In Re Marks
In this stepparent adoption case, Morgan Marks filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Michele Marks, the biological mother of ten-year-old G. M. M., and to adopt the girl. The Superior Court of Carroll County granted the petition after finding that Michele Marks had abandoned her daughter by failing to communicate with her in a meaningful and supportive manner and by failing to pay child support while she (the mother) was incarcerated. Michele Marks appeals, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. Because we find that there was insufficient clear and convincing evidence to show that Michele Marks’ failure to communicate with аnd support G. M. M. was without justifiable cause, or that the circumstances which caused G. M. M.’s deprivation were likely to continue, we reverse the court’s order terminating Michele Marks’ parental rights. In light of this ruling, the court’s grant of Morgan Marks’ petition to adopt G. M. M. is reversed by operation of law.
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights based on аn adoption petition, we construe the evidence favorably to the trial court’s ruling and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the biological parent’s rights to custody have been lost. We do not weigh the evidence or assess witness credibility, but defer to the trial court’s factual findings аnd affirm unless this standard is not met.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Johnson v. Taylor,
So viewed, the relevant evidence showed that Michele Marks (hereinafter, “the mother”) married Jeffrey Marks (“Marks”) in 1993, and their daughter, G. M. M., was born in July 1999. The couple divorced in June 2002, and the court granted custody of G. M. M. to Marks. The court granted the mother supervised visitation with the child and ordered her to pay Marks $40 per week for childcare сosts in lieu of child support. Instead of having the mother pay for childcare, however, Marks allowed the mother to watch G. M. M. on weekdays while he worked.
It is undisputed that both the mother and Marks used illegal drugs until 2002, when G. M. M. was three years old. Marks testified that he stopped using illegal drugs in 2002, but the mother continued to abuse drugs. Even though Marks knew about the mother’s drug abuse, he continued tо allow her to visit with G. M. M. from 2002 to 2004.
In January 2004, the mother was arrested and charged with trafficking in methamphetamine and other crimes. Two months later, Marks married Morgan Smith (hereinafter “the petitioner”). Marks subsequently filed a petition for modification of the mother’s visitation rights because he was concerned about the effect of the mother’s drug use and lifestyle on G. M. M. The trial court granted the modification in April 2004, suspending the mother’s visitation rights until she demonstrated that she was drug free for six consecutive months. The court also ordered her to pay at least $40 per week in child support.
In August 2005, the mother pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine,
Marks admitted, however, that he did not tell G. M. M. about all of thе cards and letters that her mother had sent to her because, in his opinion, “to tell [G. M. M.] that her mother is trying to come back in her life after she knows that her mother’s never been in her family is very detrimental to a nine-year-old, her stability and her mental thoughts.” He further testified that there was “no way” he would show her the cards and letters at this time because, in his opinion, it was not аn appropriate time to tell a nine-year-old girl that her mother had been trying to communicate with her when “the only thing she knows is the family that she has now,” meaning him, his wife (the petitioner), and their family. In addition, he admitted that, when G. M. M. asked him why her mother was not involved in her life, he told her that “her mother had problems with drugs and she chose a lifestyle, that lifestyle, over her.”
The evidеnce also shows that, at the time of the February 3, 2009 hearing on the adoption petition, the mother had been out of prison for only two weeks. The mother admitted that she had acted very foolishly and made very poor choices prior to her arrest, and she stated that she took full responsibility for her mistakes. It is undisputed that, during her three and a half years оf incarceration, the mother completed extensive occupational training, parenting classes, and several months of rehabilitation for substance abuse. Specifically, she became certified as a First Class firefighter, earned several other firefighting certifications, including training as a first responder, in first aid and CPR, and in accident victim extrication, assisted
Following the hearing on the adoption petition, the trial court granted the petition, finding that the mother had effectively abandoned G. M. M. by failing to communicate with her in a meaningful and supportive manner and by failing to pay child support while incarcerated. Although the court acknowledged that the mother had regularly sent three or four letters per month to the child during her incarceration and that Marks had withheld the letters in an exercise of “parental discretion,” it made no finding as to whether the mother’s failure to communicate with and support G. M. M. was without justifiable cause.
On appeal, the mother contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights and granting the petition for аdoption, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings. For the following reasons, we agree.
Generally, a stepparent may adopt his or her spouse’s child only if the biological parent whose rights will end with the adoption “voluntarily and in writing surrenders all of his [or her] rights to the child to [the stepparent] for the purpose of enabling [thе stepparent] to adopt the child.”
for a period of onе year or longer immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, without justifiable cause, has significantly failed: (1) To communicate or to make a bona fide attempt to communicate with that child in a meaningful, supportive, parental manner; or (2) To provide for the care and support of that child as required by law or judicial decreet.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
If the petitioner meets that burden of proof and the court finds that one of the above situations exists, then the court must also determine whether the proposed adoption is in the best interest of the child.
[a] court is nоt allowed to terminate a parent’s natural right because it has determined that the child might have better financial, educational or even moral advantages elsewhere. Only under compelling circumstances found to exist by clear and convincing proof may a court sever the parent-child custodial relationship.
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.)
Blackburn v. Blackburn,
1.
There is insufficient clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that the mother abandoned G. M. M. under
2.
There is insufficient clеar and convincing evidence to support an adoption under either subsection of
(a) As noted above, when a biological parent refuses to surrender his or her parental rights, an adoption is still authorized under
[T]he words “without justifiable cause” as used in [OCGA]§ 19-8-10 (b) are constitutionally significant[ 2 ] The Due Process Clause gives a parent substantial protection of his or her parental rights requiring that clear and convincing evidence of unfitness be shown before a natural parent’s rights in his child may be terminated.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.)
Smallwood v. Davis,
In the instant case, pretermitting whether there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother lacked justifiable cause for her failure to сommunicate with G. M. M. in a meaningful, supportive, parental manner before she was incarcerated and during the first few months of her incarceration, the evidence clearly showed that the mother had regularly sent cards and letters to her daughter for at least two years prior to the filing of the adoption petition. Her efforts to communicate with G. M. M. were thwarted, however, by Marks, who unilaterally decided that allowing the child to read the letters from her mother was not in the child’s best interest.
Under these circumstances, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the mother’s failure to communicate with the child for the requisite statutory period was without justifiable cause. See
McCollum v. Jones,
(b) Similarly, an adoption is not authorized under
Justifiable cause for the failure to pay child support may be found in situations where the parent has been unable to earn income due to incarceration, mental illness, mental incapacity, hospitalization, or other circumstances beyond [his or her] control. Each case must bе decided on its own circumstances. . . . [incarceration does not per se give rise to justifiable cause for failure to pay support[;] rather it is simply one factor to be considered.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
McCollum v. Jones,
Although the mother does not dispute that she failed to pay child support during her incarceration, she also testified that she was not able to earn any income while incarcerated. The petitioner failed to present any evidence to the contrary. In fact, the petitioner failed to present any evidence of the mother’s financial condition during her incarceration. Thus, the petitioner did not meet her burden of showing that the mother’s failure to support G. M. M. was without justifiable cause. In addition, the triаl court failed to make any written findings as to whether the mother’s failure to support G. M. M. was without justifiable cause.
Consequently, for the same reasons outlined in the previous subdivision, the court erred in terminating the mother’s rights and granting the adoption under
3.
To the extеnt that the trial court’s order could be read to imply that the adoption was authorized under a separate provision,
In this case, pretermitting whether the court was authorized to grant the adoption petition based upon
Judgment reversed.
Notes
The petitioner filed the adoption petition on August 25, 2008. Therefore, for the purposes of
See
Thorne v. Padgett,
See footnote 1, supra.
The record shows that the petitioner did not specifically cite to either