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In Re Merrimack County (Nh Pelrb)
930 A.2d 1202
N.H.
2007
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*1 modify petition or amend the supplement the need arise to Should this, too, hearing done to the so prior must be alleged, facts respond. has an opportunity defendant isolation; instead, we to do so attempt do not construe

We statutes v. Mt. Cranmore Soraghan statutory the overall scheme. harmony with (2005). Resort, two or more Ski interpreting N.H. When matter, we construe them so subject statutes that deal with a similar other, will lead to reasonable they do not contradict each and so Id. of the legislative purpose results and effectuate the statutes. 173-B:3, The 173-B:3, read in with RSA I. harmony

RSA VIII must be 173-B:3, limited to admit evidence under RSA VIII is power trial court’s 173-B:3, I, 173-B:3, I. the notice of RSA RSA sets requirement hearing contest. The trial court has broad discretion contours to facts pertaining alleged it deems “relevant and material” admit evidence 173-B:3,1, not admit on unnoticed to RSA but it should evidence pursuant charges.

Reversed. Galway C.J., JJ., concurred. Duggan, Hicks, Broderick, Employee Labor Board Public Relations No. 2006-525

Appeal County of Merrimack (New Board) Public Labor Relations Hampshire Employee 19, 2007 Argued: April 23, 2007

Opinion August Issued: *2 Atlas, (Susan P.C., Atlas & A. Atlas on the brief and orally), of Nashua for the petitioner. Branch, LLP, Meyer

Backus, of Manchester {Jon Solomon & Meyer, brief), Chemical Workers and International Purcell on the and Ellen Workers, 10I6C, Local Commercial Food & Union Council/United counsel, the brief and Vehar, on Akron, general assistant Ohio {Randall respondent. for the orally), County (county), appeals The Merrimack

Dalianis, petitioner, J. Union International Chemical Workers respondent, Council/United (union), Workers, cross-appeals Local 1046C Food & Commercial Board Labor Relations Hampshire Employee of the New Public decision (PELRB) an arbitrator’s award implement ordering the union. We employee represented by of an mandating reinstatement vacate and remand. part, part affirm employer is a following: public

The record supports 2006). 273-A:l, X The union is the (Supp. of RSA meaning within *3 at the county’s for certain workers bargaining representative exclusive a collective county signatories home. The and the union were nursing (CBA). are Particularly appeal relevant to this bargaining agreement 1,2,24 articles and 25 of the CBA:

n “any rights, Article 1 contained the that parties’ agreement virtue of the New authority existing by Hampshire

duties or in no beway Revised Annotated or other law shall Stat[ut]es that, to the abridged by or limited” the CBA and extent law, CBA such any provision “any was inconsistent of law shall provision(s) prevail.”

* gave right manage Article exclusive home, right discipline or

nursing including as limited or employees, “[e]xcept specifically abridged the terms of [the CBA].”

n Article 24 provided abuse/neglect/exploitation” “[r]esident

would not be tolerated and that instance of “[a]ny physical, verbal, any mental or medical abuse/neglect/exploitation resident shall be for immediate termination.” grounds n Article 25 contained and arbitration grievance procedures. arbitration, provided

In the case of this article be if it was binding” arbitrator’s decision would “final “within the of the Arbitrator scope authority power set forth within this This article also Agreement.” provided: “The function of the Arbitrator is to determine the of this It interpretation specific provisions Agreement. that the arbitrator shall have agreed no to add to, from, subtract or terms of modify any agreement.” this 31, 2002; The CBA on March expired parties did not enter into a new CBA until after the events herein described. May

Beginning employed Melissa Foote as a assistant, (LNA), resident and later as a licensed nursing assistant at the union, home. Foote nursing also served as a steward for the shop participating negotiations contract and representing bargaining unit members.

On working October Foote was at the home where her nursing duties included performing safety checks on certain home nursing half every responding residents hour and to their calls. At approximately 2:30 LNAs found p.m., two one of residents in his wheelchair. sitting He had defecated. One LNA that the thought wearing resident should be Foote, diaper, an adult but the other was unsure. as the LNA primarily resident, responsible for this was called to answer this Foote question. him responded to the resident’s accusation that she had not attended pointing him, his face and finger yelling, loudly interrupting what she had done that emphasize day. Ultimately, this incident was home, to the assistant director of at the reported nursing nursing who form, resident, filled out a asked a social worker to complaint interview the representative and called Foote and a union to her office to discuss what had happened. reported It was also to the New Hampshire Department (DHHS). Health and Human Services

Based from the upon recommendations administrator and assistant home, administrator of the nursing county’s board of commissioners *4 23, voted to terminate Foote’s employment effective November 2002. The recommendation, administrator testified that he based his at least in part, upon wrongdoing. Foote’s refusal to admit to The union then filed a grievance on Foote’s behalf.

The to arbitration. The parties proceeded arbitration issue to which was: “Whether there was cause for the stipulated just County to terminate not, Ms. Foote under the collective If bargaining agreement? what shall arbitrator, the be?” In its brief to the the remedy county agreed that 28:10-a, “under RSA have County employees employed who been for more than one are entitled to a cause’ of year ‘good discharge.” standard brief, According county to that the further that agreed “good would be examined under traditional cause standards.” After five of the arbitrator found that while had not days hearing, Foote resident, neglected verbally the she had abused him. The arbitrator found, however, further that her conduct “was no more serious than Home,” that and Nursing at the to work who have continued employees resident, not she would the verbally abused having Foote admitted to had terminating Therefore, arbitrator found the terminated. have been the which penalty” and unreasonable “overly harsh Foote was reinstate county the The arbitrator ordered cause. county lacked benefits, Foote’s upon conditioned Foote, or other lost pay without back The training programs. abuse/neglect management taking anger Foote, union to file an unfair prompting to reinstate county refused filed a counterclaim county the PELRB. The practice charge labor labor practice in an unfair engaged the union had alleging that asserted Specifically, Foote’s reinstatement. demanding it exceeded his and unenforceable because award was void the arbitrator’s The public policy. and because it violated under the CBA authority followed. cross-appeal favor. This appeal PELRB ruled in the union’s PELRB, findings to its of we defer reviewing When a decision law, will not set aside its fact, and, ruling an erroneous of we absent demonstrates a clear party unless appealing decision order or unreasonable. unjust of the evidence that the is preponderance (2003); Comm’n, 688, also RSA 149 N.H. see Nashua Police Appeal of (2007). presumptively PELRB’s of fact are Though findings 541:13 record its reasonable, support we require lawful (2003). Laconia, 91, 93 150 N.H. City Appeal determinations.

I by enforcing first that the PELRB erred argues arbitrator’s award because the award exceeded the arbitrator’s and, therefore, “A to arbitral binding. judicial challenge was not final and court to consider both the CBA and authority requires reviewing R.W.F., Inc., submission.” Larocque arbitral Rochester, 1993); 149 N.H. City see Police Comm’n Appeal of (2003) (extent is determined jurisdiction by parties’ of arbitrator’s arbitrate; question submit even agreement parties may agree to arbitrator); Cargill, Local 238 Intern. Broth. Teamsters v. arbitrability to (8th 1995) (“Once Inc., gone beyond have parties to an actually their to arbitrate and have submitted an issue promise arbiter, we must look both to their contract and to the submission of omitted)). to the to determine his authority.” (quotation issue concern whether the have overriding contracting parties agreed is “[T]he arbitrate not whether the within the particular dispute, agreement *5 Rochester, CBA.” 149 N.H. at 534 Appeal City Police Comm’n of of of omitted). and citation (quotation 40 ordinarily novo,

While we contractual interpret provisions de see Durham, 486, 487 (2003), Appeal Town 149 N.H. “the general rule [is] of of that the interpretation arbitrator, of a CBA is within the province of the subject to certain exceptions recognized by our case are law” that not N.H., 106, (2001); relevant here. Appeal State 147 N.H. 109 see of of (2006) (where Manchester, 289, Appeal City 153 N.H. 294 PELRB of had authority interpret CBA to determine whether claim was arbitrable, we interpretation novo); review PELRB’s of CBA de Appeal of Durham, (same). Town 149 at N.H. 487-88 the parties “[W]hen include CBA, an arbitration clause in their they choose to disputes have concerning constructions of the CBA resolved by Appeal arbitrator.” N.H., omitted). State N.H. at 109 (quotation brackets of “Because the parties have contracted to disputes by have settled arbitrator chosen them rather than judge, it is the arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the of the meaning contract that agreed have Misco, Inc., accept.” 29, (1987); v. Paperworkers U.S. 37-38 see Drivers, 170, (1st 2001). 8, 10 Keebler Co. v. Truck Local Cir. For reason, this the PELRB does not regularly jurisdiction have to interpret the CBA when it provides binding for final and arbitration. Appeal State N.H., 147 at N.H. 108.

Our review of the arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA is similarly (1st limited. Georgia-Pacific See v. Local Corp. 1988). Just as the court not may reject the arbitrator’s factual findings simply them, because it disagrees may neither the court reject arbitrator’s interpretation of CBA because the court simply disagrees Misco, with it. See 484 U.S. 38. at While the arbitrator cannot ignore CBA, plain language of the because the parties authorized the arbitrator give meaning to that “a court language, reject should not an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the long contract.” Id. as the “[A]s arguably construing arbitrator is even applying acting contract and within the scope authority, of his that a court is he convinced committed Id.; serious error does not suffice to overturn his Georgia- decision.” see F.2d Corp., 864 at 944. The court’s task is thus ... “ordinarily Pacific limited to determining whether the arbitrator’s construction of the [CBA] Union, Inc., is to extent any plausible.” Exxon v. Esso Corp. Workers’ F.3d abrogated on other Eastern grounds by (2000). Workers, Associated Coal Corp. United Mine 531 U.S. 57 “[A]n arbitrator’s view of the scope issue is entitled to the same deference normally accorded to the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.” Larocque, 8 F.3d at 97 (quotation ellipses omitted); (1969). Co., 302, 304 see Transp. Pelletier v. Auclair 109 N.H. *6 submission, arbitrator to to the which asked the looking parties’ and, not, terminate Foote if “just the had cause” to decide whether CBA, which did light parties’ expired a and in of the remedy, to formulate cause,” the “traditional the arbitrator determined that “just not reference county’s of the decision. Under applied cause standard” his review just standard, the to consider the “the arbitrator ... has this surrounding necessary interpret and circumstances underlying issues and reach a final decision.” the of the CBA apply express provisions Manchester, States 153 N.H. at 293. United Appeal City of of analyzing just identified seven criteria for whether Court has Supreme (2) (1) the employer’s the reasonableness of the position; cause exists: (3) timing investigation to the the of the given employee; notice (5) (4) undertaken; against of the the evidence investigation; the fairness (7) (6) discrimination; and the relation of the the of employee; possibility the the employee’s of to the nature of offense and degree discipline Misco, n.5; Manchester, Appeal City record. 484 U.S. at 34 see past of of N.H. at 293 seven criteria with Consistent with this (citing approval). standard, the examined whether conduct arbitrator Foote’s warranted CBA, determined it did not. penalty maximum under the of the CBA say interpretation We cannot that the arbitrator’s Misco, implausible require submission is so as to reversal. See parties’ say 484 U.S. at 38. Nor can we that the has demonstrated a clear PELRB’s uphold of the evidence that the decision to this preponderance unjust Appeal is either or unreasonable. See Nashua interpretation Comm’n, “By requesting Police 149 N.H. at 689. the arbitrator [Foote], county] just determine whether had cause to both [the parties authority upon conferred the arbitrator to decide that issue.” Steelworkers, (8th Homestake Min. Co. v. United 153 F.3d Cir. 1998) omitted). (quotation Having and brackets been asked whether there and, not, just remedy, was cause to terminate Foote if provide “[t]he free to conclude there no just arbitrator was was cause for [Foote], discharging just but that there was cause for a lesser discipline.” 16, 22 Employees, Boston Medical v. Service Local (2002). 2001), denied, U.S. 1083 cert.

Our conclusion is consonant with the decisions of other courts. See id. cases). In Bureau Communication (citing Engraving Graphic (8th Union, instance, International 823-24 as here, ordered the employer employee arbitrator reinstate who had terminated for thirteen unexcused Unlike accruing been absences. here, CBA at issue the CBA in Bureau included a Engraving just not, however, Bureau 284 F.3d at 824. It did provision. Engraving, state constituted cause. Id. at 825. As did that thirteen unexcused absences case, in Bureau framed parties parties Engraving this as: “Whether the had cause to Employer issue for the arbitration not, and if what should be employment grievant..., terminate the omitted). The concluded that (quotation Id. at 824 remedy?” absences, accrued thirteen the employer had although employee *7 terminating cause for her. Id. just lacked exceeded his

On the contended that the arbitrator had appeal, employer the which language policy, the attendance authority by ignoring plain thirteen unexcused was remedy that the for absences provided termination, analysis. cause Id. The court ruled by conducting just authority conferred on the arbitrator to parties’ the submission that the analysis interpretation conduct a cause just at the court “For explained: submission was reasonable. Id. 825. As it, to to the only employer] agreed stipulate just reasons known to [the entered into the cause it is analysis____Having just stipulation, cause to now that the arbitrator acted disingenuous employer] argue for [the the asked it to by conducting very analysis employer] improperly [the (where Id.; Co., F.3d at 680 employer undertake.” see Homestake Min. whether had cause to requested employer just arbitrator to determine cannot that arbitrator lacked discharge employee, employer argue (same). issue); Inc., to decide this 66 F.3d at 990-91 authority Cargill, here, the arbitrator would Similarly, having agreed apply and, arbitrator, having “traditional cause standards” in its brief to the just standards, itself the decision to terminate Foote under those the analyzed county argue improperly by analyzing cannot now that the arbitrator acted arbitrator, to the the conceded that just county cause as he did. In its brief arbitration, would examined under good “for the of this cause be purposes or In with this just principles.” keeping traditional cause standards concession, county the that: the CBA the county argued permitted Foote; tolerated; Foote’s conduct could not Foote knew or be that her conduct would result in Foote was discharge; should have known or action as action progressive disciplinary not entitled to corrective such futile; of anti-union discharged would have been Foote was not because bias; treated; no circumstances mitigating Foote was not disparately to a lesser reducing existed that would warrant Foote’s termination Misco, short, the criteria set forth in county argued sanction. seven n.5. its decision to terminate Foote Having analyzed 484 U.S. at 34 itself traditional cannot fault just principles, county under cause analysis. for in the same engaging CBA, The that under articles 24 and 25 of the once county argues resident, he lacked verbally arbitrator found that Foote had abused the her. decision to terminate See disagree county’s Food, v. United Local Spring Corp. Poland (2003). denied, once the arbitrator county, 540 U.S. 818 To cert. in the as “grounds that Foote committed an act listed CBA

found termination,” separate remedy he “not free to fashion a immediate was in the Id. at 34. parties’ agreement.” from the one apart provided contends, before the contrary argument also to its county arbitrator, did not ask the arbitrator to parties’ apply submission the CBA’s just apply implied traditional cause but rather principles, CBA “was “just county definition of cause.” While the concedes that the standard,” the silent with to the articulation of a respect collectively bargained asserts that “the mere existence of a labor ‘cause,’ ... agreement employer ‘just mandates that demonstrate Thus, to the the reference in ‘good according county, cause’ cause.’” 24(B) “grounds “just Article for termination” was akin to a reference to cause,” provision, terminating employee and that under this See verbally abusing per Georgia- a resident constituted se cause. 864 F.2d at 945. Corp., Pacific assertions, To relies support upon Georgia-Pacific Corp., its *8 945-46, 864 F.2d at and Poland 314 F.3d at 34-35. Both of Spring Corp., these cases are from this case. The CBAs in those cases distinguishable could not terminated unambiguously provided employees except be for cause and act just expressly employee’s included within the 942; definition of See just Georgia-Pacific Corp., cause. 864 F.2d at Poland 314 F.3d at 31. The CBA in the not Spying, appeal instant does even use is, thus, phrase “just cause.” The instant case unlike Georgia-Pacific that, and Corp. Spring, Poland which stand “for the once an proposition arbitrator finds an employee specifically committed some act listed in termination, as providing just [CBA] cause for the arbitrator is not free to determine that the act does not warrant termination but rather Co., warrants some lesser Keebler at 13. penalty.” F.3d When confronted with the CBA and the parties’ asking submission him to existed, determine whether cause just say we cannot that the arbitrator unreasonably harmonized the two. See Trailmobile Trail. v. Inter. Un. of Workers, (8th 2000) 744, Elec. 223 F.3d Cir. that it (holding upwas arbitrator to harmonize management rights just clause with cause CBA); 3, Metro provision Chevrolet v. Union de Tronquistas, 1987) (when 4-5 Cir. CBA general contains clause prohibiting termination cause except just equate and does not certain behavior cause, just “an arbitrator is empowered determine whether the cause”). employee’s action which precipitated just dismissal constitutes only whether wanted the arbitrator to determine county Had the accused, she it could have Foote had in the conduct of which was engaged only “If factual were the bone of accordingly. finding framed the issue contention, committed not frame the issue as whether why [Foote] essence, to the county] single question submitted a [the [abuse]? it.” authority that he lacked the answer complains arbitrator now (6th 2006) Appx. 192 Fed. Flooring Hartco v. Local (not Having full-text that the publication). requested recommended for cause, Foote was discharged just arbitrator determine whether heard to the arbitrator complain should “not now be making that it instead of factual performed analysis requested purely Trail., 223 F.3d at 747. finding.” Trailmobile Further, may of the be county’s interpretation while the submission requires that the to arbitration plausible, agree do not submission “[w]e upon the ... limitations review of arbitration interpretation, this of the which would interpretation awards militate submission against Pelletier, 304; 109 N.H. at see LB & B in this case.” upset award[] (10th 2006) Broth., Associates v. International (while immediate just of CBA’s cause and employer’s interpretation was one arbitrator read these discharge provisions interpretation, unreasonable). The and his was not provisions differently interpretation that the him the parties’ stipulation “gave arbitrator’s decision as well and the analysis interpretation conduct a reasonable domain.” Bureau within stipulation] [the [was] engaging 825. While the assumes that Engraving, 284 F.3d at termination,... one of verbal cause for episode “equaled abuse concluded otherwise. That conclusion will not be disturbed arbitrator reading stipulation] here.” Id. the arbitrator’s [CBA ‘Whether seriously strained or even flawed ... is irrelevant. was [them], and what the applied precisely construed and this is arguably him Hardwood So. Coun. parties bargained for to do.” Bruce Floors v. (6th *9 1104, 1108 1993); Associates, Workers, see LB & B 461 Ind. F.3d at 1200. therefore, reasons, hold that the PELRB did not

For all of the above we by enforcing err as a matter of law the arbitrator’s award.

II erroneously that the PELRB enforced the next asserts find, violated “To so we public policy. arbitrator’s award because award strong the PELRB’s order contravenes a must conclude statutes, controlling regulations, as public policy expressed dominant Pelham, law, authority.” common and other Town applicable Appeal (2006) omitted). 125, 129 154 N.H. such cases our review is (quotation “[I]n law, general limited to the confines of rather than considerations positive Id.; & v. Rubber supposed public interests.” see W.R. Grace Co. (1983). Workers, 461 U.S.

“In the context of an arbitration award that reinstates a fired employee, question charged public is not whether the conduct offends remedy or whether some short of unconditional reinstatement... policy, Rather, might have been the sole whether the preferable. question is gives award itself—the order offense.” Mercy reinstatement — Ass’n, Hospital v. Massachusetts Nurses denied, (2006); cert. 126 S. Ct. 1939 see Eastern Associated Coal Corp., determination, at 62-63. In making U.S. this “we must read the pertinent statutes and regulations light background labor law that favors policy determination of disciplinary questions through arbitration when chosen as a result of labor-management negotiation.” Mercy 429 F.3d at Hospital, omitted); 344 (quotation Eastern Associated Coal 531 U.S. at Corp., 65. Further, a here, “[w]ith few limited not relevant exceptions bound [we are] by of fact.” findings Mercy Hospital, [the] 429 F.3d at 344. Thus, we examine “only award, whether reinstatement on the facts as arbitrator, found well-defined, an explicit, contravenes public dominant Id. at 345. policy.”

The county argues that there are strong and dominant public policies against reinstating an LNA who has been found to have abused verbally a resident and who fails understand the wrongful nature of her conduct. To support argument, (2006). this the county upon § relies 42 C.F.R. 483.13 §

42 C.F.R. 483.13 that a provides long-term resident of a care facility, home, like the nursing verbal, “has the right sexual, be free from abuse, physical, mental corporal punishment, and involuntary 483.13(b). § seclusion.” 42 C.F.R. It also provides that a long-term care facility, home, like the nursing must employ “[n]ot individuals who have been... guilty abusing, [f]ound neglecting, mistreating by a residents law; court of or ... had finding a entered into the [h]ave State nurse aide abuse, registry concerning neglect, mistreatment of residents or 483.13(c)(ii). misappropriation § of their property.” C.F.R. disagree §

We that 42 C.F.R. 483.13 expresses strong and dominant public policy against reinstating an LNA who has been found arbitrator to have engaged one of verbal episode abuse who fails and/or to admit her wrongdoing. regulation While precludes nursing homes from employing individuals who have been found guilty by a court of abusing, neglecting residents, or mistreating as those terms are defined elsewhere, and from employing those for whom the State has entered an

46 aide it is silent with registry, respect

adverse into the State’s nurse finding as Foote. reinstating an LNA such in as that term is by engaged Foote was not found a court to have abuse 3002(1) 3002(1) 2007). § 42 defines (Supp. § in 42 U.S.C.A. U.S.C.A. used confinement, injury, “abuse” as the willful “infliction of unreasonable harm, intimidation, or resulting physical pain, or cruel punishment ... ... of or services that are anguish deprivation goods mental ... or harm, The mental or mental illness.” necessary physical anguish, to avoid definition and no as to express opinion did not use this we Foote’s conduct meets it. whether

Moreover, the is silent with to reinstatement. regulation respect however, scheme, statutory regulatory in the same provisions Other (and, extension, in by reinstating) engages an LNA who hiring reveal to 42 U.S.C.A. precluded. a of verbal abuse is not Pursuant single episode for removal may petition § a nurse aide State 1395i-3(g)(Supp. the State registry “upon her name from the a determination his or aide does not personal history that... nurse employment or and ... neglect; neglect reflect a of abusive behavior pattern Thus, was a occurrence.” under original finding singular involved in the law, not from in its nursing precluded having employ federal a home is LNA, Foote, engaged was found an arbitrator to have such as who § abuse. We therefore conclude that C.F.R. 483.13 episode one of verbal reinstatement with public policy prohibiting [Foote’s] does not “establish Medical, 260 F.3d at 25. clarity.” Boston [sufficient] strong public relies and dominant county mistakenly upon its support home residents as policy against nursing abuse (residents 1395i-3(c)(1)(A) 2007) See, § 42 U.S.C.A. arguments. e.g., (Supp. right physical have to be free from nursing facility “[t]he skilled abuse”). question As discussed “the is not whether previously, mental policy competent nursing violated a favor of public conduct [Foote’s] care, order to reinstate her violated that Boston policy.” but whether the 23; Medical, Eastern Associated Coal 531 U.S. at 62- Corp., 260 F.3d at see 63. Care county’s upon Gogebic is the reliance Medical

Similarly misplaced (Mich. denied, App.), appeal AFSCME Local 531 N.W.2d 728 Ct. (Mich. 1995). case, unlike the appeal, instant N.W.2d on the State’s finding against State had entered an adverse nurse Moreover, Care, at 731. nurse aide Med. N.W.2d registry. Gogebic decided the United States Facility Care was before Gogebic Medical Coal Corporation Court decided Eastern Associated Supreme Pelham, at 129- decision in Town 154 N.H. Appeal conflicts with our *11 Supreme Coal the United States Corporation, In Eastern Associated 31. by ... most... approach applied “adhered to the narrow so[-]called Court courts, court must find the terms of namely reviewing circuit that a federal issue, award, policy.” at violated underlying public not the conduct an Glanstein, Review Arbitration Mary Policy A Hail Pass: Public (2001); Awards, see Eastern 16 OHIO St. J. ON DlSP. RESOL. We this narrow Coal 531 U.S. at 62-63. embraced Corp., Associated 129-31, Pelham, N.H. where Town at we approach Appeal strong policy against whether there was a and dominant public examined department employees. Gogebic untruthful The court reinstating police Care, contrast, 531 N.W.2d at examined whether Medical general public nurse’s conduct violated the favor of underlying policy abuse, care residents from not whether there protecting long-term facility her. strong public policy against reinstating was a and dominant Because we find that no and dominant exists strong public policy against Foote, reinstating an such as we hold that the PELRB did not employee by ordering county err as a matter of law with the comply Pelham, award. See Town 154 N.H. at 131. Appeal

Ill (1) following In its the union raises the issues: cross-appeal, whether erroneously PELRB dismissed the bifurcated “Reserved Issues” without (2) matters; for the union to address those whether the opportunity applied wrong legal PELRB standard when it failed to admit or take administrative notice of the union’s evidence that would have reinforced its position agencies primary responsibility that State with protect public recently interest had taken actions to Foote to as an permit practice (3) LNA; whether, if reinstatement to her former position improper, Foote to another in the may position county. light be reinstated of our award, decision to affirm the PELRB’s decision the arbitration upholding (2) (3) we conclude that issues are moot. (1), respect argues

With issue union that the PELRB erred when it dismissed the Reserved Issues sua The record on sponte. submitted 2,2006 appeal hearing reveals that the officer’s March notified the decision union that Issues “administratively Reserved would be dismissed unless either PELRB party request proceedings files further within 24, 2006, days.” The record further reveals that on March union request filed a for further PELRB on proceedings the Reserved Issues. Nonetheless, 19,2006, on the PELRB dismissed the April Reserved Issues as moot. violated Reserved Issues involved whether

The so-called (1999) (1) 273-A:5,1 reinstate Foote in contravention by: refusing to RSA award, her thereby interfering licensing obligations of the arbitrator’s (2) in anti-union discrimination engaging job prospects; and future (3) Foote; discovery failing refusing provide to reinstate refusing DHHS. The union argues in connection with a before proceeding materials “strengthen request would [its] anti-union discrimination proving Thus, remedies,” fees and costs. whether including attorney’s additional discrimination to reinstate by failing in anti-union county engaged moot. While the asserts that the Foote does not to be appear claim, the union’s anti-union discrimination already addressed *12 only mistaken. The arbitrator addressed whether Foote, it terminated not in anti-union discrimination when engaged to reinstate her. it did so when it refused whether record submitted on we therefore vacate appeal, light remand for of the Reserved Issues as moot and PELRB’s dismissal 273-A:6, IX consistent with this See RSA opinion. further proceedings (1999) (orders fact findings of PELRB shall contain of and and decisions law). conclusions of part; vacated in and part;

Affirmed remanded.

Galway concurred; Duggan, J., Hicks, JJ., with whom Broderick, C.J., joined, dissented.

DUGGAN, J., Because I that the arbitrator fashioned dissenting. believe affirming of industrial and that PELRB’s justice, his own brand in our state’s labor unnecessary uncertainty threatens to create decision why disagree I first I respectfully explain law I dissent. jurisprudence, and then set forth how I would resolve this majority’s analysis, with the case.

I the following The asked the arbitrator resolve arbitral submission County there was cause for the to terminate Ms. inquiry: just ‘Whether not, the collective If what shall bargaining agreement? Foote under submission, with the holds that this combined remedy majority be?” the arbitrator to ‘just fact the CBA “did not reference cause’” allowed exercise his essentially “‘traditional cause standard’” apply a for Foote’s discipline to determine the level of independent judgment conduct. verbal, of mental provides: “Any physical,

Article 24 of the CBA instance resident shall be abuse/neglect/exploitation any grounds or medical added.) The (Emphasis majority apparently immediate termination.” a difference between article and a meaningful concludes that there is verbal, mental provides: “Any physical, CBA that instance hypothetical any or medical resident shall be abuse/neglect/exploitation Moreover, drawing I do such a agree. for immediate termination.” not unnecessary uncertainty distinction threatens to create about how we will might language resolve future cases. For other CBAs contain example, (1) verbal, as: instance of mental or medical “Any physical, such any resident shall be reason for immediate abuse/neglect/exploitation (2) termination”; verbal, or instance of mental or medical “Any physical, any resident shall be cause for immediate abuse/neglect/exploitation where, continuum, along termination.” We will have to decide a this falls, language require parties bargaining alternative or at table to use another, i.e. cause” i.e. or synonym, “just “grounds,” one over “reason” “cause.”

Treatises, law, cause,” “just case and dictionaries the view that support “cause,” are not distinct are “grounds” concepts “reason” when collectively bargained-for agreement used to describe conduct that serves as an basis for Those offenses that are adequate discharge. “grounds,” “cause” “reason” for termination are necessarily “just Thus, cause” for termination. by expressly unambiguously providing termination, specific “grounds” “just the CBA did reference a cause” *13 standard.

One respected arbitration treatise observes: do, fact,

Most collective bargaining agreements require “just “cause” or cause” for or discharge discipline____ It is common to right include the for suspend “just cause,” cause,” cause,” “justifiable cause,” “proper “obvious or quite commonly simply for “cause.” There significant is no between these various phrases. difference Elkouri, (5th 1997)

Elkouri & How Arbitration Works 887 ed. (brackets added). omitted; emphasis See,

Numerous courts use these interchangeably. e.g., terms Intern. Co., Inc., (6th 1980) 474, Broth. Firemen v. Nestle 475-77 Cir. of “cause” and (repeatedly using “grounds” interchangeably); Bruce UBC, 2713, 449, (5th Hardwood Floors v. Indus. Work. No. 455 1997) J., (Benavides, dissenting) (using “ground” synonym as for cause”), denied, (1997); “proper cert. 522 U.S. 928 Ohio Barg. Coll. Off. of (Ohio 1991) 71, v. Serv. Civ. 572 N.E.2d 75 Emp., (using “ground” 50 essence, dishonesty, “In as a holding, with “causes” and

interchangeably cause.”); School Dist. discharge, per immediate se ground for (Mass. 2001) Geller, 1241, (summarizing 755 N.E.2d 1247 n.8 v. Beverly the terms using “just reasons for dismissal and cases where CBAs list cause,” cause,” “grounds” interchangeably); “cause” and “proper 97-1780, Union No. No. 1998 WL Marathon Oil Co. v. Local (6th 25, 1998)(using“grounds” synonymously). *2 and “cause” Sept. at well for a distinction augur dictionaries nor thesauruses Neither Heritage Dictionary (3d See, 799 e.g., these terms. between American 1992)(definition grounds. The provides: underlying “Often “ground” ed. action; grounds suspicion; ground a cause: prompting condition for divorce.”); 356 THIRD New INTERNATIONALDICTIONARY WEBSTER’S for 2002) (“cause” reason: a good adequate ed. means “a or (unabridged —>”); for activating employee discharged sufficient factor <an RANDOM Dictionary English Language (1966) (similar); House Dictionary (8th 1999) (“cause” ground ed. means “A Black’s Law good does not have cause to file suit>. legal plaintiff action <the reason____ The term is often used legally cause. A sufficient shown; just cases.—Also termed employment-termination good Legal (2d cause; cause; cause.”); ed. Thesaurus lawful sufficient 1992)(“cause” are “ground” synonyms). CBA, arbitrator, his discretion to construe the Even the broad Misco, (1987), Inc., 484 U.S. did not specifically Paperworkers Instead, he “grounds.” acknowledged offer an of the word interpretation grounds that article 24 that “certain kinds of conduct shall be provides members of the “clearly put[s] bargaining immediate termination” and unit, Foote, could to immediate including subject on notice that be Then, decision, as the basis for his he termination for incidents abuse.” “just to have used cause” in the arbitral submission as appears essentially or to mete out a that he did not find “harsh” penalty a vehicle engage In so the arbitrator did not contract doing, “unreasonable.” Misco, misinterpretation. or even contract See interpretation, permissible (“[A]s arguably construing at 38 as the arbitrator is even long U.S. his that a acting scope authority, the contract and within applying not to overturn court is convinced he committed serious error does suffice decision.”). Instead, at his his he from the CBA to arrive own departed *14 language a result that is justice, prohibited plain brand of industrial (“the to, have no to add subtract of the CBA arbitrator shall from, language of this modify any agreement”), plain or terms (‘Whether County there was cause for the arbitral submission not, If bargaining agreement. terminate Foote under the collective Ms. 51 well-settled, added)), persuasive remedy (emphasis what shall the be?” country. from across the overwhelming authority jurisdictions consistently in hold that where an jurisdictions Courts other for grounds lists certain behavior as employment agreement termination, occurred, there a that such conduct has finding where is remedy. Although free to fashion his own the term the arbitrator is not cases, change often its does not “just appears cause” these absence Food, See, v. United Local reasoning. e.g., Spring Corp. essential Poland (1st (2003) 2002), denied, 1445, 29, Cir. cert. 540 U.S. 818 314 F.3d 34-35 (“once finds that an has committed an act employee an arbitrator as bargaining agreement providing just listed the collective specifically termination, the arbitrator is not free to fashion a separate cause for the one remedy apart provided parties’ agreement”); Logistics from (E.D. Union, 650, Personnel v. Truck Drivers Local 6 F. 2d 655 Supp. 1998) (where drug CBA on test is provides testing positive Mich. termination, for “the relevant under the collective grounds only question, is whether the ... tested bargaining agreement, employee positive”); (where Bruce, employee 103 F.3d at 452 CBA states that will be conduct, ten-day for immoral arbitrator not free to discharged impose Steelworkers, 279, suspension); Warrior & Nav. v. United 996 F.2d Gulf (11th (1994) (where 1993), denied, 281 Cir. cert. 511 U.S. 1083 agreement cause” for termination and listed certain acts for which an required “just could employee discharged, be arbitrator lacked discretion reduce Queen Delta Steamboat Dist. 2 discharge suspension); Co. v. Marine (5th 599, 601, 1989), denied, 889 F.2d 604 Cir. 498 Eng., cert. U.S. 853 (1990) (where agreement provides “proper for termination for cause” and cause, lists behavior that would constitute weigh arbitrator is not free to factors); 27, conduct other proved against Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Local (1st 1988) (where 940, 864 F.2d Cir. “just arbitrator uses as a cause” means of enumerated ignoring specifically grounds discharge, for he engages example excess”); of arbitral S.D. “patent Warren Co. v. (1st Intern., Paperworkers’ denied, United 845 F.2d cert. (1988) (where 488 U.S. 992 agreement provides discharge for “proper based, cause” and identifies specific upon discharge may causes which be may conduct); not order different remedy proved Metro 1987) (when Tronquistas, Chevrolet Union de general “just provision cause” in contract is combined with provision based, specific upon may lists conduct which be appropriateness consideration); Nestle, penalty is removed from arbitrator’s 630 F.2d at (where provides termination, contract insubordination is basis arbitrator not free to decide that termination too a penalty); severe Union, Mistletoe Serv. v. Motor Exp. Expressmen’s *15 (10th 1977) (where terminate employer may agreement provides Cir. conditions, if fails to meet certain arbitrator not employee employment for the decision to judgment employer’s free to substitute his own (N.J. 1985) Coll., terminate); 495 A.2d 865 Cty. Coll. Mortis v. Cty. of Staff (where list of conduct for which can be agreement employees includes authority by discharge his discharged, reducing arbitrator exceeds Coll. 572 N.E.2d at 75 Barg., (agreement provides Ohio suspension); Off.of cause to terminate and arbitrator not free to patient that abuse of termination); v. United Steel City reduce from East Providence penalty of Am., 15509, & 2006-145-Appeal 2006-162-Appeal, Workers Local Nos. (R.I. 2007) (where 27, 1828760, June arbitrator determines 2007 WL at *8 exists, it is irrational” for him to exceed his just “patently an form of There is no by considering discipline). alternate authority jurisprudence reason that our state’s labor law should be persuasive different. by majority distinguishable. example,

The cases relied are For upon Union, in Communication International Engraving Graphic Bureau of (8th 2002), F.3d Cir. the arbitral submission asked the Employer to determine ‘“Whether the had cause to arbitrator Puffer, not, Linda if what grievant, terminate the employment Thus, ease, to the instant the arbitral remedy?”’ should be the contrast made no reference to Engraving determining submission Bureau of an argument allowing depart cause “under the CBA." arbitrator submission, the arbitral stronger from the CBA is much when reason, and does not gives require whatever arbitrator broad him in the grounded parties’ agreement. to be America, Co. v. United Steelworkers Mining Homestake (8th 1998), 678, 680 Cir. the arbitrator determined that the worker’s Here, by did not a violation of the rule. employer’s conduct constitute contrast, elderly found that Foote did abuse the expressly resident. Trailer, Electronic, LLC Union In Trailmobile v. International

Electrical, Salaried, Workers, 223 F.3d Machine and Furniture (8th 2000), conduct that provision examples a handbook that listed warning” an to immediate without was “may subject employee issue, that the could enforce provided employer only at and the CBA case, In the instant there is no at issue provision “reasonable rules.” proscribed of “reasonable rules” and the regarding enforcement conduct into the CBA. directly is written 1195, 1196 Brotherhood,

In LB & B v. International Associates (10th provided employee engaged the CBA who Id. “‘may subject discharge.’” sexual harassment be to immediate omitted). The Tenth Circuit noted that if the CBA did (emphasis expressly a different outcome would have permissive language, not use such obtained. Id. at 1198n.2. The CBA here uses the word “shall.” See Dancart (1984) (the Co., *16 602 v. St. Albans Rubber 124 N.H. word “shall” Corp. character”). “commonly mandatory does have a 16, Local 21 Employees,

In Boston Medical v. Service (2002), 2001), denied, there at provision cert. 534 U.S. 1083 was no Instead, enumerated for dismissal. the specific grounds issue which clause, management rights arbitrator a charged reconciling was right to the exclusive to and a clause reserving management discipline, that could for cause.” Id. at providing employees discharged only “just be expressly 20-21. The First Circuit noted that Boston Medical is from “a the collective distinguishable bargaining agreement case where situations____” in specifically provides for automatic [certain] Id. at 23 n.5. Inc., In Local 238 International Brotherhood Teamsters v. Cargill, (8th

F.3d Eighth the Circuit found “an inherent tension between the CBA ambiguity” drug and a and alcohol that was not policy However, “written verbatim into the bargaining agreement.” collective the court stated that clearly the collective bargaining agreement “[i]f that an expressly provided employee who refuses to take an alcohol test terminated,’ “willbe we would agree with the district court’s decision that the arbitrator’s award ‘ignored plain the mandatory language’ Here, agreement----” Id. the CBA states that abuse shall be for grounds termination. No separate policy is involved. decision, order to the uphold the majority turns to a

seven-factor test. There are two why reasons we should not turn to that First, test in this case. the arbitral submission did not ask the arbitrator to decide: “Whether there was cause for County the to terminate Ms. not, Instead, Foote? If what shall the be?” it remedy asked the arbitrator to resolve the following concrete “Whether there inquiry: was cause for the County to terminate Ms. Foote under the collective bargaining not, added.) If agreement? Thus, what shall the be?” remedy (Emphasis the arbitrator’s decision had to be anchored plain language of CBA, language unambiguously lists the conduct that constitutes “grounds” “just cause”—to terminate. The arbitrator not was free — depart from that If the language. parties had no intention of requiring terms, arbitrator to enforce the unambiguous contract then would not have inserted the “under phrase the collective into bargaining agreement” the arbitral submission.

Second, as the United States Appeals Court of for the Eleventh Circuit explained, type has of broad cause” “just analysis embodied bargaining agreement into when a collective play

seven-factor test comes adequate conduct that shall serve as an basis spell does not out Nav., It not employed 996 F.2d at 281 n.8. discharge. Warrior Gulf & case. every single is not inconsistent with explanation Appeal The Eleventh Circuit’s (2006), Manchester, N.H. where we cited the seven-

City of issues, noted that in approval, deciding just factor test with but to consider the issues and underlying has “the arbitrator necessary interpret apply express circumstances surrounding added.) reach a final decision.” (Emphasis the CBA and provisions of circumstances and found Here, surrounding the arbitrator examined of the CBA. apply express provisions He then compelled abuse. was Manchester authorizes Nothing Appeal City of a If we conclude provision CBA with seven-factor test. supplant express case, test in then employing every cause” means seven-factor “just specific types grounds will never be able to make of conduct employers *17 so, termination, do their anytime they try because to immediate to an arbitrator. subject upset by decisions will be disciplinary that if the was concerned that the arbitrator majority states Foote, to then it could have discharge its decision might second-guess whether Foote had in the only engaged asked the arbitrator to “determine true, accused.” If that is then both sides would conduct of which she was CBA, abuse, to the idea that under the agreeable have had to have been (and alone, to terminate employment. Clearly does constitute a valid basis case, the union never posture the of this would understandably), given fact, it seem that Foote for firing made such a concession. would have led the union to the case in the first impetus grieve was one abuse Furthermore, failing unfair to fault the for it seems place. would from the of the depart plain language that the arbitrator anticipate CBA. the First Circuit:

To borrow from particular type of a to ... for right [a The reservation if the wholly meaningless would be ineffective conduct] action, to such to review pursuant right, subject employer’s If the reserved appropriateness. an arbitrator on the basis of mean that the can take no right employer is construed to in excess of a at its own risk reprimand, except action disciplinary in case an arbitrator should later subject penalties to severe that some milder action is the opinion appropriate, be of the inherent which has not employer’s right effect would be that contract is no at all. relinquished by right expressly been omitted). Chevrolet, 5 (quotation 835 F.2d at Metro II of the cases that hold that Accordingly, adopt reasoning I would termination, as for types grounds a CBA lists of conduct particular where has occurred. ends when he finds that such conduct inquiry cases, although I would hold that the “arbitrator Consistent those grievance, in the context of a to consider the authority, ha[d] underlying surrounding necessary interpret issues and circumstances decision,” of the CBA and reach a final apply express provisions Pelham, (2006), 154 N.H. his award Town Appeal of CBA and the arbitral nevertheless had to be consistent with the 1993). R.W.F., Inc., submission. 96-97 LaRocque Article 24 for where say may only does not termination abuse occur (Boudin, C.J., or “fair.” See Poland 314 F.3d at 38 equitable Spring, Rather, states, verbal, concurring). it mental or “Any physical, instance medical resident shall be abuse/neglect/exploitation any grounds added.) immediate termination.” This (Emphasis language unambiguously gives county just employment cause to terminate where abuse occurs. Moreover, “exclusively” article of the CBA reserves management right “discipline discharge” Taken articles 2 and employees. together, decisions, that certain plainly contemplate management such as abuse, termination for second-guessed will not be arbitration. during CBA, Significantly, as these two part provisions among were terms and bargained parties conditions and it was not for the outcome, arbitrator to If ignore parties them. desired some other free to negotiate were for other to be included language within the CBA.

The paramount point to be remembered in labor arbitration is *18 power authority that the of an arbitrator totally is derived from bargaining the collective and that he agreement violates his to the if he obligation parties substitutes his own brand of justice industrial for what has been the agreed parties. omitted). at 33 (quotations

Id. The holding rationale for this is persuasive: provisions “contractual like the clause ... are bargained [termination abuse] for and inserted precisely to take discretion from away charged arbitrators with enforcing the collective bargaining agreement.” Spring, Poland 314 F.3d at 34-35. case, sustain

[T]o [the this decision] notwithstanding the took pre-negotiation place, [is] of... that the equivalent saying parties engaged in a meaningless them rules and disciplinary incorporating by negotiating act agreement. says] bargaining [It into the collective to fashion remedies even when this right retained the arbitrator That is not given by parties. was not authority contractual the law.

Warren, 845 F.2d at 8. to the may applied seem unfair when outlined above approach case, discharged had not been employees since other especially instant However, the word interpret was free to conduct. arbitrator abusive fit. He was also free to find that “abuse,” and it however he saw apply of the CBA. meaning within the Foote’s conduct did not constitute “abuse” occurred, the CBA said, that abuse finding That once he made to terminate county’s him to decision unambiguously required uphold CBA. No of that directive interpretation under the employment error. it is reversible required, ignoring conclusion, can draft satisfactory say employers is not...

[i]t clearly restrict bargaining agreement the collective applied the arbitrator exercising arbitrator from bargaining may at the table happens here. The realities of what admirably CBA article at was illusory. issue] make this [The flexibility give some workers give management drafted to [prohibited instance of must every conduct] that not protection of that questioned why price termination. It can be mean guess to second should be to flexibility permit certain forgiving to be less management’s judgment [in instances]. J., dissenting). impose I would not (Lynch,

Poland 314 F.3d at Spring, dissent. respectfully such a and therefore price, BRODERICK,C.J., in the dissent. joins

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Merrimack County (Nh Pelrb)
Court Name: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
Date Published: Aug 23, 2007
Citation: 930 A.2d 1202
Docket Number: 2006-525
Court Abbreviation: N.H.
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