In Re Merriam
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Krieger
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARCIA S. KRIEGER, Chief Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the United States Trustee’s Motion to
I.JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
II.ISSUES PRESENTED
This is a Chapter 7 case in which the U.S. Trustee seeks disgorgement of legal fees pursuant to
Mr. Zurinskas admits that he failed to sign the petition and attend the Debtor’s Section 341 meeting. He did so because such services exceeded those authorized by his client. He contends that his fee for pre-petition services is reasonable and that it should not be reduced or disgorged under
Although these arguments raise important questions about an attorney’s obligations when representing a debtor in a bankruptcy case, this controversy focuses upon
III.UNDISPUTED FACTS
At the time of oral argument, the parties were given an opportunity to request an evidentiary hearing. Neither did. Instead, both parties presented legal argument laced with factual references, which the Court treats as an offer of proof. Taken as true, the following facts are undisputed:
1. Mr. Zurinskas is an attorney licensed to practice in Colorado and admitted to practice before this Court. He has represented many debtors in consumer bankruptcy cases, and has limited the scope of his representation in approximately 100-200 other cases. No challenge has been made to his fees in other cases.
2. Mr. Zurinskas consulted with the Debtor to assess her legal situation and provide bankruptcy advice. Perceiving this to be a simple consumer case, he offered the Debtor two flat fee alterna
3. Mr. Zurinskas prepared and filed the Debtor’s petition, schedules, statement of affairs and creditors’ matrix on October 18, 1999. The petition was signed by the Debtor, only, and nothing on the petition, schedules or statement of affairs stated that Mr. Zurinskas had prepared them. The Debtor responded to question No. 9 on the statement of affairs stating that she had paid Mr. Zurinskas $399.00 pre-petition. Approximately two weeks after filing the petition, Mr. Zurinskas filed the attorney fee disclosure required by
4. The Debtor appeared at the scheduled Section 341 meeting without Mr. Zu-rinskas. The Debtor has since received her discharge and the Chapter 7 Trustee has filed a report stating that the estate has no assets and requesting that the case be closed.
5. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, Administrative Order 1999-6 was in effect, however it was amended shortly after the oral argument in this matter.
3
Prior to its amendment, Administrative Order 1999-6 stated that Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.2(c) and other provisions of Colorado law authorizing the limitation (unbundling) of attorney services are not applicable in matters pending before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The order did not specifically refer to the Bankruptcy Court, however, by definition the Bankruptcy Court is a unit of the District Court.
6. The Amended Administrative Order 1999-6 (Amended Order) specifically addresses matters pending before the Bankruptcy Court. It states that Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.2(c) (and other provisions of Colorado law allowing unbundling of legal services) does not apply in adversary proceedings or matters governed by
VI. ANALYSIS
Because the U.S. Trustee presented no evidence establishing that the $399.00 paid to Mr. Zurinskas is excessive for the pre-petition services he provided, the first issue is resolved. The remaining issue is whether Mr. Zurinskas’ failure to sign the
Resolution of this issue requires the Court to determine whether Mr. Zurinskas had a duty to sign the Debtor’s petition or attend the Section 341 meeting. If so, the Court must determine whether breach of such duty makes his fee excessive and therefore subject to reduction or recoupment under
Before addressing Mr. Zurinskas’ alleged defaults, it is helpful to reflect upon the scope and purpose of
(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court may cancel any such agreement, or order the return of any such payment, to the extent excessive, to—
(1) the estate, if the property transferred—
(A) would have been property of the estate; or
(B) was to be paid by or on behalf of the debtor under a plan under Chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title; or
(2) the entity that made such payment. 6
The purpose of
A. Failure to Sign the Debtor’s Petition.
The U.S. Trustee’s first argument is that Mr. Zurinskas’ fee is excessive given his failure to sign the Debtor’s petition, which violated
It is not necessary to resolve whether limited representation was permissible at the time this case was filed because regardless of the scope of Mr. Zurinskas’ representation, he was obligated to sign the petition by
[e]very petition ... shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign all papers. Each paper shall state the signer’s address and telephone number, if any. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signatureis corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
The requirements of
While it is true that neither
The reasoning of these opinions is also applicable in a bankruptcy case.
The failure of an attorney to sign a petition he or she prepares potentially misleads the Court, the trustee and creditors, and distorts the bankruptcy process. 11 From a superficial perspective, there is no apparent justification for excusing an attorney who prepares a petition from signing it when a petition preparer is required to do so. 12 But regardless of whether it is an attorney or petition preparer who prepares the petition, if such person does not sign it the Court, trustee and creditors do not know who is responsible for its contents. Should the Court hold a debtor responsible for the petition’s accuracy and sufficiency if it was prepared by an attorney? Can such debtor assert that the contents of the petition result from advice of counsel in defense of a motion to dismiss or a challenge to discharge for false oath?
Mr. Zurinskas chose not to sign the petition because he did not want to enter a general appearance in this bankruptcy case by the customary practice of signing and filing a pleading. Limited appearances are not authorized in matters before the District Court,
13
but limitation of the services provided by debtor’s counsel in a bankruptcy case is quite common. Contrary to Mr. Zurinskas’ assumption, however,
Indeed, such purpose is integral to the unbundling of legal services in litigation matters permitted by Colorado ethi
Mr Zurinskas also argues that he was excused from signing the petition because the language of
Admittedly, there can be varying interpretations of the term “attorney of record”, and the Court appreciates Mr. Zurinskas’ fear that by signing the petition he would be required to perform services for which the Debtor did not want to pay. But a narrow interpretation of the phrase “attorney of record” ignores the purpose of
How can an attorney for a debtor both comply with
Happily the conundrum faced by Mr. Zurinskas is, at least partially, resolved by Amended Administrative Order 1999-6. A debtor’s counsel may limit the scope of services to be provided in the main bankruptcy case but must specify the limitation in the
The conclusion that Mr. Zurinskas was obligated to sign the petition does not, however, resolve the question of whether his pre-petition fees should be reduced and recouped under
At this juncture, it is helpful to distinguish between the duties owed by an attorney to a client and those owed to a court. The attorney-client relationship is essentially contractual with outward boundaries set by the attorney’s ethical obligations. 16 The duties owed to a client arise at the time of retention and may vary based upon the needs, desires, resources of the client and the expertise of and compensation required by the attorney. The freedom of the attorney and client to negotiate terms may not be as great as in other business relationships, but the evolution in ethical rules over recent years has been toward greater client input and control. The provisions of Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.2(c) are illustrative of the expanding role of the client in controlling his or her legal affairs.
Obligations arising out of the attorney-client relationship are important primarily to the attorney and client and only secondarily to third parties. When an attorney fails to perform duties owed to a client, a remedy may be found in litigation, arbitration or further negotiation. If these measures prove unsuccessful or if there are repeated defaults, an attorney’s conduct may become the subject of a disciplinary proceeding. It is rare, however, that a court presiding over litigation in which the attorney represents the client will resolve conflicts or enforcing obligations between the attorney and client. To do so could affect the court’s impartiality in determining the primary controversy.
In contrast, an attorney’s duties to a court are actually duties owed to the legal system. Because the attorney is an essential player in the judicial process, performance of duties to the court are important to the outcome in pending litigation and to public confidence in the legal system. Such duties are not subject to negotiation and do not vary from case-.to-case based upon the needs and desires of a given client.
Regardless of a client’s desire for a particular outcome, an attorney has an ethical responsibility to act only within proper bounds and to be honest with the court. Stated otherwise, the role of an ethical lawyer is “as an officer of the court and a key component of a systemof justice, dedicated to a search for truth....”
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 128 (1986).
An attorney’s obligations to the legal system arise upon his or her licensure. Such obligations are embedded in the attorney’s oath 17 and are what make attorneys “officers of the court.” Fundamental among such obligations are candor, honesty and compliance with the rules of and orders issued by a court. In performing these duties lawyers demonstrate their obeisance to the rule of law and their confidence in the judicial process. When lawyers fail in these duties they give license to all citizens to ignore both the law and judicial authority. To ensure that the judicial process works properly and predictably, every court is empowered to enforce its own rules and orders, particularly with regard to the officers who practice before it.
“[D]eeply rooted in the common law tradition is the power of any court to ‘manage its affairs [which] necessarily includes the authority to impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions upon errant lawyers practicing before it.’ ”
Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1586, 1545 (11th Cir.1993), quoting Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1447 (11th Cir.1985), which quoted Flaksa v. Little River Marine Construction Co., 389 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir.1968).
The obligations of an attorney to a court changes over time as ethical rules and rules of procedure are revised, hopefully with input from both bench and bar. However, such modifications are only indirectly related to the dynamics inherent to attorney-client relationships. For example, even though Colo. R. PROf’l Conduct 1.2(c) allows unbundling of legal services, an attorney remains obligated to comply with
Both Mr. Zurinskas and the U.S. Trustee have confused Mr. Zurinskas’ duties. The limitation of Mr. Zurinskas’ services to the Debtor grew out of the attorney-client relationship, but his duty to sign the petition was owed to the Court and legal system. Mr. Zurinskas incorrectly assumed that his agreement with the Debtor excused his obligation to the Court. The U.S. Trustee mistakenly invokes
Reduction or recoupment of Mr. Zurins-kas’ fees pursuant to
B. Failure to Attend the Section 341 Meeting.
The U.S. Trustee also seeks recoupment of fees pursuant to
The answer to the first question is less clear than it is with regard to Mr. Zurinskas’ obligation to sign the petition because neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy Rules expressly require an attorney representing a debtor to attend the Section 341 meeting. The debtor is required to attend the Section 341 meeting by
Though a debtor’s attorney is not required to attend the
The U.S. Trustee argues that the Court should require that all attorneys representing debtors attend
In only one case,
In re Hailey,
21 B.R. 453 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1982), did the court re
Such conclusion is consistent with the experience of this Court, but it does not justify imposition of a rule mandating attendance by every attorney representing a debtor at every
In this case, there has been no showing that Mr. Zurinskas’ failure to attend the Debtor’s
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the U.S. Trustee’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. In accordance with the Motion, the Court has reviewed Mr. Zurinskas’ fees, but determines that reduction or recoupment pursuant to
Notes
. Except as specifically noted, all future references to statutory provisions are to United States Code, Title 11, known as the Bankruptcy Code.
. Mr. Zurinskas estimates that it takes approximately three hours to travel between his Boulder office and the courthouse to attend the
. Amended Administrative Order 1999-6 was issued on April 10, 2000.
.
. This provision is implemented by
(b) Disclosure of Compensation Paid or Promised to Attorney for Debtor. Every attorney for a debtor, whether or not the attorney applies for compensation, shall file and transmit to the United States trustee within 15 days after the order for relief, or at another time as the court may direct, the statement required by§ 329 of the Code including whether the attorney has shared or agreed to share the compensation with any other entity. The statement shall include the particulars of any such sharing or agreement to share by the attorney, but the details of any agreement for the sharing of the compensation with a member or regular associate of the attorney‘s law firm shall not be required. A supplemental statement shall be filed and transmitted to the United States trustee within 15 days after any payment or agreement not previously disclosed.
. The review process is implemented by
(a) Payment or Transfer to Attorney Before Order for Relief. On motion by any party in interest or on the court’s own initiative, the court after notice and a hearing may determine whether any payment of money or any transfer of property by the debtor, made directly or indirectly and in contemplation of the filing of a petition under the Code by or against the debtor or before entry of the order for relief in an involuntary case, to an attorney for services rendered or to be rendered is excessive.
(b) Payment or Transfer to Attorney After Order for Relief. On motion by the debtor, the United States trustee, or on the court‘s own initiative, the court after notice and a hearing may determine whether any payment of money or any transfer of property, or any agreement therefor, by the debtor to an attorney after entry of an order for relief in a case under the Code is excessive, whether the payment or transfer is made or is to be made directly or indirectly, if the payment, transfer, or agreement therefor is for services in any way related to the case.
.
See Arens v. Boughton (In re Prudhomme),
43 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir.1995) (attorney fees excessive given services rendered and failure to disclose contingent fee arrangement);
Turner v. Davis, Gillenwater & Lynch (In re Investment Bankers, Inc.),
4 F.3d 1556, 1565 (10th Cir.1993) (attorney who fails to comply with the disclosure requirements of
. See Quiat v. Berger (In re Vann), 136 B.R. 863, 870 (D.Colo.1992) (while the court may deny all fees where there is an actual conflict of interest, the court may allow partial fees if . the need for attorney fees is outweighed by the equities of the case), aff‘d in an unpublished opinion 986 F.2d 1431 (10th Cir.1993); In re Smith, 24 B.R. 266 (Bankr.D.D.C.1982) (court could not determine how much the attorney’s ethical violations diminished the value of services performed for multiple debts, but attorney fees excessive given attorney’s lack of competency and failure to file attorney disclosures).
.
.
. It could be argued that listing of an attorney in the statement of affairs as having received a pre-petition payment for legal services or filing the attorney disclosure required by
. Indeed, it may be more important that petition preparers and attorneys who limit their representation sign the petition precisely because they will not be representing the debtor throughout the case. Errors and omissions in petitions, schedules and statements of affairs are relatively common and can be corrected by amendment. When an attorney represents a debtor post-petition this happens routinely. However, if the preparer of the petition and other documents is not involved in the case, he or she may have no notice of the need for amendment. The debt- or may know the preparer’s identity, but may not recognize that amendments are necessary or may not want to pay for such amendments. Disclosure of the preparer‘s identity allows the U.S. Trustee, interim trustee or creditor to obtain clarifying or correcting disclosures.
. See Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners, 868 F.Supp. 1226, 1229 (D.Colo.1994).
. The manner of entering an appearance is regulated by local rule.
See
12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3154 (2d ed.1997);
. Colo. R. Prof‘l Conduct 1.2(c) provides that:
(c) [a] lawyer may limit the scope or objectives, or both, of the representation if the client consents after consultation. A lawyer may provide limited representation to pro se parties as permitted by C.R.C.P. 11(b) and C.R.C.P. 311(b).
. See, e.g., Colo. R. Prof‘l conduct 1.1 (competence), 1.2 (scope and objectives of representation), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.7 (conflict of interest), 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others), and 4.2 (communication with person represented by counsel).
. The oath of admission for attorneys in Colorado includes:
I will maintain the respect due to Courts and judicial officers;
I will employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor;
I will treat all persons whom I encounter through my practice of law with fairness, courtesy, respect and honesty; ...
I will at all times faithfully and diligently adhere to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.
.
See Hale v. U.S. Trustee (In re Basham), 208 B.R. 926, 932
(9th Cir. BAP 1997)
aff‘d
152 F.3d 924 (9th Cir.1998) (table) (fees for pre-petition document preparation were excessive where attorney failed to file fee disclosure required by
.
See In re Barnes, 691
N.E.2d 1225
(Ind.
1998) (attorney suspended for neglect of client matters including not filing Chapter 13 plan, failing to attend creditor’s meeting and failing to keep clients advised);
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Flanagan,
77 Ohio St.3d 381, 674 N.E.2d 681 (1997) (reprimand for attorney‘s unprofessional conduct and neglect of legal matters including allowing non-attorney employee to advise clients and prepare documentation without review by attorney, failing to meet with clients and failing to attend