210 Mich. 188 | Mich. | 1920
Lead Opinion
Frederick Mayer, deceased, was for many years a resident of the village of Homer in Calhoun county, engaged during the greater portion of his residence in keeping a saloon. He died in July, 1917, intestate, leaving an estate consisting of both real and personal property inventoried and appraised in the probate court of said county at a valuation of $8,829.48. He was a single man and died leaving no known heirs at law to inherit his estate. Administration proceedings were instituted in the probate court of Calhoun county and the attorney general entered his appearance in behalf of the State of Michigan under the statute applicable in such cases.
Commissioners on claims were appointed by the probate court and Alice Rogers filed a claim against the estate for services rendered during 2114 years, claiming “the entire estate of said deceased of every nature,” stating of what it consisted substantially as described in the inventory. Various hearings were had before the commissioners on claims, and while the matter was pending she filed an amended claim for damages in the sum of $15,000 for breach of contract for services as deceased’s housekeeper during a period of over 10 years immediately preceding his death, describing the
. Claimant is a married woman of mature years, separated but never divorced from her husband, Henry Rogers, who for a time was in Mayer’s employ and amongst other duties ran a pool room for him adjoining the saloon. Mayer occupied rooms over the saloon and Rogers lived with his wife and son in an apartment over the pool room. While living with and keeping house for her husband, claimant cared for Mayer’s rooms and did work of various kinds upon the premises, including assisting her husband in preparing luncheons served in the saloon. Her husband left her about May, 1907, since which time he has not lived with or contributed to her support. Their son, who was then a young man, remained for a time tending bar for Mayer but soon thereafter married and Went with his wife to a home of their own.
The case was submitted to the jury on two theories
Defendant’s assignments of error are based on the contentions that a verdict in favor of the estate should have been directed because there was no contract shown and claimant had already been paid for whatever services she rendered deceased; that if not paid in full she could only recover for services rendered since August 1, 1911, when Act No. 196 of that year (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 11478) went into effect entitling the wife to her earnings, which before that time belonged to her husband, and that in any event the verdict was against the great weight of evidence, excessive and unsupported by any competent testimony to the extent of the award.
To the general proposition that as a matter of law the husband was entitled to his wife’s earnings prior to 1911, numerous decisions of this court leave no room for debate and are controlling. As the law then stood in this State the common-law rule that a husband is entitled to the labor and earnings of his wife unquestionably obtained. Plaintiff’s answer to this is an implied emancipation by the husband. The record is silent as to the occasion of and particular reason for Kogers leaving his wife. The bare facts that he did go, stayed away, and has not contributed to her support since appear. Why he went or through whose fault is not disclosed. But it does appear that he left her well nested in their former home, and she remained there as Mayer’s housekeeper, well provided for
Her legal status as a wife and common-law disability as such continued up to the time of this trial except as modified by statute. The married woman’s act of 1855 (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 11485) only abolished the common-law rule relative to the husband’s marital rights respecting his wife’s distinct, individual property acquired by inheritance, devise, grant, gift, etc. Not until Act No. 196, Pub. Acts 1911, became operative did she acquire the right to her earnings and to make contracts in relation thereto independent of her husband. The law upon the subject of emancipation is recently discussed and clearly stated by Justice Stone in an estate case entitled In re Burnham’s Estate, 207 Mich. 361.
As to the claimed life contract, several witnesses testified to statements by Mayer on different occasions “that Allie (claimant) and Fern (a little girl who lived with her) would get the property when he was through,” that he intended to will his property to claimant and also that he had done so. He in fact made no such provisions, so far as shown. Whatever may have been his expressed sentiments towards her and declarations as to what he had done or was going to do for her, none of their testimony discloses any element of an expressed contract with the possible exception of that by a witness named Markle in which the word “understanding” is especially pointed out and stressed by her counsel as of contractual significance. Markle lived at Albion, where he stated he
“talked about the wet and dry proposition for a few minutes and then he (Mayer) asked me if I knew enough to make a will and keep, my G- — d d — n mouth shut about it, that is the expression he used. • I said yes, I can make you a will and I think I knew enough to keep my mouth shut about it. * * * He said that he had a lady that had been keeping house for him a good many years and the understanding was when she went to. keeping house for him that if he had any property at his death and she was. living, that he wanted her to have that property. He wanted to make a will to that effect. * * * He said he would be up in a few days but didn’t come. I don’t think he ever mentioned the will to me after that. Never came back again to have the will drawn.”
An understanding that if she survived Mayer “he wanted her to have that property” does not compass the essential elements of an express contract, agreement or promise on his part that if she would remain with and keep house for him, “look after his wants and necessities until his death, he would leave her all his property.” This testimony also shows that the mentioned understanding was “when she went to keeping house for him,” which was some years before Act No: 196 of 1911 was passed and her disability as a married woman to independently contract in relation to her services had not yet been removed. The jury should have been instructed that there could be no recovery on an express contract, nor on quantum meruit prior to the time Act No. 196 of 1911 became operative.
Application of the statute of limitations, suggested at the argument of this, case, does not appear to have
As the case must be remanded for re-trial, it is deemed sufficient without further discussion of the evidence at this time to state that upon this record it is the opinion of the court that the verdict is, under the law applicable to the case, against the great weight of evidence and excessive.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed and, a new trial granted.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). The period covered by plaintiff’s claim for services was 10 years immediately preceding Mayer’s death. For a period of 12 years immediately preceding Mayer’s death plaintiff had been wholly abandoned and unsupported by her husband. With the cause of the separation of this husband and wife we are not concerned. Because of the abandonment of plaintiff by her husband and his entire failure to support her she was free to work and receive wages, and to contract as to her services. That a wife might become emancipated from the disability of coverture respecting her earnings was recognized. In re Burnham’s Estate, supra. See, also, Schoenberg v. Voigt, 36 Mich. 310; 13 R. C. L. p. 1090; 21 Cyc. p. 1406. As to a wife’s right to contract and be liable for medical aid it was said in Carstens v. Hanselman, 61 Mich. 426:
“Where a husband utterly deserts his wife, it would be a cruel rule for her if she cannot, in his absence, * * * make a binding agreement for any necessary, whether articles to be purchased or professional help, without becoming a public charge.”
“A married woman whose husband is a nonresident.*195 and has lived apart from her for six or seven years, during which time she has provided her own support, • may, in an action for personal injuries, recover for medical attendance, although the physician’s bill was unpaid when the suit was commenced.” Lammiman v. Railway Co., 112 Mich. 602 (quoting from syllabus).
The testimony of the witness Markle and the testimony of other witnesses as to declarations and statements of the deceased made an issue of fact for the jury as to whether a contract had been made respecting plaintiff’s services.
“It is true, as urged by the counsel for the estate, that neither of these witnesses testified to the contract in the exact terms set out by the claimant, but we do not think it can be said that this testimony has no' tendency to prove such a contract. It cannot be supposed that the decedent would go over in detail the terms of his contract with the claimant with every casual acquaintance. These witnesses’ testimony, however, tends to show that there was a contract between decedent and claimant, by the terms of which claimant had agreed to stay with decedent until his death, in consideration of which he, decedent, had agreed to ‘do well by her.’ ” In re Thompson’s Estate, 157 Mich. 669.
“There was abundant testimony tending to rebut the presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously, and the court was fully justified in submitting that question to the jury. The testimony tended to show that the services were performed with the mutual understanding that at the death of Marie L. Williams, claimant should succeed to the estate, and that decedent had agreed to make a will accordingly. When a promise is made to compensate for services by will, and the promisor dies without so providing, the value of the services may be recovered as a claim against the estate.” In re Williams’ Estate, 106 Mich. 490.
See, also, Shane v. Shearsmith’s Estate, 137 Mich. 32; Sykes v. City Savings Bank, 115 Mich. 321; La
The other assignments of error have been examined and no prejudicial error calling for reversal being found the judgment should be affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.