate compensates a creditor for the fact that “[a] debtor‘s promise of future payments is worth less than an immediate payment of the same total amount because the creditor cannot use the money right away, inflation may cause the value of the dollar to decline before the debtor pays, and there is always some risk of nonpayment.“). In other words, typically there is a difference between the interest rate on a loan and the contemporaneous risk-free discounting rate, and this difference reflects in large part a premium that the lender has required the borrower to agree to pay in order to compensate the lender for the risk of nonpayment.22
Accordingly, the disallowance of claims to the extent that they are for unmatured interest payments pursuant to
II.
Although the majority nominally declines to reach whether
The majority explicitly states that “[w]e do not hold here that
For example, the majority states, “We are not convinced that a plain reading of
[W]here the Bankruptcy Code intends a court to discount something to present value, the Code clearly uses the term “value, as of” a certain date. Many sources support the use of the term “value” for this purpose, none support U.S. Bank‘s contention that “amount ... as of” also implies a present value calculation.
Maj Op. at 597-598 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The majority concludes: “Where the Code speaks of discounting cash streams to present value, it speaks in terms of `value, as of `a certain date. It does not use `amount ... as of.‘” Maj. Op. at 598.25 This textual argument is not limited by its terms to claims based on loan obligations.
Additionally, the majority “decline[s] to follow the approach” of the court in Loewen, noting that ”Loewen is, of course, not binding on this Court or the District Court.” Maj. Op. at 601 & n. 17. The majority does state that Loewen is distinguishable because the promissory notes in that case were not interest-bearing. Maj. Op. at 601 n. 17. But the majority further states, “The Loewen court determined that
Collectively, these statements go farther than necessary if we are merely holding that “double discounting” is not allowed in cases that are subject to the rule in
In light of the basic purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and the general instruction in
III.
In light of this traditional construction of
The manifest purpose of the securitization and guarantee process in this case was to convert the original mortgage loans into a substantially different form of financial instrument. The terms of the Pooling and Service Agreements make it clear that rather than loaning funds to the Trusts, the certificate holders were instead purchasing a right to be paid from the trust‘s assets according to the specified schedules.27 Indeed, the Agreements described the payments due to the certificate-holders as “Principal Distribution Amounts” and “Interest Distribution Amounts.” These terms imply that the Trusts were not making principal and interest payments on loans granted to the Trusts by the certificate holders. Rather, these terms imply that the Trusts were instead distributing payments derived from the Trusts’ revenues to the certificate holders. The fact that the Trusts’ underlying revenue streams from the mortgages were divisible into principal and interest portions, and the fact that the scheduled distributions to the certificate holders reflected this underlying division, does not imply that the Trusts’ payments to the certificate holders were themselves in the nature of principal and interest payments.
as evidence or prepayment of such sum the licensee will deliver to the licensor, at the time of signing this agreement, two sets of negotiable promissory notes of equal amounts for the aggregate sums of twenty-two thousand five hundred dollars ($22,500) ... payable at the following times and in the following amounts: Five thousand dollars ($5,000) shall be payable at the end of one year from the date hereof; ten thousand dollars ($10,000) at the end of two years from the date hereof; and seven thousand five hundred ($7,500) at the end of three years from the date hereof.
Id. After the licensee entered bankruptcy, the Seventh Circuit allowed a claim on one of the two sets of these promissory notes (a set of three notes for $2,500, $5,000, and $3,750 respectively), for a total of $10,537.51, their discounted value as of the time bankruptcy proceedings began. Id. at 282, 284.
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the relationship between the payments due on the promissory notes and the underlying royalty payments as follows:
In our judgment, the indebtedness represented by the notes was the consideration for the grant of the exclusive license. It was expressed in terms of royalties, and properly so, because, in so far as royalties up to that amount would be earned under the agreement, payment of the notes would cancel any obligation in respect thereto. But it was not expressed as conditioned upon such royalties being earned. The parties contemplated the possible cancellation of the license before the expiration of three years because of licensee‘s breach of the agreement or its insolvency. Nevertheless the obligation to pay the $22,000 [sic] remained.
. . .
There is no guaranty that, if royalties shall in fact become due, they shall amount to at least $22,500 for the period; there is an absolute undertaking that this amount shall be paid. . . . [T]he provision that notes should be given and that they should be negotiable is additional evidence tending to resolve any doubt as to the intention of the parties that the amount therein stated was to be payable in any event. That the notes were not in fact sold is of no moment. The parties necessarily contemplated that they might be negotiated.
Id. at 284. In short, the Seventh Circuit recognized that although the payment obligations were “expressed in terms of royalties,” once those obligations had been converted into guaranteed and negotiable financial instruments, they should be treated as such by the Bankruptcy Code.
This same principle should apply in our case. Although payments distributed by the Trusts are “expressed in terms” of “Principal Distribution Amounts” and “Interest Distribution Amounts,” in reality the B-2 Certificate holders were like the holders of the negotiable promissory notes in In re Wisconsin Engine: they were guaranteed a future set of payments, and the payments owed to the B-2 Certificate holders were not conditioned on the Trusts acquiring the revenue from the underlying mortgages and then distributing it to the certificate holders. Indeed, creating such a financial instrument was the manifest purpose of the securitization and guarantee process with respect to the B-2 Certificates.
IV.
Consequently, the Bankruptcy Court‘s error was not in discounting Oakwood Home‘s future guarantees of payment for the Principal Distribution Amounts to present value in accordance with the general instruction in
In light of the multiple operations embedded in the rule in
The limited guarantee of payment supplied by Oakwood Homes to the B-2 Certificate holders was specifically intended to facilitate the sale of the B-2 Certificates by eliminating this concentrated risk. And because Oakwood Home‘s guarantee of the B-2 Certificate‘s scheduled payments was not in the form of a loan, nor even in the form of a guarantee on a loan, nowhere in this transaction did the B-2 Certificate holders bargain for any interest rate premium associated with the risk that Oakwood Homes itself would fail to make the payments required by the terms of the Limited Guarantee.29
In other words, by erroneously applying
V.
Due to the procedural posture of this case, however, it is not possible for us to remand the case to the District Court with an instruction to reverse the Bankruptcy Court‘s judgment to the extent that the Bankruptcy Court disallowed claims based on Oakwood Home‘s guarantees of payment on the Interest Distribution Amounts. That is because JP Morgan chose not to raise this portion of the Bankruptcy Court‘s judgment as an issue in this appeal, and instead appealed only the Bankruptcy Court‘s subsequent decision to discount the remainder of the B-2 Certificate holders’ claims to present value.
Of course, in light of the traditional construction of
Before us, U.S. Bank correctly argued that the future obligations in this case were not in the nature of loan payments and therefore should be discounted to present value. Accordingly, I would hold that we are bound to affirm the District Court‘s judgment on this appeal. That is because the Bankruptcy Court did not err with respect to the sole issue presented on appeal, and JP Morgan chose not to appeal the issue with respect to which the Bankruptcy Court did in fact err.31
In sum, to the extent that the majority‘s reasoning implies that discounting non-interest-bearing future obligations to present value is contrary to the text of the Bankruptcy Code, I believe that it unnecessarily and unjustifiably undermines the traditional construction of
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent.
Notes
Finally, I do not agree with the majority that § 502(b)(6) and § 502(b)(7) imply that “[t]he default state of all `amounts’ under § 502(b) subsections other than subsections (6) and (7), then, is acceleration.” Maj. Op. at 603. Rather,
We need not reach this issue today, however, because the B-2 Certificates were not in fact loans to the Trusts, and thus Oakwood Homes’ guarantees of payment on the B-2 Certificates were not guarantees on loans, and the B-2 Certificate holders were not lenders who had bargained for an interest rate premium on a loan which would reflect in part the risk of Oakwood Homes’ nonpayment on its guarantee. Indeed, these findings are confirmed by the simple fact that parties described by the majority as the “primary obligors” — the Trusts — will not in fact become insolvent as a result of the stipulated revenue shortfalls, and the B-2 Certificate holders will not have a claim against the Trusts for a default on their obligations under the Pooling and Service Agreements. Rather, the possibility of such a shortfall in revenues was expressly contemplated and provided for in the Pooling and Service Agreements, and the B-2 Certificate holders knowingly purchased low-priority certificates. Similarly, the B-2 Certificate holders will have no claim for direct payment from the purchasers who default on their mortgages, because they did not bargain for and receive the right to such direct payments. Accordingly, this is not a case in which a lender has a claim against both a borrower and guarantor who have failed to make payments, because the B-2 Certificate holders will have no such claim against either the Trusts or the underlying purchasers as a result of the stipulated shortfalls. Again, these facts simply confirm that due to the securitization process, the B-2 Certificate holders were not lenders, and Oakwood Homes did not provide the B-2 Certificate holders with a guarantee on a loan.