In re PAMELA C. MARTINEZ on Habeas Corpus
No. S103581
Supreme Court of California
Apr. 3, 2003
26 Cal.4th 20 | 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 | 25 P.3d 1103
COUNSEL
Elizаbeth A. Courtenay, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Pamela C. Martinez.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Paul D. Gifford, Assistant Attorney
OPINION
BROWN, J.- The Penal Code provides that inmates in county jails and state prisons may have their sentences reduced as a reward for their conduct, including work and good behavior. The rate at which inmates accrue credit depends on numerous factors, including whether the confinemеnt is presentence or postsentence. A jury convicted petitioner, her conviction was reversed, and she then pleaded guilty. She now contends her state prison confinement prior to the reversal must be characterized as presentence for credit accrual purposes.
In People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 25 P.3d 1103] (Buckhalter), we held that a petitioner who is serving a state prison sentence and is remanded for resentencing retains postsentence status for credit accrual purposes. (Id. at pp. 40-41.) We expressly declined to “consider the proper credit treatment of one who spends time in сustody after his convictions have been reversed on appeal, thus setting the entire matter at large.” (Id. at p. 40, fn. 10.) We now face the question left unanswered in Buckhalter. We conclude petitioner‘s prereversal prison time ought not be viewed as presentence custody, and her credit accrual should be calculated in accordance with her ultimate postsentence status.
I. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Petitioner was taken into custody on February 11, 1995. A jury convicted her of petty theft with priors (
petitioner pleaded guilty to the underlying charge, and the trial court dismissed one of her prior strikes.
For convenience we designate four distinct phases of this history. Phase I is the period from the initial arrest to the initial sentencing, which in this case continued from February 11, 1995, until July 9, 1996. Phase II is the period from the initial sentencing to the reversal (July 9, 1996, through July 9, 1999). Phase III is the period from the reversal to the second sentencing (July 9, 1999, until Aug. 19, 1999), and phase IV is the period after the second and final sentencing (after Aug. 19, 1999). The parties do not dispute that petitioner should accrue credits as a presentence inmate for phases I and III (see
The trial court resentenced petitioner on August 19, 1999, after she had pleaded guilty. The court recalculated the entire period prior to August 19, 1999 (phases I, II and III), as prеsentence time, granting petitioner conduct credit for 50 percent of her actual custody time. Under this theory, petitioner‘s phase II credit accrual (up to 50 percent pursuant to
The Court of Appeal endorsed the 1999 sentencing position, reasoning that the reversal of petitioner‘s conviction meant the initial conviction ceased to exist. Accordingly, petitioner could not have been a postsentence inmate during phase II because there was no valid conviction and sentence in existence. The Attorney General petitioned for review, implicitly asserting the April 17, 2001, resentencing was correct. We granted review, and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Section 2900.1
Our analysis begins with
In In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [240 P.2d 596] (James), the petitioner pleaded guilty in December 1944 to first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. (Id. at p. 308.) In January 1952, we determined the plea had been invalid, and reversed the conviction. (Id. at p. 313) We explained that if the People obtained а conviction for manslaughter on retrial (having apparently agreed not to retry James for murder), he would be entitled to credit for the more than seven years of actual confinement. Furthermore, because we implicitly deemed this confinement postsentence, rather than characterizing it as presentence, we noted James would be eligible for conduct credit pursuant to the postsentence credit statute. (Id. at p. 314.)3 We also declined to compute James‘s prereversal credits in accordance with his prereversal status as a life prisoner, which would have rendered him ineligible to accrue credits against a fixed term. (See In re Bentley (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 988, 995 [118 Cal.Rptr. 452].)
Since James did not expressly analyze the question, its result does not control our decision. Nonetheless, the literal terms of the relevant statutes appear in accord with
served in state prison, not a local jail. Nevertheless, petitioner offers several arguments contending the time she served during phase II should be characterized as presentence pursuant to
B. Postsentence Status Is Not a “Credit Disability”
Since James, the Legislature has instituted determinate sentencing and created a complex array of presentence and postsentence credit schemes to serve various functions. As we observed in Buckhalter, this complexity “‘is likеly to produce some incongruous results and arguable unfairness when compared to a theoretical state of perfect and equal justice. [Because] there is no simple or universal formula to solve all presentence credit issues, our aim [must be] to provide . . . a construction [of the statutory scheme] which is faithful to its language, which produces fair and reasonable results in a majority of cases, and which can be readily understood and applied by trial courts.‘” (Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 29, quoting People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 1195 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 534, 892 P.2d 1277], quoting In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487, 495 [256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967].)
Petitioner contends she should not be subject to what she describes as the “credit disability” of postsentence status in light of the subsequent reversal. Petitioner‘s argument focuses on the disadvantage (through reduced conduct credit) that she suffers by having her phase II time deemed postsentence time. It is not self-evident, however, that postsentence status is an inherent disability. Whether a petitioner fares better “presentence” or “postsentence” will vary, depending on the nature of the commitment offense and the petitioner‘s history. A nonviolent offender may receive a credit up to 50 percent of her actual presentence confinement. (
Id. at p. 176.)5 Thus, the negative consequences of postsentence status are linked to petitioner‘s recidivist status.6 If petitioner had no prior strikes,
As we observed in Buckhalter, “the pre- and postsentence credit systems serve disparate goals and target persons who are not similarly situated. The presentence credit scheme, section 4019, focuses primarily on encouraging minimal cooperation and good behavior by persons temporarily detained in local custody before they are convicted, sentenced, and committed on felony charges. By contrast, the worktime credit scheme for persons serving prison terms emphasizes penological considerations, including the extent to which certain classes of prisoners, but not others, deserve or might benefit from incentives to shorten their terms through participation in rehabilitative work, education, and training programs. . . .” (Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 36.) These considerations have shaped the distribution of postsentence credit: The Legislature has determined that offenders with no prior strikes are the most amenable to rehabilitation, and they thus earn the most credits. Offenders with one prior strike receive reduced postsentence credit, and those with two prior strikes, considered the least amenable to rehabilitation, receive none at all.
The Legislature has thus enacted the current scheme to ensure a petitioner‘s credit accrual is commensurate with her status. This may produce occasional incongruities. For example, granting more credits to postsentence inmates may inadvertently reward offenders who post bail or plead guilty quickly (see, e.g., In re Cleaver (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 770, 773-775 [204 Cal.Rptr. 835]), whereas favoring presentence inmates may similarly reward offenders who do not post bail or who go to trial (People v. Applin (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 404, 408, 411 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 862]). These occasional disparities have not been fatal.
C. Petitioner Is Nоt Entitled to the Same Credits as an Inmate Awaiting Trial
Petitioner contends that during phase II she was similarly situated to a petitioner who had not yet gone to trial. She asserts that she should be no
worse off for having suffered a later reversed conviction than would be a hypothetical petitioner who simply had her trial delayed for a comparable period of time. She compares herself with pretrial detainees, and argues she should receive the same two-for-four conduct credits.
A pretrial detainee is not similarly situated to a state prison inmate. (Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 36; People v. Caddick (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 46, 53 [206 Cal.Rptr. 454].) “Pretrial detaineе-felons are presumptively innocent and therefore not in need of rehabilitation; prison inmates are conclusively guilty and presumptively in need of rehabilitation. In many cases, the pretrial detainee may make bail at any time, thereby interfering with any continual work or education program. . . . Pretrial detainees have court appearances; they consult with their attorneys and other experts their cases may require. This makes continual work rehabilitation or education [programming] impractical; obviously such interruptions are not a concern for prison inmates. Moreover, the Legislature has not declared its intent to achieve self-sufficiency in the county jails. While the foregoing distinctions [do not exhaust] the differences between the two classes, they are sufficient to demonstrate that the classes
Furthermore, petitioner‘s proposal to recharacterize her phase II confinement as presentence time would arguably create an equal protection problem even worse than that to which petitioner objects. Suppose a jury convicts two defendants, each of whom has a prior strike, of the same first degree burglary (
D. Petitioner‘s Credits Are Not Based on an Incorrect Judgment
Finally, petitioner contends her credit accrual should not be based on an incorrect initial judgment, and should be corrected to apply retroactively to
her phase II confinement. But her subsequent plea confirms that her initial conviction, although procedurally invalid, was not without legal basis. On the contrary, she pleaded guilty to the charged offense, and thus does not warrant disparate treatment from a petitioner who initially received an error-free judgment.
Petitioner objects to characterizing her phase II custody as postsentence “retroactively,” based on her subsequent guilty plea. But her entire claim depends on our willingness to recharacterize her phase II custody retroactively, i.e., after her reversal. We agree that petitioner‘s phase II time may be recharacterized. Our recharacterization analysis, however, does not cease with her reversal, but also includes her eventual reconviction.
Petitioner derives some benefit, however, from our recharacterization. She was sentenced initially as a third striker, which would have rendered her ineligible to earn any postsentence conduct credits, as in James, supra, 38 Cal.2d 302. She ultimately pleaded guilty as a second striker, eligible to earn postsentence conduct credit up to 20 percent of the total prison sentence. Because we follow petitioner‘s ultimate phase IV status, we concludе that during her phase II confinement, she was entitled to earn credits under the 20 percent formula described above.8
CONCLUSION
It is petitioner‘s ultimate phase IV status as a convicted second striker, not her unresolved phase III status as presentence petitioner, nor her initial phase II status as a convicted third striker, that must
We therefore reversе the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to direct the trial court to sentence petitioner in accordance with the April 17, 2001, sentencing. The trial court should clarify the date on which petitioner‘s custody commenced. Calculation of the actual days of conduct credit earned by petitioner during her phase II and phase IV confinements should be left to prison authorities. (See Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 30-31, 40-41.)
George, C. J., Baxter, J., Chin, J., and Moreno, J., concurred.
KENNARD, J.-I dissent.
Petitioner Pamela C. Martinez pleaded guilty to the crime of petty theft (
The issue before this court is the correct interpretation and application of certain provisions of the California Penal Code governing credits that a detainee or inmаte may earn for good behavior and participation in qualifying work programs (collectively referred to as conduct credits) while in custody. These credits are applied against a penal sentence to shorten its length. The Penal Code sets several different rates at which these conduct credits may be earned, depending on the inmate‘s crime, criminal record, and sentence and also, of particular importance here, on whether the custody time during which the credits were earned occurred before or after the pronouncement of sеntence. Briefly stated, the majority concludes that time spent in prison before pronouncement of a sentence should be treated, in the eyes of the law, as having occurred after that sentence. I disagree. In this instance, as in most instances, the simple and obvious answer is the correct one: Presentence means before the sentence, and postsentence means after the sentence. Therefore, in my view, the time petitioner spent in prison before pronouncement of sentence is presentence time, not postsentence time, fоr purposes of computing conduct credits.
Only a few facts need be stated. In February 1995, petitioner was arrested. In July 1996, after a jury trial that resulted in a conviction for petty theft, petitioner was sentenced to prison and immediately began to serve that sentence. Petitioner challenged the validity of her conviction by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, and, in July 1999, the Court of Appeal set aside petitioner‘s conviction and ordered a new trial. On August 19, 1999, petitioner pleaded guilty to petty theft with a prior conviction, and the court sentenced her to state prison for a term of nine years.
An issue then arose about petitioner‘s entitlement to conduct credits for the three years she spent in prison from July 1996 and July 1999 under the invalid judgment. Petitioner‘s entitlement to some credit for this period was beyond dispute.
same criminal act or acts.” Likewise, it was not disputed that she had earned conduct credits by her behavior in
The majority agrees with the superior court that the three years petitioner spent in prison before July 1999 is postsentence time for purpose of calculating conduct credits against her August 1999 sentence. How does the majority arrive at a conclusion so implausible on its face?
The majority begins with a 1952 decision of this court in a habeas corpus proceeding setting aside a first degree murder conviction: In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [240 P.2d 596]. At the end of the opinion in James, after determining that the petitioner‘s conviction was invalid, this court noted that the petitioner was “still subject to trial,” and that if he was convicted after a new trial “his confinement based upon the invalid 1944 judgment, together with any time credits for good conduct earned thereon (
Although conceding that James “did not expressly analyze the question” and therefore does not control here, the majority professes to find significance in this court‘s reference, in the passage quoted above, to former
which petitioner‘s conduct credits accrued for the time she spent in prison before the valid conviction and sentence.
The majority next asserts that “the literal terms of the relevant statutes appear in accord with the result in James.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.) The majority explains its reasoning this way: ”
As relevant here,
Cal.Rptr. 269].) Thus, the wording of the presentence credit statutes,
The majority argues that petitioner‘s state prison time must be characterized as postsentence time because “‘prison inmates are conclusively guilty and presumptively in need of rehabilitation.‘” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36, quoting People v. Caddick (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 46, 53 [206 Cal.Rptr. 454].) This is a fair statement as applied to prison inmates who have been validly convicted, but an invalid conviction does not conclusively determine guilt nor does it establish a presumptive need of rehabilitation. Until a vаlid conviction is obtained, all persons accused of crime are equally entitled to a presumption of innocence and thus similarly situated for purposes of credit statutes.
The majority suggests that characterizing petitioner‘s presentence state prison time as presentence time for purposes of computing conduct credits “would arguably create an equal protection problem” because she would have more presentence time, and thus more conduct credits, than a defendant whose initial conviction and sentence for the vеry same offense were not invalid. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36.) Yet, as the majority elsewhere acknowledges (id. at p. 35), these sorts of “incongruities” are inevitable and have not been thought sufficient to invalidate the entire credit scheme. (In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487, 495 [256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967].)
I agree with the Court of Appeal here that in calculating conduct credits against petitioner‘s nine-year state prison sentence pronounced in August
1999 for the crime of petty theft, all earlier periods of custody attributable to that petty theft, including the three years petitioner spent in state prison under an invalid conviction for the same crime, is presentence time. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeal‘s judgment.
Werdegar, J., concurred.
Petitioner‘s petition for a rehearing was denied June 18, 2003, and on June 20, 2003, thе opinion was modified to read as printed above. Kennard, J., and Werdegar, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.