In Re Marriage of Toole

TOOLE, Petitioner-Appellee re MARRIAGE OF PATRICIA and Cross- Appellant, TOOLE, v. MICHAEL Respondent-Appellant and Cross-

Appellee. Second District No. 2 — 94—0858 Opinion July Rehearing August filed denied 1995.— RATHJE, J., dissenting.

Larry Kajfes, Larry Kajfes, Ltd., S. Chicago, S. appellant. Tader, Piccione, John J. Keeley Piccione and Mark W. both of & Associ- ates, Wheaton, appellee. of for PRESIDING JUSTICE opinion McLAREN delivered the court:

Petitioner, Toole, Patricia Toole, and respondent, Michael ended marriage years their of judgment with a of dissolution entered on 29, June 1994. Michael timely filed a appeal, notice of and Patricia filed a cross-appeal. affirm part, part, in in reverse and remand.

The record reveals that Patricia and Michael married on parties December 1971. The have two children. At time of the dissolution, age Kristie had majority attained the of and Jodie was 17 years and 11 months old. married,

When Michael and Patricia first Michael worked at a family-owned construction company, Potteiger Corporation. Michael promoted superintendent Potteiger at in 1973 or 1974. Illlinois, the Tooles moved to employed where Michael was as a superintendent construction for Morris Diesel until 1992. At the time trial, of employed by Michael was Company, CCI Construction Inc. (CCE, as a superintendent, receiving salary $62,000 construction a $1,000 in 1993 and an a bonus year. Michael had also received

per him to position requires with CCI $8,500 in March 1994. His bonus trial, working Michael was locations. At the time of travel to various provided Michael with a in Louisiana. CCI at a construction site food, truck, Louisiana, a with insur day for hotel room in $25 paid maintenance for CCI. ance and subsequently Michael when she was 17

Patricia married disposition. to this positions employment not relevant held various years employ- as an worked for three Beginning in Patricia counselor, "headhunter,” company called West Person- for a ment (West). time, required po- college degree was not nel At that West, year In her last with employment sition of counselor at West. $34,000 $35,000. from Mi- separation After her Patricia earned chael, license and sold real Patricia earned an Arizona real estate January during which time she earned July estate from 1992 to $2,000 expenses. April From $3,300 incurring in approximately while trial, Depart- worked for the Arizona 1993 to the time of Patricia paid an hour to assist Security and was $7.98 ment of Economic manager "case ser- people finding jobs. position in A entitled /human Illinois, vices,” in exists comparable position to Patricia’s with West However, manager position the case with the State of Arizona. take her years college. Patricia estimated would requires two college degree. years two-year to obtain a part-time four attendance in corre- pertinent opinion to this our We will detail other facts below. sponding discussion on the issues I. MAINTENANCE February Subsequently, separated

Michael and Patricia Hughes, an un- daughters two moved with David Patricia male, related adult in California. lease, signed a with a month-to-month testified that she Arizona, Hughes’ roughly 25 miles from

tenancy, apartment for an below, out of house, and, during the trial moved on a weekend break that she apartment. She testified Hughes’ her new house and into living Hughes. going to continue with was not conjugal basis that Patricia resided on The trial court found 15, 1994, May until which Hughes period separation it therefore denied proceedings, and in the middle of the trial the trial temporary maintenance to Patricia. granting in the maintenance pay rehabilitative court ordered Michael granting of We reverse the per month for 36 months. amount of $800 in a participation of Patricia’s rehabilitative maintenance because this issue our resolution of conjugal relationship and note that in this State. previously articulated not been Initially, judgment pass we note that we no moral on Patricia’s Hughes. legislature provid cohabitation with The intention of the ing obligation an ex-spouse’s for the termination of mainte receiving ex-spouse nance when the the maintenance has entered another, by legal relationship into husband-wife whether or (In means, attempt public other is to control morals. re Mar (1985), 456, 467, riage Sappington quoting 106 Ill. 2d re Mar of 663.) (1980), riage App. Bramson 83 Ill. 3d Rather: of " consideration, important morality '[A]n divorced from the of conduct, materially is whether the cohabitation has affected the recipient spouse’s support need for because she either received support from sup her co-resident or used maintenance monies to ” port 467-68, Bramson, (Sappington, quoting him.’ at Ill. 2d 663.) 3d at Thus, bar, in the case at we neither condemn nor extol Patricia’s conjugal Hughes. cohabitation with 504(a)

Section of the Illinois and Dissolution Mar- (Act) riage Act may grant directs that a permanent either or temporary maintenance "after consideration of all relevant factors.” 5/504(a) (West 1992). 750 ILCS

In authorizing maintenance, rehabilitative the Act aims to "provide spouse receiving support incentive for the diligence to use in procuring training or necessary self-sufficiency.” skills to attain (In 378.) (1991), re Marriage Chegar propriety of a maintenance award and the amount and duration thereof are matters which lie within the discretion of the trial court i and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. re Mar 381.) riage Carini 112 Ill. App. 3d An abuse of discre tion in this area occurs where "no reasonable man would take the adopted by view the trial court.” Chegar, 3d at 378. provides: The Act also agreed by

"Unless parties agreement otherwise in a written judgment set court, forth approved by or otherwise obligation pay upon future maintenance is terminated the death party, of either nance, or remarriage party receiving mainte- party receivingmaintenance cohabits with another if resident, person on a continuing conjugal (Emphasis basis.” add- ed.) (750 5/510(c)(West 1992).) This section of the generally Act is utilized in an spouse action one seeking the payments modification or termination of maintenance (West (750 granted spouse the other under section 504. ILCS 5/504 1992); see, Sappington, 106 A e.g., Ill. 2d court of review will not reverse the finding concerning conjugal trial court’s the existence of weight contrary the manifest finding

relationship unless (1994), App. 3d 262 Ill. Marriage In re Herrin the evidence. finding that Patricia cohabited with David The trial court’s 5/510(c) (750 "resident, ILCS Hughes continuing conjugal basis” on a 1992)) (West weight manifest The against of the evidence. is not the meals, accounts, bank Hughes that Patricia and shared record reveals chores, accounts, exchanged holiday and credit as well as household together took birthday gifts. The two also vacations Thus, trial court’s decision to relationship. a maintained sexual contrary not to the deny temporary maintenance to Patricia was weight manifest of the evidence. however, finding conjugal relationship, a light

In of its maintenance. granting trial erred in Patricia rehabilitative (1992), App. 3d the trial court In re Klein 231 Ill. Marriage of marriage proceeding in a dissolution granted maintenance to wife cohabiting she was with another despite the wife’s admission that 901.) Court, (Klein, Appellate Fourth man. 231 Ill. 3d District, reversed, stating: petitioner’s whether

"There be no distinction between should is ripens or maintenance obligation is terminated before after awarded, if a or party If a died before maintenance ordered. award, no reason for party before the there would be remarried require terminated awarding only to then it to be maintenance 510(c).Similarly, party if a who seeks mainte pursuant to section awarded, award should maintenance is nance cohabits before added.) 510(c). (Emphasis pursuant [Citation.]” to section be denied 905.) (K lein, App. 3d at herein, empha we agree, contrary to the dissent which believe "terminated”; it is the incorrect antecedent for the verb sizes terminated, "maintenance,” under "obligation” pay not which 5/510(c) (West 1992).) 510(c). (750 Thus, the dissent’s section ILCS case had received no maintenance point that the wife the instant Furthermore, party where a died before mainte consequence. is of no awarded, deter granting of maintenance has been nance was 91.) (Stacke App. 3d v. Bates mined to be error. Also, remarried but had the recipient of maintenance where invalid, appellate court determined subsequent marriage declared from the first provisions maintenance that the reinstatement of the (1990), 203 Marriage re Harris marriage properly denied. resident, Thus, Patricia cohabited on a because 3d Hughes, Patricia and Michael did continuing conjugal basis with reconcile, obligation all forms Michael’s subsequently maintenance, maintenance, including has been rehabilitative terminated. Hughes’ out of

We determine that the fact that moved during should not have residence the course of the trial below mainte grant influenced trial court’s decision to rehabilitative regarding granting under section nance. The rationale maintenance (750 (West 1992)) not be expressed Klein should 5/504 where, Klein, limited to situations as the facts indicated in conjugal currently occurring (Klein, cohabitation is 903). Instead, at we determine that maintenance should not be party looking awarded where the to receive maintenance is either co cohabited, habiting, conjugal party on a basis with another inception marriage, subsequent since the absent reconcilia appellate tion. As the court noted in In re Harris'. 510(b) (c)] plain language provides "While the [now of section obligations upon remarriage, maintenance terminate it does not provide obligations for reinstatement of those in the event the 246.) remarriage (Harris, App. is declared invalid.” 203 Ill. 3d at Likewise, we determine that reinstatement maintenance obligations basis, party conjugal where a cohabited on but is no longer cohabiting basis, conjugal provided by on a is not statute. obligation pay terminates, Once the nothing maintenance in the provides Act for its revival. necessary

We determine that it is to consider the factors listed in section 510 prerequisites considering of the Act as main whether granted tenance can be under section 504 of the Act. Our determina 504(a), tion very language is bolstered of section which states that maintenance should be awarded "after all rele consideration of added.) (750 factors, including (Emphasis vant [those delineated].” 5/504(a) (West 1992); Klein, 905; ILCS see In also 3d at (the 49, re Marriage Schlosser 52 (see interprets language predecessor the same in the section 504(b)), par. Rev. Stat. ch. to indicate a "nonexclusive list”).) Moreover, includes, part section 504 also as of its nonexclusive factors, "any list of expressly other factor that the court finds to be (750 5/504(a)(12) (West 1992).) just equitable.” We only just determine that it is fac equitable to consider the 510(c), statutorily required tors listed in section but also it is when awarding pursuant maintenance to section 504. that, note in an of a opinion

We earlier which involved the death spouse maintenance, apply who was to this court declined to 510(c) arising factors section delineated section to an action under (Stacke, 504. 504 was 3d at section decision, amended, the Stacke January after effective time, include, language cited above section for the first 1992). 504(a)(12). 5/504(a)(12) (West 750 ILCS determination, light we need not consider Michael’s of our conjugal regarding finding that re- other claims the trial court’s ended, Hughes that Patricia vol- lationship Patricia and between Hughes, and that Patricia’s untarily her income to live with reduced ill claim of health is unsubstantiated. granted rehabilitative conclude the trial court erred when conjugal that there was a rela-

maintenance once it had determined reverse tionship subsequent without a reconciliation. We therefore judgment granting maintenance. portion of the II. OF MARITAL PROPERTY AND DISSIPATION DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS. items, following

The trial listed with what court found values, property: to be marital respective court found to be their “1. Proceeds from of the parties[’] the sale

residence at 2400 Bluemont Court $66,049.00

Naperville, Illinois 2. Financial Principal $25,000.00 IRA

Group Reimbursement $27,883.00 obligation tax $15,500.00 4. 1994 Cherokee Jeep $ 5. Mazda Automobile 00.00 6. Plaintiffs deferred $ 500.00 Plan

Compensation 7. Reimbursement of funds $15,521.00

dissipated by Defendant $136,503.00.: TOTAL $44,000 above, paid by arriving In the trial court found that at the gift, pay- not a parents proceeds Michael to his from the house $44,000 contended, and included the ment on a loan as Michael had Also, the trial court figure proceeds in its for the from the house. $8,500 Morse-Diesel IRA dissipated that from his found Michael had $15,521, $7,021 together, parties’ equity home from the loan — expenditures these oc- point listed as The court found that above. distributed 60% of parties separated. curred after the The court and 40% to Michael. property the marital to Patricia finding: in the trial court erred appeal, On the issues are whether (1) (2) $15,521; dissipated Michael Patricia did not have to reimburse (3) payment expenses; Michael for the of Patricia did not household (4) automobile; $44,000 dissipate payment of her Mazda value proceeds parents repay- out of the house from Michael to his was not (5) loan; ment on a and Michael reimburse the marital estate must $27,883 respect parties’ obliga- the amount with 1986 tax of to tion. regard property

Our standard of review with to the division dividing whether the trial court its the marital abused discretion (In 281.) property. (1994), Marriage App. re Morris 3d of question agree only "The is not whether we but the trial whether person exceeded the bounds of reason so that no reasonable Morris, adopted by take the would view the trial court.” 3d at 281. dissipation allegedly applies improper doctrine of

expenditures of marital purposes funds for unrelated to the mar riage, marriage irretrievably at a time after the irreconcilably (In 496.) (1990), broken Marriage down. re O’Neill 138 Ill. 2d A party charged dissipation proving carries the burden of he did not, fact, dissipate (1987), assets. In re Marriage Petrovich 3d finding

The trial court’s dissipated $15,521 that Michael had not an abuse of discretion. Michael claims he has "properly family expenses documented” pay-back and "loan for all reasons” challenged expenditures. our review of the record fails support this 6A, contention. In Michael’s evidence exhibit No. Mi apparently chael wrote the names of various entities to which he paid money April through testimony June of 1990. His detailed payments, some of these but left much regard to be desired with example, Co.,” Visa,” others. For he lists "Shell Oil "Corestates "Item[s],” "Firstar Naper Bank” as monthly pay with substantial going entities, ments to all three payments but does not itemize these vague further. "General and spent statements that funds were on expenses marital inadequate finding or to bills are to avoid a dissipation.” re Tietz Moreover, testimony the court heard uncontested from Patricia regarding the amount owed on she marital credit cards when left the up residence after Michael had cut her credit cards and saw amounts subsequently which Michael had paid to the various credit card entities. cross-appeal, argues her the trial court erred in

limiting $15,521. dissipation amount of Michael’s determine that the trial finding dissipa- court’s as to the amount of The record is clear to an abuse of discretion.

tion does not amount $15,521 the credit cards after Patri- paid more than on that Michael However, testimony Michael’s detailed cia left the marital residence. 6A, expenses, listed them in his exhibit No. household some The after Patricia had left the marital home. which were incurred court, discretion, exercising properly have subtracted trial could from the amounts tallied on or all of these delineated amounts some the credit cards. argues Michael should have been found to have

Patricia also that. $2,000 girlfriend stayed at Michael’s dissipated because Michael’s expenses, apartment Pennsylvania, paying in without rent or while by employer. She being housed in a Louisiana motel his Michael was Pennsylvania. implies apartment that Michael did not need the employer him from loca- simply because Michael’s moves room does not mean Michael pays tion to location and for his hotel nomad, permanent as a with no should be constrained live resi- Thus, finding to the amount do not find the trial court’s as dence. we dissipation an abuse of discretion. of the by ordering that the trial court erred not

Michael contends payment expenses for the of household Patricia to reimburse Michael alleges Michael after Patricia left the marital residence. incurred divorcing spouse A expenses were marital debts. that these evidence, that he or she required prove, preponderance of the property to be expenses for the maintenance of marital is entitled to expenses. re Irvine entitled to credit for noted, however, the trial court did As we Mi grant the full amount of the credit card bills that not Patricia claims were for paid separation, after the which Michael chael granting full purposes.” By marital not Patricia the "proper and cards, using paid by that Michael credit it is expenditures amount of expen into account the household apparent that the trial court took Thus, determine the paid separation. ses which Michael after the we failing specifically to order trial court did not its discretion abuse expenses. Patricia to household urges that the trial court

Michael also this court to determine her by finding dissipated Patricia had not the value of car. erred Pa a Mazda automobile —which trial court’s order listed the value of agree in her brief describes as a 1990 Honda —as zero. We tricia weight finding against the manifest Michael that zero value is evidence; admits had some value. Patricia’s brief the car must have that traded in the car to a California dealer received Patricia trade-in, bought a $11,000 following the Directly credit. $6,500, $5,000 daugh- gave to her daughter truck for her Kristie for $5,000 paid cash vehicle, attorneys, her buy paid ter Jodie Hughes’ solely in David that was entitled for a Headmaster Buick that Pa- transactions, agree with Michael we light of these name. her dissipated tricia value of car. determination, that trial also determine

Despite this we not so unreason parties between property court’s division of the marital apportionment are able that we convinced whole, The trial court’s error property, as a should be disturbed. car, for which dissipated the of her finding Patricia to have value $11,000 credit, gave prej did not constitute the car dealer light scheme of in of the trial court’s entire distribution udicial error $136,503. Marriage the at See In re Schus estate otherwise valued of (court (1992), 958, property App. ter 224 Ill. 3d 977 refused to remand trial wife division when husband discovered after a settlement $1,853, light in received, entitled to of which husband claimed to be of court’s scheme of an estate valued at the trial entire distribution 252, (1985), App. 3d $555,206); In re 138 Ill. Marriage see Brooks of valuation, ("relatively roughly 262 errors” in which totalled minor $36,500 $460,000, require an estate at do not a disturbance of valued appeal); Marriage of on In re Weinstein property the division see of (a (1984), possible error in concern 3d valuation $4,300 ing property a the jewelry with of disturb value would $115,000). an estate division of otherwise valued at finding that also will not disturb the trial court’s the $44,000 underlying parents Michael his transaction between and was $44,000 gift, parents a paid not a loan. Because Michael to his out of house, proceeds the from and the trial Michael’s Patricia’s $44,000 Michael to estate because of repay ordered to the marital Illinois, finding. parent this a a In a transfer to child is (1993), presumed gift. a Marcello to be re of only by This clear and presumption may be overcome Marcello, convincing contrary. 3d at 314. evidence to the bar, at that In the case the trial court’s determination the weight against the presumption was not is not manifest of overcome True, Toole, father, the evidence. Michael’s Earl Peter testified that a $44,000 repayment the he a on loan. received from Michael was testimony concerning was earlier transfers from there also in elder Tooles Michael and Patricia and evidence signed promissory of 694.) 691, Thus, 3d App. the trial court did err when not it ordered $27,883 repay Michael to the the marital into estate.

III. CHILD SUPPORT that, The record separation, paid reveals after the Michael (see amount (West 1992)) statutorily required below the 750 minimum ILCS 5/505 support. petition to Patricia for filed child Patricia a for 1991, in support petition more child November but the was not heard the until time of trial.

The trial pay sup court ordered Michael to retroactive child port $21,643.32 in the equal statutorily amount of required the (See 510(a) (West 1992).) 5/505, minimum ap amount. 750 ILCS On peal, inquiry our its limited to whether the trial court abused awarding support. discretion in this as child amount retroactive 815.) 806, (1992), Marriage Carpel App. re 3d An of abuse of person discretion occurs when no reasonable take the view would adopted by Marriage Partney (1991), In the trial court. re 212 586, 3d 590.

619 filed in support child was Although petition Patricia’s trial, Michael heard the time of not until November but that he procedure, and record does not disclose acquiesced in this delay. prejudice suffered because ordering Michael to abuse trial court did not its discretion

The not to bene- Michael should be allowed support. child retroactive reaching age majority fit because his children from separa- Furthermore, delay support proceedings. the child after Patricia, payments tion, and Michael made his children lived with statutory substantially below minimum of 25% for two children. (750 1992).) 5/505(a)(1) (West record that Mi- also reveals bookkeeping procedures and other excuses to reduce or chael utilized making. light of the delay payments the minimal that he was rec- ord, then, regard support. find to child we no abuse discretion with EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

IV. admitting into by trial not evi- Michael contends the court erred by made in a settlement offer and dence statement Patricia admitting into a letter Patricia’s evidence from doctor. agree with Michael that the statement in the settlement testimony regarding point

offer contradicts material of Patricia’s $44,000 and, a loan parents gift whether the from Michael’s was a therefore, impeachment should have been admitted into evidence for (Sawicki (1983), However, purposes. v. Kim 3d testimony regarding and light of the other evidence nature of $44,000 Patricia, payment from elder Tooles Michael that, we are not statement in the settlement convinced Patricia’s evidence, changed offer been allowed into the trial court would have Therefore, its find Co. decision. we this error harmless. J.L. Simmons Rubber Group ex rel. Insurance v. Firestone Tire & Co. Hartford (1985), Ill. 2d 115. doctor Michael also contends a letter Patricia’s erroneously agree admission admitted. We with Michael that its merely is, error, but determine that the evidence was cumulative (1991), therefore, Authority Transit Chicago harmless. Pharr v. Ill. App. 3d 517. by trial court erred order

Patricia also contends that the ing attorney paid by there was never her fees Michael. attorney fees, petition the trial court that Patricia be awarded before In re Pagano waived this issue. thus Page County is circuit Du affirmed judgment of the court of on the part part. Because of our determination and reversed 620 award, compelled

maintenance we are to this the remand cause to ruling division, property trial court to if its related determine to the which we have otherwise determined not an to constitute abuse form, current discretion in its should be See ILCS revisited. 750 5/503(d)(12) (West 1992); Klein, see also part; part

Affirmed in reversed in and remanded.

INGLIS, J., concurs. RATHJE, dissenting:

JUSTICE I respectfully regarding majority’s dissent the reversal of trial court’s award rehabilitative maintenance. concur with I majority’s of all treatment other issues. George Solich & v. Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of

Chicago, Inc. our supreme 158 Ill. 2d court wrote: [statutory] rule "[T]here is no construction which authorizes legislature plain court to declare that the did mean what language imports. statute is [Citation.]Where enactment *** unambiguous liberty clear depart a court is not at from plain language meaning reading of the statute into exceptions, legislature limitations or conditions that the did not Solich, express.” 158 Ill. 2d at 83. part:

The statute reads in relevant *** obligation "[T]he is if maintenance terminated future party receiving person maintenance cohabits with another on added.) resident, continuing conjugal a 5/510(c) (West 1992). (Emphasis basis.” 750 ILCS Initially, disagree majority’s I with the conclusion that section 510(c) applies explicitly to this case. states Section that it deals maintenance, provisions and termination of "Modification support, expenses, property (Emphasis educational distribution.” added.) (750 (West 1992).) subject judgment, Prior to the 5/510 petitioner had no received maintenance which could have been modi-

fied terminated. 510(c) Assuming, arguendo, that section applicable the facts case, plain meaning statutory of this it is clear language in this section bar an does not award maintenance petitioner. that, during this The evidence demonstrates the course of proceedings, petitioner stopped cohabiting with David Hughes. Petitioner testified that she had executed lease for rental City, Arizona, of mobile home Bullhead which was 25 miles away Hughes’ residence. She further testified that she had completed her move dur- new residence and utilities for her prepaid trial court’s conclusion ing supported the the trial. This evidence cohabiting longer May 15, petitioner was no that, after Hughes. cohabitation; only speaks it nothing past says about

The statute Thus, cohabitation, here. it cannot not at issue continuing which is to here, where, the as barring maintenance be as rehabilitative read subject cohabitation ended. record, clearly not abuse its upon trial court did

Based this the petitioner. to awarding maintenance discretion in rehabilitative Moreover, majority’s on In re I not find the reliance do Initially, I persuasive. at all note Klein factually distinguishable appeal the at bar. In that Klein is throughout proceed Klein, petitioner clearly cohabiting the the was ending relationship. ings any indicate intention of and did not petitioner obviously was not entitled to maintenance. The Klein Additionally, reasoning court agree I do not with the the Klein party a who employs finding that maintenance can be denied to majority cites the fol- cohabits before maintenance is awarded. The lowing passage from Klein: petitioner’s no

"There should be distinction between whether obligation ripens it or after maintenance is is terminated before awarded, party ordered. a or a died maintenance If if before award, party remarried there would be no reason before for awarding only require then it maintenance to to be terminated 510(c).Similarly, party pursuant to section who seeks mainte if awarded, award should nance cohabits maintenance is before 510(c). added.) (Emphasis pursuant [Citation.]” be denied section (Klein, App. 3d at justify

To its that there should be no distinction erroneous conclusion ripens party’s obligation is before between whether a terminated ordered, analogize attempts the Klein after maintenance is obvious, remarriage. death is cohabitation to death and To state condition, and, permanent remarriage. Conversely, hopefully, so is is, cases, majority temporary circum- cohabitation in the vast Thus, analogy the case at bar demon- stance. does not work. As strated, prior the award of mainte- cohabitation can indeed end nance.

Further, the Klein court stated: by petitioner

"Although case law cited addresses termination cohabiting, recipient to be cohab- maintenance when found iting original ignored determining propriety should not be espouse ignores

maintenance award. To view such a unnecessary, continuing potential for parties strains between the marriage whose ended. Although respondent’s counsel respondent cohabiting, conceded disqualifies this action her if only petitioner maintenance she cohabiting, continues would for if to respondent’s be continue monitor activities to learn forced if changed. this status Such parties contacts between the should not added.) (Emphasis 3d at 905. encouraged.” Klein, be In response passage, to this I first would note that divorce cases routinely follow-up monitoring. importantly, involve More the dem- onstrated need of a party, petitioner, such as the instant certainly rehabilitative maintenance should precedence take over if monitoring, any, placed upon burden of party. the other I would affirm the trial court’s award rehabilitative mainte- nance. ILLINOIS,

THE Plaintiff-Appellant, PEOPLE OF THE OF STATE v. MI- MALTBIA, Defendant-Appellee. CHAEL Third District No. 3 — 94—0527 Opinion July 13, Rehearing August filed denied 1995.— further indicated that Michael and Patricia notes in at a time Mr. Toole evidence to the elder needed when improve personal his financial with the statements connection money supposedly represented construction business he owned. The by of Michael’s and actually the notes dated back the construction original acknowledged Patricia’s home in The elder Toole Mr. given daughter money that his had also a been similar amount of under similar circumstances that she and her husband had also subsequently sign asked to been notes. Michael’s father failed to request repayment alleged from Michael Patricia for this debt prior by Patricia, proceedings the commencement of divorce daughter repaid furthermore his had son-in-law never they Moreover, supposedly "notes” into which entered. Michael placed money certified that monies purchase no as earnest on the property light for the house had been borrowed. the evi- dence, the trial in requiring repay court did not err Michael to $44,000 into the marital estate division. for Next, argues by ordering Michael trial court erred $27,883 obliga Michael to estate reimburse marital for a tax disagree. tion. We gave Michael’s father testified that he interest his Potteiger Corporation to Michael and Michael’s sister. Michael that, Potteiger dissolved, testified when assets in excess $400,000 were two distributed to the shareholders —Michael and his recalculated, subsequently resulting sister. The distribution was an additional distribution to the shareholders and concomitant ad liability $27,883. ditional tax in the tax li amount This additional ability, Potteiger incurred virtue Michael’s nonmarital stock, paid by party Michael and Patricia. Just as is entitled to assets, party subject liability, retain nonmarital is also absent circumstances, special for debts incurred on account of those assets. (750 (West 57503(d) 1992); In re Marriage Lees

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Marriage of Toole

Court Name: Appellate Court of Illinois

Date Published: Jul 27, 1995

Citation: 653 N.E.2d 456

Docket Number: 2-94-0858

Court Abbreviation: Ill. App. Ct.