251 F. 667 | D. Mont. | 1917
The property statement involved, in appearance and substance, bore the stamp of carelessness and inefficiency, and doubtless that and the fact that title to all the realty, the great bulk of the property, was in oilier Neumans, aroused some misgiving. But these statements are made to secure credit, are relied on, and induce credit, always subject to some limit. In the instant case, so far as appears, the credit was the first given, was based on no information blit the statement, and would not have been given otherwise. Direct testimony of reliance and inducement is not indispensable. The rule is that, after positive ■proof of false material representations to induce action, and that the action was taken, it will be inferred the action was in reliance on mid induced by the representations; and the burden shifts to the falsifier to overcome the inference. Hicks v. Stevens, 121 Ill. 186, 11 N. E. 243; Wilson v. Administrator, 91 Va. 183, 21 S. E. 245, 50 Am. St. Rep. 824; Fishback v. Miller, 15 Nev. 443; Randall, etc., Co. v. Mineral Water Co., 120 Minn. 268, 139 N. W. 606, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 706; Pom. Eq. Jr., § 891. filíese will guide to some cases contra.
This is the common law, wherein, in actions of deceit and the like, reliance, inducement, intent, mental condition, etc., are arrived at by logical inference from circumstances; pai ties not being qualified witnesses. That parties may now testify thereto does not annul the rule. And it may be observed that, if the circumstances do not warrant the inference, parties’ testimony thereto, being to personal consciousness inaccessible to other testimony, is of doubtful value. Of course, fraud is not presumed, and must be proven; but this general