In re Nomination of Greg PAULMIER for the Office of City Council of the City of Philadelphia Democratic Primary May 2, 2007 from the 31st Legislative District. Petition of Greg Paulmier.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
April 24, 2007
937 A.2d 364
Submitted April 12, 2007. Clarifying Opinion Dec. 28, 2007.
Margaret M. Tartaglione, for City Com‘rs of Philadelphia, participant.
Robert Thomas Vance, for Cindy M. Bass, respondent.
BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, BALDWIN and FITZGERALD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of April, 2007, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the Commonwealth Court is REVERSED, and the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is VACATED. Opinion to follow.
Chief Justice CAPPY.
OPINION
On April 24, 2007 this Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and vacated the order of the trial court to strike Greg Paulmier from the ballot for the Democratic primary election for the 8th Council District of Philadelphia scheduled for May 15, 2007. The per curiam order was expedited in order to settle the issue of whether Paulmier‘s name would appear on the ballot in time for the election. This opinion now follows, to clarify the issue of compliance on a statement of financial interests under Section 1105 of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act,
Paulmier filed a timely nomination petition to enter the race for Philadelphia City Council. He also filed a timely statement of financial interests pursuant to Section 1105 of the Ethics Act, which requires, inter alia, that a candidate disclose the names and addresses of all direct and indirect sources of income. Cindy Bass, as objector, then filed a petition to strike Paulmier‘s nomination petition, alleging that the statement of financial interests contained material defects and/or omissions that would require Paulmier‘s name to be removed from the ballot. Specifically, Bass complained that
A three-judge panel of the Court of Common Pleas dismissed Paulmier‘s nomination petition and ordered his name to be struck from the ballot. The trial court relied on this Court‘s per curiam order in In re Braxton, 583 Pa. 35, 874 A.2d 1143 (2005).
On appeal, Senior Judge McCloskey, sitting for the Commonwealth Court, affirmed citing Braxton, but also referencing the precedent of In re Anastasio, 820 A.2d 880 (Pa. Cmwlth.Ct.2003), affirmed without opinion, 573 Pa. 512, 827 A.2d 373 (2003), In re Benninghoff, 578 Pa. 402, 852 A.2d 1182 (2004) and In re Littlepage, 589 Pa. 455, 909 A.2d 1235 (2006).
Paulmier petitioned this Court arguing that the Commonwealth Court erred in finding that he did not make sufficient disclosure of the source of his income, or in the alternative, that if his disclosure was deficient, it was a mere technical defect, subject to amendment under this Court‘s holding in Benninghoff. Paulmier asserts that he believed that because he was self-employed as a housing specialist, he complied in good faith with the instructions on the financial statement form when he listed “rental income” as the sole source of his income, and “Housing Specialist” as his occupation. He submits that he did not understand or believe that the form required that he list the names of his individual tenants or the addresses of his rental properties. He contends that an attorney, accountant, self-employed shop owner or contractor would only have to list their income and not every client or person who bought a product from them. This is because a self-employed person lists the name of his business as the
Paulmier then submits that even if his interpretation of the disclosure requirement was incorrect, his statement of financial interest was subject to amendment. He argues that when the information on the face of the form is technically deficient, but still sufficient to give notice of the source of income, this Court created a right to amend and bring the financial statement into full compliance with the requirements of the Ethics Act in Benninghoff, 852 A.2d at 1182. Paulmier contends that he provided the pertinent information about the source of his income as a sole proprietor who managed rental properties, distinguishing this case from the facts that constituted a fatal defect in Anastasio, 820 A.2d at 881, and in Littlepage, 909 A.2d at 1237, where the candidates listed “none” in block 10 of their financial statements, even though both candidates did receive income. Paulmier further notes that his disclosure on the statement of financial interests form was sufficient to give any reviewer notice of his ownership of rental properties, which would allow the reviewer to consult the public record for further information. Having given proper notice, Paulmier argues that if this Court finds that his first disclosure did not fully comply with the Act, then we should accept his timely amendment in which he disclosed the names and addresses of his individual tenants.1
Bass, as objector, argues as the instructions provided by the State Ethics Commission on the financial statement form specifically demand disclosure of “the source and address, not the dollar amount, of any payment, fee... rental income... [of $1,300 or more of gross income,]” that the instructions
This Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in its determination that Paulmier‘s disclosures constituted a fatal defect that would preclude his name from appearing on the ballot. On review, an appellate court may reverse a decision concerning a challenge to a nomination petition if the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, there was an abuse of discretion or there was an error of law. In re Carroll, 586 Pa. 624, 896 A.2d 566, 573 (Pa.2006). But here, the question concerns the proper interpretation of the Ethics Act. This is a question of statutory interpretation, and therefore, a question of law. Id. Accordingly, our scope in reviewing the record is plenary and our standard is de novo, which means we may consider the entire record and that we owe no deference to the lower courts. Id.
As an introductory note to the law that governs election matters, this Court observes that there are two competing cases interpreting the “fatal defect” rule related to candidate error in financial disclosure governed by
Next, it is important to observe that two statutory schemes govern election matters, the aforementioned Ethics Act and the Pennsylvania Election Code,
The Ethics Act states that the failure to file the financial statement in accordance with the provisions of the Act is a fatal defect for a petition to appear on the ballot. See
This Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court in Anastasio without opinion. Anastasio, 827 A.2d at 373. But the application of the fatality rule was then severely restricted by our decision in Benninghoff, 852 A.2d at 1182. In Benninghoff, the candidate, an incumbent state representative, filed a timely financial statement. Id. at 1184. He listed the Commonwealth as his employer in block 6, but failed to do so once again in block 10, where he was required to disclose the source of his income, i.e., his employer. Id. This Court noted that under
In doing so, this Court addressed the Commonwealth Court‘s decision in Anastasio to apply the per se rule of fatality. We noted our per curiam affirmance, but found that Anastasio was inapposite because that candidate failed to designate anything on block 10 of the form, instead listing “none,” despite the fact that he had income. Id. at 1188. Rather, this Court found the matter in Benninghoff to be
Mr. Justice Castille wrote a concurring opinion in Benninghoff, joined by Mr. Justice Eakin. Benninghoff, 852 A.2d at 1189. He cautioned that the new rule announced by this Court in Benninghoff was not consonant with the draconian per se rule imposed by Anastasio, and that he would thus specifically reject Anastasio. Id. at 1190. Justice Castille emphasized that the per curiam order in Anastasio lacked any precedential value binding on this Court, because we did not affirm the opinion below or the rationale it expressed. Id. at 1190-91. Justice Castille considered the fatal defect language of Section 1104 and expressed his support for the rule announced in the Cioppa plurality, which would conclude that fatal defects are limited to untimely filings, and that mere defects or omissions in a petition otherwise timely filed would be subject to amendment. Id. at 1192 (citing Cioppa, 626 A.2d at 148-49).
The divergence between Anastasio‘s per se rule and Benninghoff‘s more lenient substantial compliance rule is explained when we consider the fact that the Commonwealth Court‘s rationale in Anastasio was based on a consideration of the language of the Ethics Act alone, which promotes the goal of full financial disclosure. See
Having settled that area of law, this Court is left with the task of determining exactly what a self-employed candidate like Paulmier must disclose, either in the first timely filing or by timely amendment, in order to comply with the Ethics Act. To do so, this Court must examine the pertinent language of the Ethics Act under the Statutory Construction Act.
The words of the Ethics Act require that a candidate for office file a statement of financial interests submitting information from the prior calendar year which includes the “name and address of any direct or indirect source of income totaling
Given the words of the Ethics Act, and the definitions the Legislature has provided, it is clear that all income, directly or indirectly received, must be taken into account, and that the “source” of that income must be disclosed. Therefore, when a candidate like Paulmier receives over $1,300 dollars in a year from a specific source, he must identify the source, either the business or individual, who made that particular contribution to his income. Notably, in the case of rental income, the statutory definitions are written so broadly that there are two distinct sources to which a candidate like Paulmier might attribute his income. A “source” is any individual who provides income, and as Paulmier has 13 tenants who each pay him more than $1,300 a year in rental fees, each tenant is a statutorily defined source of Paulmier‘s income. At the same time, the statute also defines “source” as a business which includes a sole proprietorship or self-employed individual. A sole proprietorship references an “individual” who is an “owner of a business establishment.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY. A self-employed individual is one who “earn[s] one‘s living directly from one‘s own profession or business, rather than as an employee earning salary or commission from another.”
This raises the question of which source to disclose. Section 1105 demands the disclosure of “any direct or indirect source of income.” As previously stated, “source” is a “person who contributes [income],” and “person” is any “individual or business.”
This holding is inapposite to that of the Commonwealth Court in In re deYoung II, 900 A.2d 961 (Pa. Cmwlth.Ct.2006) in which the court decided that the self-employed like
Based on the reasoning above, we hold that Paulmier‘s first statement of financial interests did not comply with Section 1105 of the Ethics Act, because he did not disclose the individual or business source of his rental income. But, as Paulmier did amend in a timely manner and then disclosed one of the two statutorily defined sources of his rental income as the Act requires, we hold that the Commonwealth Court improperly struck the candidate from the ballot, which action we reversed by per curiam order dated April 24, 2007.
Justice EAKIN, Justice BALDWIN and Justice FITZGERALD join the opinion.
Justice CASTILLE, Justice SAYLOR and Justice BAER file concurring opinions.
I join the Majority‘s Opinion in full. I agree with the Majority‘s holding that the fatal defect rule contained in Section 1104 of the Ethics Act should be limited to barring from the ballot those candidates who fail to file statements of financial interests or who file them in an untimely manner. Maj. Op. at 445, 937 A.2d at 371. Further, I agree with the Majority‘s conclusion that when read together, the Ethics Act,
As indicated by the Majority, our Court has dealt with the fatality rule contained in Section 1104 of the Ethics Act in various ways with regard to timely statements of financial interests, depending upon the defect appearing on the form.1 On the one hand, we have found fatal certain errors of omission contained in a statement and held that such errors are not subject to amendment. See e.g. In re Anastasio, 820 A.2d 880 (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct.2003), affirmed per curiam without opinion, 573 Pa. 512, 827 A.2d 373 (2003) (finding a fatal defect where a candidate erroneously indicated “none” on his timely filed statement of financial interest in the section of the statement requiring the reporting of any direct or indirect source of income over $1,300 pursuant to Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act,); In re Braxton, 583 Pa. 35, 874 A.2d 1143 (2005) (per curiam) (reversing the Commonwealth Court‘s
On the other hand, we have concluded that certain errors of omission are subject to amendment where the omitted information is contained elsewhere on the form. See In re Benninghoff, 578 Pa. 402, 852 A.2d 1182, 1187 (2004) (interpreting the fatal defect rule of the Ethics Act as permitting an amendment to a timely filed financial statement where a candidate has substantially complied with the Ethics Act, in that all of the statutorily required disclosures “can be facially obtained from the information provided on the form as a whole.“).
As the author of Littlepage and Benninghoff, I attempted to draw fine distinctions between the different defects contained in the various financial interest statements filed by candidates because I believed the need for full disclosure in accordance with the goals for the Ethics Act was paramount. See
Thus, in my view, as eloquently explained by the Majority, because it is clear that the intent of the Legislature is to encourage both full financial disclosure and protect voter choice, when read together, such intents are best served by a rule that permits a good faith timely filer to amend a statement of financial interest in order to come into full compliance “giving the public both the benefit of full financial disclosure and the broadest choice of representatives.” Maj. Op. at 445, 937 A.2d at 371.
I have noted several times herein my view that good faith remains a prerequisite to any amendment. As the Majority
Accordingly, despite my prior expressions to the contrary, I now am able to join the Majority‘s decision in full, permitting candidates who file timely, and in good faith, statements of financial interests containing material omissions with their nomination petition the ability to amend such statements and to bring them into compliance with the requirements of the Ethics Act.
Justice SAYLOR concurring.
Respectfully, I do not regard the plain-meaning approach to the statutory fatal-defect rule, which has been in place for the past several years, as being amenable to abandonment under the exception to stare decisis pertaining to erroneous rulings of law.
As the majority recognizes, there are sound reasons supporting the longstanding requirement of adherence to precedent. See generally Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (emphasizing the role of precedent in furthering “the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, reliance on judicial decisions, and... the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.“). Moreover, on issues of statutory construction, legislative bodies are free to address judicial holdings with which they disagree, and accordingly, stare decisis should be afforded “special force” in such matters. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989); cf. In re Burtt‘s Estate, 353 Pa. 217, 231, 44 A.2d 670, 677 (1945) (“A statutory
Here, the majority recognizes the doctrine of stare decisis, but chooses to invoke the exception for erroneous legal rulings. It is true that, in matters of statutory construction, departure from stare decisis is warranted where the Court has “distorted the clear intention of the legislative enactment and by that erroneous interpretation permitted the policy of that legislation to be effectively frustrated.” Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 135, 331 A.2d 452, 456 (1975). From my perspective, however, this Court‘s plain-meaning approach to the statutory fatal-defect rule was, and remains, an entirely reasonable application of settled principles of statutory interpretation. The relevant statutory provision prescribes that, “failure to file the statement [of financial interests] in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall, in addition to any other penalties provided, be a fatal defect to a petition to appear on the ballot.”
Today, however, the majority effectively deems such approach irrational and concludes that it was always the Legislature‘s intent to apply the fatal defect rule only in a single circumstance—when a statement of financial interests is not filed in accordance with one provision of the Act, i.e., the section governing the timing of the statement‘s filing,
I do not dispute that the majority‘s present construction, as ably developed by Mr. Justice Castille in his previous responsive opinions in this arena, represents a legitimately restrained approach to the fatal defect provision. Further, such construction carried substantial force from the standpoint of writing on a clean slate, in the same way as did the interpretation that prevailed. Indeed, my personal perspective is that the approach maintained by Justice Castille and presently adopted by the majority represents the better policy by some large measure.2 Because, however, the interpretation upon which this Court settled years ago follows the plain language of the governing statute, I fail to see how it is in any sense unreasoned. Thus, I believe that any remaining policy choice to be made at this point in time is best left to the Legislature. Certainly the Assembly is aware of our decisions in this line, and, ordinarily, its continuing inaction would give rise to an inference that it has been, and remains, satisfied.
Justice CASTILLE concurring.
I join the Majority Opinion in its entirety. I do so because it adopts the position I have maintained since the Court‘s affirmance of the Commonwealth Court‘s opinion in In re Nom. Petition of Anastasio, 820 A.2d 880 (Pa.Cmwlth.Ct.2003), aff‘d per curiam without opinion, 573 Pa. 512, 827 A.2d 373 (2003). Specifically, today‘s Majority, construing the Ethics Act and the Election Code together, holds that: “the fatality rule announced in Section 1104 of the Ethics Act was intended by the Legislature to bar only those candidates from the ballot who fail to file statements of financial interests or who file them in an untimely manner.” Majority Op. at 445, 937 A.2d at 371. This construction is consonant with the position I set forth in my Concurring Opinion in In re Nom. Petition of Benninghoff, 578 Pa. 402, 852 A.2d 1182, 1192 (2004) (Castille, J., joined by Eakin, J., concurring) (“Given the occasion for the amendment [to the Ethics Act which added the ‘fatal defect’ language], I would conclude that fatal defects are limited to untimely filings. Mere defects or omissions in timely filings, such as the ones at issue here, should be subject to amendment.“) (noting agreement with Petition of Cioppa, 533 Pa. 564, 626 A.2d 146, 148-49 (1993)) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court by Nix, C.J.). I agree with the Majority that our holding today necessitates overruling and/or disapproving Anastasio and the line of cases which have relied upon its per se rule.1
Pa. 384, 388 A.2d [709,] 720 [(1978)] (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is not a vehicle for perpetuating error, but rather a legal concept which responds to the demands of justice and, thus, permits the orderly growth processes of the law to flourish.“). Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539, 905 A.2d 918, 967(2006). The experience of the last few election cycles, where it became apparent that the Anastasio approach had become a potent political weapon, resulting in the courts being inundated with election challenges premised upon supposed “fatal defects,” and candidates being removed for a variety of minor perceived “infractions,” reaffirmed my belief that such was not the General Assembly‘s intention and that Anastasio, which was affirmed by this Court without explanation, required revisiting.