60 Conn. App. 127 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2000
Opinion
The respondent father
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The respondent and the child’s
After the mother’s discharge from the hospital, the department provided her with a pediatric nurse for eight hours during the day and a psychiatric nurse for eight hours at night. As a result of its increasing concerns about the respondents’ abilities to care for the child, the department, on May 14,1996, requested and obtained an order of temporary custody, and the child was placed in foster care. On the following day, the respondent informed the department that he intended to enter the Stonington Institute, an in-patient treatment facility for substance abusers. Although he was seen at the institute for an intake interview, he later chose not to enter the program.
On June 6, 1996, the respondent was arrested for risk of injury to a child, sexual assault and violation of probation for his involvement with a fifteen year old girl.
As a resident of Seaview, the respondent received services such as therapy and vocational training. The respondent also received other services through the office of adult probation. The department transported the child to Seaview for weekly visits with the respondent. According to a social worker for the department, the respondent “canceled quite a few visits from September [1997] until the beginning of November, either canceled or would just not be in at least every other week. At times we’d bring [the child] and [the respondent] wasn’t there. Or sometimes he would be there and say he can’t visit because he has an appointment and just leave. . . . We requested a phone call the day before or that morning to let us know whether he was going to be able to visit. For the most part he did not do that.”
In December, 1997, the respondent was admitted to the Stonington Institute for treatment of his alcohol abuse problem. He remained there for about two to three weeks and then returned to Seaview. Upon his return, the respondent was uncooperative with the requirements of the Seaview program. He refused to work, was absent from the program on the weekends, missed therapy appointments, failed to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and failed to visit his son.
The respondent continued to live at Seaview until the summer of 1998. On June 11, 1998, he was arrested after a domestic dispute with the mother. On August 14, 1998, the commissioner of children and families filed a petition for the termination of parental rights with respect to the child. The court subsequently granted the termination petition because neither parent had “achieve [d] such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable
I
The respondent first claims that he was denied his statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel.
“In determining whether counsel has been ineffective in a termination proceeding, we have enunciated the following standard: The range of competence . . . requires not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel whose performance is reasonably competent, or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training
We do not address whether trial counsel’s representation of the respondent was deficient because the record on its face reveals that any alleged deficiencies did not result in prejudice. The record reveals overwhelming evidence that supported the court’s judgment on numerous grounds. First, the evidence amply supported the court’s finding that the respondent failed to achieve rehabilitation. Throughout the child’s three years in foster care, the department offered the respondent visitation with the child and psychiatric treatment to encourage reunification. The court found that despite the department’s efforts at reunification, the respondent visited his son only minimally during the three years that the child has been in foster care and has not requested any visits since the respondent’s incarceration in 1998. The respondent also failed to cooperate with the department of mental retardation and the office of adult probation, and is currently serving a three year prison sentence.
Second, the evidence sufficiently supported the court’s finding that the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is not in the child’s best interest. In arriving at this decision, the court made specific findings regarding the seven statutory factors enumerated in General Statutes § 17a-112 (d). The court found, inter alia, that the child has bonded with his foster family
In view of the evidence in this case, we conclude that the respondent has failed to meet his burden of proving that any alleged inadequacy of trial counsel affected the outcome of the termination proceedings.
II
The respondent next claims that his right to equal protection under the state constitution was violated because he was not provided with the same residential treatment services that were made available to the child’s mother. This claim requires little discussion.
The respondent does not directly challenge the merits of the court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. He merely asserts without analysis that the state “has clearly manifested a bias in favor of providing more intensive rehabilitation services to the mother . . . .” “We are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, 242 Conn. 17, 44-45, 699 A.2d 101 (1997). Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henderson, 47 Conn. App. 542, 558, 706 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908, 713 A.2d 829 (1998). The respondent’s analysis is inadequate, and we therefore decline to review this claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The respondent mother has not appealed from the judgment terminating her parental rights. We refer in this opinion to the respondent father as the respondent.
The sexual assault charge was later disposed oí by a nolle.
In March, 1999, the respondent began serving a three year sentence for violation of his probation. While in prison, the respondent has not requested visits with his son. His release date from prison is July 21, 2001. The child has been in the same foster home for almost four years and his foster parents have indicated that they would like to adopt him.
The respondent also claims that his right to effective assistance of counsel derives from both our state and the federal constitutions. We need not address this claim because even if the respondent had a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a parental termination proceeding, such a right would not affect our analysis today or the outcome of this appeal.