*1 DIDIER, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross- W. OF GAIL MARRIAGE and Cross- DIDIER, Respondent-Appellant MARTIN W. Appellant, and Appellee. Division) (1st No. 1 — 99—2564 District
First Opinion 2000. filed December *2 TULLY, J., dissenting. Gigante, Gigante, Jenen, Wheeling, of Richard and Richard
Paul R. EC., Chicago, appellant. for (Andrea Friedlander, Yavitz, Lake, Yavitz, Chicago &
David B. Toback counsel), appellee. for opinion of the court: JUSTICE COHEN delivered the marriage, his petition After trial on wife’s dissolution (Martin) respondent appeals judgment Martin W. Didier *3 court erred County. court of Cook Martin asserts that the trial circuit (1) awarding nonmarital and classifying in certain (2) (Gail), awarding Martin and Gail A. Didier petitioner trial claiming that cross-appeals, maintenance. Gail inadequate (1) “whatsoever,” awarding Martin maintenance court erred (2) transferred into Martin’s busi- finding that certain funds that Gail (3) all loan, relieving and Martin of gift ness rather than a were part, part affirm in reverse obligations. child support We remand. 14, February were married on
Martin Didier ánd Gail Adreani Ryan, born Chicago, three children: couple Illinois. The had 22, 1982, Kari, April 1985. May 3, 1980; born born Kelly, May and Gail worked outside At the of their both Martin marriage, time first born stopped working their child was home. Gail when marriage, acquired substantial during 1980. Both before and income provided investment corporate partnership interests $600,000 $850,000 year. income used per Gail’s ranging from by a suc- including employed Martin. Martin was support family, and 1990. Martin’s between 1976 corporations cession different 256
highest for any given year during W-2 income period ap- proximately $35,000. As of Martin became self-employed.
The parties agreement were in as to several issues related to the dissolution and stipulated to the following facts before trial court:
A. Gail is a mother and part-time homemaker and works for Mc- Lane, Donald’s. Terri-Lyn Northbrook, Gail resides at 4161 Illinois, parties’ with the three children. Martin self-employed through
B. Integration Technologies, Inc. (ITI), a subchapter “S” corporation incorporated by Martin in 1990. Martin 3.743%, C. received as a family 5,600 or
shares, capital Terminal, Ltd., stock in Pier closely North held corporation. stock This is Martin’s nonmarital property and should assigned be to him. 3.743%, 5,600
D. Gail as a family shares, received from her or capital Terminal, stock in North Pier Ltd. This stock is Gail’s assigned should be to her. Terminal, stock, E. addition Pier Ltd., North Gail owns following corporate and partnership interests: % Shares Acquired Name Interest # of Date(s) National Terminals Norwood Norwood Norridge Adreani Farms Courts Adreani Buildings of Amber Development Corp. Builders, Plaza, (partnership) Inc. Woods, (partnership) Inc. Corp. Inc. [20] [20] [10] 19.091353 [10] n/a n/a 38,484.4 [20] [100] [100] 08-21-89 04-02-97 08-21-89 03-01-89 08-25-89 12-08-92 1983. — The parties E following during vehicles the mar- riage:
1. 1998 Explorer Ford
2. 1991 Explorer Ford
3. 1990 Ford Taurus
4. Toyota 4Runner
5. 1998 Saab 900. Gail is the for all of the titleholder aforementioned vehicles. The parties agreed whereby have entered into an order Gail has as- signed Martin, title of provided Ford Taurus to steps necessary all Martin takes to transfer title of said vehicle into State, Secretary agrees his name with the Illinois and *4 indemnify and Gail harmless with ownership hold and use of said vehicle. Lane, Title to Terri-Lyn
G. the residence located at 4161 North- (the brook, home), in Illinois Northbrook is held a land trust under Company. Trust Parkway Bank & agreement 8096 with No. trust trust under said interest is the owner 100%of beneficial Gail to be if is found stipulates that the residence agreement. Martin that he made asset, not make claims he will Gail’s nonmarital is the marital estate entitled for which marital contributions $430,000. property is stipulated of the value reimbursement. mortgage property. on the There has never been addition, following has assets In Gail H. A. Gail in the name of brokerage account 1. ABN-AMRO an Didier; name of in the checking savings accounts Bank and
2. La Salle Didier; Gail A. $5,000 policy; life insurance and
3. a fixtures, jewelry, furniture, furnishings, cloth- appliances, 4. all in home or in the Northbrook ing personal property other and possession. her of ITI. ITI on its balance of the stock shows
I. Martin owns 100% sheet, federal income tax corporation’s contained within $205,639. return, in the amount a “Loan from Shareholders” addition, following Martin has the assets:
J. checking savings in the name of accounts 1. La Salle Bank Didier; Martin W Didier; W in the name of Martin
2. a Charles Schwab IRA $25,000.00 policy; benefit life insurance 3. a MONY death fixtures, jewelry, cloth- furniture, furnishings, appliances, 4. all personal possession. in his ing and other attorney his is seek- neither he nor stipulated K. Martin has attorneys ing an award of fees Gail. lengthy and fact-intensive. appeal
The record before us on Rel- the facts. brevity, forego we an initial recitation of the interests of on direct as each of the issues will be we address evant facts discussed cross-appeal. I. of Marital Assets Classification the trial court’s classification Northbrook appeals and certain accounts home, partnership interests corporate Gail’s from those income received containing investment purportedly the classifica- We first consider as nonmarital assets. interests home. tion the Northbrook parties that, marriage after their
The record reflects Niles, “Washington Golf’ complex a condominium known lived units of the condominium testified that one Illinois. Gail (Adre- father, Raymond Adreani from her to her complex ani). building complex. developer responsible was the Adreani held in title to the condominium further testified that *5 only name and that Martin’s had name never been on the title. Martin testimony 1983, offered no contrary. to the In parties began the of construction the Northbrook home on lot by a owned Adreani in an- other of real 1984, his estate In developments. construction of the Northbrook home completed family and the moved in. There was conflicting testimony the degree as to of Martin’s involvement in the process. construction Although the trial specific court made no find- ings of fact on point, Gail testified that she her sold condominium proceeds and used the of the sale to finance the construction of the Northbrook home. Gail paid further testified that in 1986 she Adreani $29,870 the upon 1986, for lot which In the house was built. Adreani quitclaim transferring executed a deed title to the Northbrook home Parkway to the Bank and Trust Company as trustee Gail and named owner 100% of the beneficial land interest a trust. Gail testified Martin’s name had been never on the title to the Northbrook home. The Northbrook home a mortgage. never had Although Martin Gail, testified that he turned paychecks his over to Gail testified of expenses that all the household were paid from income. The trial court found that acquired “Gail Lane, at 4161 property Terri-Lyn by gift Northbrook from her father” assigned property to asGail her nonmarital asset. may “Before a dispose court of property upon dissolution of marriage, the property must be classified as either marital or non- marital. The trial [Citation.] court’s classification will not be disturbed appeal contrary unless it is weight to the manifest of the evidence.” (1999). Marriage Gurda, App. 304 Ill. 3d 1023-24 Under of (the Marriage Marriage Illinois and Dissolution of Act Dissolution Act) (750 (West 1998)), ILCS seq. et there is a rebuttable 5/101 presumption property acquired by spouse that all either after the date marriage of but entry judgment before the of dissolution is marital 5/503(b) (West regardless of property, how title is held. 750 ILCS 1998). presumption can only showing, by “The be overcome with a evidence, clear and convincing falls within one of the property statutory exceptions listed subsection [503] (a) [of the Dissolution claiming The party property Act]. [Citations.] that the is nonmarital has the proof. Any [Citation.] burden doubts as the nature of the property are of finding property resolved favor that the is marital.” Hegge, App. re 285 Ill. 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 1998). a presumption parent
“There is another a transfer a be presumed gift, presumption may child is to be a and that overcome convincing contrary.” clear and evidence to the re “In a Hagshenas, cases where deter subject be found to [is] at issue mination of nature are considered presumptions conflicting presumptions, to these weight of the evidence out, simple manifest cancel each other 3d at 186- Hagshenas, [Citations.]” is applied. standard by the out is, a child canceled presumption 87. “That marriage is acquired after conflicting that all presumption the is and, thus, court is free to determine the trial marital prop or nonmarital question the asset sue of whether Hagshenas, presumption.” erty without resort at 187. gift, pur
Therefore, presumption the benefit without burden at trial to establish it was Gail’s suant to statute “property she weight of the evidence that manifest 5/503(a)(2) gift from her father. 750 ILCS Lane” as a Terri-Lyn (West 1998).1 gratuitous transfer of voluntary “A is a make intent donee where the donor manifests an from donor to *6 the property the to absolutely irrevocably such a and and delivers gift (1993); In 112, 115 re Poliquin, App. In re 247 Ill. 3d donee.” Estate of (1986). of Agazim, App. 147 Ill. 3d 648-49 an situation: presents case at bar us with unusual two (Gail Adreani) conveyances separate two attempted individuals upon which it constructed. From residential home and the lot reading record, understanding of the trial apparent our of the the and Martin to parties court and the Adreani allowed Gail years in on land Northbrook. Two after construct house Adreani’s family lived during the time Gail and completed, house was which $29,870 (ostensibly, at house, paid in the Gail to Adreani the sum of of her from the of the nonmarital condo- part, proceeds least sale minium) that Adreani had only. for the lot The trial court concluded to deeding it rests the gifted by upon the house to Gail the land which District case to rule set forth in the recent Second 1Wedecline follow the (1998), Blunda, the court App. 299 Ill. 3d 855 which marriage, held, gift during [was] that “it the burden to a reference making parent party challenging present to evidence that the added.) Blunda, 299 Ill. (Emphasis intent.” transfer lacked donative conflicting presumptions ruling of the 866. This fails to consider the effect (as District case of in the earlier Second of marital set forth 186-87), negate the otherwise Hagshenas, 3d at which is proof. presumed the burden of We parent, donative intent of the and reverses conflicting involving these approach believe that the better in circumstances party claiming that presumptions require proponent, as the is nonmarital, gift by weight of the evi prove is the manifest the elements 5/503(b) (West 1998); Hegge, 3d at 141-42. dence. 750 ILCS
260 Bank
Parkway Company and Trust as trustee of a land trust and naming Gail as 100% owner of the beneficial interest. The trial court ruled predicated conclusion, on that and the parties’ briefs this ap- peal were consistent with this scenario.
Upon however, analysis, neatly the matter is not so resolved. The general rule derived from real property law is that “buildings and other structures placed or affixed to the part soil become of the land belong to its 41 Improvements § owner.” Am. Jur. (1977). L. § Ill. & Prac. Improvements operat Had this rule been ing, Adreani would have title to the upon Northbrook home completion its as owner lot upon it which rests.
However, general “[a]n exception improvements rule that belong to the owner of the land is found in the well-established principle that a structure erected one man another, on the land of permission, part estate, his does not become a real but personal continues to be the property of the person who erected it.” added.) (1995). (Emphasis § Am. Jur. Improvements It is certain that permission Gail had her father’s to construct the North- brook home on his lot. “If improvement is made the owner’s permission, agreement an it shall remain the person making it implied, any in the absence of other facts or cir- showing cumstances a different intention ***.” 42 C.J.S. Improve- § ments order determine whether facts or circumstances in
the record reflect that Gail her father intended he own upon Northbrook home its completion, period the relevant for our consideration is that period encompassing the construction of the home. The record reflects that Gail built the home for her family, Martin, including and intended they primary use it as their resi certainly dence. Gail’s father was aware of and approved this use of fact, family his land. he allowed and her to live in the house years for two making any without claim of possession ownership or *7 prior deeding to the light land into trust on Gail’s In behalf. of the above, principles of real law set forth and after a careful record, the review of we have been unable to find factual basis to agreement defeat an implied between Gail and her she father that would retain ownership upon completion. of the Northbrook home its Considering conflicting respect the evidence with to Martin’s involve ment the construction process and with due deference to the role of it, the trial in assessing credibility court the witnesses before we that, find under these implied narrow circumstances based an father, agreement acquired Gail title between and her Gail sole to the upon completion. Northbrook home its himself. actions of Gail’s father in the support
Our decision finds built, he home was sold the Northbrook years after two county statement, state $29,870. closing A signed lot to Gail for testimony support own transfer declarations and Gail’s real estate her to sell in this transaction was purpose conclusion that her father’s quitclaim lot into trust via only. the lot Adreani then transferred deed. “proper the Northbrook trial court found that Gail received
The lot, gift as a home and ty,” interpret which as the Northbrook we that a However, elementary property “it is law from her father. may grantor convey title or interest the quitclaim deed will whatever inter given only time it such title and have in the land at the is added.) v. Mid-America (Emphasis Development Corp. Cree est.” (1997). already Co., We have Advertising held deed was executed Gail quitclaim the time the determined at Her father’s personal property. home as her title Northbrook Therefore, the land itself. remaining sole title interest was not only to transfer title to the land and quitclaim deed was effective possess. to cannot a title one does not quitclaim the house. One personal property, the house current state of title is that owns as to land Parkway Company and the Bank and Trust holds title upon trust, of 100% of the which it rests a land with Gail as owner that, beneficial interest.2 We therefore hold because Gail’s father never house, finding held title the trial court’s classifica on this tion house Gail’s nonmarital basis against weight of the manifest the evidence. gratu of a is must be
One the elements transfer 648-49. The record is clear that Agazim, quite itous. testimony gift. the lot was not a The record contains Gail’s own father, indicating her a purchased closing she the lot from statement $29,870 County purchase price of and Illinois and Cook real estate the house and the lot transfer declarations to that effect. Because both entry marriage but before the by Gail after the date were dissolution, they presumptively property. were judgment (West 1998). 5/503(b) that the house 750 ILCS order establish at trial lot it Gail’s burden and the were parties’ stipulation held under the land 2The title to the house is faulty from a stipulation A cannot cure the transfer title trust irrelevant. proper delivery under settlor Without the of title the trustee trustee. trust, satisfy required express elements of an the land Adreani failed Solomon, trust with to the house. Kurtz v.
262 by to show clear and convincing evidence that the funds to used construct the house and purchase exclusively the lot by were obtained one of the methods forth in the Marriage set Dissolution Act. In re of 5/503(a) 138,142 (West 1998). Hegge, (1996); 285 App. Ill. 3d 750 ILCS Despite testimony Gail’s that she both constructed the Northbrook home purchased and the lot with funds obtained from the sale of her condominium, nonmarital documentary the record testimony contains neither nor tracing
evidence those funds. court previously This has held that “[t]racing requires that the source of the be funds identi (1991). fied.” In re Marriage Davis, 215 Ill. App. 763, 3d 770 In of drafting Act, legislature strongly Dissolution favored the presumption setting of marital property, high a hurdle evidentiary for litigants attempting overcome the In presumption. Marriage See re (1981) Parr, 103 199, 3d App. Ill. 205 (stating that the Dissolution of Act “an express preference has for the of property classification as marital property”). We do not hold that a party’s testimony may never rise to convincing the level of clear and evidence on the of trac issue (2000) ing. Henke, 159, See In re Marriage Ill. App. 313 3d 168 of (holding testimony regarding outstanding that wife’s balance of mortgage entered into herself and her husband cost of construc tion of building husband’s nonmarital farm sufficiently was clear convincing to trace the of contribution the marital estate reimbursement). entitled marital estate to only We determine that, us, under the circumstances before of non- the bare assertion a particular marital of money, supporting source sum of without documentary records, such as deposit slips, evidence account canceled checks, etc., convincing. Henke, cannot be deemed clear and 313 Ill. 167; 3d In App. Marriage Kerman, re 492, 3d 500 App. of (1993); In re Marriage 809, (1992); Ill. Phillips, App. 229 3d 821 In Guntren, 1, (1986); re Ill. 3d re Marriage (1980). Scott, 85 Ill. App. carry Gail failed to her burden at trial. that, trust, have held an legal equitable “[i]n We Illinois land title real is held the trustee and ben the interest of the eficiary Mendelson, is re personal property.” Estate (West 1994). personal 765 ILCS As 430/1 may this beneficial interest either or be classified as subject equitable upon nonmarital is distribution dis (West 5/503(d) 1998); marriage. solution of 750 ILCS Frazier, 477-78 Gail failed to Because used to lot adequately purchase trace funds nonmarital source, acquired upon the beneficial interest she transfer the lot subject properly into a land trust is classified as a marital asset and distribution. equitable circumstances, the trial court’s that, hold under these Wetherefore Terri-Lyn Lane” Northbrook at 4131 “property classification weight of the against the manifest property Gail’s evidence. corporate classification of the trial court’s
We next address that Gail’s stipulated Martin property. her nonmarital interests as Terminal, Ltd., property. her nonmarital North Pier stock in the 20% interest the classification Gail’s also does not contest *9 this inter- acquired as Gail partnership Adreani as nonmarital Farms though acquired marriage. Even years parties’ est to the prior two during the Buildings partnership her 20% interest the Adreani prop- nonmarital that this interest Gail’s marriage, Martin concedes argues Martin however that erty based on a letter from her father. remaining her business interests Gail failed that she prove Inc., Woods, Development Corp., Courts of Amber Nor- Norridge Inc., Plaza, Inc., gifts nonmarital from Builders, wood Norwood her father. of assertion, finding Martin to the points of this support father, Adreani, engaged “pattern Raymond Gail’s
trial court that to his children. portions of of of his business interests endowment” above, Martin conflicting discussed Applying presumptions the rule of prove it at trial correctly states that was burden re that the elements of a with weight manifest of evidence at 186- spect Hagshenas, were met. to these interests delivery “A of gift requires proof 87. of donative intent and valid Schmidt, re subject matter.” In Ill. challenges sufficiency proof Martin of Gail’s father’s grounds Raymond testify on did not as to his donative intent that intent at trial. trial,
At Gail testified that the contested business interests gifts testimony were from her father. Martin offered no the con Adreani, brother, both trary. Susan Smith Bruce Gail’s sister gifts from their father and testified that Gail’s business interests were gifts. that all five of the Adreani children had each received identical the individ parties’ stipulation before the trial court that Also was Terminal, Ltd., ual to Gail and transfers the North Pier stock Martin, family.” As shown respectively, “gift[s] were from Gail’s record, all of the other stock transfers the stock certificates agree statement that the Although were to Gail alone. we with the determining intent is the donor’s “evidence most relevant in donative added) (In Simmons, re testimony” (emphasis own testimony is the (1991)), say we cannot that such court heard only relevant of donative intent. trial evidence testimony on this issue Gail and her siblings and was able to ex amine the form of the Terminal, Ltd., transfer of the North Pier stock in comparison of the other business interests. The trial court found testimony sufficiently witnesses’ credible and persuasive, the evidence supported “pattern the existence part endowment” of Gail’s father over the course of more than years “pattern and that this endowment” was sufficient to es tablish his donative intent with business interests is record, sue. After a say careful review of the we cannot find this ing against weight manifest of the evidence.
Finally, challenges the trial court’s classification of the following investment accounts as Gail’s property:
Name Amount $211,588.00 ABN-AMRO Account $249,246.00 La Salle Nat’l Bank Market Account Money 5,366.00 La Salle Nat’l Bank Money $ Market Account 25,546.00 La Salle Checking $ Nat’l Bank Account $491,746.00. TOTAL: The trial court found that these accounts were established with income from Gail’s nonmarital and awarded businesses them Gail. Martin challenges finding, claiming that Gail failed to trace the funds in *10 by these accounts clear and convincing receipt evidence from time of through trial, thereby failed to presumption overcome the of mar ital property. Based on failure to the presumption overcome of marital property, argues Martin these accounts should therefore 503(b) have been property classified marital default under section 5/503(b) (West 1998). of the Dissolution Act. ILCS 750 Gail did not re spond argument authority to in her position, this briefs. As for his Marriage In re Je of previous cites the decision this court of linek, Jelinek, (1993). 244 App. Ill. 3d In 496 we dealt the issue of with tracing the of acquisition certain stocks during husband Jelinek, marriage. App. 3d at 504-06. determined We analogous the husband in a because received these stocks manner (as replacement the issuance of a stock or a of split dividend premarital equity in a corporation), newly acquired diminished Jelinek, stocks 244 property. were also the husband’s nonmarital Ill. “[t]racing 3d at from the of App. Apart general 505. statement procedure property funds is a allows the court to find that which marital property which would otherwise fall within the definition of
265 statutory exceptions” one under of actually property nonmarital re 504), not with case is instructive (Jelinek, 244 3d at this App. Ill. of numbered Tracing acquisition before us. spect issue tracing the flow of cash. very a different proposition stocks is opinion, our earlier considered properties As with as Gail’s accounts classification of these of the trial court’s review con was this determination nonmarital is limited whether Marriage Gurda, re weight the evidence. In trary to the manifest of of (1999). the trial 1019, before 304 3d 1023-24 evidence App. Ill. testimony as to of Gail’s court with to these accounts consisted single monthly of and a balance state the nonmarital the funds source statements) (the beginning ap for each of the accounts ment no Although Martin offered ev proximately the time trial commenced. her the accounts were dispute idence to Gail’s assertion case law to do so. Illinois it was not his burden nonmarital 503(a) seeking exception holds that the the benefit of section party 503(b) in section of Dis to the of marital presumption Marriage Hegge, In re proof. bears the burden of solution Act of (1996). proof, of Gail 3d In order to meet burden App. Ill. of the funds required to trace the asserted nonmarital source is, to by clear, convincing and affirmative evidence—that the accounts X, Hegge, Y Z. among fungible dollars differentiate otherwise 143; Snow, Ill. Marriage App. Ill. 3d at re of (1980). Amato, 650-51 a recent trial provided While statements court the balance accounts, they clearly satisfy failed to the trac for each of the balance the funds. affirmatively identifying the source of ing requirement Davis, 763, 770 After careful re her burden record, find that failed to meet we Gail review source the funds convincing evidence as to the nonmarital clear that the trial classifica therefore hold court’s these accounts. We against the accounts as Gail’s tion these weight manifest of the evidence. ITI “Loan” to
II. finding that court’s challenges On the trial cross-appeal, 1992 and $231,500 ITI between that she transferred to the sum (for was not entitled estate which she 1995 was a as nonmarital designated repayment) “[Pjroperty rather than a loan. 503(a) may presumptively be in section still pursuant exceptions *11 of the affirmative act marital property transmuted into on the based contributing The doctrine is spouse. transmutation gift make a of contributing intended to spouse that the presumption property the marital Marriage Riech, estate.” In re of App. “The gift of a presumption transforming the may into be rebutted clear and convinc ing Riech, evidence that no was intended.” 3d at 311. We believe that finding the trial court was correct in its Gail failed to presumption rebut the of her transfer funds to ITI awas gift to the marital The estate. record of subsequent conduct respect with to the transfer supports finding gift. trial court’s of Although Gail testified that she considered the transfer of funds a loan, there conflicting testimony had as whether she ever repayment. discussed Martin the of requested with matter Gail no se curity Although whatsoever the transfer. familiarity she denied corporate loans, formalities with Gail sat on the board corporations. directors of ITI several neither authorized nor exe a promissory cuted note for the stated amount. funds car were ried on the corporate books a “loan shareholder,” par stipulated ties that Martin was the sole shareholder. an employee As ITI, with full access to the corporate accounts with full check- writing authority, Gail any neither authorized nor issued herself in repayment. checks No for repayment demands were made until the commencement of proceedings. light record, the dissolution of the say we cannot the trial court’s classification of the funds that Gail transferred to ITI aas to the marital estate rather than a loan against weight the manifest of the evidence.
III. and Child Support Maintenance On appeal, challenges direct the amount the trial court’s award of maintenance from insufficient. Gail as On cross- appeal, challenges the maintenance an award as excessive and abuse of argues discretion. Gail further on cross-appeal the trial relieving court abused its discretion Martin of child support obligations. light questions of our disposition case, not appeal. we need address these In re issues See Guerra, Rosen, 153 Ill. App. 3d (1984) (holding that because the issues support and child depend heavily upon apportion maintenance so reapportionment ment of marital a remand for of marital issues). property requires that the trial court readdress those IV Conclusion finding “property We reverse the of the trial court that the 4131 Terri-Lyn property; Lane” is Gail’s nonmarital we affirm the trial court’s business interests as nonmari- classification Gail’s tal we reverse the trial that the investment property; finding court’s *12 finding affirm the and we property, nonmarital are Gail’s accounts ITI were a transferred the funds that Gail the trial court that subject not than a loan and thus marital estate rather subject now of marital property the amount light reimbursement. to reconsider distribution, direct the trial court we further equitable the in with support accordance maintenance and child the issues of 5/504, 505 ILCS Act. 750 provisions Dissolution appropriate (West 1998). part in and reasons, in reverse part, affirm foregoing
For we the the views with proceedings further consistent remand the cause for expressed opinion. in this part; cause remanded. part
Affirmed in reversed EJ., McNULTY, concurs. TULLY,dissenting:
JUSTICE the majority. I The conclusion that respectfully dissent from the home, be declaring it to regarding the Northbrook majority reaches Didier, petitioner-appellee, just plain wrong. Gail property, marital is funds from Gail’s nonmari- testimony in noncontradicted stated that purchase the Northbrook tal condominium were used to property home is Gail’s finding The trial the Northbrook home. court’s discretion, and the trial court’s nonmarital is not an abuse of property is and reasonable and should be affirmed. conclusion fair Further, instance, kept separate apart property being in a the sole property from marital and held land trust with Gail 503(a)(2) prop indicates when beneficial owner the trust. Section mar exchange property acquired before the erty acquired is nonmarital riage, property. is be or classified as property known exchange prop for nonmarital acquired during marriage Eroperty nonmarital, property if is especially the new erty is also considered Smith, name alone. In re acquiring spouse’s held in the (West 1998). 5/503(a)(2) I would find that Ill. 2d 518 750 ILCS property has been convincing evidence that this there was clear and treated as nonmari has been viewed property, held as taxes, paid have been expenses, including and that all tal following investments, as the petitioner. As to the items of such account, ABN-AMRO, money Bank market La Salle National accounts: $491,746.00, account, I totaling checking Bank La Salle National of the investments that agree majority as to the classification with evi failure of sufficient majority property finds as marital due to concept general this from the dence. To differentiate marriage during the require would showing testimony donor, father, or some other evidence more than her bare appears statement. It that the finding trial court’s of Gail’s investments business as nonmarital against weight manifest of the evidence. I concur with majority. As issue maintenance and child support, agree I majority. ILLINOIS, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PLUMMER, Defendant-Appellant. JOHNNY (2nd Division) First District No. 1 — 98—1007 *13 Opinion filed December 2000.