23 F. 32 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Pennsylvania | 1885
The petitioner claims his discharge on the ground that he is unlawfully held in custody in violation of the tenth article of the treaty of 1812 between the governments of the United States and Great Britain. Briefly, the facts of the case are these:
The petitioner was convicted of burglary in the court of oyer and terminer of Clarion county, Pennsylvania, and thereupon was sentenced on August 23,1881, to undergo an imprisonment for the period of seven years in the Western Penitentiary of Pennsylvania, to which prison he was duly committed. In December, 1881, he escaped therefrom and fled to Canada. Burglary not being an extradition crime,
The application for the petitioner’s discharge proceeds upon the theory that the treaty between the United States and Groat Britain .secures to the extradited person immunity from detention for any crime other than that upon which the surrender is made; or, at least, exemption from detention for any offense not within the treaty. Now, it is indeed true that it has been held by Judge Hoffman, in U. S. v. Watts, 14 Fed. Rep. 130, and by the supreme court of Kentucky, in Com. v. Hawes, 13 Bush, 697, that an extradited person under this treaty cannot be tried for any .offenses other than extradition crimes; and in State v. Vauderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273, the supreme court of Ohio carried the doctrine of exemption still further, holding that the extradited person could be put on trial only for the particular offense for which he had been surrendered. Upon these adjudications, which, on account of the eminence of the judges and courts pronouncing them, are certainly entitled to great respect, the petitioner’s counsel confidently rely as establishing a principle applicable to and decisive of this case. But then, on the other hand, in U. S. v. Caldwell, 8 Blatchf. 131, and U. S. v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchf. 295, it was held by Judge Benedict (who gives most cogent reasons for the conclusion) that extradition proceedings do not by their nature secure to the, person surrendered for one crime immunity from prosecution for other offenses, whether within the treaty or not; and he distinctly ruled that no such immunity is conferred by the treaty now under consideration. A like determination was reached by the court of appeals of New York in Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N. Y. 110, where an extradited person, surrendered by the government of Trance under treaty stipulations, was arrested on civil process.
The question whether the treaty of 1842 between the United States and Great Britain prohibits the trial of the extradited person for an offense not specified in the proceedings or named in the treaty, must, therefore, be regarded as still open, while the precise question now, before me, it would seem, is altogether new. If the treaty affords
I am of opinion that the petitioner’s complaint, that he is in custody in violation of the treaty under which he was extradited, is groundless. Hence his discharge must be denied; and it is so ordered.