In Re Marriage of Baumgartner
912 N.E.2d 783
Ill. App. Ct.
2009
Check Treatment

*1 under the Illinois interest at a rate of 5% prejudgment it is entitled to 2000)). (815 (West Interest Act ILCS 205/2 provides: Act

Section (5) per receive at the rate of five “Creditors shall be allowed to any moneys they become due on per annum for all after centum note, writing.” bond, bill, promissory or other instrument (West 2000). ILCS 205/2 prejudg- as to whether

We will reverse a trial court’s determination weight of against if the manifest only ment interest is warranted it is Chessick, 668 N.E.2d the evidence. v. Krantz interest, found: denying prejudgment the trial court facts, considering including “After all relevant the nature of genuine dispute declaratory judgment initiated action Federal’s paid pursuant and that Federal has defense costs to an earlier in ruling, court this court declines to exercise its discretion award- ing by Binney.” interest as claimed us,

Based on the record before no reason to disturb the we see finding. trial court’s

CONCLUSION part, part,

We affirm in reverse remand the cause proceedings consistent opinion. with our

Affirmed in part; part. reversed and remanded in GORDON, EJ., HALL, J., R. concur. BAUMGARTNER,Petitioner-Appellant, In re MARRIAGEOF SUSANLYNN BAUMGARTNER,Respondent-Appellee. and CRAIG (1st Division) First District No. 1—08—2820 Opinion July 20, filed

WOLFSON,J., dissenting. Kirk, Rockford, McGreevyWilliams,EC., appellant.

Richard B. of of for Glenview, Campbell, appellee. Julie L. of for HALL opinion JUSTICE delivered the of the court: (Susan), an petitioner, Lynn Baumgartner appeals The Susan from County terminating obligation order of the circuit court of the of Cook respondent, Craig Baumgartner (Craig), the to contribute to the son, Taylor expenses parties’ 20-year-old educational Maxwell (Max). below, Baumgartner explained reverse the For the reasons we court’s order. par- in Craig

The of Susan and was dissolved 1998. The (Max), child, Taylor Baumgartner who was 10 ties had one Maxwell judgment The for dissolu- years age of at the time of the dissolution. marriage provided pertinent part tion of in as follows: high responsible post shall be for

“2.16 CRAIG and SUSAN by ap- expenses provided educational for their child as school Marriage of plicable section of the Illinois and Dissolution ready expenses. Act in force when Max is to incur these CRAIG Florida Pre-Paid tuition and dorm shall continue to maintain the deposits currently valued at college account with combined obligation college expenses will be The Parties’ $4000.00. post high begins account when Max his reduced the value this education. school only obligation regard be condi-

2.17 The Parties’ this shall incurred, upon ability expenses to these when tioned ability to further his education.” the child’s desire and 11, 2008, judgment to amend the January Craig filed a motion On alleged graduated that Max had marriage. Craig for dissolution of age. On information high years from school and was now 20 belief, Craig alleged that Max had attended one or two further Max nor Community College, semesters at Oakton but that neither requested Susan had informed him of that fact or contribution payment expenses. toward those that, 11, 2008, Craig alleged January then as of Max was incarcer- projected ated in His release Department the Illinois of Corrections. 9, 2009, April parole April date was and his release from was conviction, Craig alleged then that as the result of his Max will be required register prohibited to as a sex offender and will be from be- ing in vicinity any public park public private or or school. On belief, alleged graduated information and he at the that Max bottom high failing poor his school class and marks enrolled received or while that, community college. Craig judgment in the since the maintained payment for dissolution of conditioned of educational expenses ability education, on Max’s desire and further his poor his performance unlikely academic and his incarceration made it that Max pursue any higher prior would form of education twenty- to his third birthday. response Craig’s her judgment, motion to amend the Susan

specifically Craig’s allegations denied perfor- as to Max’s academic high mance in community college. school and the She further denied Craig’s allegation that Max unlikely was to continue his education *3 past age 23. April 25, 2008,

On the circuit argument Craig’s court heard on motion. The court found that “the child’s full incarceration is a emancipation child; of that and any obligation therefore future on the part Baumgartner of Mr. pay college to is abated as time.” of this

Susan filed a Following motion for reconsideration. the denial of motion, her Susan appeal. filed this

ANALYSIS law, emancipation question “What constitutes an ais of but whether there has been an emancipation question is a of fact.” In re Marriage Walters, 1086, 1092, App. 238 Ill. 3d 604 432 N.E.2d of (1992). case, In this Craig’s obligation trial court terminated to contribute to Max’s expenses solely educational on the fact of Max’s considering incarceration without whether Max’s incarceration had Therefore, emancipating effect of him. appeal the sole issue on is recognizes whether Illinois self-emancipating incarceration as a event.

I. Standard of Review dispute Because there is no as to the fact of Max’s incarceration and presented law, the issue is one of we review this issue de novo. In (2008). W., 251, re Alaka Ill. App. 379 3d 884 N.E.2d 241 300

II. Discussion Marriage and Dissolution of Pursuant to section 513 of the Illinois (750 (West 2008)), may require Act ILCS a court Marriage 5/513 majority or her to contribute to parents of a child who has reached his expenses, provided the child is not otherwise the child’s educational 5/513(a)(2) (West 2008). may also 750 ILCS The court emancipated. expenses. terminating In an award terminate an award of educational factors that expenses, the court considers “all relevant (1) the financial necessary, including”: reasonable appear (2) the child parties; living the standard of would resources (3) dissolved; the child’s enjoyed had the not been have (4) resources; 750 performance. financial the child’s academic 5/513(b) (West 2008). ILCS emancipated when he or she attains

Generally, a child becomes 470, Donahoe, Ill. Marriage App. In 114 3d age majority. re recognizes enter- 475, age, Other than Illinois 448 N.E.2d 1030 act joining the armed forces as an of self- ing into or Walters, Donahoe, 114 Ill. at 475. In the court emancipation. App. 3d allow awards of educational specially held that section 513 does not emancipated by an event other than expenses where a child has been Walters, court held that a father had age. App. 238 Ill. 3d at 1092. The daughters they his if obligation pay college expenses no to for the Walters, App. Ill. 3d at emancipated through marriage. became Daniels, App. In In re 3d N.E.2d (1998), uphold the termination of a the court relied on Walters to daughter. expenses of his married obligation father’s education Daniels, 3d at 449. along mar- jurisdictions,

In incarceration is considered with other Gimlett v. military self-emancipation. as acts of See riage and service (1981) (court included Gimlett, P.2d 450 95 Wash. marriage, military service or among incarceration the events such as independence, sufficiency terminating the child’s economic economic however, declined general, the courts have causing emancipation). under the facts of emancipating find incarceration as an event CA—0270—SCT, Edmonds, cases. See Edmonds v. individual 2005— (son’s (Miss. 2006) did for life incarceration 935 So.2d 980 paid receiving funds from his mother emancipate him as he was still *4 account); Garver, P2d 471 v. 981 facility Garver into his correctional (son 1999) a likelihood he emancipated there was (Wyo. where Schwartz, v. 860 probation); Sutton placed released or on would be 1993) (while (Mo. could meet lengthy incarceration App. S.W.2d 833 in a child’s did not result felony conviction emancipation, the test control). parental and did not terminate lengthy incarceration parties establishing The that Illinois any authority have not cited incarceration, service, military considers addition to issue, emancipating touching an event. The one Illinois case on this In (1982) Winkle, 73, App. re Van 107 Ill. 3d 437 N.E.2d 358 (superceded by statute as stated in In re Ill. Marriage Hawking, 240 App. (1992)), 3d suggests opposite N.E.2d is true. Winkle, petitioned In Van the father support to terminate his child obligation solely on the basis that the minor parties’ son had been adjudicated delinquent juvenile a and committed to the division Department Custody of Corrections. and guardianship of the son were Department. transferred to the upholding petition, reviewing the denial of the termination agreed

court the trial public policy, with court that as a matter of “the placement of a minor child with the Department of Corrections does parents not relieve the duty support.” Winkle, of their Van App. 3d at 75. The case was remanded for the trial court to review child support award in view of the child’s decreased needs due to his Winkle, incarceration. Van App. 107 Ill. 3d at 75.

We find authority support no argument that Illinois would recognize incarceration self-emancipating as a event such as or military Therefore, service. the trial court erred it when ordered Craig’s obligation termination of to contribute to Max’s education expenses solely on the basis of Max’s incarceration. judgment

The of the circuit court is reversed.

Reversed. GORDON, EJ.,

R.E. concurs. WOLFSON,

JUSTICE dissenting: Max is not a minor. Nor is he delinquent. He a 22-year-old is adult. He was 20 when he was felony convicted of a and sentenced to years three in prison. judgment The provides order in this case that the obligation expenses Max’s educational is conditioned on “the ability child’s desire and to further his education.”

No concerning evidence Max’s ability desire and to further his education was by received the trial In my court. view the record reflects Max abandoned any pursuit higher of a education when he pled guilty involving to two felonies sexual abuse of a child.

An adult’s abandonment of emancipating education can be an event. See In Marriage re Alltop, 513(a)(2) Section vests the trial court with discretion in matters

concerning expenses incurred a nonminor. 750 ILCS 57513(a)(2)(West 2008). Here, the trial court exercised that discretion. *5 felony of a squarely holds conviction

It no Illinois decision is true previously ordered deprive cannot a nonminor can or emancipating events. specific statute set out expenses. Nor does the marriage was deciding a nonminor’s stop did the court from That Daniels, in In re legally emancipating event 3d 446 support judgment order in this case and the I believe the record I affirm. of discretion. would the trial court’s exercise ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE STATE OF THE PEOPLE OF BATTLE, Defendant-Appellant. RONALD (4th Division) 1—06—1263 District No. First July Opinion filed