In re Meltzer
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Howard Leventhal uses the federal courts to make war on people who sue him or his ex-wife, Malgorzata Kubiak, in the state courts. Sometimes, he does this as retaliation. Sometimes, he does it to buy time. Sometimes, he does it to exert pressure. Whatever the motive, Leventhal’s tactic is to “make a federal case” out of everything, turning mundane state court matters into federal litigation, something he believes (wrongly, most of the time) will intimidate his opponents and make them back off.
Leventhal employs two main techniques. He removes (or has Kubiak remove) state court actions to the district court, often removing the same action again after it has been remanded. He also files (or has Kubiak file) frivolous federal actions against state court opponents, naming as defendants not only the opponents themselves but often their lawyers and even their family members.
In 2013, Leventhal and Kubiak tried something new. When Kubiak failed to pay her rent and her landlord, Michael Meltzer, sued in the state court to evict her, Leventhal, Kubiak, and Pegasus Electronics HK Ltd. (a corporation Leventhal had just formed) filed an involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy case against him. The goal, Leventhal announced before the filing, was to stall' the eviction action and harass Meltzer. When the involuntary ease was quickly dismissed, Meltzer sought
For the reasons set forth below, Meltzer will be awarded $60,788.86 in attorney’s fees and $105.17 in costs against Leven-thal, Kubiak, and Pegasus, jointly and severally. Meltzer will also be awarded $120,000 in punitive damages against Lev-enthal, $40,000 in punitive damages against Kubiak, and $20,000 in punitive damages against Pegasus. Finally, Leventhal and Kubiak will be barred from filing anything in the bankruptcy court for this district (other than a notice of appeal from this decision) without first obtaining leave of court.
1. Jurisdiction
The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and the district court’s Internal Operating Procedure 15(a). This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). See In re Glannon,
2. Background
Familiarity with the facts is assumed. What follows is an outline sufficient to provide context. A full account appears in the court’s opinion finding sanctions warranted. See Meltzer,
Kubiak and Leventhal were once married, and during their marriage they lived in a house rented from Meltzer. They later divorced, and Leventhal moved out. In 2012, Kubiak stopped paying rent. When efforts to get her to pay proved unsuccessful, Meltzer served her with a notice terminating the tenancy. Rather than pay the rent or move out, however, Kubiak took a third tack: she told Meltzer she would sue him under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) if he did not let her remain on the premises. With Leventhal’s assistance, she eventually filed an action against Meltzer in the district court that alleged Meltzer had sexually harassed her in violation of the FHA. See Kubiak v. Meltzer, No. 12 C 6849,
But the FHA action did not have the desired effect. Meltzer went ahead and filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Kubiak in Illinois state court seeking to have her evicted. Acting as Kub-iak’s representative, Leventhal then threatened that if some sort of settlement could not be reached, he would file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Meltzer. Leventhal’s theory, described in an e-mail to Meltzer’s lawyer, was that upon the filing of the petition, the claim in
Undaunted, in August 2013 Meltzer moved in the eviction action for a judgment of possession. Five days later, Lev-enthal, Kubiak, and Pegasus made good on Leventhal’s threat, filing the involuntary petition that resulted in this case. Attached to the petition were three memo-randa purporting to describe each petitioner’s claim against Meltzer.
Despite the bankruptcy petition, the state court proceeded to trial on Meltzer’s motion. And rightly so: under section 303(f) of the Code, the filing of an involuntary petition does not deprive an alleged debtor of his ability to use property of the estate pending entry of an order for relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(f). The claim therefore remained Meltzer’s to pursue despite the petition. At the conclusion of the trial, the state court entered judgment in favor of Meltzer, awarding him $52,600 in damages against Kubiak and $5,000 in attorney’s fees.
About a week later, Meltzer moved to dismiss the bankruptcy ease and sought sanctions against Leventhal, Kubiak, and Pegasus for having filed it. Although the involuntary petition had failed to serve its intended purpose (since the eviction action had not been stopped), Leventhal opposed dismissal. His opposition made an eviden-tiary hearing necessary, and a hearing was set. When the petitioners failed to submit any pretrial materials, however, they were barred from presenting evidence at the hearing — and with no evidence forthcoming from the parties having the burden of proof, no hearing was needed. The motion was granted and the case dismissed.
In March 2014, the court held an eviden-tiary hearing on the final matters in the case: Meltzer’s requests for relief under sections 303® and (k), 11 U.S.C. §§ 303®, (k), and Bankruptcy Rule 9011, Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9011. Meltzer testified at the hearing, as did an attorney for Gene Schenberg, a creditor of Leventhal. Of the three petitioners, only Leventhal appeared. He called no witnesses himself and when required to testify invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to all but two questions from Meltzer, declining even to say whether he was one of the petitioners in the case.
In its post-hearing decision, the court found that Leventhal, Kubiak, and Pegasus had filed the involuntary petition against Meltzer in bad faith. “Indeed,” the court said, “the bad faith was grotesque: the case was thoroughly fraudulent and an egregious abuse of the bankruptcy system. The bad faith call is not a close one.” Meltzer,
• First, the evidence showed that one of the petitioners, Pegasus, was bogus, a corporation Leventhal had created only two weeks before the petition was filed presumably to satisfy the three-creditor requirement in section 303(b)(1). The signature of the “attorney” for the corporation on the petition as well as on the memorandum concerning Pegagus’s claim was forged; the person whose name appeared under it was neither an attorney nor a Pegasus employee, and she denied signing the memorandum. Id. at 509, 516-17.
• Second, the evidence showed that two of the three petitioning creditors, Leven-thal and Pegasus, were not in fact creditors of Meltzer. They had no claims against him. The third petitioner, Kubiak, had a claim against Meltzer (the claim in the FHA action), but that claim was in bona fide dispute. Id. at 509, 517. None of the petitioners, then, was entitled under section 303(b)(1) to file an involuntary petition against Meltzer.
Because the petition had been dismissed and had been filed in bad faith, Meltzer was awarded'his attorney’s fees and costs under sections 303(i)(l)(A) and (B), as well as punitive damages under section 303(i)(2)(B), against all three petitioners. See id. at 514-18. He was also awarded non-monetary relief under sections 303(k)(l) and (2). See id. at 518-19.
Since the hearing on sanctions had been bifurcated, see id. at 506 n. 1, the court set further briefing on the amounts of fees, costs, and punitive damages. Also to be briefed was Meltzer’s request for an order under Rule 9011(e)—which the court found had been violated as well, see id. at 519-21—that would restrict the petitioners’s ability to litigate in the bankruptcy court for this district as well as in all other courts, state and federal, in the United States. These matters are now briefed
3. Discussion
a. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
An alleged debtor awarded attorney’s fees and costs because an involuntary petition against him has been dismissed is entitled to “reasonable” fees. 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(i)(l)(A), (B). Because fees assessed under section 303(i)(l) are considered damages, Meltzer,
Still, the fees must be “reasonable.” Id.; Poterek,
To arrive at Meltzer’s fees and costs, then, three determinations must be made: “(1) the number of hours reasonably expended by ... counsel, (2) the reasonable hourly rate for those services, and (3) costs.” Johnson,
i. Reasonable Hourly Rates
The hourly rates of Meltzer’s attorneys are reasonable. The reasonable hourly rate is the rate that is “derived from the market rate for the services rendered.” Pickett,
Meltzer was represented in the involuntary case by attorneys from Deutsch, Levy & Engel, Chartered, a Chicago law firm. In support of his claim for fees, Meltzer submitted an affidavit from one of his attorneys, Leon Farbman. The affidavit provides the hourly rates of the two Deutsch Levy partners, one associate, and one paralegal who worked on the case. (Dkt. No. 140 at ¶¶ 7-8). These rates are the normal hourly rates of the three attorneys and paralegal. (Id.). Also submitted was a second Farbman affidavit attaching copies of the invoices Deutsch Levy sent Meltzer for their work on the case. (Dkt. No. 167). The invoices indicate that he regularly paid the fees charged.
The two affidavits and the invoices are sufficient to show that the hourly rates are the relevant market rates and are reasonable. See Stark,
ii. Reasonable Hours Expended
The hours Meltzer’s attorneys spent defending the involuntary case, pursuing its dismissal, and pursuing sanctions, are also reasonable.
The lodestar method entitles the petitioning party to compensation only for attorney time “reasonably expended.” Hensley,
The party seeking fees has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the hours worked and should submit evidence supporting those hours. Hensley,
The invoices show ' that the three Deutsch Levy attorneys spent a total of4 179.2 hours from August 4, 2013, through March 27, 2014, on the case. At eight hours a day, assuming a five-day week, that means the attorneys spent just over four weeks of time. The fees for that time totaled $60,788.86. The work performed included preparation and presentation of several motions, preparation of numerous briefs, many necessary because of motions Leventhal filed; factual investigation; preparing for the evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss; drafting pretrial materials for the sanctions hearing; preparing for that hearing; and conducting the sanctions hearing. The hours spent and the fees incurred for that much work are not only reasonable, they are modest.
True, some of entries on the invoices have problems. Several entries, for example, are lumped or block-billed. Two or three entries have only vague descriptions of the work performed. One entry includes work on the lis pendens “foreclosure” action which was not sufficiently related to the bankruptcy case to be com-pensable. See Better Care,
But no reduction is required here. The block-billing is not extensive enough to prevent an assessment of the reasonableness of the time spent. See Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n v. Clarke, No. 06 C 602,
In figuring the lodestar amount, a court “need not perform a line-by-line review of a fee petition,” Super Pawn Jewelry & Loan, LLC v. American Envtl. Energy, Inc., No. 11 C 8894,
Just as Leventhal does not quarrel with Deutsch Levy’s rates, he does not suggest the hours billed were not actually spent on the case. Instead, he contends that the invoices are fraudulent, asserting that no evidence establishes their genuineness and shows they were actually sent to Meltzer. He notes that the underlying attorney time sheets have not been supplied. As proof that the invoices are fabrications, Leven-thal points to small details: the format of the page numbers, the differences in the invoice numbers, and the rounded nature of Meltzer’s payments (“$48,500 even,” he notes). He also complains that many entries on the invoices have been redacted and that all of the invoices are headed simply “Federal Court Lawsuit.”
None of this is enough to give pause. The second Farbman affidavit attests to the genuineness of the invoices and says they were sent to Meltzer. (Dkt. No. 167 at ¶ 3). Leventhal offers no evidence to the contrary. The features of the invoices Leventhal cites — page numbers, invoice numbers, and so on — raise no inference of fabrication. As explained earlier, see discussion, supra, at 10 n.4, entries on the invoices were redacted at the court’s direction (see Dkt. No. 166) to eliminate services for which no compensation was sought. The redactions were necessary because all of the work for Meltzer was billed to a single matter entitled “Federal Court Lawsuit,” see discussion, supra, at 10 n.4, probably the FHA action in which Deutsch Levy also represented Meltzer. As for the time sheets, there is no requirement that they be supplied; whether to require them rests with the court’s discretion. Harper,
Leventhal’s remaining argument about the fees is that Meltzer incurred them needlessly — because of foolish decisions he or his lawyers made, not anything Leven-thal or Kubiak did. Leventhal argues:
All Meltzer needed to do to avoid all of the controversies between the partieswas write a three sentence email to Kubiak to the effect: “Meg I am very-sorry that we couldn’t get together on [the] purchase of the house. I would like you to vacate in 90 days. Will that be OK?” 5
(Dkt. No. 169 at 6). Instead, Meltzer and his “herd of 11 attorneys ... embarked upon a legal onslaught attacking Kubiak as schoolyard bullies attack — in groups.” (Id. at 7). The legal fees Meltzer had to pay, Leventhal believes, are his own fault, a self-inflicted wound.
Leventhal’s argument betrays two basic misunderstandings. The first is about what actually happened here. What happened was that when Meltzer’s lawyers pursued his contractual right as a landlord to recover the premises and unpaid rent, Kubiak (with Leventhal’s aid) attacked him, filing the FHA action.
Leventhal’s other basic misunderstanding concerns the purpose of the legal system. That purpose is to resolve disputes. Sherrod v. Birnbaum,
Meltzer will be awarded his reasonable fees of $60,788.86. Leventhal, Kubiak, arid Pegasus will be held jointly and severally liable for that amount. See United States ex rel. Howard v. Urban Inv. Trust, Inc., No. 03 C 7668,
The costs recoverable under section 303(i)(l)(A) are the “costs of defending against the involuntary petition.” In re K.P. Enter.,
Meltzer requests $829.14 in costs, consisting of charges for (1) photocopies, (2) postage, (3) overnight delivery, (4) Westlaw research, (5) the filing fee for a motion for relief from stay in the chapter 13 case Leventhal filed shortly before the March 2014 sanctions hearing,
The Westlaw charges, however, must be disallowed. Charges for computerized legal research are considered office overhead, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary they are assumed to have been recovered through attorney’s fees. In re Rio Hair Naturalizer Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1055,
Meltzer will be awarded a total of $105.17 in costs. As with the attorney’s fees, Leventhal, Kubiak, and Pegasus will be held jointly and severally liable for the costs. See Howard,
b. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages under section 303(i)(2)(B) are determined the same way punitive damages generally are: the amount must be sufficient to serve the objectives of deterrence and punishment. See Hendrickson v. Cooper,
The enormity of the wrong to Meltzer, first of all, was substantial. As
Next, the intent of the creditors was malicious. Not one of the creditors had a claim against Meltzer meeting the requirement in section 303(b)(1) that the claim be neither contingent as to liability nor the subject of a bona fide dispute. Two of the creditors, Leventhal and Pegasus, had no claim whatever against Meltzer. Pegasus did not even exist until two weeks before the petition date. The only claim of the other creditor, Kubiak, was the claim in the FHA action, and that claim was very much in bona fide dispute. The petition and accompanying memoranda were “not only false but fraudulent,” Meltzer,
For Leventhal, at least, there are no mitigating factors, and he does not claim there are. In fact, he concedes he “deserves a monetary penalty of some sort in this matter for behavior that would have better been left undone.” (Dkt. No. 169 at 7). There are, however, three aggravating factors, two of which apply to Kubiak and all of which apply to Leventhal.
• First, as noted earlier, the involuntary case Leventhal and Kubiak filed was only one part of a wider litigation war waged against Meltzer. The war began with Kubiak’s FHA action against Meltzer. When Meltzer filed the eviction action, Leventhal, Kubiak, and Pegasus filed the involuntary petition. Two days later, Lev-enthal recorded a lis pendens notice against Meltzer’s property, Meltzer,
«Second, Leventhal and Kubiak have abused the judicial system similarly in the past. As detailed in Meltzer;
• Third, monetary awards and penalties do not appear to deter Leventhal in the slightest. The judgment Sehenberg obtained against Leventhal — for malicious prosecution and abuse of process — was for $274,000. See Meltzer,
Although no mitigating factors help Lev-enthal, one mitigating factor weighs in Kubiak’s favor. Leventhal, not Kubiak, seems to have been the driving force behind the involuntary petition, and Kubiak’s involvement was limited. Her signatures on the petition and accompanying memorandum were photographic images, not original ink signatures. She never appeared in court during the case. She did not resist the motion to dismiss, did not file pretrial materials before the hearing on dismissal, did not file pretrial materials before the hearing on sanctions, and did not appear at that hearing. (Meltzer contends she even ignored a subpoena served in connection with the sanctions hearing.) Virtually all of the motions from the petitioners came from Leventhal. The few post-petition papers Kubiak purportedly filed again bore a photographic image of her signature almost certainly placed there by Leventhal. {See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 155, 163, 173,178, 191).
Kubiak deserves some credit, .then, for not pressing the matter. But the extent to which she was involved in filing and prosecuting the involuntary case — that is, the extent to which she authorized Leven-thal to act for her — is unclear. If, as Lev-
Given the seriousness of the petitioners’ conduct, their malicious intent, and the aggravating and mitigating factors discussed, Meltzer will be awarded punitive damages as follows: $120,000 against Lev-enthal, $40,000 against Kubiak, and $20,000 against Pegasus.
In opposing punitive damages, Kubiak (really Leventhal) argues that she has already been punished enough through the state court’s $52,600 damage award in the eviction action. But the damages the state court awarded were compensatory damages for back rent, not punitive damages. (See Meltzer Exs. 17, 19). Kubiak also contends that an award of punitive damages would violate'the Eighth Amendment. She is mistaken. The Eighth Amendment is concerned with punishments that are criminal, not civil, in nature. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
Because Leventhal raises constitutional concerns, however, it is worth noting that the punitive damage awards here handily satisfy the constitutional provision that does apply: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Because punitive damages vindicate the government’s “legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition,” an award violates due process only when it is “grossly excessive in relation to
The first of these “guideposts,” the degree of reprehensibility, is the most important, Campbell,
The thoroughly reprehensible nature of Leventhal and Kubiak’s conduct—particularly Leventhal’s—has been detailed here and in past opinions. Again, Leventhal and Kubiak deliberately filed an involuntary petition against Meltzer to torment him and prevent him from exercising his rights in the state court. They filed the petition knowing perfectly well it was fraudulent: the petition involved the fabrication of claims, the impersonation of others, the forging of signatures, even the creation of a new corporation to ensure there would be enough creditors. And with Leventhal, at least, the misconduct did not stop with the petition. Leventhal resisted its dismissal, resisted Meltzer’s requests for damages and other relief, filed a false affidavit with another forged signature in which Kubiak purported to deny her involvement, even harassed Melt-zer repeatedly with post-hearing motions. See Meltzer,
The second guidepost, the disparity between the harm suffered and the punitive damages awarded, addresses the relationship between awards of compensatory and punitive damages. Campbell,
The punitive damage awards here do not begin to approach the constitutional outer limit. The compensatory damages award is $60,894.03. The $120,000 punitive damage award against Leventhal is
The third and final guidepost is the difference between the punitive damage award and the criminal or civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Campbell,
The punitive damage awards here are comparable to, or lower than, the maximum criminal penalties for the conduct in question. The analogous federal crimes are false oaths in a bankruptcy case, 18 U.S.C. § 152, bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 157, and perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1621. See John Richards Homes,
Meltzer, then, will be awarded $120,000 in punitive damages against Leventhal and $40,000 in punitive damages against Kub-iak, and $20,000 in punitive damages against Pegasus. These amounts comply with constitutional norms and are the minimum necessary to achieve some measure of deterrence and punishment,
c. Injunction against Further Filings
Finally, restrictions will be imposed on the ability of Leventhal, Kubiak, and anyone acting on their behalf to file documents in the bankruptcy court for this district. They will be barred from filing any document (other than a notice of appeal from this decision) without leave of court.
Courts are places “in which serious people attend to serious business,” Morris v. Jenkins,
Federal courts have a responsibility to protect themselves from abuse, id. and they have “ample authority” to do so by restricting the ability of abusive litigants to file. Pullen-Walker v. Executive Comm. of the U.S. Dist. Ct., 482 Fed.Appx.
Filing restrictions, however, must be “narrowly tailored” to the type of abuse and must not “bar the courthouse door entirely.” Pullen-Walker,
Restricting the future ability of Leven-thal and Kubiak to file anything in the bankruptcy court for this district without permission is entirely warranted here. As discussed above (and in earlier opinions in this matter, see Meltzer,
The restrictions will be narrowly tailored—limited to the bankruptcy court for this district and barring filings only from Kubiak,' Leventhal, and. anyone acting on their behalf. The restrictions also will not close the courthouse door entirely: filings will be possible with judicial permission, and Leventhal and Kubiak will be able to ask to have the restrictions lifted after five years. The Seventh Circuit has consistently upheld screening orders of this kind as a way of curbing litigation abuse. See, e.g., Wallis,
Meltzer, though, wants broader relief. In his amended sanctions motion he asked for a bar not only against the petitioners but “any individual or entity with whom they are associated.” (Dkt. No. 55 at 12). And the request became more elaborate in his post-hearing memorandum. There,
These requests will be declined. Some could not be enforced as a practical matter: the bars to filings against people who have “encountered” the petitioners and the requirement that the petitioners provide other courts with this court’s earlier opinion. Some are no longer necessary: Leventhal and Kubiak are already restricted filers in the district court. Others are of questionable legality. Although the court in In re Martin-Trigona,
Although given an opportunity to respond to 'Meltzer’s request for filing restrictions against him, Leventhal offers no opposition. He never denies having abused the courts, never claims that any of his filings have been legitimate, and never asserts that he needs unfettered access to the courts either because he has meritorious claims against anyone or even that he might have them. His lack of opposition is telling. It is fair to assume that unless barred he will go right on doing what he has been doing.
The only opposition comes from Kub-iak — or rather Leventhal on Kubiak’s behalf. Kubiak asserts that no evidence was “adduced at trial” showing she had engaged in abusive filings. (Dkt. No. 163 at 5).
She is mistaken on several levels.
• First, plenty of evidence was adduced at the hearing. There was evidence not only of the abusive involuntary petition but.
• Second, as if that evidence were not enough, the dockets of the bankruptcy and district courts are replete with additional proof of Leventhal and Kubiak’s abuses not only in this case but in the Schenberg and Peterson matters. Courts are entitled to take judicial notice of the records of proceedings in related matters, see Opoka v. I.N.S.,
• Third, Kubiak’s argument assumes “that the sole judicial role in this proceeding is as a neutral arbiter of a dispute between private parties.” Martin-Trigona,
Kubiak next observes that “even convicted felons” have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Filing restrictions, she says, would violate that right.
Kubiak is mistaken. Certainly, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gives her a right of access to the courts, Tennessee v. Lane,
Finally, Kubiak insists again that she is blameless here. According to Kubiak, she “did not know and had no reason to know that the actions being carried out by Lev-enthal in this case would or might cause any damage to Meltzer.” (Dkt. No. 163 at 2).
Kubiak’s protestations of innocence— really Leventhal’s protestations on her behalf — are wholly unconvincing. True, Leventhal appears to have orchestrated Kubiak’s litigation against Meltzer in the district court, state court, and bankruptcy court, just as he is now directing her efforts against Peterson here and elsewhere. But as discussed earlier, see discussion, supra, at 19-20, if Kubiak did not authorize Leventhal to run interference for her, not once did she appear before the court to say so, nor did she file a single document disavowing his actions. See Meltzer,
Leventhal, Kubiak, and anyone acting on their behalf will be barred from filing any document in the bankruptcy court for this district (other than a notice of appeal from this decision) without first obtaining leave of court.
4. Conclusion
For these reasons, alleged debtor Michael Meltzer is awarded $60,788.86 in attorney’s fees and $105.17 in costs against Howard Leventhal, Malgorzata Kubiak, and Pegasus Electronics HK Ltd., jointly and severally. Meltzer is awarded $120,000 in punitive damages against Lev-enthal, $40,000 in punitive damages against Kubiak, and $20,000 in punitive damages against Pegasus. Leventhal, Kubiak, and anyone acting on their behalf are enjoined from filing any new document in the bankruptcy court for this district (apart from a notice of appeal from this decision) without first obtaining leave of court. Meltzer was previously found entitled to relief under section 303(k). See Meltzer,
Notes
. Leventhal’s hand in the FHA action is evident from the papers Kubiak filed. Leven-thal’s legal work has a consistent format and appearance, and his rhetorical style is unmistakable. Leventhal later filed an appearance in the FHA action and even moved to intervene (a motion the district court denied).
. Leventhal even filed his own cross-motion for sanctions against Meltzer in the involuntary case. That motion was denied. See id. at 521-22. After the evidentiary hearing, Lev-enthal and Kubiak continued to file motions aimed at Meltzer in an apparent effort to run up his costs and get him to abandon his sanctions requests. The latest of these motions resulted in a $6,500 sanction against Leventhal under Rule 9011. See Meltzer,
. Or as briefed as they will ever be. Only Leventhal filed a memorandum opposing Meltzer’s requests. (Dkt. No. 169). A memorandum was filed purportedly by Kubiak (Dkt. No. 163), but as with many other papers Kubiak has purported to file in this case, the format, appearance, rhetorical style, and photographic iipage of Kubiak’s signature all point to Leventhal as the real author. See Meltzer,
. The affidavits explain that Deutsch Levy billed all time for work on Meltzer matters under the same matter number. (Dkt. No. 167 at ¶ 4). At the court's direction (see Dkt. No. 166), Deutsch Levy produced to Leven-thal and also filed with the court the firm’s original invoices, redacting descriptions of services for which compensation was not sought. Although many entries (and even whole pages) have been redacted in their entirety, some entries are redacted only in part.
. When Meltzer first contacted Kubiak about the unpaid rent, she told him she wanted to buy the property. See Meltzer,
. The attorneys were attacked, too, as were members of Meltzer’s family. Named as defendants in the FHA action were Meltzer, his wife, his father, and the lawyers representing him in his dispute with Kubiak. Meltzer,
. This is why the law makes malicious prosecution and abuse of process wrongs for which damages can be recovered. See generally 3 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts §§ 592-96 (2d ed.2011).
.There is a potential third step to the lodestar method. Once the lodestar is calculated, it can be "adjusted.” Johnson,
. Leventhal filed a chapter 13 petition on February 20, 2014, five weeks before the hearing. See In re Leventhal, No. 14-5506 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.). Meltzer moved for relief from the stay, and that motion was granted in part to permit the parties to comply with the pretrial order for the sanctions hearing. {Id. Dkt. Nos. 7, 8, 13). The trustee moved to dismiss the chapter 13 case, and that motion was granted on March 14, 2014. (Id. Dkt. Nos. 12, 27). Leventhal appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. {Id. Dkt. Nos. 30, 47).
. The description of the two removals in the court’s earlier opinion is correct but somewhat confusing. Meltzer,
. The same cannot be said of the FHA action. Although Leventhal was plainly the author of the papers Kubiak filed in that action, the complaint and some (though not all) of the papers bear what appear to be Kubiak's original signature.
. All of the declarations that Kubiak was not involved have come from Leventhal, not Kub-iak herself. The post-hearing memorandum Kubiak filed stating she “did not know and had no reason to know that the actions being carried out by Leventhal” would harm Melt-zer bore the same photographic image of her signature and was composed in Leventhal’s distinctive rhetorical style. (Dkt. No. 163). A Kubiak affidavit to similar effect was admitted into evidence at the sanctions hearing, but when asked whether he had written and signed the affidavit, Leventhal asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 518. The court concluded that “the affidavit was a fake and Kubiak's signature forged.” Id.
. In the memorandum that Kubiak (really Leventhal) filed, she invokes what she calls the "innocent spouse doctrine.” (Dkt. No. 163 at 1-2). There is no such doctrine. Kubiak is referring to a provision of the Internal , Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6015, that allows a spouse to avoid joint and several liability for income taxes if the so-called “innocent spouse” was unaware of the other spouse's reporting deficiency. See Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r,
. The assumption is a fair one because the district court's orders restricting the ability of Leventhal and Kubiak to file here have simply caused them to shift their attentions to a different district. In June 2015, Leventhal purported to remove Peterson’s foreign judgment action from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. See Peterson v. Kubiak, No. 2:15-cv-00751-JPS (E.D.Wis.). The district court immediately remanded the removed action. (Id. Dkt. No. 7). Two weeks later, Kubiak brought an action in the same district against Peterson’s attorneys alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. See Kubiak v. Shannon, et al., No. 2:15-cv-00813-LA (E.D.Wis.). That action is still pending. The notice of removal and the FDCPA complaint bear all the hallmarks of Leventhal: the same format and style of his other filings as well as the photographic image of Kubiak’s signature.