101 F. 800 | N.D. Iowa | 1900
Prom the certificate of the referee it is made to appear that Prank Novak was formerly in business as a carpenter and contractor in Iowa City; that he became indebted to the Iowa Lumber Company in the sum of $1,605, and suit, aided by an attachment, was begun in the district court of Johnson county to enforce payment of this debt, the attachment being levied upon realty
From the record now certified up, it does not appear that the referee has yet passed upon the validity or amount of the claims asserted on behalf of the sons of the bankrupt. Furthermore, the record does not contain the evidence submitted to the referee, and the facts certified by the referee are therefore not open to re-examination upon this review; the only question that can be considered being whether a wife, holding a provable debt against her husband, can maintain a petition for adjudication against her husband. Under the provisions of the Code of Iowa, a wife may become the creditor of the husband. Thus, in Knox v. Moser, 69 Iowa, 341, 28 N. W. 629, it was held that "under our statutes a wife may hold separate property, and her husband may execute to her, for a lawful consideration, a promissory note, which she may enforce against his properly.” This being the settled rule in Iowa, I can see no ground for holding that the wife, being an actual creditor in good faith, may not exercise the right conferred by the bankrupt act upon creditors to initiate proceedings in bankruptcy when cause therefor exists. 'Certainly, if the husband, becoming insolvent, should be adjudged to be a bankrupt on his own petition or on a petition filed by other creditors, the wife is entitled to prove up her claim, if she is a creditor in good faith, and to share in the distribution of the estate; and, if this be true, why should she not be entitled to initiate proceedings in bankruptcy, if that be necessary, in order- to insure to her a share in the division of his property?
It must not be understood that, in thus passing upon the question certified by the referee, it is intended to approve the practice adopted in this case, of allowing an attack upon the validity of the adjudication by proceedings taken before the referee at the first meeting of the creditors. The question whether, after an adjudication has been had after due notice in the mode required by the act, it is still open to a creditor to raise an issue upon the jurisdictional facts, and, if so, what is the proper mode of procedure, are matters not considered or passed upon in the present case.