20 S.D. 498 | S.D. | 1906
A resident of. Sioux Falls, known as “John McClellan,” died intestate in that city August 3, 1899. Directly, numerous petitions for letters of administration were filed in the county court, among which were the following: One by E. J. Taber, as next friend and alleged creditor, praying appointment of himself; one by H. H. Keith, as an alleged creditor, praying appointment of himself; one by the State Banking & Trust Company, as an alleged creditor, praying appointment oí E. J. Taber; one by Margaret Hammil and Mary McClelland, as alleged nieces of the decedent, praying appointment of William Van Eps; one by Mary A. Vine, on behalf of herself and others, as alleged brothers and sisters of the decedent, praying appointment of Cyrus Walts. On the héaring of these petitions the county court appointed Van Eps, to whom letters of administration were issued, and who duly qualified and entered upon the discharge of his duties. From the order appointing Van Eps, separate appeals were taken to the circuit court,, on questions of both law and fact, by Keith, Vine, and the trust company.
It will be observed that at the second trial in the circuit court there remained only four parties, namely, the Canadian claimants,
The Canadian claimants contend the court erred in not dismissing the Arkansas claimant’s appeal. The contention is untenable. It is not consistent with their conduct in the circuit court. Before the first trial they consented to have all the petitions heard together, and no reason was shown why the consolidation thus effected should have been set aside. When the Arkansas claimants asked for a separate trial they objected on the ground, among others, of the former agreement to consolidate. If they did not desire to have the Arkansas claimants’ petition heard in connection with their own, they should not have resisted the motion for a separate hearing. Moreover, the course pursued by the learned circuit court is sanctioned by the statute and did not prejudice any substantial rights. The Revised Probate Code of 1903 provides :
“Sec. 83. When a petition praying for letters of administration is filed, the judge must give notice thereof containing the name of the decedent, the name of the applicant for letters, and the day and term of the court at which the application will be heard, which notice must be published by posting or printing in a newspaper, the same as required for notice of the probate of a will.
“Sec. 89. Any person interested may contest the petition by filing written opposition thereto on the ground of the incompetency of the applicant, or may assert his own rights to the administration and pray that letters be issued to himself. In the latter case the contestant must file a petition and give the notice required for an original petition, and the court must hear the two petitions together.”
“Sec. 359. When the appeal is on questions of fact, or on questions of both law and fact, the trial in the circuit court must be de novo, and shall be conducted in the same manner as if the case and proceedings had lawfully originated in that court; and .such appellate court has the same power to decide the questions of*506 fact which the county court or judge had, and it may, in its discretion, as in suits in chancery, and with like effect, make an order for the trial by a jury of any or all the material questions, of fact arising upon the issues between the parties, and such an order must state distinctly and plainly the questions of fact to be tried.”
The Canadian and Ireland claimants’ petitions were certainly pending in the circuit court by reason of the appeal from the order of the county court appointing Van Eps, Von questions of both law and fact.” They were there for trial de novo; the hearing to be conducted in the same manner as if the case and proceedings had originated in the circuit court. Though the Arkansas claimants’ appeal may not have been properly perfected or neither cottrt acquired jurisdiction of their petition as such, nevertheless it was in fact filed in the circuit court, and was amply sufficient to constitute the written opposition of interested persons who at least were authorized to contest the other-pending petitions on the ground of the-mcompetency of the applicants. The right of the Canadian claimants to question Van Eps’ 'appointment rested alone on their alleged relationship? to the decedent. Such relationship was the only issue of fact presented by their petition. If successful as to such issue, they would name the administrator; if not successful, it was wholly immaterial to them who was the administrator or what was done with other petitions for letters of administration. The right to- contest a petition includes the right to cross-examine witnesses, make objections to testimony, and offer evidence tending to prove the incompetency of the petitioner. If either group of claimants was related to the decedent, neither of the others could be. Hence, evidence in support of one tended to refute the allegations of the-others, and the only sensible method of procedure was to hear all the petitions together, the course required by the statute and pursued by the learned circuit court.
For the same reasons, the contention of the Arkansas claimants that they should have been given a separate trial cannot be sustained. They had consented to the consolidation of the several cases, the other petitioners were entitled to contest their claim.of' relationship to the decedent, and the statute required the court to-hear all the petitions together.
It is urged that the court erred in refusing the damand of the Canadian claimants for a trial by jury. Section 6, art.-6,-of the state Constitution ordains that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy.” The effect of this provision was merely to continue unimpaired and inviolate the right as it existed in the territory when the Constitution was adopted. It neither added to nor took from that right, except to extend it to “all cases at law” without regard to the amount in controversy. 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 974; Belatti v. Pierce, 8 S. D. 456, 66 N. W. 1088. The law in force when the Constitution was adopted was the same as it is now. It expressly authorized the court to decide the questions of fact, or in its discretion, as in suits in chancery, and with like effect, to submit such questions to a jury. Rev. Prob. Code 1903, § 359; Comp. Laws 1887, § 5976; Prob. Code 1877, § 326. So the right did not exist when the Constitution was adopted, a petition for letters of administration is not a “casé at law” as that term is understood and construed by the courts, and the court invaded no constitutional right by refusing a jury trial. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 47 Minn. 451, 50 N. W. 598.
The Canadian claimants sought to prove that their brother John McClelland entered and deserted from the British army at Toronto" in 1856. To- show that this enlistment and desertion occurred in 1859, alleged copies of the original attestation and register sheet of one John McClelland were introduced in evidence, to the intro-
It was not error to receive in. evidence photographic reproductions of portions of the enlistment papers. The photographer testified that he had been engaged solely in that business for upwards of 10 years; that he was manager of the Armagh branch of the firm of '‘Allison, Photographers, Belfast”; one of the highest class photographers in Ireland ; that he went to the barracks at Birr and took time and correct negatives of certain portions of the original attestation and registration sheet, they being submitted to him for that purpose by the officer in charge of the same; and that the exhibits attached -to his deposition were correct and exact photographs in every detail of the portions of the originals which they respectively represent. The originals could not be produced; the witness was not cross-examined; the photographs themselves appeared to be correct reproductions; the foundation for secondary evidence was properly laid; aiid though testimony subsequently received, touching different photographic processes, may have diminished the evidentiary value of the photographs, it did not render the ruling on their admission erroneous or require their exclusion. And they clearly were admissible for the purpose of showing that the copies furnished by the custodian of the original records were true and correct; especially with respect to the dates of the soldiers’ enlistment and desertion, the only really important purpose served by such records.
Experts in handwriting were permitted to compare the signatures in the photographic reproductions of the enlistment papers with proved signatures of the decedent and a proved signature of the Canadian McClelland, for the evident purpose of showing that the signatures on the enlistment papers were written b3r the latter and not by the former. Regarding the use of photographic reproductions for comparison of handwriting the authorities are conflicting. We apprehend that -the constant development of the art has served to weaken, if not remove, many reasons assigned in earlier
The learned circuit court found that the Canadian claimants are not brothers and sisters of the decedent. The findings of a trial court on disputed questions of fact are always presumptively right, and though, under our statute, not as controlling upon this court as the'verdict of a jury, must stand, unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them. Feldman v. Trumbower, 7 S. D. 408, 64 N. W. 189; Randall v. Burk Tp., 4 S. D. 337, 57 N. W. 4; Reid v. Kellogg, 8 S. D. 596, 67 N. W. 687; Webster v. White, 8 S. D. 479, 66 N. W. 1145; McKenna v. Whittaker, 9 S. D. 442, 69 N. W. 587; Hulst v. Association, 9 S. D. 144, 68 N. W. 200; Grewing v. Machine Co., 12 S. D. 127, 80 N. W. 176. There was evidence tending to prove that the Canadian claimants were the surviving sons and daughters of Abraham McClelland, a native of Ireland, who was the father of five sons and four daughters, named William, Samuel, John, Abraham, Thomas, Jane, Frances, Margaret, and Mary Ann, and who, after his marriage, resided for a time at Irvcnstown, county Fermanagh, later at or near Armagh, county Armagh, whence he emigrated with all his family, except Williám, in 1850, taking ship at Belfast, landing at Quebec and settling at Niagara on the Take, Canada, where he was joined by his son William two years later; that Abraham McClelland was a farmer and linen weaver and belonged to the constabulary in Ireland; that his son John, who is claimed to have been the decedent, was born at Trvenstown, September 27, 1831; that John was about 5 feet 7^ inches in height, weighed about 160 pounds, had dark gray or hazel eyes, brown hair, and unusually large thumb joints, a family char
The learned circuit court also found that the Arkansas claimants were not sons and grandsons of the decedent. Robert Wilson of Glenwood, Minn., age 69, testified substantially as follows: Witness was born in county Meath, Ireland; his mother’s maiden name' was. Ruth McClelland; her father’s name was'Samuel McClelland; she had three brothers, Charles, John, and one wlm died in childhood, and four sisters, Ann, Catherine, Mary Jane, and Elizabeth. Her brother John was born at Skryne county Meath, was nine or ten years older than the witness, was a gamekeeper on the Dillon estate. Game keepers were called “wood-rangers” and accompanied the owners of estates when out hunting. Witness saw his uncle John just before leaving Ireland in 1842, when the witness was ix years old. Witness’ family'sailed from Liverpool, landed at. New York, were at Rochester, and went to Scugog Island, Canada, in 1847. ' Witness’''Uncle John, wife, and one child, three or four months' old, came to Scugog about- a year later and lived with witness’ family during the firfet winter; •■> His; wife taught school. White there'another child was'born. After being there over a year’'John and his family removed to1 Port Perry; 'later to St. John, New Brunswick. Letters were received from his uncle while the latter was at St. John, which have been lost, in one of which it was stated that his uncle had separated from his wife on account of a quarrel with her brothers. Mullingar was a place in county Meath noted as a market for fat cattle, whence came the saying common in Ireland and Canada, when one sees a very stout woman: “That she looks like a Mullinger heifer beef to the heels.” Witness’ uncle was of sandy complexion, had dark hair, dark blue eyes, was square built; a short man, rather light-hearted in general, though quick tempered. Was fond of sport, never liked work, did scarcely anything but hunt and fish, usually shooting from the left shoulder. Pie had two ' children when he left Scugog Island, and one afterwards. Witness
Nearly all of the testimony introduced in support of the Arkansas claimants’ petition was received over properly stated objections. Here again the presumption must prevail that all incompetent evidence was disregarded by the trial court in making its findings of fact, and, of course, such evidence should not, now be considered for the purpose of setting aside the findings. Under well recognized rules relating to> the proof-of pedigree, there manifestly was sufficient uncontradicted competent evidence that Hannah Cruikshank married John McClellan in Ireland;, that he and she removed to- Scugog Island and then to St. John; that the)'- had three sons, two of whom were witnesses; that they separated at St. John on account of a quarrel between McClellan' and his brothers-in-law. So- the vital question is whether Hannah Cruikshank’s husband was the decedent. It is, therefore, the evidence relating to this alleged identity which demands special attention. Were the declarations of Joseph Cruikshank, deceased, relative to what was revealed by the War Department records, admissible? Such declarations simply conveyed information of the fact that a man was, or had been, enrolled in a company or regiment serving in Dakota, under the name of John McClelland. Had Cruikshank been living- and called as a witness, he could not have-testified to the contents of the records. Nevertheless, the testimony-under discussion was admissible for the purpose of showing that information had reached the family that the missing father might be-in Dakota, not that he in fact was there, and that is all it tended to.
Another ground assigned by the Arkansas claimants in then-motion for a new trial was “newly discovered evidence, material to the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.” Rev. Code Civ. Proc. 1903, § 301, subd. 4. This was supported by an affidavit of one of their attorneys; the certified copy of a marriage registry corresponding with the one introduced in evidence on the
The estate should recover disbursements in this court and costs, except “for argument” to be taxed against the appellants. The orders appealed from are affirmed.