*1 2000 UT Marriage GONZALEZ re of Juanita Martin Briceno. Briceno, L. aka Juanita
Juanita Appellant.
Petitioner Casualty Property & Company, Intervenor
Insurance Appellee.
No. 970521.
Supreme Utah. Court of 28, 2000.
Jan. May
Rehearing Denied *2 through Metropolitan. If insurance City, Gon- ceno had Lake for Hauge, Salt Tamara J. spouse at the time of was Briceno's Gonzalez zalez. fire, under the she would have a claim Stevens, City, for Lake L. Salt Robert policy. Presumably, premiums Metropolitan Metropolitan. calculated on this basis. were SUMMARY 5, 1996, February Metropolitan On T3 pursuant motion to intervene to rule filed a DURHAM, Justice: Associate Chief 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ¶ 1 appeals L. Gonzalez Petitioner Juanita Metropolitan that Briceno had no asserted granting sum of the district court a decision recognition of the al- reason to contest Met of intervenor mary judgment favor Metropolitan's inter- leged marriage and that Casualty Insurance ropolitan Property & represented est was therefore denying her ("Metropolitan") and Company support action. In its memorandum complaint to dismiss motions motion, Metropolitan stated that it moved to complaint. to amend her in intervention and pe- intervene because Gonzalezhad filed Gonzaleg's on Ms. is an action based This tition "to establish her insurance claim marriage, adjudication petition for Metropolitan." opposed against §Aun. 80- Code brought pursuant Utah motion, arguing Metropolitan had that relationship (Supp.1998), regarding her 1-4.5 points failed to attach a memorandum of Metropolitan moved with Martin Briceno.1 affidavits, appropriate as re- authorities the in contested to intervene. Ms. Gonzalez quired under rule 4-501 of Utah Code ultimately stipulated it. tervention but answered Judicial Administration. Gonzalez summary judgment Metropolitan moved for the intervenor's on March 1996. ground that Ms. Gonzalez failed on the 12, 1996, Stipu- March filed a On adjudication her complete the Metropolitan Allow lation for Leave to ap statutory period. This time within the Metropolitan granting An Intervene. order and remand for peal reverse followed. We leave intervene was filed on March following proceedings, note the further but 1996. justices' separate opinions divergence in the (1) interpre as to the concerning the issues: «[ Metropolitan formally denied Ms. Gon- (Supp. §Ann. 80-1-4.5 tation of Utah Code claim on June 1996. On zalez's insurance 1988) ("ONE-YEAR LIMITATION"), this 7, 1996, trial court set a date of August view, being opinion majority con reflects 7, 1997, Ms. January for trial of Gonzalez's Zimmer Stewart and curred Justices depending availability. petition, on the court's (2) man; propriety of the trial as to the 4, 1996, Metropolitan moved for October On as court's refusal to dismiss was based summary judgment. Its motion ("INTERVENTION"), intervenor below upon "the fact that Ms. Gonzalez did portion concurs Justice Zimmerman reputation as the wife of have a uniform joined opinion, by Chief Russon's Justice Briceno," section required Martin under Howe, only to the extent it holds but affidavits of the Utah Code. No 30-1-4.5 stipulation pursuant was were attached. That motion denied. properly permitted. 6, 1997, January entry T5 A minute BACKGROUND date, noted that scheduled ¶ 2 The trial following day, had been stricken. adjudica petition for According to the (the of a criminal trial was continued because "petition"), Ms. Gonza tion of precedence on the court's calendar. On living together took began and Mr. Briceno lez 18, 1997, ordered a new Bri- March the court September, On October 1988. Tri- scheduling April for Gonza conference ceno set fire to home. Ms. August 1997. Gonzalez relationship Briceno al was reset alleges that her with lez time, trial. day. requested Bri- never an accelerated on that At the "terminated" passed exactly originally as the statute in 1987. version of the statute is same 1. The 1998 [ 10, 1997, April Metropolitan filed a was her motion to dismiss the 6 On intervenor's Summary Judgment upon complaint. based "Motion granted Metropolitan's The court Comply Statutory with Time Lim- Failure to summary judgment motion for based on Gon- its," in which it Ms. Gonzalez's comply claimed failure to zalez's petition should be dismissed because she time limit. judgment concerning her failed to obtain *3 fact, findings 11 In its conclusions of year alleged marriage within one of its termi- law, petitioner's and order motion to nation, required under as Utah Code intervention, dismiss the in Metropolitan § contended that 80-1-4.5. "present- court concluded that had period statutory time ran from the date the legal ed no valid basis for her withdrawal of terminated, relationship allegedly October allowing thus the com- [the] Stipulation," 21, 1995, and that the statute of limitations plaint in interventionto The court stand. by filing Metropol- not tolled the action. was Metropolitan squarely also ruled that "falls contend, argued and has not itan did 24(a)(2) within rule of the Utah Rules of Civil here, expired that the statute of limitations regarding Procedure intervention." In its prior commencement of Ms. Gonzalez's findings of fact and of law re- conclusions proceeding. this garding summary motion intervenor's support in 1 7 In an affidavit of her memo- judgment, the court held that opposition, randum in Gonzalez admitted that 21, 1996, period expired limitation on October on she her rela- October considered date. occurred after the which commencement "permanently tionship with Briceno termi- prior action. This date was also to the indicated, however, nated." She also that initial trial date set the court. time, I that have re-established a "since relationship with Martin." Gonzalez filed {12 law, In its conclusions of the trial petition allege motion to amend her second "petitioner court determined that is not relationship the re-establishment and never has been married Brice- to Martin April no in solemnized or rela- unsolemnized 8,May T8 On Gonzalez movedto tionship." Metropolitan's complaint dismiss as interve- ap- 113 Petitioner raises three issues on stipulated asserted that she had nor. She First, peal. argues she that it was error for on, Metropolitan's intervention al- based its grant Metropolitan's court to motion leged suggestion that a decision on her mari- summary peti- judgment dismissing dispose coverage ques- tal would status all ground petition tion on that the was policy. in tions Briceno's insurance She then adjudicated year within one of the termi- proper argued that was not Second, relationship. nation of the Ms. Gon- 24(a)
party under rule because it had in fact Gonzaleg's zalez that contends trial court erred already denied insurance claim refusing grant her motion Met- to dismiss coverage. based on lack of She asserted that ropolitan's complaint in intervention. Final- Metropolitan's prejudice intervention would ly, argues that Ms. Gonzalez the trial court rights and social status of herself and her should not have denied her motion to amend children, Briceno, father is inas- three whose petition allege continuing relation- prevent much denial of her as ship Briceno. "assuming[] legal rights, all of them from responsibilities and social status due them [ (Durham, opinion noted in 1 As joint the cireurestances of their rela- under J.), joined by Justice Stewart Justice tionships." Zimmerman, regarding determines the result op- 9 In memorandum the statute of limitations issue. As to the position, argued its interest in Ms. issue, Justice Zimmerman con- remained, despite un- Gonzalez's status its portion opin- curs of Justice Russon's coverage equivocal denial of to her. Howe, ion, joined by only Chief but motions, pursuant arguments on all the the extent it holds that intervention After denied, stipulation properly permitted. motion to amend was OF REVIEW ONE-YEAR LIMITATION
STANDARD [ Legislature 17 In the Utah enacted summary judg- grant A 1 15 trial court's recognized possibility a statute genuine appropriate no ment when establishing an marriage. unsolemnized moving fact exist and the issues of material 30-1-4.5 (Supp.1998).3 § Utah Code Ann. judgment as a matter of is entitled to states, perti Subsection two of the statute 56(c); R. P. see also Ron law. See Utah Civ. part, nent "The determination or establish Roofing Asphalt Paving, Inc. Case & ment of a under this section must (Utah 1989). Blomquist, TIB relationship during occur described trial cor- deciding whether When (1), year following subsection or within one genuine rectly found that there was no issue relationship." the termination Id. fact, material this court reviews the facts added). 30-1-4.5(2) (emphasis to be drawn therefrom and inferences *4 {18 light loging party. See most favorable The trial court found that "[mJore Additionally, summary judg- because year passed id. than one has since the termi- law, give a matter of granted ment is relationship nation of the between Martin legal conclusions no petitioner," the trial court's defer- Briceno and the and that Ms. review their decision for correct- ence and require- Gonzalez had therefore not met the Deseelhorst,. Gary v. L. NP ness. See White ment that determination of the oc- (Utah 1994). 1371, Corp., Ski 879 1874 relationship's year cur within one appeared
termination.
The trial court
completion
required
has not
assume that the statute
This court
heretofore
merely
employs
proceeding,
it
when re
of
its com-
identified the standard
mencement,
one-year period.
viewing
right
to intervene as of
within the
a motion
24(a).
Furthermore,
put
assuring
Rule of Civil Procedure
burden of
under Utah
Gonzalez,
Chambers,
Lima v.
more given initially the court's 1. Statute Limitations date, scheduled trial the would not have one-year been decided within the time- 124 Conventional statutes of limita unlikely frame. It seems legislature that the tion run until the date on which an action is trap intended to create such a for the un question commenced. The raised ac wary, leading filed, timely to the dismissal of tion is whether the somewhat unusual lan uncontested lawsuits. guage of section 80-1-4.5 was intended to create phenomenon: a novel a statute of 126 State speedy and federal trial acts filing limitations not tolled provide area, of an guidance ac some useful in this tion, so that an action filed in timely man they inasmuch as requirements also contain ner could still fail the period limitation due to that cases be specific resolved within time- delays discovery T7-1-6(1)(h) or a court's crowded frames. Section of the Utah legislature Code, docket. should example, not be requires begin that a trial deemed to have potentially created such a thirty within days arraignment after if the unfair rule without clear convincing bail, and lan posting accused is not long as guage evidencing so; its intent to do presents court's other business no obstacle to 77-1-6(1)(b) § ambiguities this. See Utah Code Ann. appear created in this statute be nothing the result of more than context, inartful Even in the criminal trial drafting. legislative pur however, -It is clear that the where defendant's Sixth pose fraud, preventing gave welfare rights implicated, which Amendment the United limitation, rise to the time nothing has Supreme do States Court has declined to estab- Gonzaleg's with Ms. attempts "rigid to establish a requirements" lish time to determine statutory marriage Briceno, to Mr. and that right whether a defendant's speedy to a trial strict construction regard- of the subsection was Hoyt, violated. See State v. 806 P.2d
1080 Fam.Code (quoting 1017 Tex. Id. at Ct.App.1991) (citing Barker (West 514, 521, 1.91(b) Supp.1989) (emphasis added 92 S.Ct. Wingo, 407 U.S. (1972)). ).6 in Barker The Court
L.Ed.2d 101 tion, the reason for assertion outlined a defendant." including of his four-part test to assess Barker, right, and [4] "[1](llength delay, 407 U.S. [8] of the prejudice to the the defendant's any viola delay, [2] tutional under found that one-year $28 equal The court statutory protection statute made United in White held limitation grounds. States Constitution period unconsti- a distinction The court the Texas Thus, party has a when a even S.Ct. persons" "ceremoniously married between trial, delay speedy right to a constitutional per- married "informally or common-law prejudicial. where it is will be excused sons," one-year period to com- that the case entitled to in this the intervenor Were reasonably related must be an action mencee not, concern, of course it is See which governmental interest. such legitimate to a the level of "delay" not rise to here would White, F.Supp. Finding that at 1017-18. Indeed, lengthy prejudicial. being overly proof the exis- requiring the interest any could not demonstrate timely marriage in a a common law tence of Moreover, as Ms. prejudice in this case. Texas courts did to insure that fashion was out, pointed without the insur rely on stale evidence divorce have to delays would have been er's intervention proceedings, the court reasoned probate they except extent that were legitimate, the unlikely, to the interest was while the court's own docket. caused rationally related statutory was not scheme See id. at 1018. goals. Considerations 2. Constitutional severity bar to of the Noting prove a common commencing an action claim accept intervenor's 27 Were we one-year just marriage within law an en- meant to create legislature termination, the relationship's White limitations, type tirely new of statute com about subject particularly concerned be limitation would time rights be ex munity property that would example, challenge. For constitutional legitimacy of the two and the tinguished Co., Auto. Ins. v. State Farm Mut. White un (E.D.Tex.1995), that would be the court had children F.Supp. 1012 court relied on id. The case resolved. statute. The apply a similar Texas case that Supreme Court States suing auto insurer United woman her involved a regarding statute similar Texas of her held a motorist clause under the uninsured *7 prove legitimacy of one-year period to the alleged of her policy, regarding the death equal protection because The Texas statute law husband. common a child violated in light short of period was too the time marriage in which a proceeding "'A stated: id.; involved. See important rights the must be proved this section to be under is 100, Habluetzel, 91, 102 456 U.S. year after the Mills not later than one commenced (1982).7 770 But 71 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. ...'" relationship ended. the date on which concededly petition her filed although Ms. Gonzalez the since in White noted that 6. The court one-year of her rela of the termination re within statute had been version of the Texas 1989 argues amended, tionship. Metropolitan that the case of cently of the statute the earlier version (Utah Ct.App. Englehorn, 906 918 1995 amendment Bunch v. specifically instructed that the White, prop 1995), dispositive and retroactively applied. 907 is here stands See be adjudication (citing petition for of mar F.Supp. Tex. Fam.Code that a at 1017 n. 2 osition year brought decided within a riage (Act be and 1.91(b) (West must Supp.1996) of § May R.S., 1)). relationship's Intervenor Leg., § The 1995 amend termination. ch. the 74th of Bunch, to two a divorce ac the of limitations this case. In ment extended misconstrues statute amendment, sepa by parties even years, the after the the terms of ten months tion filed Shepherd v. See the period is not absolute. trial court dismissed that time Id. at 919. The rated. (Tex.App. 1 Ledford, ground 409 n. mar 926 S.W.2d on the that no 1996). therefore riage established and it had been jurisdiction ac subject over the maiter lacked explicit appeals appeal, the court of one-year statutory tion. Id. On constitutionality the of arguments ly constitutional appeal, to consider refused period us on this is not before limitation
1081 nevertheless, question legitimacy of (apply- the the 405-09 926 S.W.2d at Shepherd, see Metropolitan's presence in lawsuit of mentioning the Texas ing, without White its according involved in White significant public policy statute concerns implicates terms). appeal. that should be addressed on dis light of the considerations T30 In Rule of Civil Proce- 133 Pursuant Utah above, the statute of we construe cussed 24(a), applicant must allowed to dure be un potential to avoid question limitations in requirements are satisfied: intervene four that section constitutionality, and conclude (2) (1) application timely; applicant the petition filing of a requires 830-1-4.5 relating property or has an interest year one adjudication within for action; subject transaction which is the relationship. after termination (3) dispo- applicant is so situated that the analysis of the decision rests on our Our practical may, sition of the action as a mat- therefore, intent, we do not legislature's ter, applicant's ability impair impede or arguments raised the constitutional reach (4) interest; appli- protect Statutory Ms. Gonzalez. See Sutherland represented adequately is not cant's interest (rev. 45.11, 5th 49 Construction existing parties. ed.1992). Further, light ruling, of our we ordinarily only appro Spouses 1 are 34 whether reach the issue of do not priate parties litigation. to divorce See Ms. Gonzalez's motion court erred Divorce, Annotation, Wagner, Frank D. petition. Ms. Should to amend her second Claims, 373, 378 Third Parties' 63 A.L.R.3d remand, amend after still wish to exception generally An to this is motion, pre and we she should renew her made, however, third-party claims give her motion due sume the court will ownership equitable the "actual or concern Typi light opinion. of this consideration in property, real or to some other asserted liberally granted. cally, motions to amend are upon real such as an encumbrance terest Dewsnup, 851 P.2d See Timm v. 1993). ownership personal prop property, or the omitted). (footnotes case, This
erty." Id. INTERVENTION adjudication which concerns a analogous where a third marriage, to cases {381 Next, turn Gonzalez's con- to Ms. attempts in a divorce ac to intervene for the trial court to tention that it was error here, question for both tion. The threshold deny her to dismiss motion 24(a) rule and interven requirements initially complaint in intervention. Gonzalez context, is whether Metro tion in a challenged Metropolitan's motion to inter- property politan relating an interest to a vene, stipu- later reversed course and but subject which is the transaction lated to the intervention. action. Stipulations between alleged any never "inter- usually by the courts. First honored Mortgage Denver Investors v. C.N. Zundel & est" relating any property or transaction (Utah 1979). Assocs., 600 P.2d Nev- subject petition. its matter of *8 ertheless, may ignore agree- intervention, prior such stipu- the courts the complaint in to lation, Metropolitan stated as its basis for requiring judicial law points ments "when peti- it that this intervention that "believes determination are involved." Id. No consid- attempt an to defraud by court of tion is filed as an eration was undertaken attempting company by falsely in insurance standing to intervene Ms. none existed." adjudicate marriage; a where petition to establish today by stating argu- We believe that appellant, not to obtain a divorce. raised the that these sufficiently clarify begin ments were not articulated below. of the left unre- we some issues Finding However, Id. at 921. section 30-1-4.5 to be unam- since court in Bunch. solved the limitation, biguous regarding affirmed the time it constitutionality one-year statute of limi- the of a agree the trial court. Id. We with Ms. Gonzalez us, express opinion no tations is not before clearly distinguishable that her inasmuch case is the issue. marriage, involves a to establish a as it 1082 however, potentially liable for employer, for The acceptable an reason clearly not
This is
man,
not
was
proceeding
drowning
in
death of
right
a
intervening as of
marriage. Laud-
existence of a
seeking to
establish
in an action
permitted
to intervene
is,
fraud
attempting
prevent
See id.
of dissolution.
set aside the order
able
187,
The
type
property inter-
N.E.2d at 324.
Ill.Dec.
498
approach
101
does
by courts
contemplated
typically
that
though
est
the former wife
that
court reasoned
an
in the context of
considering this issue
against
wrongful death action
might bring a
proceed-
in
divorcee
application
a
intervenor's
order was set
employer if the dissolution
ing.
aside,
interest
in
employer's current
might bring was at
that she
future action
this issue
Looking
the treatment of
36
hypothetical, and inciden
"speculative,
most most
we find that while
jurisdictions,
in other
Id.
tal."
proceedings,
in divorcee
intervention
allow
granted
after
such intervention
Fisher,
Likewise,
v.
546
in Fisher
138
heavy
Analyzing
a
burden.
meets
intervenor
(N.D.1996),
354,
found
the court
N.W.2d
358
Virgi-
rule in West
an identical
divorcing parents did
that the children
party
nia,
third
"[a]
court found that
in their divorce
right
a
to intervene
have
proceeding
in a divorce
seeking intervention
appointment of a
regarding the
proceedings
property in-
protecting a
purpose of
company, even
closely held
receiver for their
demonstrating
the burden
terest assumes
value of
might affect the
appointment
if such
outweigh
will
the substan-
which
an interest
company.
in
shares
the children's
par-
divorcing
privacy interests
tial
by stating that
analysis begins
"[al
court's
124, 459
Boyle
Boyle, 194 W.Va.
ties."
v.
or
not 'remote'
is one that is
'direct'
interest
Boyle,
the court
404
S.E.2d
(citing 3B James
'contingent.'"
Id. at 356
claiming
party
intervention to a third
denied
Moore,
Federal
Practice
Moore's
W.
by the wife as
buy
obtained
right
stock
a
ed.1995)).
(2d
¶ 24.07[2],
It contin
at 24-54
id. at
settlement.
See
part of
divorce
ues,
is one
Boyle
protectible'
interest
'legally
Embracing
"[a]
the rationale of the
recognizes as be
court,
recently
the see-
law
court
allowed
'the substantive
another
proceeding
applicant."
being
intervene
owned
longing
wife to
to or
ond
wife, challenging the
Pub. Serv. Unit
(quoting New Orleans
Id.
first
brought by the
(5th
Line,
See Co-
her divorce settlement.
464
validity of
F.2d
Pipe
ed Gas
(Miss.1999).
Cohen,
denied,
748 So.2d
Cir.),
hen v.
105 S.Ct.
469 U.S.
cert.
(at
There,
seven
(1984)
stressed
least
origi
the court
(emphasis
L.Ed.2d 860
another) the "rare fact
times
one form
nal).
par
Finally,
"[al
the court states
and that
it is
nature of this case
driven"
interest'
party
'real
ty
qualifies as a
who
normal rule.
departure from the
significant
P.,
17(a),
party with
F.R.
is a
under rule
Civ.
discus-
At the outset of its
id. at 92-94.
(citing
Id.
protectible'
interest."
'legally
Cohen,
court made it clear
R. Miller &
Wright,
Alan
Arthur
sion
6A Charles
rule,
identical
to our
its intervention
under
Kane,
Practice & Proce
Mary Kay
Federal
("[Thhe
litiga-
(2d
1990)
own,
in the
interest alone
"an economic
ed.
dure
at 339
Id.
to allow intervention."
tion is insufficient
... must
requirement
in interest
real
omitted).
(citations
at 93.
... a
asserting
purposes
satisfied
be
intervenor.").
by an
Since
claim
adopted
jurisdictions
have
T37 Other
minority
shares
found that the valuation
instance,
in In re
For
rationale.
similar
Perkinson,
speculative under
corporation was a
Ill.App.3d
a close
Marriage of
did not have
the children
(1986),
taking, it held that
1083 parties grant summary The claims of the who at- we reverse the trial court's of 139 tempted judgment Metropolitan in actions are in to intervene these favor of on the entirely of in of analogous to those the insurer issue of statute limitations. privacy of present action. The interests 4] remand, 43 On should Gonzalez choose to couple determining in and a their status proceed adjudication with the property rights without the interference of marriage, apply pre the trial court should parties clearly paramount. outside Cer- ponderance proof of the evidence standard of tainly, Metropolitan's "interest" in this action marriage to the establishment of a under the greater employer than in is no Perkin- Hansen, statute. See Hansen v. 958 son, likely to who was be sued the order of (Utah Ct.App.1998). 935-36 While no dissolutionwas set aside. single factor determinative Many €40 of the cases interven analysis, and court's while "numerous factors possible tion also find that it would be considered," proving should be evidence each separate bring intervenor action to en five elements is essential. any rights, thereby alleged avoiding force Blair, Whyte 885 P.2d 798 inappropriate pri their insinuation into the 1994). showing must make a couple. vate affairs of married See Ex consent, capacity marry, capacity give (Ala.1982) Kirkley, parte 418 So.2d 121 duties, assumption rights of marital co (former wife could intervene former habitation, as, holding and a acquir out subsequent proceeding husband's divorce as, ing general reputation a uniform and any money obtain their owed her under di husband and wife. See Utah Code decree, contempt voree but rather could file 30-1-4.5(1)(a)-(e) (1998). One commenta Fisher, suit); 358; Boyle, at 546 N.W.2d tor has noted "the suceess of the common law S.E.2d 405.9 doctrine, especially of the re out,' quirement 'holding distinguishing Metropolitan any bas show failed to parties' between cases which the intent requires
interest this action that its intru- they and those in which cohab private sion into an otherwise matter be- Cynthia ited without such intent." persons regarding tween two the nature of Bowman, A Proposal Grant Feminist fact, relationship. petitioner their ar- Bring Marriage, Back Low Metropolitan Common gues, denied Ms. in- trial, L.Rev. At Or. during pendency surance claim below, court will have to determine whether Ms. proceedings making it clear that it dispute Gonzalez meets this standard. The adjudica- proceed could without the court's regarding repu the existence of a "uniform" Accordingly, adopting tion of this matter. tation is a material fact this case and to in Boyle, the rationale of the court I would grant the extent the trial court's permitting hold that the trial court erred in summary intervene, judgment was based on that Metropolitan to and that it should ground, may not stand. granted have Ms. Gonzalez's motion to dis- earlier, joined miss. As noted this view is Although by any party 1 44 not discussed Stewart, only by majority and a point appeal, may to this note a question. the court affirms on this disposition assist in the of the case on re- 26, 1999, entry mand. On March after the PROCEDURE ON REMAND case, summary judgment in this Having found that section 80-1-4.5 filed an action in federal district requires against Metropolitan, that an action to alleging determine or various con- a marriage establish be commenced tractual and tortious causes of action related within year relationship, policy. of the termination of the It to its insurance is not clear from (Wyo.1999) (denying to creditor would be able to contest its obli- divorcing "possessory where husband had no gation contract, in an action the insurance spouse's property, marketable interest" in his appeal. which is not before us on this making payment of his debt to creditor unavail- source). able from such *10 ZIMMERMAN, Justice, concurring: the claim in case whether v. Insur the case of Proctor relies on
therein
[
opinion
portion of the
I concur in that
Am.,
when third adjudications concerning a ted to intervene CONCLUSION objections of a marriage over the judgment of the trial court 146 The question. putative marriage actual on the statute part, reversed affirmed but Therefore, join portion I do not in that issue, is re- and the matter of limitations opinion. Russon's proceedings consistent further manded for RUSSON, Justice, dissenting: opinion. [ lead Durham's 51 I from Justice dissent trial court's I would affirm all of the opinion. concurs in STEWART T 47 Justice opinion. DURHAM's rulings. Associate Chief Justice *11 stipulation the aside refusal to set the court's err First, did not trial court the attempts to estab- thus to She for failure for intervention. petition dismissing Gonzalez's question for a of review limitation set a new standard time lish jurisdictional the meet appeal. § us on brought 80-1-4.5. Justice before properly Code forth Utah attempt to not even of a new stan- opinion purported does establishment Durham's This plain by of its joined the basis a statute on not been the read dard of review pro- its simply rewrites instead but language, majority this court. of legisla- attributing motives by visions implicitly relies on Durham 154 Justice relating to requirement the Although ture. Mortgage Denver in First statement our of commencement, of conclusion, than rather Associates, 600 Zundel & v. C.N. Investors poten- and could unusual proceedings is legal (Utah 1979), that a "court" P.2d in certain concerns tially raise constitutional parties by stipulations between not bound scenarios, not one this case is hypothetical judicial deter requiring of law points "when years in which thirteen had Gonzalez them. Op. 132. Durham involved."1 mination are adjudication and petition for a commence to However, in First Denver statement this Moreover, filing her after do so. failed to means) empow (whatever clearly does not obtain an attempt to made no petition, she deci novo a trial court's de er us to review trial limit. The the time adjudication within matters stipulation as to a to set aside sion an accelerated found that specifically court Rather, recognizes Denver First law. arranged Gonza- have been could schedule Supreme court-not trial that where a case This is not sought one. lez had with the discretion entrusted Court-is meeting the from prevented petitioner was between stipulation honor such whether to wholly beyond by events statutory deadline Indeed, in that further stated as we parties. Rather, from it is evident her control. case, stipulation involves issues whether recog- simply failed record that by their law, "[plarties are bound fact or limitation the time the nature of nize by the relieved therefrom stipulations unless a traditional as it functioned falsely assumed court, power to set which has [trial] satisfied that had been limitations statute of inadvertently into stipulation entered aside It is petition was filed. at the time Id.; also 73 see justifiable cause." or for rescue duty this court to the constitutional (1974) at 548 Stipulations Am.Jur.2d plain read the inability to their parties from ("It it is within recognized generally I affirm a statute. language of stip aside a facts to set particular of the court in view of the discretion decision court's relating to the conduct case. ulation of of this cause."). result, stipula As a pending of a Zim- Second, recognized as 1 53 be reversed will not set aside below tion correctly court opinion, the trial merman's dis abused its only if the trial court appeal Metro- motion to dismiss denied Gonzalez's of dis abuse The well-established cretion. Dur- Although Justice complaint. politan's requires us review cretion standard analysis of the standard undertakes ham trial of the discretion "presume motions relating contested of review the ree- unless properly exercised correctly fails to right, she intervene as of contrary." Goddard clearly ord shows standard of review reference 1984).2 Hickman, 534-35 appeal: brought to us on properly question in this action. standing to intervene import tan had scope confess that 1. I must appeal statement, did not Op. Justice Dur- But Gonzalez quoted in isolation 132. Durham to enter trial court any alleged of the aware, failure as I am me. So far ham, utterly escapes brought courts involve disputed standing before cases all findings had specific judicial requiring determination." "points of law stipula- approved the at the time it intervene Hence, passage would reading of this a literal tion, the trial indication nor is there disregard all everywhere to require courts all Rather, Gonzalez obligated do so. court was rendering a full-blown stipulations for the sake of to dismiss of her motion appeals later denial legal sound- of the independent determination With in intervention. parties' choices. ness motion, exten- received respect the court to that motion, oral heard briefing on Gonzalez's sive regard, states that Justice Durham In this findings and rul- of fact argument, Metropoli- and entered whether failed to consider trial court $55 Employing defrauding the correct damaging standard of a creditor is small.4 review, Hence, uphold ruling I would properly impose court's courts more strin gent entertaining applica to dismiss Metro standards when *12 case, politan's complaint. In this tions for in intervention divorce cases. carefully particular reviewed the facts denying 57 The reasons for intervention it and rendered a and circumstances before in manifestly apply most divorce cases do not opinion refusing reasoned to set aside the particular to the In facts of this case. this stipulation. legal It found there was a sound case, Metropolitan specifically alleged a Metropolitan's intervention and basis for that marriage petition. fraudulent basis for the meet Gonzalez had failed to her burden of intervention, Metropolitan In its why stipulation showing should be set purpose asserts that "Juanita Gonzalez's sole aside. filing petition attempt is to to a this create Finally, Metropoli relationship I hold that of husband and wife between right pur a tan has to intervene in this action. herself and Martin Briceno for the sole assertion, Contrary pose obtaining coverage to Justice Durham's insurance under a "analogous policy Metropolitan by case is not to cases where a third issued Martin Bri- to words, party attempts Metropolitan to intervene a divorce ac ceno." In other con Op. tion." Durham 134. a divorce ac tends that and Briceno had not tion, marriage relationship actually the status of the met the criteria of the unsolemnized (and personal legal marriage the attendant inter time statute of the fire and relationship) they actually they ests that attach to that have that did not believe met already been established. Because divorce the criteria. proven If this contention is correct, attempt retroactively constitutes such a fundamental alteration in to wife, legal a purpose the lives of husband and a the law establish a status for the sole justifiably presumes obtaining that a divoree will be insurance benefits would consti sought legitimate personal manipulation for reasons. In a tute fraud and state stat typically I sought good tervention divorce cases is ute. submit that where there is a ereditors who claim that their faith interests assertion that a to validate an implicated by disposition marriage are unsolemnized is filed for fraudulent spouses' purposes, principles governing permis financial assets. Such interventions they present statutory policies are disfavored because a sub sive and the confusing underlying stantial grant right risk the central issues statute parties' relating already-established party clearly right A intervention. has a Moreover, private relationship. brought the likeli of intervention in an action that was parties that to hood will seek a purpose defrauding part for sole that y,.5 primary purpose divorce for the sole ings specifically Metropoli- particular lawof treated vention in the circumstances of this standing properly supported tan's to intervene. There is no basis in case. To the extent there is a findings allegation parties relationship those careful and correct us to atirib- to a are at- status, ute tempting legal an abuse of discretion. alter their where that (and entails) privacy rights status the attendant primary argument 3. Gonzalez's her motion doubt, they attempting is in are the altera- by Metropolitan's was that she had been misled primary purpose tion for the sole or of deceit or believing poten- counsel into there were no other (and met), fraud the other criteria of rule 24 are tial bases in the insurance contract for right granted. of intervention should be More- correctly her claims. The trial court found that over, necessary we to the extent find it to craft right deny had reserved its cov- circumstances, particular rules to meet new erage provisions under other of the contract and may proper do so when the case arises. right had notified Gonzalez that it reserved the do so the outset. from 5. state, It is no answer as does Justice Dur- suggested argument It was at oral that annul- ham, Durham note Op. supra Metropoli- may litigate might present analogy its ments tan concerns in the context of a closer and could separate policy. be affected our decision Whether contract action on the insurance here. or not Metropolitan obviously adequate analogy, litigate, annulment is an it does not cannot in the policies governing separate dispute, alter fundamental inter- context of a contract a decision relevant, to locate counsel has failed Metropolitan is tioner's fact T58 Given petition, dispositive, authority relating perhaps even
alleging a fraudulent basis retroactive establishment court has petitioner's and because federal claim. This proceed marriage does unsolemnized advice to giving such no business estab- presumptions of the the same from provide represented by counsel. Nor can we divorce inherent legal status lished ques- a federal court when no such advice to action, applies special heightened burden no properly certified from that tions have been application intervention. 78-2-2(1) court. See Utah Code right regarding the Consequently, the issues by the tradition- governed of intervention *13 Rule of Civil Procedure of Utah al standards concurs 62 Chief Justice HOWE 24(a). opinion. dissenting RUSSON's Justice rule, the four tradi- According T59 T acted on this 63 Justice STEWART met. for intervention are requirements tional First, application opinion prior to his retirement. dispute no that the there is second, Metropolitan has a clear timely; payment fraudu- avoiding interest third, claims; peti- Gonzalez's lent insurance Metropolitan may impair that interest
tion opportunity to demon- not have the
does brought for petition has been strate that the 2000 UT fourth, purposes; no fraudulent Utah, Appellee, a clear interest than has Plaintiff other STATE of opportunity present evidence demon- v. petition is fraudu- strating that Gonzalez's BYBEE, Defendant Alexander James lent. Appellant. correctly trial dismissed 160 The failure to meet petition for Gonzalez's No. 980248. §Ann. 80-1- in Utah Code time limitation Supreme Court of Utah. 4.5; not abuse its discretion it did stipulation; request ignore her May Metropoli- correctly and it refused dismiss I would af- intervention. tan's grounds. court on all
firm the trial
{61 disap- express my I Finally, write to attempt apparent
proval of Durham's parties. one of the give legal advice to titled "Procedure on states her section
She "[allthough not discussed
Remand" that appeal, point
any party to this note disposition case on
may in the assist However, Op. 144. Durham
remand." nothing thereafter discusses issue she legal question this court any disputed
do likely to occur remand
believes James, district court. State (Utah 1991). Rather, provides she apparently exclu- advisory opinion that is factually dis-
sively to collateral and related proceedings in court. She does
tinct federal peti- apparent presumption that so under the petent jurisdiction. regarding that has been estab- marital status recognized by another court of com- lished and