*1 BRATCHER, Petitioner-Appellee, and In re MARRIAGE OF LELA ANN BRATCHER, Respondent-Appellant. DAVIDL. 4 — 07—0621
Fourth District No. Opinion Argued filed June March TURNER, J., specially concurring.
MYERSCOUGH,J., dissenting. Erwin, Cole, Ltd., (argued), James A. Martinkus Martinkus & of Cham- paign, appellant. (argued), and L. both of Thomson & Wein-
Alan I. Weintraub Gina Wood traub, Bloomington, appellee. of the court: opinion
JUSTICE COOK delivered the Bratcher, Petitioner, Bratcher, David L. respondent, Lela Ann and year they graduated school. were married in children, college They have two born in 1973 Neither has a education. 7, 2004, May petition and Lela filed a for dissolution of mar- 1976. On time, age. On riage. years were each 50 At that judgment entered a of dissolution November the trial court in his or her personal property each marriage, awarding property, marital with possession dividing equally remaining $1,634,000. Additionally, ordered receiving each about of 111 period month for a pay David to maintenance reverse and the award of maintenance. We appeals months. David remand.
I. BACKGROUND following findings. made the founded Bratcher Air Heating Conditioning in 1983. When business, opened for approximately Lela assisted seven capacities, including answering phones, billing, payroll, various hiring, decorating, training supplier, Lennox. Lela also grocery worked as a checker at a local store to obtain health-insurance *2 family. benefits for the Lela’s in the ceased in involvement workforce primary caregiver parties’ grand- when she became daughter a problems. who had number of health Air Heating Conditioning court found that Bratcher and $1,297,922. has a value of of figure That included a discount 20% for lack of marketability, finding essentially that business is a “one man show” in terms its management. “Dave Bratcher is Bratcher Heating admission, and Air Conditioning. By his own the business cannot run without him.”
The trial court awarded Lela the former marital residence and some The primary accounts. awarded asset Lela was a commercial on property $725,000. Fort Jesse Road valued at trial court also ordered David to make an equalizing lump-sum payment to Lela of $876,759. lump-sum payment, With the total award of marital property Lela, $34,682 deducting even after in credit-card debt that required pay, $1,634,449. was
David was Heating awarded Conditioning, Bratcher and Air residence, Street, a commercial property East on Pine and a number accounts, and he was charged dissipation payments he made to parties’ daughters $6,467. in the amount of After deduct- ing the lump-sum payment, the total award of marital $1,634,719. David was
Under order, the trial court’s monthly Lela will receive income of $14,000, approximately $8,193 consisting of rental on income the Fort $5,845 Jesse Road property and lump-sum interest at 8% on pay- ment, plus some perhaps income her anticipated from work as a real- tor. In ruling reconsider, on David’s motion to the trial court noted that the rental income on the Fort Jesse Road property “is less higher certain” than by David, $10,829. argued amount David will monthly receive income approximately $27,000, $9,013 consisting wages, dividends, $1,710 income $417 rental on the East Pine Street property, $21,900 other Heating income Bratcher and Air Conditioning, reduced payment. interest on the lump-sum If in, maintenance is factored monthly Lela will have income of monthly $14,500. David will have income maintenance, In awarding trial that in noted terms of type of income incomes, generate Lela would never personal produces. income virtue ‘equalize’ declinesto the Court “While beyond it look award, it find that can does of the maintenance additional, discretionary and allow basic needs of the amount income, of this duration with the in a As referenced consideration. available for the Court’s of income above, truly was into the business world venture joint effort.” concur Steigmann’s special from Justice quoted
The trial court also 839, 853, Hart, rence in In re J., concurring): specially (Steigmann, *** morally, financially. only partnership, not “Marriage is a with the petitioner to saddle inequitable upon dissolution It is respondent to earning potential and to allow her reduced burden of he reached advantageous position continue in the joint efforts.”
II. ANALYSIS great in a number of factual presented are “Maintenance issues Marriage Mayhall, simple analysis.” situations and resist 22, 25 “The trial court amount, duration of a propriety, to determine the has discretion will not reverse the trial court’s reviewing A maintenance award. *3 Mar of discretion.” In re absent an abuse maintenance determination 591, 595 Ill. 3d 801 N.E.2d App. 344 riage Reynard, of I). course, trial courts can do does not mean that Of that (Reynard important It that awarding maintenance. they please in whatever clarify control of and ability to maintain reviewing courts have some awards. underlying maintenance legal principles the Dissolution of Marriage Illinois enactment of the theWith (West 2006)) Act) (750 (Dissolution in seq. ILCS et Act 5/101 needs of the for the financial 1977, sought to legislature through rather than of through disposition spouses 768, at 24. The at 725 N.E.2d App. 3d Mayhall, for mainte Act made it easier the Dissolution 1993 amendments to right not the absolute awarded, maintenance is to nance be mainly be reserved and should marriage to a every party 768, 725 N.E.2d Ill. 3d at necessity. 311 Mayhall, circumstances of at 24. in In re in this case to those compare the facts interesting to
It is (1986), N.E.2d 659 Rubinstein, Ill. 495 145 Marriage of college and the graduating after were married where the his pursued the husband years while school for 10 taught then wife the husband commenced training. Shortly after medical education and
391 he practice, his medical filed for The Second dissolution remanded, stating, contributing spouse “[T]he District reversed and must receive some for the financial effort and compensation form of provided in support spouse expectation to student that where, here, prosper marital unit will in the future Harry filed completed part the suit divorce so soon after Helen her added.) bargain.” (Emphasis Rubinstein, of the Ill. App. Rubinstein, 495 N.E.2d at In that compensation could not be by assets, achieved division marital because the dissolution oc curred significant acquired. before assets were present
That is not in the acquired true case where the had several millions of dollars assets and Lela was awarded half of those *** assets. Lela “saddle[d] was not with the burden her reduced 745)— earning (Hart, potential” at totaling awarded assets than the of the more value business. true does, It is will never the income that David cases, but there is no need for Lela to In some the family work. busi may ness almost may constitute all of the assets and it necessary award that to the operator business and compensate business the other present maintenance. That is not true in the case where assets, Lela was awarded including lump-sum payment, gross. similar to maintenance Lela made years, contributions to the early business its but she has compensated been for those contributions.
In awarding maintenance,
court may
impairment
consider
earning capacity
to “devoting
having
due
time to
duties
domestic
or
foregone or delayed education, training, employment,
op
or career
(West 2006).
5/504(a)(4)
portunities due
the marriage.”
750 ILCS
The court
consider
also
“contributions and services
seeking
education,
maintenance to the
career
training,
or career
potential,
5/504(a)(10)
or license of the
spouse.”
other
750 ILCS
2006). In Mayhall,
were married after
school and
marriage
was dissolved 14
later. The wife maintained the
primary
household and was the
caretaker
two children.
affirmed an
We
award maintenance
the wife on
basis she had
disadvantaged
been
to her
husband
because of
delayed entry
her
into the workforce.
Mayhall,
at
however,
at
average-
involved
*4
assets,
income earners
no
with
not the situation here. Le
earning capacity
greater
la’s
would
be
if she
probably
had worked
continuously
the
the parties’ marriage,
outside
home after
but it would
have approached
“disadvantaged by
never
David’s. Lela was not
to”
David.
Equalization marriage, where disadvantaged has spouse been assets, both they have few many years, married for have been the other. earning more than spouse with one employed have been not Again, that is 725 N.E.2d at Mayhall, 311 income of these necessary It is not the situation here. enjoyed at the standard they may continue parties so that to make a sufficient assets marriage. This case involved during the distribution eliminated Lela, lump-sum substantial award parties. any inequality between in its award of maintenance. abused its discretion
The trial court marital its division of provided for Lela properly The trial court so, to do a division possible it is property. Where to an award preferable is provides for adequately certainty lump-sum advantage Lela has The fact in the future. be modified or terminated payment; it cannot is not a reason for some maintenance pay afford to that David could so. ordering him to do
III. CONCLUSION remand so in this case and the award of maintenance reverse We with the in accordance may reconsider its award that the trial court opinion. in this expressed views and remanded.
Reversed TURNER, concurring: specially JUSTICE light was excessive I find the maintenance award Since (750 504(a) Act ILCS of the Dissolution in section factors contained 5/504(a) its discretion 2004)), I trial court abused agree the and remand warranted. amount of maintenance determining the point. emphasize particular separately I write law, court bore a the trial plethora of case In with a accordance “ reasonable needs upon ‘the maintenance based duty to determine the standard in view of seeking maintenance ” Marriage Selinger, In re during marriage.’ (2004), quoting 611, 615, 814 N.E.2d Neither of Tietz, this well- it considered rulings demonstrates court’s letter of the trial fashioning its maintenance award. settled benchmark Af- Affairs Financial “Imputed petitioner submitted While maintenance, determining it in court considered fidavit” and relationship any the affidavit had failed to show at trial the evidence
393 to the living during Moreover, standard of established the even if accurately the affidavit represented petitioner’s needs in view standard of during marriage, established income from property rental petitioner awarded to would itself portion of the “needs” set forth in the Although affidavit. the rental property was not fully leased at the time hearing, trial court’s letter ruling on the motion to appears reconsider to es sentially disregard this valuable asset. I petitioner note herself testi fied it was important she parties’ receive the property commercial because the rental income from property “long- could offer her security.” Further, term recognized was majority opinion, petitioner also cash, received an award of presum which ably generate significant will additional income. See 383 App. Ill. 3d at MYERSCOUGH,
JUSTICE dissenting: I respectfully I dissent. would affirm court, the trial which did an exceptional job explaining its decision. The clearly did not abuse its discretion here. The court meticulously crafted a fair dissolution judgment. The majority creates magical new law and is second- guessing court, the trial which is inappropriate: course, “Of that does not mean that trial courts can do they please whatever in awarding It that reviewing courts have some ability to maintain control of and clarify legal principles underlying maintenance App. awards.” 383 Ill. 3d at 390. This trial court did not do pleased. whatever it The trial court followed the law and should be affirmed. The trial court’s award of maintenance and a settle ment in this high-income family does not constitute an abuse of discre tion.
The amount of a maintenance award lies within the sound discre
tion of
court,
and this court must not reverse that decision
unless it was an abuse of discretion.
351
Selinger,
App.
619,
Ill.
3d at
Section 504 of the 2004)) Dissolution Act ILCS 5/504 sets forth factors the trial court is to consider fashioning when maintenance award. In considering factors, the court is not required give them equal weight long “so as the balance struck by the court is reasonable under the circumstances.” In re Marriage of Miller, 231 Ill. 1349, 1353 “Although the trial court must consider all the statutory relevant fac tors, it specific need not make findings as to the reasons for its deci- 394 1004, Reynard, re sions.” In II). (Reynard
N.E.2d
its maintenance
improperly
the trial court
fashioned
argues
disposable net income.
attempt
award
requires
Act nor Illinois case law
“Neither
the Dissolution
I,
App. 3d at
Reynard
incomes.”
equalization
[disposable]
incomes
equalization
The trial court’s November ruling letter cor- The court’s initial considered the factors. “beyond the discretion to look it the court’s rectly stated was within additional, discretionary of the and allow basic needs with the amount of income, in of this duration a noted that The court consideration.” [c]ourt’s income available for the (2) education; (1) college not have a age and does Lela was (3) effort; while joint were a establishing the business years spent caregiver breadwinner, primary as Lela acted primary David acted (4) came to an in the workforce Lela’s involvement daughters; Olivia; granddaughter caregiver to their primary became end when she (5) support from David gets income but currently generates no Lela $5,400 the amount of per payment mortgage month and his (6) house; $9,000 month; on her expenses Lela estimates future at (7) hopes $20,000 Lela per year after reestablishing herself (8) business; the real-estate combining after David’s three financial affidavits, affairs monthly surplus $14,000 David has a of over even after paying monthly expenses Lela; on behalf of enjoyed good standard of living. The court noted that Lela will never produce Further, type produces. income David David’s exhibit ANos. and B fail to take into consideration the considerable tax deduc- tion he will receive for making in maintenance payments and the tax consequences Finally, to Lela. David in large part controls how much income he receives and will control how much rental income and, fact, Lela receives has indicated he intends to move the busi- ness from testified, awarded to Lela. As he he has left large profit amounts of in the business.
This couple
very
lived a
lifestyle. They enjoyed
nice
substantial
income. While David
primary breadwinner,
was the
Lela had a
part
helping
get
business started. She was the
primary caregiver to their children and later to their granddaughter.
Because of Lela’s
significant
sacrifices and
contributions
the family,
greater
has much
earning capacity than does Lela. “It is
inequitable upon dissolution
party
to saddle a
with the burden of her
reduced earning potential and to allow
the other
to continue in
advantageous
position he
reached
their joint efforts.”
Reynard I, 344 App.
Fourth District No. 4 — 07—0976 Rehearing Argued May Opinion denied filed June 2008. August Urbana, Webber, P.C., appel (argued), Beckett of Beckett & Chad S. lant. LLP, Thomas, Haughey, (argued), & Knipp Mamer
Denise Bates appellee. Champaign, for