In re N.M.
Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Opinion
POHLMAN, Judge:
¶1 In this appeal, we are asked to address whether the juvenile court properly terminated E.M.’s (Father) parental rights to N.M. (Child). For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
Child’s Removal and the Initial Permanency Proceedings
¶2 In an April 2015 shelter proceeding, the juvenile court determined that Child’s removal from Father and Child’s mother (Mother) was necessаry and in Child’s best interest due to both parents’ incarceration. The court thereafter adjudicated Child neglected as to both Father and Mother, and it placed Child in the custody of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). DCFS created a family plan for both Father and Mother and recommended reunification as the primary permanency goal, with Child’s adoption as the concurrent goal. The court accepted the proposed plan as well as the stated goals and ordered DCFS to make “reasonable effort tо finalize the permanency goal.” In November 2015, given Father’s and Mother’s respective lack of progress, the court granted temporary custody and guardianship of Child to his maternal grandparents (Maternal Grandparents), subject to DCFS supervision. Child remained with Maternal Grandparents from then on.
¶3 The court thereafter terminated reunification services for both parents and, accordingly, in a September 2016 permanency hearing, changed the permanency goal to adoption, with the concurrent goal of permanent custody and guardianship with Maternal Grandparents. The court also determined that Child’s best interest required a petition for termination of parental rights to be filed, and it ordered that such a petition be filed, and a pretrial hearing held, within forty-five days.1
The November 2016 Pretrial Hearing
¶5 At the pretrial hearing, rather than proceeding with the TPR, the State moved to change the temporary custody in Maternal Grandparents to permanent custody and guardianship and to dismiss the TPR. The State declared that “there are some burdens of proof . . . that would be very difficult to be able to carry forward” and that its request “would be in the child’s best interest.”
¶6 In response, the court noted that adoption was the permanency goal in the case, and it heard from those present regarding the State’s request to grant permanent custody and guardianship to Maternal Grandparents. The State, the Guardian ad Litem, and the parents agreed that permanent custody and guardianship would be in Child’s best interest. Maternal Grandparents stated that their desire was to adopt Child.
¶7 After hearing from those present, the court expressed concern that granting the State’s request to “set the goal at permanent custody and guardianship” would only delay the proceedings and increase the uncertainty in Child’s life. The court then stated:
[I]n this particular case I’m not ready to name permanent custody and guardianship as the permanency goal. We have a young child here of tender age and young age, and I appreciate everything that’s been said in this matter, but it’s the Court’s decision what the permanency goal should be. It very well may end up being permanent custody and guardianship, but I don’t have the evidence before me and I feel like I need to hear that evidence.
¶8 Mother objected, stating that the court did have evidence and knew “almost everything” about the case. The State also objected, asserting that it did not think it could “carry the burden of proof” if it went to trial on the TPR. In response, the court stated,
[T]he Court set the permanency goal of adoption, and we’ll hear the evidence that’s involved. Whether you think the burden is there or not, that’s the job for the Court to decide; and very well it may not be, and I’ll make a decision for permanent custody and guardianship, but there isn’t a stipulation in this matter. The grandparents have voiced their concerns and I want to hear the evidence.
¶9 The court therefore denied the State’s request to dismiss the TPR and order permanent custody and guardianshiр in Maternal Grandparents, and it set the case for a termination trial in January 2017.
The Pretrial Motions
¶10 Before the termination trial began, both the State and the parents filed additional documents with the court. First, the State filed a notice to withdraw the TPR. Next, Father and Mother filed a joint rule 60(b) motion, asking the court to set aside its
¶11 In the alternative, the parents argued that the court should treat the State’s November 16 oral motion to dismiss the TPR as a rule 41 notice of dismissal under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The parents claimed that, because the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the TPR, the court lost jurisdiction over the petition while still retaining jurisdiction to enter an order of permanent custody and guardianship in line with the court’s concurrent goal. The parents also noted that Maternal Grandparents would be free to file their own termination petition.
¶12 On January 17, 2017, the court denied the parents’ rule 60(b) motion and struck the State’s notice of withdrawal.
The Termination Trial
¶13 The case proceeded to the termination trial. On the second day of trial, Mother advised the court that she wished to relinquish her parental rights to Child to allow Maternal Grandparents to adopt Child. The court took Mother’s voluntary relinquishment under advisement. The State thereafter clarified that, given Mother’s voluntary relinquishment, it had “no misgivings about going forward with and putting on whatever evidence was necessary to establish [Father’s] unfitness.” The State explained that, although it had asserted in the November
¶14 In February 2017, the court entered a termination order, terminating both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as to Child. The court accepted Mother’s voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights. As to Father, the court determined that he was an unfit parent and that it would be in Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. In doing so, the court noted that, while having Child “in a permanent custody and guardianship arrangement may be convenient for Father, . . . it is not in [Child’s] best interest.” The court observed that Child instead needed “the certainty and benefits that come with being adopted.” Accordingly, the court determined that it was “strictly and absolutely necessary to terminate parental rights so Maternal Grandparents can adopt [Child],” and it ordered Child to remain in Maternal Grandparents’ custody until he was adopted.
¶15 Father appeals the juvenile court’s denial of his rule 60(b) motion and the court’s termination of his parental rights as to Child.
ANALYSIS
I. Failure to Accept the Parties’ Stipulation about the Permanency Goal
¶16 Father first argues that the juvenile court erred “in applying the law by failing to accept [the parties’] stipulation” that it would be in Child’s best interest to change the
¶17 Father’s request that the juvenile court honor the parties’ stipulation appeared in his joint rule 60(b) motion for relief from the court’s November 2016 oral ruling, which the court denied and later incorporated into the termination order. We generally review both a court’s denial of a rule 60(b) motion and a refusal to acceрt an alleged stipulation for an abuse of discretion. See generally Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, ¶ 7, 104 P.3d 1198 (reviewing a denial of a rule 60(b) motion); Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, ¶ 6, 197 P.3d 117 (reviewing a district court’s refusal to accept a stipulation). And here, we conclude that the court did not exceed its discretion when it declined to adopt the proffered stipulation. Father’s overall argument—that the juvenile court was bound by the parties’ stipulation—is at odds both with precedent establishing a juvenile court’s inherent discretion to disregard stipulations that intrude upon its core responsibilities and with the overarching purpose of juvеnile courts in protecting a child’s best interest throughout child welfare and permanency proceedings.
¶18 The Utah Supreme Court has explained that, while “the law favors the settlement of disputes” through agreements between parties, there are circumstances in which it is appropriate for a court to disregard such agreements and stipulations. See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ¶¶ 20–21, 137 P.3d 809. Put plainly, a court may disregard stipulations that “compromise the core responsibilities of the court.” See id. ¶ 21. For example, a court may, pursuant to its faсt-finding responsibility, disregard agreements regarding certain facts and instead “compel the parties to present evidence for the court to weigh and evaluate.” Id. ¶ 20; In re D.A.J., 2015 UT App 74, ¶ 6, 347 P.3d 430 (per curiam) (same). A court also must “exercise greater care when delegating judicial functions” in cases “where
¶19 To that end, juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings involving abused, neglected, or dependent children within the statutory definitions, including termination proceedings.
¶20 In this regard, our supreme court has explained that the court overseeing these types of proceedings retains the “final authority over the determination of [a child’s] best
¶21 For example, in In re adoption of J.M., 2005 UT App 157, 135 P.3d 902 (per curiam), although the father delegated his parental powers through a signed statement to his own parents, the juvenile court instead awarded temporary guardianship to the maternal grandparents. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. On appeal, the paternal grandparents argued that “the delegation of parental powers trumps the juvenile court’s power to determine guardianship of thе child.” Id. ¶ 2. This court disagreed, noting that “[n]o provision in the Utah Code regulating the juvenile court limits the juvenile court’s authority when a delegation of parental power has been signed.” Id. ¶¶ 2–3. And we observed that “[t]o hold otherwise would allow any parent in danger of having their parental rights terminated a means of divesting the juvenile court of its power to protect the best interests of children“—an untenable proposition, given the juvenile court’s ultimate authority to determine what is or is not in a child’s best interest. See id.
¶22 Similarly, in In re D.A.J., a private party filed а petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights and, in the course of the proceedings, the mother and the private party entered into a stipulation “that addressed many issues related to the custody and care” of the child. 2015 UT App 74, ¶ 2. When the juvenile court dismissed the termination petition after determining that grounds for termination were not established and termination was not in the child’s best interest, the private party appealed,
¶23 Here, the stipulation upon which Father relies represented the parties’ determination that, rather than terminate Father’s parental rights and proceed with the primary permanency goal of adoption, it would be in Child’s best interest to place Child in the permanent custody and guardianship of Maternal Grandparents. Nevertheless, because that stipulation was necessаrily predicated upon a determination by the parties regarding what was in Child’s best interest, the court was not bound by it or obligated to accept it. See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ¶¶ 21–28, 37. As we have explained above, one of the juvenile court’s core responsibilities is protecting and making determinations regarding a child’s best interest. Thus, the juvenile court, not the parties, retains the final authority to determine, once reunification services to both parents are terminated, what permanency goal—permanent custody and guardianship or adoption—would be in a child’s best interest. See id.; see generally
¶24 Father also argues that the juvenile court erred by declining to treat the State’s motion to change the permanency goal and dismiss the TPR as a voluntary dismissal under rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a dismissal he claims ought to have resulted in the juvenile court’s loss of jurisdiction over the TPR. In particular, he claims that the court erred because the State’s “oral request was proper” under rule 41.
¶25 Father asked the juvenilе court in his joint rule 60(b) motion to treat the State’s oral motion to change the permanency goal and dismiss the TPR as a rule 41 voluntary dismissal. We generally review for an abuse of discretion the court’s refusal to grant relief on this basis. Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, ¶ 7, 104 P.3d 1198 (“We will generally reverse a [lower] court’s denial of a rule 60(b) motion only where the court has exceeded its discretion.“). However, even if the juvenile court exceeded its discretion in failing to grant the relief Father requested, Father is entitled to relief on appeal only if he can also dеmonstrate that he was harmed by the alleged error. See In re P.D., 2013 UT App 162, ¶ 11, 306 P.3d 817 (“On appeal, the appellant has the burden of demonstrating an error was prejudicial—that there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” (quotation simplified)). We conclude that Father’s rule 41 challenge fails because, as we explain below, he has not shown that he was harmed by the alleged error.
¶26 Rule 41 provides in relevant part that a plaintiff may voluntarily “dismiss an action without a court оrder by filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves an answer
¶27 Even assuming for purposes of argument that the court ought to have construed the State’s request as a rule 41 dismissal and that it was error not to do so, Father has not demonstrated that the juvenile court’s alleged error was harmful. See In re J.B., 2002 UT App 268, ¶¶ 8–12, 53 P.3d 968 (affirming the termination of a father’s parental rights where, even though the juvenile court erred in relying upon findings from a prior termination proceeding in which the father did not participate to terminate the mother’s rights, the error was not harmful). “The pivotal question is whether the error resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal of the termination order. An error is prejudicial only if a review of the record persuades the appellate court that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the [appellant].” In re C.Y., 765 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quotation simplified); see also Albrecht v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 64, ¶¶ 31–32, 44 P.3d 838 (declining to reach the merits of an allegedly improper rule 41 dismissal where the alleged error was harmless in light of the record and the other proceedings in the case). Father contends, in conclusory fashion, that had the TPR been dismissed, the State would not have been forced “to pursue termination against him,” and the court would have instead “properly mov[ed] towards its concurrent goal of permanent custody and guardianship as stipulated to by the parties.”
¶29 In this regard, Fаther has provided little basis for his prediction about how the case would have proceeded. Even had the TPR been dismissed, the court retained jurisdiction over
¶30 Accordingly, Father has not shown he is entitled to relief on appeal. On this basis, we reject his rule 41 challenge to the termination of his parental rights.
CONCLUSION
¶31 We reject Father’s argument that the juvenile court erred by failing to accept the parties’ stipulation regarding Child’s best