In re RALPH MARTINEZ on Habeas Corpus.
Crim. No. 13858
In Bank.
Jan. 23, 1970.
1 Cal. 3d 641
Ralph Martinez, in pro. per., and Marsha B. Shanle, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and David Cunningham, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TOBRINER, J.-Ralph Martinez, currently incarcerated in Folsom State Prison, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking release on the grounds that the Adult Authority revoked his parole without adequate cause. Petitioner alleges that the authority‘s determination to terminate his parole status was based primarily on (1) evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure and (2) a confession obtained in violation of People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], and petitioner contends that such matters should not properly be considered by the Adult Authority. We conclude that in view of the uniquely critical responsibilities inherent in the administration of the parole system, the authority could properly consider all the evidence before it.
Initially we review the facts of the case. On May 12, 1955, petitioner was convicted of violation of
Following the conviction in October 1963, petitioner‘s parole was cancelled on November 15, 1963, and formally revoked on February 13, 1964. The revocation was ostensibly based on three grounds: (1) the October 1963 conviction; (2) driving a motor vehicle without the knowledge or consent of his parole agent or the Division of Parole, and (3) using alcoholic beverages to excess.
The following year, on March 11, 1965, the Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed petitioner‘s 1963 conviction, concluding that evidence introduced at trial was obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional search1 and that statements used against petitioner were obtained in violation of the dictates of People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338 (People v. Martinez (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 796 [43 Cal.Rptr. 197]). On July 13, 1965, the charges on which petitioner had been convicted in 1963 were dismissed. Petitioner remained in prison, however, because his parole on his 1955 conviction had been revoked.
When petitioner‘s application for parole next came before the Adult
The circumstances of the present case are comparable to those addressed by this court in In re Brown (1967) 67 Cal.2d 339 [62 Cal.Rptr. 6, 431 P.2d 630]. There, as here, the Adult Authority revoked the defendant‘s parole on several grounds, a criminal conviction constituting the primary, most serious ground. In Brown, as in the instant case, the conviction was later overturned on appeal; in Brown, reversal rested solely on the introduction at trial of a confession obtained in violation of Dorado. Under those circumstances we held that the invalid conviction, relied on by the Adult Authority, could not properly constitute a basis for “cause” to revoke the defendant‘s parole, and we remanded the case to the authority so that they could decide whether to retain the revocation on the basis of the lesser parole violation with which the parolee had been charged. In addition, we indicated that the reversal of the conviction would not preclude further inquiry by the Adult Authority into the subject matter of the crime in question, to determine if the defendant “had engaged in conduct that constitutes cause for parole revocation.” (67 Cal.2d at p. 342).2
Although the February 1964 parole revocation order in the instant case is identical to the one before the court in Brown in that it grounds revocation primarily on a conviction which has subsequently been found invalid, we agree with the People‘s contention that the proceedings in the Adult Authority after the appellate reversal of the defendant‘s 1963 conviction must properly be viewed as “further inquiry” into the subject matter of the conviction as approved in Brown and thus must be considered by this court. In its subsequent proceeding the authority sustained “continuance of incarceration based on parole behavior and not on 1963 commitment.” Upon a complete reading of the authority‘s records we believe that, although the authority predicated its decision on “parole behavior” rather than on the conviction, the authority considered the illegally obtained
We are required to face these issues directly in this case, only because we find, from the facts as related in the prior judicial decision (People v. Martinez, supra, 232 Cal.App.2d 796, 797-799), that the police authorities, in obtaining the extrinsic evidence and statements from defendant, did indeed violate the defendant-parolee‘s Fourth and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.4 Although past cases have sometimes declared that a parolee is in “constructive custody” or “without liberty,” “[f]ictions of ‘custody’ and the like ... cannot change the reality of a parolee‘s conditional freedom and cannot affect the constitutional protections surrounding his interest in that conditional freedom.” (Rose v. Haskins (6th Cir. 1968) 388 F.2d 91, 98, fn. 2 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).) In the instant case regular police officers undertook the search pursuant to their general law enforcement duties; the officers, at the time of the search, did not even know of defendant‘s parole status. The investigation involved suspected criminal activity, not parole violations. Under these circumstances the officers cannot undertake a search without probable cause and then later seek to justify their actions by relying on the defendant‘s parole status, a status of which they were unaware at the time of their search. (People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176, 178 [41 Cal.Rptr. 590, 397 P.2d 174]; People v. Gastelum (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 205, 207 [46 Cal.Rptr. 743]; People v. Hernandez (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 147, fn. 2 [40 Cal.Rptr. 100]; cf. People v. Rosales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 299 [66 Cal.Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489] (parolee entitled to protection of
In addition, the defendant‘s parole status, of course, did not permit the police to interrogate the defendant in connection with the suspected criminal activity without first apprising him of his constitutional rights. The strictures of Dorado apply whenever the police initiate custodial interrogation in connection with their investigation of a new criminal matter; indeed, in Dorado itself, the defendant was an incarcerated prisoner, who had allegedly committed a crime within the prison and who was interrogated by prison officials. (62 Cal.2d at pp. 342-344.) The Fifth Amendment rights of parolees equally demand these protections. (See In re Brown, supra, 67 Cal.2d 339, 340; People v. Gastelum, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 205, 209.) Thus the statements elicited from defendant Martinez in the instant case
We therefore must now turn to the difficult problems presented by the Adult Authority‘s consideration of this evidence. In resolving these questions we look initially to the test articulated by our court in People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674 [72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800]; there we examined the applicability of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to a civil narcotics commitment proceeding. We declared in Moore: “Whether any particular rule of criminal procedure should be applied in a narcotic addict commitment proceeding depends upon consideration of the relationship of the policy underlying the rule to the proceeding. (Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1428].)” (69 Cal.2d at pp. 681-682.) In determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment and the Dorado-Miranda exclusionary rules to Adult Authority proceedings we examine both the policies underlying the rules and the purposes and nature of the proceeding.
1. One purpose of both the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the Dorado-Miranda exclusionary rule is the deterrence of illegal governmental conduct.
As we recognized in Moore, “[t]he basic purpose of the [Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. (Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 [4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1677, 80 S.Ct. 1437]; Mapp v. Ohio (1961) supra, 367 U.S. 643, 656 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090, 81 S.Ct. 1684]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [33 Cal.Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001]; People v. Cahan, supra, 44 Cal.2d 434, 445 et seq. [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513].)” (69 Cal.2d at p. 682.) The rule attempts “to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee [to be free from unreasonable search and seizure] in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.” (Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 217). “By denying any profit from the unconstitutional methods of law enforcement, it is to be anticipated that law enforcement officials will have no incentive to engage in such methods.” (People v. Moore, supra, 69 Cal.2d 674, 682.)
The decision of this court in Dorado, and subsequently the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602], requiring the exclusion of confessions elicited through custodial interrogation when the defendant was not adequately apprised of his constitutional rights, rested,
As we stated explicitly in In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 372-373 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380], the companion case of Dorado: “[W]e believe that the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo sought primarily to prevent police tactics which, in the past, have spawned involuntary confessions. ... [T]he rule contemplated the prospective prevention of coercive practices-not the extirpation of such practices committed in the past.” (See also Johnson v. New Jersey (1966) 384 U.S. 719 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 S.Ct. 1772].)
2. The critical responsibilities of the administration of the parole system require that the Adult Authority generally be permitted to consider all relevant evidence.
Although we recognize that theoretically the exclusion of the products of illegal searches and interrogations from Adult Authority proceedings would supplement the deterrent force of the criminal trial exclusionary rules, we must also consider the unique nature and responsibilities of the Adult Authority and the extremely high costs which the expanded application of the exclusionary rule would entail in this context. Our desire to preserve legalistic symmetry cannot obscure the necessity of examining the practical merits of the underlying competing societal interests actually at stake. We must be ever-cautious of becoming “so overly concerned with ‘the internal perfecting of [the law‘s] own categories’ as to forget the goals of the [judicial] enterprise.” (See Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren (1969) 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 2.)
We believe, at this time, that the incremental deterrent effect that will realistically be achieved by shielding the Adult Authority from illegally procured evidence is slight; the bungling police officer is not likely to be halted by the thought that his unlawful conduct will prevent the termination
On the other hand, the social consequences of imposing the exclusionary rule upon the authority can be disastrous. Conceivably, if the improperly obtained evidence were the sole basis for parole revocation, the authority might find itself unable to act in the case of the paroled murderer whom the police improperly discovered had cached a minor armory for future use or the paroled narcotics peddler who had collected a quantity of heroin for future sale. Although we recognize, of course, that such evidence would not be admissible in a court of law, we believe that an agency whose delicate duty is to decide when a convicted offender can be safely allowed to return to and remain in society is in a different posture than the court which decides his original guilt. To blind the authority to relevant facts in this special context is to incur a risk of danger to the public which, at least as of this date, outweighs the competing considerations of a problematical gain in deterrence. We thus conclude that at this time the general Fourth Amendment and Dorado exclusionary rules are not applicable to Adult Authority proceedings.
In holding that the Adult Authority could properly consider the illegally obtained evidence in this case, we specifically note that we are not faced with a situation in which it has been alleged that the circumstances surrounding the interrogation are of a nature to render the confession “involuntary” or “coerced” (see, e.g., Brooks v. Florida (1967) 389 U.S. 413, 414-415 [19 L.Ed.2d 643, 88 S.Ct. 541]; Beecher v. Alabama (1967) 389 U.S. 35, 36-38 [19 L.Ed.2d 35, 88 S.Ct. 189]; Sims v. Georgia (1967) 389 U.S. 404, 406-407 [19 L.Ed.2d 634, 88 S.Ct. 523])7 or that the police conduct in effectuating the search was so egregious as to offend “the ‘traditions and [collective] conscience of our people.‘” (Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 493 [14 L.Ed.2d 510, 85 S.Ct. 1678] (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105 [78 L.Ed. 674, 54 S.Ct. 330])) or to “shock the conscience.” (See Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 172-174 [96 L.Ed. 183, 72 S.Ct. 205])
In declining to apply the exclusionary rules to Adult Authority proceedings, we do not, of course, intimate that these exclusionary rules are not applicable to other administrative proceedings. (See Knoll Associates, Inc. v. Federal Trade Com. (7th Cir. 1968) 397 F.2d 530, 533-534 (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied to Fed. Trade Com. hearing); Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority (1966) 25 App.Div.2d 225 [268 N.Y.S.2d 433], revd. on other grounds (1967) 19 N.Y.2d 418 [280 N.Y.S.2d 381, 227 N.E.2d 302] (Breitel, J.) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied to liquor license revocation proceeding); cf. In re Marsh (1968) 40 Ill.2d 53 [237 N.E.2d 529, 531] (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied to juvenile proceedings).)8 In other circumstances, the consequences of excluding some relevant information may not be as dire as they are in the Adult Authority context, and thus our evaluation of the appropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule may well be altered.
We thus conclude that in the instant case the Adult Authority could properly consider all the evidence before it and its decision to reaffirm
The writ is denied.
Traynor, C. J., McComb, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
PETERS, J.-I dissent.
The majority hold that evidence concededly obtained in violation of the constitutional protection to which a parolee continues to be entitled may properly be considered by the Adult Authority “in exercising its broad authority over the parole system and parolees,...” In reaching their conclusion, the majority purport to apply the following test: “In determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment and the Dorado-Miranda exclusionary rules to Adult Authority proceedings we examine both the policies underlying the rules and the purposes and nature of the proceeding.”
Although I agree with the basic test set out by the majority, I am of the opinion that the majority have reached an incorrect result by failing to examine adequately the opposing interests involved. In the first place, they assert without any analysis their belief that the incremental deterrence of police misconduct to be reaped from an application of the exclusionary rule to Adult Authority proceedings would be “slight.” Second, they fail even to mention a second purpose served by the exclusionary rule-to uphold the integrity of our system of government. On the other hand, in discussing the “social consequences” of applying the exclusionary rule to Adult Authority proceedings, the majority mention no “consequences” that are unique to such proceedings and that distinguish them from court proceedings; instead, they merely state their belief that the authority is “in a different posture” than the courts.
Contrary to the majority, I believe that to hold unconstitutionally obtained evidence admissible in Adult Authority proceedings will furnish an incentive to government officials to violate the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, especially when the subject of their investigation is a parolee.
As this court stated in People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 682, “[t]he basic purpose of the exclusionary rule it to deter unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. [Citations.] The exclusionary rule is not a penalty but is derived from the principle that the state must not profit from its own wrong. [Citation.] By denying any profit from the unconstitutional methods of law enforcement, it is to be
Conversely, once law enforcement officials are permitted to profit in any conceivable way as a direct result of unconstitutional methods of law enforcement it is to be anticipated that they will have an incentive to engage in such methods in the hope of uncovering some evidence from which they may profit. The officials ordinarily suffer no penalty for their unlawful conduct. (See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 670 (Douglas, J., concurring).) Faced with a situation where there might be something to gain, even where the possibility of gain is remote, and where they cannot secure evidence by legal means, the danger of the officials engaging in unconstitutional methods of law enforcement is acute. (Cf. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 449.)
Because the laudable purpose of the exclusionary rule-to deter unconstitutional methods of law enforcement-can only be served by denying the government any and all profit from such methods, any exception to the rule eliminates the deterrent effect of the rule and encourages law enforcement officials to engage in the unlawful conduct. When those officials have nothing to lose and something to gain by such conduct, the deterrent effect of the rule is largely if not entirely destroyed. Under today‘s majority decision, a law enforcement official is encouraged to engage in unconstitutional law enforcement methods in the hope that the evidence thereby secured may be profitably used should it subsequently appear that the victim of such conduct was a parolee.
Not only does the majority opinion jeopardize the constitutional rights of citizenry in general, it completely emasculates those limited constitutional rights to which it concedes parolees are entitled. Investigations of parole violations and new criminal offenses are very often cooperative efforts; police and parole officers frequently work together to reimprison the parolee suspected of criminal activity. When the cost of prosecution in terms of time and money is considered too high, and when the parolee still has a considerable time to serve on his original sentence, the People will often forego a new criminal trial and instead will look to the parole revocation to serve the ends of a new conviction.1
Moreover, the majority state merely that “[o]ne purpose of both the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the Dorado-Miranda exclusionary rule is the deterrence of illegal governmental conduct.” (Italics deleted in part.) They fail completely to mention another purpose of the exclusionary rule that also would be served by withdrawing illegally obtained evidence from the proper consideration of the Adult Authority- “the imperative of judicial integrity.” (Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 222). This secondary function of the exclusionary rule draws its strength from the profound philosophical roots that support a government of law. This court has articulated this concern in a variety of ways, declaring that “the state must not profit from its own wrong” (People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 386), and that it is “morally incongruous” for the state to impose punishment when it, itself, has become a law breaker. (People v. Cahan, supra, 44 Cal.2d 434, 446.) In both Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 479-480, and Mapp v. Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. 643, 659, the United States Supreme Court cited with approval Justice Brandeis’ eloquent dissent in Olmstead v. United States (1928) 277 U.S. 438, 485 [72 L.Ed. 944, 960, 48 S.Ct. 564, 66 A.L.R. 376]: “Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. ... If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” (See also, People v. Cahan, supra, 44 Cal.2d 434, 446.)
Reliance on fruits of illegal government action is as destructive of the appearance of justice and as likely to lead to the miseducation of the
On the other hand, the majority fail to mention any “social consequences” of applying the exclusionary rule to Adult Authority proceedings that are not equally a result of applying the rule to court proceedings. In either case, the result will sometimes be that the government will be unable to act against criminals-even dangerous criminals. This would be true in Adult Authority proceedings when the illegally obtained evidence is the sole basis for parole revocation just as it is now true in court proceedings when the illegally obtained evidence is the sole basis for conviction. The United States Supreme Court and this court were both well aware that the application of the exclusionary rule to court proceedings would sometimes result in the freeing of criminals who would otherwise be incarcerated. (See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. 643, 659; Elkins v. United States, supra, 364 U.S. 206, 217-218; People v. Cahan, supra, 44 Cal.2d 434, 438-439, 449-450.) As this court stated in People v. Cahan, supra, 44 Cal.2d 434, 449, “[i]t is contended, however, that the police do not always have a choice of securing evidence by legal means and that in many cases the criminal will escape if illegally obtained evidence cannot be used against him. This contention is not properly directed at the exclusionary rule, but at the constitutional provisions themselves. It was rejected when those provisions were adopted.” And certainly police officers who violate the fundamental guarantees in order to obtain parole revocation are no less guilty of violating the basic law of the land than officers who violate those guarantees for the purpose of the apprehension and conviction of criminal offenders. (Cf. People v. Moore, supra, 69 Cal.2d 674, 680.)
Recognition of the basic rationales underlying the exclusionary rule has led many courts to hold the rule applicable in noncriminal proceedings. In addition to our decision involving narcotic commitment proceedings in People v. Moore, supra, 69 Cal.2d 674, the United States Supreme Court has held the rule applicable in civil forfeiture proceedings, proceedings in which the government is one of the adversary parties. (One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania (1965) 380 U.S. 693 [14 L.Ed.2d 170, 85 S.Ct. 1246]; see People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal.2d 92, 96-97 [41 Cal.Rptr. 290, 396 P.2d 706]; cf. Hinchcliffe v. Clarke (N.D. Ohio 1963) 230 F.Supp. 91, 100-102 (rule applied in civil tax assessment proceeding); United States v. Blank (N.D. Ohio 1966) 261 F.Supp. 180,
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of the rule‘s application to administrative proceedings, the genre encompassing Adult Authority interviews, several courts, state and federal, have recently concluded that the purposes of the rule dictate that it be given effect in such proceedings. (Knoll Associates, Inc. v. Federal Trade Com., supra, 397 F.2d 530, 533-534 (F.T.C. proceeding); Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, supra, 25 App.Div.2d 225, reversed on other grounds 19 N.Y.2d 418 (Breitel, J.) (liquor license revocation proceeding); Finn‘s Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor Authority (1968) 31 App.Div.2d 15, 19 [294 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596] (same); Malik v. New York State Liquor Authority (1968) 30 App.Div.2d 1040 [294 N.Y.S.2d 948] (same).)
Judge Breitel‘s reasoning in Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, supra, 25 App.Div.2d 225, 231-232, is germane to the parole revocation context: “All of the reasons in policy which suggest the application of the exclusionary rule to illegal searches and seizures by public officers in criminal proceedings apply equally to administrative proceedings of the present character, namely those involving penalties, forfeitures, or other sanctions for the violation of law or regulation.2 ... The exclusionary rule is addressed to the obnoxiousness of illegal conduct by public officials and the visiting by officials of serious official consequences upon the victims of such illegal conduct. ... The exclusionary rule rests on a theory of deterrence; that policy would not be served if the illegal official activity could be used, despite unavailability in criminal proceedings, to effect parallel sanctions of forfeiture in an administrative proceeding.” (Italics added.)
I recognize that many of the constitutional criminal protections available to defendants at trial, or even at noncriminal narcotic commitment proceedings, have in the past been held not constitutionally required in parole revocation proceedings. (See, e.g., In re McLain, 55 Cal.2d 78, 85 [9 Cal.Rptr. 824, 357 P.2d 1080] (no constitutional right to notice or hearing); In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal.2d 295, 304 [57 Cal.Rptr. 600, 425 P.2d 200] (no constitutional right to appointment of counsel).) The
In sum, the “social consequences” of applying the exclusionary rule to Adult Authority proceedings are no different from the “social consequences” of applying the exclusionary rule to court proceedings. More important, the result of the majority‘s holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to Adult Authority proceedings is that the constitutional rights of the general citizenry will be jeopardized and that a parolee‘s limited constitutional rights-to which even the majority readily concede he is entitled-will be held only at the whim of the police.
The People maintain that the Adult Authority had before it other evidence, untainted by the illegal police conduct, implicating petitioner in the 1963 criminal activity, and thus that there are grounds to sustain the parole revocation even if the illegally obtained evidence should have been excluded. It is unclear from the meagre Adult Authority records, however, what the authority relied on in finding the petitioner guilty of errant “parole behavior.” Given this ambiguity, the proper disposition of the case would be a remand to the authority to consider whether revocation was justifiable absent the illegally obtained evidence.