The opinion of the court was delivered by
The petitioner was convicted in the district court of Mitchell county of assault and battery. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail for a term of three months and to pay a fine of one dollar, and to stand committed until the fine and costs were paid. The penalty for the offense of assault and battery is found in section 2028, General Statutes'of 1901. That section reads :
“Any person who shall assault, or beat, or wound another under such circumstances as not to constitute any other offense herein defined, shall upon conviction thereof be fined in a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year.”
The prisoner paid the fine assessed against him and has sued out this writ of habeas corpus, seeking his discharge on the ground that the court was without power to assess a punishment of fine and imprisonment upon him, when the statute authorizes either one or the other, and not both. We think the court was without power to inflict the punishment imposed.
In Ex parte Lange,
“It is no answer to this to say that the court had jurisdiction of the person of the prisoner, and of the offense under the statute. It by no means follows that these two facts make valid, however erroneous it may be, any judgment the court may render in such case. If a justice of the peace, having jurisdiction to fine for a misdemeanor, and with the party charged properly before him, should render a judgment that he be hung, it would simply be void. Why void ? Because he had no power to render such a judgment. So, if a court of general jurisdiction should, on an indictment for libel, render a judgment of death, or confiscation of property, it would, for the same reason, be void. Or if on an indictment for treason the court should render.a judgment of attaint whereby the heirs of the criminal could not inherit his property, which should by the judgment of the court be confiscated to the state, it would be void as to the attaihder, because in excess of the authority of the court, and forbidden by the constitution.” '
In People, ex rel. Tweed, v. Liscomb,
The petitioner will be discharged.
