¶ 1 This еase requires us to evaluate the interplay between Arizona’s civil commitment statutes and its criminal statute governing incompetent defendants. We conclude that A.R.S. § 13-4517(1) provides an effective alternative to the petition for evaluation prescribed by A.R.S. § 36-523, and hold that an order enterеd in a criminal case pursuant to § 13-4517 requiring an individual to undergo mental health treatment obviates the need for strict compliance with the preliminary civil evaluation procedure set forth in § 36-523.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2 Appellant, J.T., appeals the superior court’s order that he undergo a combination of inpatient and outpatient treatment in a mental health treatment facility. Appellant argues that because no Petition for Evaluation was ever filed as a predicate to that order, the superior court lacked jurisdiction and he was denied due process. The State contеnds that Appellant’s argument is without merit because (1) the issue raised on appeal is moot; (2) the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction; and (3) Appellant was not denied due process.
¶3 On January 30, 2006, Appellant was arrested for aggravated assault and booked into the Fourth Avenue Jail in Phoenix, Arizоna. After his arrest, the criminal court ordered an evaluation of his competency pursuant to Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11. The evidence showed that Appellant was not competent to stand trial, but that wdth treatment his competency could be restored. See A.R.S. § 13-4510(C). The Rule 11 court ordered Appellant to a Restоration to Competency Program (“RTC”). In December 2006, after Appellant completed the RTC, an examining psychologist opined that Appellant was competent to stand trial.
¶ 4 However, on January 3, 2008, Appellant and the State stipulated to the admission of the results of a second Rule 11 eompeten-cy evaluation, and the Rule 11 court found that Appellant was not competent to stand trial. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-4517 (2001), the court found that there was “no substantial probability that Defendant [would] be restored to competency within 21 months after the date of the original finding of incompeteney.”
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that there is reasonable cause to believe that Defendant is a danger to self, a danger to others, persistently or acutely disabled, or gravely disabled as a result of a disorder pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-501, et. seq.;
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Defendant is not willing and is not capable of voluntarily consenting to admission to a mental health treatment agency for the evaluation, care or treatment of his/her [sic] mental condition; and THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Defendant is likely, without immediate or continued hospitalization, to suffer serious physical harm or serious illness, or to inflict serious physical harm on аnother person prior to evaluation and further hearing.
¶ 5 After making these findings, the court ordered the following:
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant shall be immediately taken into custody by the Sheriff and shall be immediately transported to Desert Vista Behavioral Health Center for inpatient evaluation pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-530;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED аppointing the Deputy Public Defender assigned to mental health proceedings as co-counsel during all civil mental health proceedings; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the County Attorney is to file a Petition for Court-Ordered Evaluation with the Clerk of the Court, pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-521(F), by 5:00 p.m. on 0l/04/08 and provide a copy of the filed Petition to this division. The division staff is directed to review the file to determine compliance within 48 hours of the Petition’s file date.
*280 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the State in this cause furnish to the Probate Registrar’ copies of all police reports concerning the charges in this cause by 5:00 p.m. 01/7/08. The copies will be sent to the еvaluation agency to aid in the evaluation and treatment of the Defendant;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all medical records currently in the possession of Correctional Health Services shall be promptly delivered to the Desert Vista Behavioral Health Center; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing without prejudice the criminal chаrges in this matter effective at 5:00 p.m. on 01/04/08.
¶ 6 The State filed an “Application for Involuntary Evaluation” on January 4, 2008, which was served on Appellant on January 17, 2008. With its Application, the State supplied copies of the police report and written reports of six doctors who examined Appellаnt for his Rule 11 evaluations. The State never filed any document styled “Petition for Court^Ordered Evaluation.”
¶ 7 On January 17, 2008, a treatment team at Desert Vista Behavioral Health Center (“Desert Vista”) evaluated Appellant pursuant to the January 3, 2008 court order.
¶ 8 On January 23, 2008, pursuant to AR.S. § 36-533 (2003), the Desert Vista treatment team filed a Petition for Court-Ordered Treatment. The team recommended that Appellant continue to receive hospital care and treatment, and asserted that without such treatment, Appellant would remain persistently and acutely disabled.
¶ 9 On January 23, 2008, the probate court issued а Detention Order for Treatment and Notice pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-535. The court held a hearing on the Petition for Court-Ordered Treatment on January 29, 2008, and Appellant was represented by counsel during the proceedings. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-540, the court issued an order for Appellant to undergo treatment for a period not to exceed 365 days, with a period of inpatient treatment not to exceed 180 days.
¶ 10 Appellant timely appeals, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to. A.R.S. § 36-546.01 and § 12-210KB) (2003).
ANALYSIS
I. Waiver
¶ 11 The State correctly notes that Appellant failed to object to the process by which he was ordered to undergo treatment. However, “La] constitutional issue may be raised and addressed for the first time on appeal, particularly when, as here, the issue is of statewide importance, is raised in the context of a fully developed record, does not turn on resolution of disputed facts, and has bеen fully briefed by the parties.” Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp.,
1112 “An involuntary commitment hearing is a civil proceeding that can result in ‘a serious deprivation of liberty.’ ” In re Jesse M.,
II. Mootness
¶ 13 The State also argues that we should not consider this appeal because the
III. Statutory Violations
¶ 14 Appellant argues that because there was no Petition for Evaluation filed, the court acted without proper authority when it ordered him to undergo an involuntary evaluation and subsequent treatment. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
A. Interplay Between Title 13 and Title 36
¶ 15 The issue presented here is one of statutory interpretation. “In interpreting statutes, our central goal ‘is to dеtermine and give effect to the legislature’s intent.’ ” Yarbrough v. Montoya-Paez,
¶ 16 The statutory mental health scheme set forth in title 36, chapter 5, article 4, provides a series of procedural safeguards to ensure that court-ordered mental health evaluations are not conducted indiscriminately. The purpose of these safeguards is to idеntify correctly those individuals who are at risk, “as a result of a mental disorder,” of being “a danger to self or others, persistently or acutely disabled or gravely disabled” and to avoid improper deprivation of an individual’s liberty interests. AR.S. § 36-520(B)(4).
¶ 17 In the civil context, AR.S. §§ 36-520, -521 and -523 work together to require first that an apрlicant allege that an individual suffers from a mental disorder and is a danger to self, others or is acutely or gravely disabled. Upon receipt of such an Application for Evaluation, the receiving agency is required to complete a prescreening of the individual and composе a report. If the prescreening results determine one is necessary, a petition must then be submitted to a court requesting an order for involuntary evaluation.
¶ 18 If, however, an individual is arrested, subjected to Rule 11 evaluation, and determined incompetent to stand trial, the process for civil commitment can take a different course. When an individual has been found both incompetent to stand trial and nonrestorable, A.R.S. § 13-4517(1) gives the court the authority to “[rjemand the defendant to the custody of the department of health services for the institution of civil commitment proceedings pursuant tо title 36, chapter 5.” See generally Nowell v. Rees,
¶ 19 Appellant correctly notes that a court-ordered involuntary evaluation that is not based on a formal petition for evaluation from a screеning agency is generally invalid.
B. Appellant Received the Statutory Protections To Which He Was Entitled.
¶ 20 On January 4, 2008, the State filеd with the court a packet of documents that comprised the functional equivalent of a petition for court-ordered evaluation.
¶ 21 The primary purpose of the Petition for Evaluation and the Application for Evaluation is to ensure that a screening agency makes an informed decision as to whether the proposed patient is in “such a condition that without immediate or continuing hospitalization he is likely to suffer serious physical harm or further deterioration or inflict serious physical harm upon another person,” ■ and whether the evaluation should take place on an outpatient basis. A.R.S. § 36- ■ 523(B)(1), (2). Here, the Rule 11 court, rather than the screеning agency, found (based on the written reports of the six doctors who evaluated Appellant pursuant to Rule 11) that Appellant was “likely, without immediate or continued hospitalization[ ] to suffer serious physical harm or serious illness, or to inflict serious physical harm on another person prior to evaluation and further hearing.” Further, the court found that Appellant’s evaluation should take place on an in-patient basis at Desert Vista. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4517(1), Appellant was properly ordered to be admitted to Desert Vista for evaluation.
¶ 22 We conclude that no further judicial review wаs required before an evaluation of appellant commenced. To conclude otherwise, and invalidate these proceedings on the ground that the commitment was not initiated in the manner required by A.R.S. §§ 36-520 and -523, would be to treat A.R.S. § 13 — 45Í7(1) as surplusage.
IV. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
¶ 23 Appellant also argues that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the Rule 11 court exceeded its scope of authority when it ordered him to undergo an involuntary evaluation and subsequent treatment. We disagree.
¶ 24 The Arizona Constitution grants the superior court original jurisdiction in cases and proceedings in which exсlusive jurisdiction is not vested by law in another court. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 14(1). Although the superior court in Maricopa County is organized into various departments, including probate, civil and criminal, “these departments are in-house administrative mechanisms that do not affect the jurisdiction of the superior court.” Marvin Johnson, P.C. v. Myers,
¶ 25 The suрerior court acquired subject matter jurisdiction when Appellant was charged with aggravated assault. As a matter of administrative policy, the commitment proceedings were transferred from the Criminal Department to the Probate/Mental Health Department. Both departments are
CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the superior court complied with the statutory scheme governing commitment of criminal defendants and that it acted within its jurisdiction when it entered the order that Appellant undergo involuntary, court-ordered evaluation and treatment, and therefore affirm.
Notes
. Appellant was present and represented by counsel during these proceedings.
. After filing the notice of appeal, appellant sought and obtained extensions of time for thе filing of his opening brief and to permit the superior court to settle the record on appeal. This appeal was fully briefed on February 6, 2009.
. This same packet was submitted by the county allorney to the Maricopa County Correctional Health Services, Psychiatry Section, Screening Agency.