In re MARRIAGE OF THERESA O‘HARE, Petitioner-Appellee, and RONALD G. STRADT, Respondent-Appellant.
Docket No. 4-17-0091
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District
May 9, 2017
2017 IL App (4th) 170091
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 09-D-386; the Hon. Jennifer M. Ascher, Judge, presiding.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Counsel on Appeal:
Ronald G. Stradt, of Springfield, appellant pro se.
Gregory A. Scott, of Scott & Scott, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee.
OPINION
¶ 1 In March 2010, the trial court dissolved the marriage of petitioner, Theresa O‘Hare, and respondent, Ronald G. Stradt. In its dissolution order, the court granted Stradt parenting time with the parties’ minor child (born August 31, 2006) on every other Tuesday evening and every other Wednesday evening through Friday morning.
¶ 2 In August 2016, Stradt filed a motion to modify parenting time, seeking to forego parenting time on Tuesdays in exchange for parenting time on every Wednesday and Thursday, which represented a 6% increase in his parenting time. In response, O‘Hare filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the
¶ 3 Stradt appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by granting O‘Hare‘s motion to dismiss. Specifically, Stradt contends that the court (1) failed to “accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts” when considering O‘Hare‘s motion to dismiss and (2) did not properly apply
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In May 2008, O‘Hare and Stradt married, and the parties had a minor child. Their marriage was dissolved in March 2010, and pursuant to the dissolution order, Stradt was allocated the following parenting time:
“(1) *** alternat[ing] weekends *** beginning from Friday afternoon until Monday morning at 9:00 a.m. ***
(2) *** [Stradt] shall be entitled to mid-week visitation on the Tuesday nights before his weekend visitations from 4:30-5:00 p.m. until Wednesday morning *** no later than 9:00 a.m. ***
(3) during the weeks in which he does not have weekend visitation, [Stradt] shall have visitation on Wednesday from 4:30-5:00 p.m. until *** no later than 9:00 a.m. on Friday.”
Holidays and school breaks were reasonably and equally divided between the parties. The arrangement allocated 56% of the parenting time to O‘Hare, while Stradt was allocated the remaining 44% of the parenting time.
¶ 6 In December 2015, Stradt filed his first motion to modify parenting responsibilities, seeking “sole custody” of the parties’ minor child, subject to O‘Hare‘s reasonable visitation. In January 2016, O‘Hare filed a motion to increase Stradt‘s child-support obligations, citing a substantial increase in his income as the basis for the motion. The trial court ordered the parties to mediate these issues and scheduled a March 2016 hearing. The mediation was unsuccessful. (O‘Hare‘s January 2016 filing is not at issue in this appeal.)
¶ 7 In March and April 2016, the parties filed individual parenting plans. Stradt sought, inter alia, sole decision-making responsibilities and parenting time on alternating weekends and every Monday and Tuesday evening. O‘Hare urged the trial court to find that no legal basis was shown for a modification to the original parenting plan and requested that the original plan remain in place. O‘Hare also filed a motion to dismiss Stradt‘s December 2015 motion to modify parental responsibilities.
¶ 8 At a May 2016 hearing, the trial court granted Stradt leave to file an amended motion to modify parental responsibilities, which Stradt filed immediately thereafter. Stradt‘s amended motion sought sole decision-making responsibilities and equal parenting time, characterizing his request as a “minor modification” pursuant to
“[T]he entire Amended Motion to Modify Parental Responsibilities does nothing more than confirm previous Orders of this Court that [Stradt] continues to argue over minutia to the extent of causing disruption in the working relationship of the parties resulting in extreme difficulties for [O‘Hare] to address and deal with [Stradt] on child-related matters.”
¶ 9 On July 8, 2016, the trial court determined that the parenting plan had not been modified within the preceding two years, but it found “merit in [O‘Hare‘s] contention that many of the allegations contained in [Stradt‘s] Amended Motion to Modify Parental Responsibilities [had]
¶ 10 At an August 2016 hearing, Stradt made an oral motion to withdraw all previous motions to modify the parenting plan, which the trial court granted. At that time, Stradt filed the motion to modify parenting time that is the subject of this appeal. Specifically, Stradt sought to change his parenting time from every other Tuesday evening and every other Wednesday evening through Friday morning to every Wednesday evening through Friday morning. The modification would increase Stradt‘s parenting time by 6% and would result in Stradt and O‘Hare sharing parenting time equally, 50% apiece.
¶ 11 In September 2016, O‘Hare filed a motion to dismiss the motion to modify parenting time, alleging that (1) Stradt failed to allege a change of circumstances and (2) the modification sought was not a minor modification as contemplated by
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 A. Standard of Review
¶ 15 We review de novo a trial court‘s dismissal pursuant to
“Such motions challenge the legal sufficiency of a pleading based on defects apparent on its face. [Citation.] In ruling on a section 2-615 motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. [Citation.] It is well understood that the critical inquiry is whether the [factual] allegations of the complaint, when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.” Id.
Stradt‘s argument also requires us to interpret
¶ 16 B. Stradt‘s Motion To Modify Parenting Time
¶ 17 In January 2016, the Illinois General Assembly amended
“The court may modify a parenting plan or allocation judgment without a showing of changed circumstances if (i) the modification is in the child‘s best interests; and *** *** [(ii)(2)] the modification constitutes a minor modification in the parenting plan or allocation judgment[.]”
750 ILCS 5/610.5(e) (West Supp. 2015) .
¶ 18 Stradt‘s motion alleged, in relevant part,
“5. That increasing [Stradt‘s] parenting time by 6% constitutes a minor modification
of parenting time in that [Stradt] seeks the following change to the parenting times as provided in the Judgment for Dissolution: From: every other Tuesday and every other Wednesday/Thursday
To: every Wednesday/Thursday.
6. That said minor modification is in the minor child‘s best interest, provides greater stability, and maximizes the child‘s relationship and access to both parents as intended by
750 ILCS 602.10(g) .”
¶ 19 1. Presumption Regarding a Section 2-615 Motion To Dismiss
¶ 20 Stradt contends that the trial court failed to “accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts” when considering O‘Hare‘s motion to dismiss. O‘Hare responds that Stradt failed to provide a factual basis for his motion and, instead, asserted various conclusions. We agree with O‘Hare.
¶ 21 In his brief, Stradt alleges that the trial court failed to accept as true his allegation that “increasing [his] parenting time by 6% constituted a minor modification of parenting time.” However, this allegation is a legal conclusion—not a fact. The court was not required to accept
this allegation as true and was at perfect liberty to disregard Stradt‘s interpretation of the statute.
¶ 22 Stradt also alleges that the trial court failed to accept as true “reasonable inferences,” such as “said minor modification is in the minor child‘s best interest, provides greater stability, and maximizes the child‘s relationship and access to both parents.” The determination that the modification was in the child‘s best interest is, again, a legal conclusion that the court was free to accept or reject. The allegations that the proposed modification would provide greater stability and maximize the child‘s relationship and access to both parents are factual conclusions that are unsupported by specific factual allegations and are, again, conclusions the court was free to accept or reject. See Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31, 976 N.E.2d 318 (courts are not required to accept as true conclusory factual allegations unsupported by specific facts).
¶ 23 Simply put, Stradt failed to allege any specific facts supporting his motion but, instead, alleged various conclusory statements that the trial court was free to accept or reject. We conclude that the trial court did not err by declining to accept as true the conclusory allegations set forth in Stradt‘s motion.
¶ 24 2. Interpretation of Section 610.5(e) of the Dissolution Act
¶ 25 Stradt contends that the trial court did not properly apply the rules of statutory construction when interpreting what Stradt characterizes as the “ambiguous” term “minor modification.” We disagree.
¶ 26 As previously stated,
¶ 27 Stradt‘s argument rests on his assertion that the term “‘minor modification’
¶ 28 This interpretation is consistent with the language of the statute in its entirety, which, though amended to ease the ability to modify parenting plans in certain situations, maintains a policy favoring the finality of the order outlining the parenting plan. Excepting
¶ 29 Stradt cites
¶ 30 In sum, we conclude that (1) the plain language of the statute supports the trial court‘s interpretation of the term “minor modification” and (2) the court did not fail to adhere to the rules of statutory construction. We commend the trial court for its thoughtful, patient resolution of the arguments raised by Stradt and for the concise reasoning outlined in its written order.
¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
¶ 33 Affirmed.