Rеspondent appeals as of right from a family court order terminating his parental rights to his minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), and (j). We remand for further proceedings.
Petitioner initiated termination proceedings against the child’s mother shortly after the child’s birth in October 1998. At the time, the mother incorrectly identified a man other than the respondent as the child’s father. The court terminated the mother’s *129 parental rights on January 15, 1999, on the basis that her parentаl rights to five other children were terminated in the past. Dining the proceedings, however, petitioner determined that respondent might be the child’s father. On January 4, 1999, petitioner sent a letter to respondent, who was incarcerated, indicating his possible paternity of the child. Respondent replied by letter on January 9, 1999, and offered to take a blood test. The test results, returned on June 25, 1999, showed a 99.42 percent probability that respondent was the child’s father. On July 16, 1999, petitioner filed a supplemental petition for termination of respondent’s parental rights, asserting that respondent was the biological father of the child.
During the second day of resрondent’s termination hearing, January 10, 2000, counsel for respondent brought to the court’s attention the possibility that respondent had an affiliation with a Native American tribe. The trial court directed petitioner to send nоtice of the proceedings to the tribe to which respondent alleged affiliation, but continued with the proofs in the case. At the end of the hearing, the trial court again advised petitioner to talk with respondent about his possible tribal membership and to notify the tribe about the proceedings.
The next day, January 11, 2000, petitioner submitted a request to the Secretary of the Interior for a search to identify the child’s possible Native American ancestry. The paperwork contained information regarding the child, respondent, and the child’s paternal grandparents and great-grandparents. The form indicated that the child’s tribe was possibly the Anishinаbee tribe. The notice indicated the applicable tribe’s right of intervention. A letter from the Secre *130 tary of the Interior responding to the request, dated February 7, 2000, indicated that there was no information available regarding the tribal membership or tribal affiliation of the child or her parents. The family court apparently accepted the letter as conclusive evidence regarding the matter.
Respondent first arguеs that the family court erred in failing to conclusively determine the child’s status as an “Indian child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (icwa), 25 USC 1901
el seq.,
before the close of proofs. We agree and remand. Whether the court failed to sаtisfy the icwa involves a legal question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.
In re SD,
The icwa sets forth specific procedures and standards for child custody proceedings involving foster care plаcement of or termination of parental rights to an Indian child. Id. One of the icwa’s requirements is that an interested Indian tribe receive notice of termination proceedings involving Indian children:
In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the рarent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention. If the identity or location of the parent or Indian custodian and thе tribe cannot be determined, such notice shall be given to the Secretary [of the Interior] in like manner, who shall have fifteen days after receipt to provide the requisite notice to the parent or Indian сustodian and the tribe. No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe or *131 the Secretary: Provided, That the parent or Indian custodian or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted up to twenty additional days to prepare for such proceeding. [25 USC 1912(a).]
For purposes of the icwa, an “Indian child” is any unmarried individual less than eighteen years of age who is either (1) an Indian tribe member or (2) both eligible for Indian tribe membership and an Indian tribe member’s biological child. 25 USC 1903(4).
We recognize the general principle that failure to cоmply with the requirements of the icwa may render invalid a proceeding terminating a parent’s rights, 25 USC 1914;
In re Elliott,
*133
The icwa does not apply to proceedings where the child involved is not an “Indian child.”
In re Colnar,
52 Wash App 37, 41;
Next, respondent argues that, as the child’s putative father, he was not provided proper notice of the original termination proceedings in accordance with our court rules. Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a party is a question of law that we review de novo on appeal.
In re
Terry,
Respondent also argues that the lower court’s adjournment of the termination hearing on October 21, 1999, denied him due process. A court’s ruling on a motion for a continuance is discretionary and we rеview it for an abuse of discretion.
In re Jackson,
Finally, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the family сourt did not clearly err in finding that petitioner established the statutory grounds for termination with clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(1);
In re Miller,
Remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdictiоn.
Notes
25 USC 1912(f) provides that a termination of parental rights must be “supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” MCR 5.980(D) contains similar language.
The present case is distinguishable from In re IEM, supra. In that case the petitioner’s sending of the required notice to the Secretary of the Interior alone wаs enough to satisfy 25 USC 1912(a) because the child’s possible Native American heritage was unspecified. In re IEM, supra at 448.
MCR 5.965(B)(7) states that at the preliminary hearing, the court “shall inquire if the child or parent is a registered member of any American Indian tribe or band, or if the child is eligible for such membership.” Respondent argues that the court’s failure to make this inquiry invalidated the proceedings below. We note that the trial court did not hold a preliminary hearing because the child was already in foster care after the termination of the parental rights of the child’s mother. In our view, the court’s failure to question whether the child or one of her parents was a registered member оf, or eligible for membership in, an American Indian tribe or band, may have been an additional factor in determining whether the court knew or had reason to know that the child was an “Indian child.” However, because we have already determined that the court and peti- *133 tíoner did not comply with the requirements of 25 USC 1912(a), we need not discuss the issue further.
In
In re Shawboose,