177 P. 453 | Cal. | 1918
Upon an accusation filed by the Los Angeles Bar Association, charging W. Ona Morton, an attorney at law, with a violation of his professional duties, a hearing was had by the superior court of Los, Angeles County, which caused a judgment to be entered depriving the accused of the right to practice as an attorney and counselor in the courts of the state of California. From this judgment the accused has appealed.
No attack is made upon the sufficiency of the accusation, which clearly charged the accused with the commission of acts which, if true, fully warranted the rendering of the judgment of which he complains.
Briefly stated, the facts in support of the charge made are as follows: Some time in August, 1917, one Robertson, then assuming the name of Butler, and his wife, robbed a man by the name of Smith of about one thousand dollars. They left Los Angeles, where the crime was committed, going to Arizona, where they, on September 18, 1917, deposited eight hundred dollars of the stolen funds in three different banks. They returned to Los Angeles on September 22, 1917, where they were immediately arrested and at once confessed their guilt to the arresting officers. Being committed to the county jail, they, on the day following, sent for Morton, to whom they admitted the fact that they had stolen the money, and also informed him that they had made a confession of the theft. As a result of the negotiations between Robertson and Morton, the latter was employed to defend them, and being informed of the deposit of the stolen funds in said banks, he *512 induced them to draw a check upon one of the accounts and deliver the same to him, by means whereof he obtained, as his fee, three hundred dollars of such stolen funds. Thereafter, by suggesting that they should be released upon bond, he induced them to draw another check in favor of one D.M. Hidey for three hundred dollars, of which sum two hundred dollars was to be paid him for securing the bond and one hundred dollars of which he was to hold for the use of Robertson and his wife. A short time thereafter, induced by the same instrumentality, Robertson drew another check for two hundred dollars, the balance of the deposit, in favor of one Hayes, with which he was assured batter board while in jail, the unused portion thereof to be paid to him upon their release. Under Morton's advice, Robertson and his wife entered a plea of not guilty, which later, likewise under his advice, was withdrawn and a plea of guilty entered, after which they applied to the court for probation. After their entering the plea of guilty, and pending the proceedings for probation, Robertson wrote a letter to one of the judges of the superior court purporting to inform him of what had occurred, whereupon he and his wife were brought before the judge, and, under oath, examined with reference to the transaction had with Morton and matters in connection therewith. At the hearing of the disbarment proceedings, Robertson and his wife, both upon direct and upon an exhaustive cross-examination, testified in great detail as to the occurrences, and as to the relationship with Morton, his knowledge of their thefts, and that the moneys secured from them, by and through him, were the funds stolen from Smith, all of which he obtained and accepted, knowing the same to be stolen property, and advised them to give false testimony as to their disposition of the same.
Basing his contention upon the fact that a proceeding for the disbarment of an attorney is in the nature of a criminal proceeding (In re Alameda County Bar Assn.,
Conceding, as claimed by appellant, that Robertson and his wife were confessed thieves, and had theretofore, in an inquiry concerning their crime, lied to the court and perjured themselves, all of which, at the hearing in this proceeding, they fully, freely, and frankly admitted, the trial court, notwithstanding their story was contradicted by the accused, a lawyer theretofore of conceded good character and standing, accepted their testimony as true and disbelieved that of accused.
In their reply brief, counsel insist that the accusation against appellant charged him with the commission of a felony, wherein Robertson and his wife were accomplices, and that, as provided in section
Moreover, the proceeding wherein these witnesses testified was a prosecution for an offense alleged to have been committed by the accused in his professional capacity as an officer of the court, the penalty for which, upon conviction, is the depriving him of the right to practice as an attorney and counselor in the courts of this state, an offense with which, since they were not attorneys at law, the witnesses could not be deemed liable to prosecution.
The judgment is affirmed.
Sloss, J., Richards, J., pro tem., Wilbur, J., Melvin, J., and Angellotti, C. J., concurred.
Rehearing denied.
All the Justices concurred.