Case Information
*1 Filed 9/6/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re TRAVIS LANELL MONTGOMERY D083970 on Habeas Corpus.
(Super. Ct. Nos. HC25670 & SCD206291) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Dismissed.
Lara Gressley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
Travis Lanell Montgomery purports to appeal the order denying a motion for discovery he made in connection with a postjudgment petition for writ of habeas corpus that sought relief for alleged violations of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA or Act). We conclude the order is not appealable and dismiss the appeal.
I.
BACKGROUND In a joint trial with codefendant Matthew Henderson in 2008, a jury found Montgomery guilty of two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery and one count each of robbery, attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon; found true firearm and gang enhancement allegations; and found true Montgomery had two prior juvenile adjudications that constituted strikes under the “Three Strikes” law. The trial court sentenced Montgomery to prison for an aggregate term of 61 years to life. On appeal, this court reversed the robbery conviction and related conspiracy conviction, struck the prison terms and enhancements imposed on those convictions, and thereby reduced the prison term to 26 years to life. ( People v. Henderson (Oct. 5, 2010, D054493) [nonpub. opn.].)
In January 2024, Montgomery sent the trial court a “declaration” “raising RJA habeas claims.” He alleged, “The prosecution sought more severe charges against [him] than against members of another race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (See Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (a)(3); undesignated section references are to this code.) Montgomery also alleged, “The court imposed a longer sentence on [him] than against members of another race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (See id. , subd. (a)(4)(A).) The declaration cited the provision of the Act authorizing the defendant to “file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the state” ( id. , subd. (d)) and attached a “motion for discovery” under the Act. Montgomery asked the court to “grant this motion invitation for the court to recall sentence on its own motion.”
The trial court treated Montgomery’s declaration as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and summarily denied it for failure to state a prima facie case for relief. In its denial order, the court stated: “Petitioner has also attached a motion for discovery under section 745, subdivision (d). Without addressing the merits of the discovery request, this court denies the freestanding discovery motion for lack of jurisdiction to consider post- judgment motions.”
Montgomery filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order in which he wrote, “Racial Justice Act claim denial is an order made after judgement affecting substantial rights and is appealable under P.C. 1237(b).” He also asserted the denial of his “request for discovery is reviewable on appeal.”
We issued an order dismissing the appeal to the extent it challenged
the denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, because the order is to
that extent not appealable. (
Robinson v. Lewis
(2020)
II.
DISCUSSION Montgomery argues a “freestanding motion for discovery under subdivision (d) of section 745 . . . is plainly permitted by the statute,” and an order denying a postconviction motion is appealable as “ ‘any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.’ ” (Quoting *4 § 1237, subd. (b).) The Attorney General responds that “[a] trial court order denying relief that the court has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).” According to the Attorney General, the RJA does not authorize a freestanding discovery motion, and the trial court lost jurisdiction to grant Montgomery’s discovery motion once it denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus because there was no longer a pending proceeding in which to order discovery. We shall conclude the challenged order is not appealable.
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a
trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made
appealable by statute.” (
People v. Loper
(2015)
“A trial court order denying relief that the court has no jurisdiction to
grant does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not
appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).” (
People v. King
(2022)
The general rule is that “ ‘[t]here is no statutory authority for a trial
court to entertain a postjudgment motion that is unrelated to any proceeding
then pending before the court. [Citation.] Indeed, a motion is not an
independent remedy. It is ancillary to an on-going action and “ ‘implies the
pendency of a suit between the parties and is confined to incidental matters
in the progress of the cause. As the rule is sometimes expressed, a motion
relates to some question collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with, and dependent on, the principal remedy.’ ” [Citation.] In
most cases, after the judgment has become final, there is nothing pending to
which a motion may attach.’ ” (
People v. Picklesimer
(2010)
The Legislature enacted the RJA “to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system”; “to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing”; and “to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining *6 convictions or imposing sentences.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subds. (i), (j).) To achieve those objectives, the Act added section 745 to the Penal Code (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5) and amended sections 1473 and 1473.7 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, §§ 4, 5).
Subdivision (a) of section 745 generally forbids the state to “seek or
obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis
of race, ethnicity, or national origin,” and goes on to specify certain
circumstances that, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, would
establish a violation. “A defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure to
the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a)
in the possession or control of the state.” (§ 745, subd. (d).) If the defendant
shows “good cause” for the disclosure, “the court shall order the records to be
released.” (
Ibid.
) Section 745, subdivision (d) thus authorizes a defendant to
make a motion for discovery of information relevant to establishing a
violation of the Act. But we cannot look at that provision in isolation, as
Montgomery would have us do. We must consider it “ ‘in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole to discern its scope and to harmonize the
various parts of the enactment.’ ” (
People v. Prudholme
(2023) 14 Cal.5th
961, 975; see
People v. Ruiz
(2018)
Section 745, subdivision (b) states: “A defendant may file a motion pursuant to this section, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7, in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a). For claims based on the trial record, a defendant may *7 raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence. The defendant may also move to stay the appeal and request remand to the superior court to file a motion pursuant to this section.” Subdivision (c) of section 745 authorizes a defendant to file a motion “at trial . . . as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of [an] alleged violation,” and requires the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing if “the defendant makes a prima facie showing of [the] violation.” Subdivision (j)(1) of section 745 states the section applies “[t]o all cases in which judgment is not final,” and subdivisions (j)(2) through (j)(5) specify dates at which section 745 applies to persons seeking relief by a petition for writ of habeas corpus under section 1473 or by a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence under section 1473.7.
Sections 1473 and 1473.7 govern postjudgment assertions of RJA claims. Section 1473, subdivision (e) authorizes prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody “after judgment has been entered based on evidence that a criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745, if that section applies based on the date of judgment . . . .” Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(3) authorizes a person no longer in custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence that “was sought, obtained, or imposed on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin in violation of subdivision (a) of section 745.”
The Legislature’s provision of several specific procedures for litigating
an alleged violation of the RJA from the time a charge is filed against a
defendant up to and including the time the defendant is no longer in custody
on any sentence imposed for a conviction indicates a motion for discovery
under section 745, subdivision (a) is not intended as “ ‘an independent
*8
remedy’ ” but as “ ‘ancillary to an on-going action.’ ” (
Picklesimer, supra
,
In this case, there was no pending proceeding in which Montgomery
could seek discovery. He attached a discovery motion to a “declaration”
“raising RJA habeas claims,” which the trial court treated as a petition for
writ of habeas corpus attacking his final judgment of conviction. (See
Picklesimer, supra
,
facie case] must be summarily denied, and it creates no cause or proceeding
which would confer discovery jurisdiction.” (
People v. Gonzalez
(1990)
“An order denying a motion the court lacks jurisdiction to grant does
not affect a defendant’s substantial rights. [Citation.] Any appeal from such
an order must be dismissed.” (
People v. Alexander
(2020)
The required dismissal of Montgomery’s appeal does not leave him with
no way to seek relief from the appellate courts. The RJA authorizes a
2
In support of her conclusion that a defendant may obtain discovery
before having to state a prima facie case for relief under the RJA in a habeas
corpus proceeding, our concurring colleague asserts the standard a defendant
must meet to obtain discovery is “notably
less
demanding” than the standard
he must meet to state a prima face case for relief. (Conc. opn.,
post
, p. 3.)
The merits of the trial court’s rulings are not before us, and it is unnecessary
to consider those standards to resolve the only issue that is before us,
namely, the appealability of the order denying Montgomery’s discovery
motion. We express no opinion on the showings a defendant must make to
obtain discovery and to state a prima facie case for relief under the Act.
*11
defendant who is in custody to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus
alleging a violation of section 745, subdivision (a) “in a court of competent
jurisdiction.” (
Id
., subd. (b); see § 1473, subd. (e).) The Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeal “have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings.”
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) Where, as here, “the superior court denies the
petition, the petitioner may then file a new petition in the Court of Appeal.”
(
Robinson, supra
,
III.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
IRION, J.
I CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J., Concurring.
I concur in the result because the portion of the trial court’s order denying Montgomery’s request for discovery is not an independently appealable order. I write separately regarding a habeas petitioner’s ability to seek such discovery more generally, and to seek review of an order denying such a request. In my view, the Legislature has expressed its intention to allow defendants to obtain discovery of evidence in the possession or control of the state that is plausibly relevant to a potential violation of the Racial Justice Act (RJA) regardless of the finality of the underlying conviction or the mechanism the defendant uses to assert their RJA claim. The same standards for obtaining discovery under the RJA should apply to all individuals asserting claims under the RJA.
Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a) prohibits criminal convictions and heightened sentencing based on race, ethnicity, or natural origin. Subdivision (b) allows “[a] defendant” to assert a violation of the RJA by filing “a motion . . . or a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7 in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Subdivision (d) likewise allows “[a] defendant [to] file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a).” Both refer generally to “a defendant” and nothing in subdivision (d), or elsewhere in the statute, suggests the Legislature intended to limit discovery under subdivision (d) only to those defendants who filed a motion while the case was still pending, or whose cases were not yet final.
Rather, in its associated findings, the Legislature expressly stated, “It is the further intent of the Legislature to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
*14
discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing sentences.”
(Assembly Bill No. 2542 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) Ch. 317, § 2, subds. (i), (j);
Assembly Bill No. 739 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) Ch. 739 [expanding relief to
cases in which a judgment was entered as final prior to January 1, 2021].) At
the same time, the Legislature amended section 1473 to add then subdivision
(f), later renumbered to subdivision (e), which states in part, “A petition
raising a claim of this nature for the first time,
or on the basis of new
discovery provided by the state
or other new evidence that could not have
been previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be
deemed a successive or abusive petition.” (§ 1473, subd. (e), added by Stats.
2020, ch. 317, § 4, renumbered by Stats. 2023 ch. 381, § 1 (boldface and italics
added). This suggests the Legislature intended that defendants who file a
petition for a writ of habeas under section 1473, subdivision (e) would be able
to file a discovery motion under section 745, subdivision (d), thereby allowing
those individuals to obtain the discovery necessary to pursue their RJA
claims. (Accord,
People v. Wilson
(2024)
It is of course conceivable that the Legislature intended instead to refer
to a defendant’s ability to obtain discovery under section 1054.9, which, as
the majority notes, the Legislature passed in response to the strict
jurisdictional rule set forth in
People v. Superior Court (Morales)
(2017)
Moreover, the very purpose of the RJA is to restore the integrity of the
judicial system by broadly and proactively addressing both explicit and
implicit biases to “ ‘ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or
obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’ (Assem. Bill 2542 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.) § 2, subd. (i).)” (
Young v. Superior Court
(2022)
Following a detailed analysis of the Legislative history—and the larger
history of race in our criminal justice system that the Legislature was
attempting to address in passing the RJA—the court in
Young
concluded,
“[t]o claim entitlement to discovery, only plausible justification is required.”
(
Young, supra,
It follows then that discovery under subdivision (d) (i.e., discovery that is aimed at attaining information that would assist in making a prima facie showing under the RJA) should not be precluded by a trial court’s finding that a defendant has not (yet) made the requisite prima facie showing. with respect to the discovery motion, so this assertion cannot be definitively established.
Requiring a defendant who files a writ of habeas corpus to meet the prima
facie burden
before
considering a related request for discovery inverses that
relationship and places a notably higher burden on defendants pursuing
relief through the habeas process. I do not believe this is what the
Legislature intended. Nor would an interpretation of section 745, subdivision
(d) that allows habeas petitioners to obtain such discovery trigger a right to
unlimited discovery, as the majority suggests. (See
People v. Gonzalez
(1990)
The majority recognizes that the strict jurisdictional rule announced in
Gonzalez
is subject to exception, but asserts section 745, subdivision (d) does
not create such an exception because it does not include the same “in
preparation to file” language as section 1054.9, subdivision (a). I see no
reason the Legislature had to use those exact words in this context to
establish a defendant’s ability to obtain discovery aimed at setting forth a
prima facie showing of an RJA violation. We read the statute as a whole and
are guided by the Legislature’s plainly expressed intentions. (
People v.
Gonzalez
(2017)
Accordingly, while I agree with the majority that a discovery motion
under section 745, subdivision (d) filed in connection with a writ of habeas
corpus—like the one at issue here—is not a freestanding motion, the denial of
which results in an independently appealable order after judgment, I
*17
conclude that section 745, subdivision (d) applies equally to all defendants
and allows a defendant with a pending habeas petition to request discovery
from the state aimed at proving the RJA violation alleged in the petition.
The trial court may rule on the discovery motion and the petition in a single
combined order, as it did here, or may rule on the discovery motion
separately, before ruling on the pending habeas petition. (See, e.g.,
People
v. Thacker
(1985)
KELETY, J.