289 P. 647 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1930
Petitioner having formerly applied for a writ, which was denied, the facts are there stated (
The plaintiff in the divorce action alleged that she was petitioner's lawful wife, whereas he averred that their marriage was illegal and void for the reason that the wife at the time had a husband living from whom she had not been divorced. Authorities are cited and quoted to the effect that an asserted prior marriage, and the illegality of the marriage of the parties litigant, cast the burden upon the party urging them of so showing.
[1] It is well established that a marriage may be established by the testimony of one of the parties thereto. (Budd v.Morgan,
[5] It is clear, therefore, that at the time of the hearing on the alimony order, and after the plaintiff, Mrs. Morgan, had proved her marriage to petitioner herein, the burden was shifted to the latter to establish the fact that his marriage to her was invalid by reason of a prior existing *605 marriage undissolved by decree of divorce or otherwise. The record conclusively shows that he offered no evidence in the matter, as well as that neither Mrs. Morgan nor anyone else gave evidence concerning a prior marriage. This burden he did not meet, and he therefore cannot at this time complain of the order made by the court. We conclude from the record that there was satisfactory proof of the marriage of Effie Morgan to this petitioner. The trial court found upon such issue. It had jurisdiction of the parties and possessed the power to make the order which was granted.
[6] Petitioner further contends that his application to vacate the alimony order should have been granted. The court heard the evidence and denied the application to vacate, and there was ample evidence to warrant and sustain the action of the court in so doing. If petitioner was dissatisfied with the order granting Mrs. Morgan alimony and counsel fees he should have appealed and had the matter reviewed and a determination made as to whether the court had abused its discretion in the matter. His present attack upon the order is collateral and cannot be properly made in this matter. (Ex parte Joutsen,
Writ discharged. Petitioner remanded.
Craig, Acting P.J., and Thompson (Ira F.), J., concurred.